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This essay argues that the application of democratic theory to the reserve powers, which developed before the emergence of responsible government, has led to ambiguity surrounding the role of head of state in Canada. These powers emerged in a pre-democratic time of conflict between the king and Parliament, and during the years of democratization were not transferred to the elected officials in the executive branch. The decline in the legitimacy of the queen and her governors has meant that these powers have become increasingly susceptible to influence by prime ministers acting unilaterally and alone. The essay suggests that the normative model of responsibie parliamentary government can be obtained by simply having the Canadian governor general issue written decisions and, in the event the powers are misused, by Parliament placing limits on the powers. Cet article fait valoir que l'application de la theorie democratique aux pouvoirs de reserve, qui se sont developpes avant l'emergence d'un gouvernement responsable, a rendu le role du chef de l'Etat au Canada un peu ambigu. Ces pouvoirs ont vu le jour au cours d'une periode predemocratique de conflits entre le roi et le parlement et ils n'ont pas ete transferes aux representants elus de l'organe executif durant les annees de democratisation. Le declin de la legitimite de la reine et de ses gouverneurs a fait que ces pouvoirs sont devenus de plus en plus susceptibles d'etre influences par les premiers ministres, qui agissent unilateralement et sans consulter personne. Le present article propose un modele normatif de gouvernement parlementaire responsable qui ferait rendre en faisant rendre des decisions ecrites par ou la gouverneure generale du Canada et, en cas d'abus, par le parlement en limitant les pouvoirs.

How do party size and ideology matter for executive-level representation in parliamentary systems? This paper attempts to answer this question by providing and analyzing comparative data on 105 parties across 16 advanced parliamentary democracies. The electoral performance of each party is assessed, alongside the extent of each party's legislative and executive representation over time, from roughly 1945 to 1995. Two main conclusions are derived from the analysis. First, concerning party size, larger parties tend to be overrepresented in government-level institutions while for smaller parties the evidence is mixed, since almost half of the smaller parties in the data set have never achieved executive-level representation. Second, concerning party ideology, center parties have been largely overrepresented in executive institutions while left-wing parties have been the most systematically underrepresented in the 16 countries. ?Que tanto importan el tamano del partido y su ideologia para la representacion a nivel ejecutivo en los sistemas parlamentarios? Este articulo trata de responder esta pregunta al proveer y analizar informacion comparativa de 105 partidos a traves de 16 democracias parlamentarias avanzadas. La actuacion de cada partido es evaluada junto al grado de la representacion legislativa y ejecutiva a traves del tiempo, aproximadamente desde 1945 hasta 1995. Dos conclusiones principales se derivan del anlisis. Primero, en relacion al tamano del partido, los partidos grandes tienden a ser sobre-representados en las instituciones al nivel del gobierno mientras que para partidos ms pequenos la evidencia es mixta, ya que casi la mitad de los pequenos partidos en el conjunto de datos nunca han logrado representacion a nivel ejecutivo. Segundo, en relacion a la ideologia, los partidos de centro han sido mayormente sobre-representados en las instituciones del ejecutivo mientras que los partidos de izquierda han sido los ms sistemticamente sub-representados en los 16 paises., The central purpose of this article is to assess how certain conditions, specifically party size and ideology, influence the likelihood that parties will be included in government-level institutions in parliamentary [...]

The parliamentary decline thesis, which overstates the dominance of the executive, is examined with particular reference to Australia and New Zealand. The existence of a reforming parliament in UK during 2001-2005 in which an executive with a majority of 166 was forced to acquiesce in the introduction of a raft of reform measures in the House of Commons, UK, that were designed to shift the balance of power is suggested by drawing upon an audit of parliamentary modernization in Britain since the election of New Labor in 1997.

The ideas of a UK core executive and the reforms that have taken place in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Cabinet Office (CO) are reviewed. The effects of the Blair government on the Centre and the parliamentary changes are highlighted.

The Japanese as well as the others support the idea of parliamentary disorder, which is the majority's treatment of the minority. Japan's cultural emphasis and the problems of the majority rule over the minority are highlighted.

The parliamentary form of government is mentioned and the extents to which the regimes vary in the postwar advanced industrial democracies are examined. The scope of the postwar parliamentary system of the advanced industrial democracies is limited thus allowing a comprehensive analysis of the varieties of parliamentary government.

The existing historiography of Germany's parliamentarization is examined. The prevailing exceptionalist interpretation is also reassessed.

Liberals were the revolution's most fundamental and consistent opponents. The study examines that the new government had no ready-made legislative program, no plan of action.

The creation of the Provisional Government in March 1917 was the result of political compromise among various forces that had taken part in the February Revolution. On 20 March, the Provincial Government decreed the creation of a Judicial Advisory Board whose responsibilities included issues of public law arising in connection with the establishment of a new government order.

The state Duma's entire history represented an unsuccessful attempt to inject western parliamentarism into the realities of early twentieth-century Russia. The private Duma sessions had also recognized their inability to affect the national situation and to defend their right to exist.