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he article is devoted to the early elections held in Serbia on December 17, 2023 – parlia- mentary, metropolitan and partly local. The main motive for their early holding: the desire to confirm the legitimacy of power after mass protests of the opposition, also to demonstrate its political impo- tence, and simultaneously buy time on the foreign policy stage to reduce pressure from Washington and Brussels. The outcome of the election was another victory for President A. Vučič and ruling Ser- bian Progressive Party. She was not a mystery to observers or participants beforehand. You could only argue about the account. But in the capital, the opposition had good chances, and this was con- firmed. The voting results were considered and an assessment was given of the opposition demon- strations after the elections, as well as the degree and nature of involvement in these events of Brus- sels and Washington. The reasons for the persistent invincibility of the ruling «progressives», the partial strengthening of the pro-Western «democratic» opposition and the unexpected success of the new populist movement «We are a voice from the people» have been revealed. The logic of political behavior and the relationship between foreign and political balancing of the President of Serbia were analyzed. It was concluded that A. Vučič mainly achieved his goals and retained such a struc- ture of power that provides him with a central role in Serbian politics, as well as free hands in fur- ther orientation in the international arena. It will not be unambiguous and straightforward in any case. But his room for maneuver has narrowed, and the direction of drift will be determined by the balance of power in the confrontation between West and East.

This article examines the protracted and controversial process of government formation in Montenegro in the aftermath of the presidential (19.03–02.04.2023) and early parliamentary elections (11.06.2023), although their results had already indicated who won, who lost. The problems revealed during the negotiations between the candidates for participation in power, which clearly characterize the mores of the subjects of the political scene of the country and the prospects of the new cabinet, are analyzed. Its structure and program are considered. The balance of power in the parliament is correlated with the sentiments of citizens revealed by polls. The forecast of Montenegro’s foreign policy orientation under the new government and the likelihood of its early admission to the EU are given. It was stated that normalization of relations with Serbia is possible, but in any case, no change in the general anti-Russian vector of foreign policy should be expected.

The article examines two parameters of the subject stated: policies of the state governments of South-Eastern Europe in view of the new developments in Ukraine, widespread attitudes, and the configuration of political forces in these countries which may provide a chance to pro-Russian circles. An analysis is based on both national and international opinion polls and the results of the last elections. As is shown, the traditionally strong Russophile sentiments in many countries of the region have reverberated again and affected the perception of the conflict. However, the potential of the pro-Russian forces is insufficient for a fundamental change in policies although the ruling circles cannot completely ignore it. The article concludes that the status and prospects of Russian cooperation with the countries of the region will remain unfavorable until the end of military operation in Ukraine, although the EU and the US are unlikely to succeed in achieving complete abandonment of Russian energy sources in a short time.

The article discusses the prerequisites and results of the presidential (19.03 – 02.04.2023) and early parliamentary elections (11.06.2023) in Montenegro. It analyses the dispositions of the electorate in view of the polls data and the election results. The results of the vote are interpreted: the defeat of the long-term ruler of the country M. Djukanovic in the struggle for the post of the head of the state and the loss of his party’s dominant position in the Assembly. An explanation is given of the reasons for the resounding success of the newly created movement «Europe Now!» and the preservation of relatively strong positions by the Democratic Party of Socialists. Suggestions have been made about the possible composition of the new ruling coalition and government. The forecast is given of the foreign policy orientation of the future cabinet and the prospects of Montenegro’s early admission to the EU. It is stated that in any development no change in the general anti-Russian vector of foreign policy is expected.

The article discusses the prerequisites and results of the fifth elections to the People’s Assembly called during the two year period and held on April 2, 2023 It analyses the dispositions of the electorate in view of the Eurobarometer polls data and the election results. The past vote, despite some changes in the party structure of the People’s Assembly, testified once again to the deep disappointment of the weary Bulgarian voter in the entire political class. At the same time, it has recreated the stalemate in Parliament. The leaders of the warring majority camps (GERB-SDS vs «We Continue the changes» – «Democratic Bulgaria») already fear of being branded as the culprits of a new failure leading to appointment of one more temporary technocratic government by the president and the next snap elections. Such a prospect does not bode well for them, while their coalition is potential of seriously damaging their reputation. In such circumstances, the fighting forces are trying to find a magic formula for formation of a coalition cabinet. The near future will show whether the instinct of self-preservation will work or selfish party interests will prevail followed by déjà vu. However, in any development no change in the general anti-Russian vector of Bulgarian foreign policy is expected.

The article deals with the parliamentary elections held in Slovenia on April 24, 2022. The extremely high voter turnout and the result of the voting would appear unprecedented in the political history of the country. A crushing victory (with an unusually high score: 41 mandates out of 90 in the State Assembly) was won by the new «Freedom Movement» created shortly before the elections and led by Robert Golob. However, a more in–depth analysis leads to a different conclusion: what happened is nothing else but déjà vu. This is the fourth time that Slovenian society has expressed its distrust of the political class and traditional parties, pinning all its hopes on the next messiah called upon to miraculously solve all problems. The election held is reviewed in terms of its outcome and the balance of power inside and outside the parliament. The result is also scanned in view of the present developments in Ukraine and Slovenia’s relationship with Russia. The Slovenian electorate’s attitude regarding the party structure is examined, and prospects of Robert Golob’s new cabinet are also assessed. It is concluded that the new government is able to change the situation in the country and make its policy more predictable. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to be able to disrupt the wellestablished algorithm of the Slovenian political system’s performance, especially at the times of extremely high turbulence in the international arena, to which small states are particularly sensitive.

This article deals with the general elections (presidential, parliamentary and partly local) held in Serbia on April 3, 2022 The main motive for the snap National Assembly elections was the intention to get the Parliament legitimized, since the existent body with no opposition discredited the country and its head applying for admission into the EU. The outcome of the elections – another win of President Alexandar Vučić and his ruling Serbian Progressive Party – was not a secret from the start for either observers or participants. The only thing to argue about was the score. However, the developments in Ukraine have made their own adjustments to the calculations of both the authorities and their opponents, and the results of voting along with their perception by winners and losers. The article also addresses the reasons for the persistent invincibility of the ruling «progressists», the long-term failures of the pro-Western «democratic» opposition and the unexpected success of the pro-Russian right-wing nationalist blocs, which previously miserably dragged out on the political margins. The mood of the Serbian electorate in relation to the party structure is also the object of special consideration. The logic of political behavior and the relationship between the external and internal political balancing of the President of Serbia are analyzed. An explanation of his seemingly strange post-election move is suggested: taking a time-out in the formation of the government, he took a step towards the defeated «democrats». It is concluded that A. Vučić is aiming at structuring the government in a way that will preserve both his central role in Serbian politics and free hand in further adaptation on the international arena, which in any case will not be single valued and straightforward. The general vector of the drift will be determined by the balance of forces in the confrontation between the West and the East at present at its climax.

The topic of the article is the 2021 elections to the municipal bodies of Kosovo and Northern Macedonia. Although usually of little attention, in the present case they went beyond local importance calling into question the stability of the governments. Backing from the protest vote the ruling parties in both states were dependent upon turned out to have had a limited shelf life during the socio-economic crisis caused by the pandemic, which their long-time opponents have effectively used. This even prejudged the extremely negative outcome for those who are currently at the helm. In neighboring Bulgaria, too, the strength of the new government began to cause increasing doubts due to discrepancies between the president and the prime minister, seemingly political associates. The enhanced cooperation between Sofia and Skopje has raised hopes for an early compromise in their long-standing dispute related to the problems of Macedonian identity, language and their common history. However, this development runs the risks of becoming a hostage or a victim of internal political strife in neighboring countries. In such a case Brussels and Washington that have urgently pressed for the lifting of the Bulgarian veto on the start of talks for accession of North Macedonia to the EU, will once again find themselves in the unenviable position of «the tail wagging the dog!».

The article analyzes the preconditions, course and outcome of this year third consecutive elections to the National Assembly (14th November) and of the Head of State (14th November to 11th November). The epilogue of the protracted political crisis caused by the inflexibility of the leadership of the new «protest parties» (ETN, DB and «Stand Up Bulgaria...») resulted in their loss of both people’s trust and a significant number of parliamentary seats. The «We continue the change» movement hastily put together by two Harvard graduates Kiril Petkov and Asen Vasilev, both former ministers of the interim cabinet who proved themselves sensible managers, turned out to be able to respond to surviving hopes of the electorate for changes for the better. They were backed both by the President and external partners (Washington and Brussels). The President’s upright behavior in a complex situation ensured his re-election for a second term thus demonstrating obvious superiority over his main electoral contender. Based on the tough lessons learned by the hapless former leaders of the protest, the new movement changed the course of action, and Petkov managed to form a coalition government with the participation of socialists, although the same could have been achieved immediately after the first elections. The rather diverse new cabinet faces difficult tasks of tackling the pandemic in a country with a majority actively advocating against vaccination, of putting an end to the corrupt practices of the former regime whose members still retain strong political positions, and of starting economic and social recovery. These challenges do not promise an easy or a long life to the government. The general conclusion that can be drawn from the recent developments is that brought to power on the tide of a mass protest political amateurs might be able to play the role of a battering ram against a rotten regime but they turn out to be less competent in effectively exercising their authority. It remains only to believe that the government that has got to work will be able to prove the opposite.