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Josip Broz scelse il comunismo come la via per la propria ascensione sociale e seppe sopravvivere alle purghe per diventare Tito, il leader dei partigiani jugoslavi e il miglior discepolo di Stalin. Le sue ambizioni territoriali lo portarono alla rottura con Stalin nel 1948 e lo spinsero a cercare di riformare il regime comunista jugoslavo. L’autogestione come versione jugoslava del socialismo e la creazione j del movimento di non allineati creò l’immagine di Tito come leader riformista. La sua ingegnosità a rinnovare il regime per assicurare la propria longevità non aveva come obiettivo di cambiarne la natura dittatoriale perché solo questa era in grado di assicurare che il suo potere rimanesse indiscusso. In questa ottica scelse di attuare le riforme politiche ed economiche rendendo possibile e accettando fondi provenienti dai Paesi capitalisti, solo fino a quando questi non avessero messo in pericolo la sua posizione personale.

Josip Broz, futur maréchal de la Yougoslavie communiste et père fon dateur du mouvement des non-alignés, naît fils d’un paysan croate ; son rêve d’enfance fut de devenir garçon de café. Le désenchantement face à sa profession rêvée arriva vite et mena Broz vers le métier de serrurier mécanicien, ce qui lui permit de faire un voyage de formation à travers différentes usines métallur giques de son Autriche-Hongrie natale. La Grande Guerre le porta d’abord sur le front serbe et ensuite sur le front russe, pour vivre la révolution d’Octobre comme un spectateur apeuré, cherchant un abri dans les steppes de l’Asie cen trale parmi les Kirghizes. De la Russie, devenu l’URSS, il revint au pays devenu entre-temps le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, avec son épouse russe mais sans aucune ardeur révolutionnaire. Il développa cette dernière brièvement en 1920 à Zagreb, mais la mise hors la loi du parti communiste l’éteignit im médiatement et Broz se réfugia de nouveau dans une pastorale paysanne, cette fois dans la campagne croate. Ce fut là, en 1923, qu’il trouva sa vocation com muniste, car il y prit conscience des limites de la vie paisible de père de famille dans la campagne croate. Il décida de s’engager dans la lutte non parce qu’il fut contraint de le faire à cause de sa condition matérielle, mais parce qu’il refusa d’accepter l’existence du « plafond de verre » social dans la société yougoslave. Pour le briser, après une brève tentative d’intégrer le principal parti politique croate, le Parti paysan croate, il se tourna vers le parti communiste, son choix de prédilection vu ses origines, son éducation ou l’absence de celle-ci et surtout son parcours personnel.

The White House, Washington, March 22, 1944 “Dear Bill (William Donovan), I understand that the matter of sending intelligence officers into the area controlled by Mihailovic’s forces has been in discussion between your people and State Department. The situation as it now stands is that with withdrawal of the British mission, including our liaison officers who were connected with the mission in the Mihailovic’s territory, we have no sources of intelligence whatever in a part of the Balkans which may become an important area at some stage of the war. I completely approve of the plan, which I understand you have proposed, and in which the State Department agrees that we should continue to obtain intelligence from that area, by sending in a new group only for that purpose. In order that there should be no misunderstanding, it should be made clear to the British that, in accordance with the established policy and practice, we intend to exercise this freedom of action for obtaining independent American secret intelligence.”1

L’alliance franco-serbe fut forgée lors des épreuves de la Grande Guerre dont notamment : lors de la crise du juillet-août 1914, lorsque le sou tien de la France à son allié russe fut décisif pour l’avenir de la Serbie ; lors de l’exode serbe en décembre 1915 et janvier 1916, quand l’action déterminée de la France permit d’abord le transfert de l’armée serbe et ensuite sa reconstitution à Corfou ; et lors de la création et surtout pendant le maintien du front de Sa lonique, grâce à des efforts incessants des gouvernements français. Le soutien et l’aide de la France, privés de toute ambition ou intérêt particuliers, permirent à la Serbie de sortir victorieuse de la Grande Guerre, une épreuve terrible, où elle vit disparaître un tiers de sa population.

Nikola Pašić, president of the Serbian government during the Great War, never opted for a Great Serbia as opposed to Yugoslavia. That was why he considered Italian demands, as expressed in the Treaty of Lon don, as more than perilous to Serbia’s and Yugoslav interests. In his mind the war had to be fought with the demise of Austria-Hungary as its main objective, and with its heritage as the main objective of Serbia’s war effort. To some extent his thinking corresponded to that of Italian Foreign Min ister, Sidney Sonnino, the architect of the territorial solutions set down in the Treaty of London. Both Pašić and Sonnino believed that the war effort would lose all meaning if the declining Austria-Hungary was replaced by a vigorous and threatening new neighbour, Italy and Yugoslavia respectively. The war turned out to be the unique opportunity for them to achieve not only their respective most ambitious national objectives but also, even more importantly, to impose strategic solutions necessary to ensure the defence of their enlarged respective states.

L’arrivée du général Franchet d’Espèrey à Salonique, en tant que commandant des troupes alliées sur le front d’Orient, en juin 1918 a créé les conditions pour que les armées alliées, menées par les divisions serbes et françaises, réussissent à percer la ligne du front le 15 septembre et obligent la Bulgarie à signer l’armistice le 29 septembre. La victoire alliée à Salonique fut à l’origine de la décision de l’État-Major allemand d’exiger la fin des hostilités vu que l’écroulement du front dans les Balkans avait rendu vains tous les efforts pour gagner la guerre. Or, le gouvernement de Georges Clemenceau se refusa d’exploiter les fruits de la victoire au-delà de ses retombés sur les affaires balkaniques. L’armistice avec l’Empire Ottoman et la libération de la Serbie furent ses objectifs principaux. La rentrée de la Roumanie dans la guerre fut, en revanche, l’objectif d’une portée plus grande, car à travers elle fut prévue de rétablir les contacts avec les forces anti-bolchéviques en Russie.

La guerre victorieuse de la Serbie et la dissolution de l’Autriche-Hongrie avaient permis l’union du Royaume du Pierre I avec les provinces orientales de la partie hongroise de l’Empire des Habsbourg. Or, avant que leur union fut acceptée par les Alliés, selon les termes de l’armistice à Villa Giusti, une administration temporaire est mise en place dans les régions du Banat, Bačka et Baranja, celles avec une population hongroise conséquente. Traité du Trianon entérine en juin 1920 l’intégration de la Croatie, de la Slavonie, de la Bosnie et Herzégovine, et de la Vojvodina au Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes. La minorité hongroise dans l’État yougoslave connut une évolution qui assura sa stabilité numérique ainsi que son essor culturel grâce au système d’éducation en langue hongroise de l’école primaire jusqu’à l’université.

Tout grand livre s’ordonne autour d’un questionnement fort. C’est le cas de l’ouvrage de Vojislav Pavlović qui s’interroge sur la validité de la vieille thèse selon laquelle la France aurait porté le « royaume des Serbes, des Croates et des Slovènes » sur les fonts baptismaux. Cette question en appelle une autre : la France est-elle entrée en guerre en août 1914 avec un projet yougoslave ou, à tout le moins, balkanique? Vojislav Pavlović montre bien qu’une stratégie balkanique lui fait alors défaut. La première phase des relations franco-serbes après le Congrès de Berlin se place sur le terrain financier. Mais Paris ne recourt pas immédiatement à l’arme financière à des fins politiques puisque ses banques présentes sur le marché serbe s’y allient avec des banques austro- hongroises. De même l’affaire de l’équipement militaire de la Serbie se traite dans une première phase en partenariat avec l’Allemagne et l’Autriche- Hongrie. C’est seulement en 1906 que ce partenariat cesse. Si la France s’engage peu à peu dans les Balkans et apporte ainsi son soutien diplomatique à la Serbie dans la crise de 1908/09, c’est par rapport à des considérations plus vastes. Le principal souci de la diplomatie française est alors de ne pas se séparer de la Russie. Ce souci de l’alliance russe la guide encore, avant tout autre calcul, tout au long de la crise de juillet 1914.

The explanations of the origins of Tito-Stalin split are to be found in the evolution of the CPY from 1937 onwards, and are intrinsically linked with the actions of Josip Broz, better known as Tito. He became a member of the Central Committee in 1934 and as such went to Moscow, only to inherit the actual leadership of the Party during the purges. He proved to be a true Stalin ist leader since he never questioned any instructions he got from Moscow. If anything, he showed himself to be overzealous. On several occasions, Georgi Dimitrov had to explain to him that there was no chance a social revolution could successfully be carried out in Yugoslavia before the War. The German attack on Yugoslavia did not incite Tito to act, but Hitler’s attack on the USSR did. Once they joined the war, Tito and the CPY started pursuing their own agenda – social revolution as a consequence of the victory in the Civil War they had waged against the Yugoslav King, the Royal Government, and their Minis ter of War in Yugoslavia – general Dragoljub, Draža, Mihailović. For Dimitrov and the Soviet authorities, Tito’s actions risked to provoke problems within the Allied coalition. Therefore he was reprimanded on several occasions, until the Partisan units under his command were recognized also by the Western Al lies. The Partisan Army, and the state institutions that were created during the war gave his movement enough potential to be at the forefront of the conflicts in Trieste and in Greece which heralded in the Cold War. The conflict with Stalin was provoked by the same tendency of Tito’s to advance his own inter ests without consulting Moscow. The causes of the conflict were not ideological since Yugoslavia was the most faithful disciple of the USSR. They were in fact geostrategic; the conflict was about the discipline within the Soviet bloc. The importance and solidity of Partisans and their institutions allowed Tito and the CPY to withstand the pressure of the Cominform countries.

La défaite italienne à Caporetto et la révolution bolchevique ont obligés les Alliés à modifier leurs buts de guerre, voire de tenter d'affaiblir le camp adverse par une paix séparée avec l'Autriche-Hongrie. Les Alliées anglo-saxons notamment voulaient ainsi prévenir la prolongation de la guerre, mais les différents pourparlers avec les représentants de la Double Monarchie n'ont pas aboutis car les Alliés voulaient une paix séparée et l'empereur Charles une paix générale. La France était résolument contre toute solution autre celle qui se soldera par une défaite de l'Allemagne et le retour de l'Alsace-Loraine au sein de la République. C'est pourquoi le gouvernement Clemenceau voulait affaiblir le camp adverse en y provoquant des troubles intérieures en apportant le soutien allié aux nationalités vivant dans l'Autriche-Hongrie. Les revendications nationales des Tchécoslovaques, des Polonais, et jusqu'au certain point, même des Yougoslaves ont été à partir du mai 1918 officiellement reconnues.

Pour examiner le processus de la création du concept des minorités dans les Bal kans, on s’appuie sur l’exemple de la Serbie tout au long de son développement national au XIXe siècle. Trois phases successives sont abordées, celles de la mi gration, intégration et assimilation. Ces étapes couvrent dans leur ensemble les aspects de l’action nationale, de la formation des institutions de l’État ainsi que de l’émergence de la conscience nationale en tant que facteur intégratif de la so ciété serbe.

L’Alliance atypique, entre la Principauté, puis le Royaume serbe et la Fran ce, a résisté à toute épreuve pendant le XIXe siècle pour être couronnée lors de l’effort commun dans les tranchées du front d’Orient. Au temps de la Grande guerre, l’alliance reste atypique, car elle reposait sur l’identité des valeurs et non sur les concessions politiques et territoriales. La Petite Entente, ainsi que le traité d’amitié de 1927, lui accordèrent finalement un cadre institutionnel.

The initial phase of the First World War in the Balkans 1914-1915 was a natural continuation of the conflicts opened during the Balkan Wars, but national fervor now encompassed all of the Balkans, from Rijeka and Ljubljana to Athens, Sofia and Bucharest, because the role of the Dual Monarchy had changed from that of an arbiter to that of a participant in the conflict. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the further survival of the Habsburg Monarchy was challenged by the Serbian government's Yugoslav project, creating conditions for implementing the nationality principle in all of the Balkans. It seemed that, in support of the alliances that were being created in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole, the time had come for the final fulfillment of the national aspirations of the Balkan peoples. The outcome of this third Balkan war no longer depended solely on the balance of power inside the Balkans, but also on the overall course of the war. After the initial victories in 1914, Serbia suffered a defeat in 1915 and her armies were forced to retreat southward to Albania and Greece, but her Yugoslav project was the foundation of her future policies and the basis for materializing the concept of a common South-Slavic state.

The French government and statesmen had never considered the creation of a unified South-Slav state as an objective of the Great War. Officially acquainted with the project through the Niš Declaration in December 1914 they remained silent on the issue, as it involved both the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and, following the Treaty of London in May 1915, an open conflict with Italy. In neither case, then, did French diplomacy deem it useful to trigger such a shift in the balance of power in Europe just to grant the wishes of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Naturally, in the spring of 1918 the dismantlement of Austria-Hungary was envisaged, but with the view to weakening the adversary camp, while the destiny of the Yugoslav provinces remained undecided. Moreover, war imperatives required extreme caution in relation to Italian intransigency. The Italian veto weighed heavily on French politics, to the extent that even the actual realization of the Yugoslav project, proclamation of a unified state on 1 December 1918 in Belgrade, took place without a consent or implicit support on the part of the French government.

The conflict between France and Italy in the Balkans in fact was an attempt at reorganizing the Balkans and Central Europe following the disappearance of the Habsburg and Romanoff. The two Latin powers now had a unique opportunity to dictate a rearrangement of the Balkans, but their positions were diametrically opposed. Italy sought to establish domination in the Adriatic and the Balkans, whereas France sought to reorganize the region with the view to precluding Germany from recovering its former influence. At the same time, after Wilson’s political defeat in the Senate in 1919 Italian guarantees of the French-German border became vitally important to France. A compromise between Paris and Rome turned out to be unfeasible for several reasons. Expansionism of both the last liberal governments and Mussolini met with resolute opposition from Belgrade. Moreover, Paris was convinced that Italian domination not only would not bring stability to the Balkans, but on the contrary, that it would shatter the region’s Little Entente-based inner cohesion and facilitate Germany’s comeback. Thus most of diplomatic initiatives coming from Paris and Rome were mutually neutralized while German economic influence in the region irresistibly grew from the early 1930s. The agreement Mussolini-Laval reconciled the two Latin powers but it was now in the new circumstances created by the rise of Nazi Germany as a dominant force in Central Europe and the Balkans.

Mineralne materije su neophodne za odvijanje bioloških funkcija i izgradnju tkiva biljaka, životinja i ljudi. Do sada je u živoj prirodi otkriveno ukupno 89 hemijskih elemenata, od koji su 27 esencijalni, a 16 ima značajnu ulogu u normalnim fiziološkim funkcijama organizma. Prirodni faktori životne sredine kao i različiti antropogeni zagađivači, utiču na funkcije reproduktivnog trakta i na kvalitet sperme životinja i ljudi. Termin „metali u tragovima“ podrazumeva koncentraciju u tkivima nižu od koncentracije gvozđa. Toksično dejstvo teških metala se zasniva na stimulaciji formiranja slobodnih radikala i reaktivnih kiseoničnih vrsta u organizmu što uzrokuje oksidativni stres i dovodi do lipidne peroksidacije membrane. Na taj način, oni mogu da izazovu oštećenja ćelija, poremećaje funkcija enzima ili genetskog materjala (DNK). U organizam se unose hranom, vodom ili dospevaju preko vazduha. Teški metali koji su toksični za spermu su Pb, Cd, Hg i Ni. Najmanje količine ovih elemenata oštećuju spermatozoide i dovode do smanjenja njihove pokretljivosti i broja. Oni negativno utiču na proces kapacitacije i akrozomsku reakciju, smanjuju aktivnost enzima koji učestvuju u odbrani od oksidativnog stresa i dovode do promena u tkivu testisa. Cilj naših istraživanja je bio određivanje koncentracija cinka, olova, žive i kadmijuma u hrani i vodi za priplodne bikove, vodi korišćenoj za izradu razređivača kao i u sadržaju otopljenih pajeta i analiza njihovog mogućeg uticaja na parametre kvaliteta sperme. Koncentracija spermatozoida i broj spermatozoida po dozi su bili u zadovoljavajućem opsegu kao i prosečne vrednosti procenta ukupno pokretljivih spermatozoida, ukupnog broja pokretljivih spermatozoida u dozi, procenta i broja progresivno pokretljivih spermatozoida i između grupa bikova nisu dokazane statistički značajne razlike u srednjim vrednostima. Prosečan broj brzih spermatozoida u dozi je bio manji u odnosu na standardne vrednosti u svim grupama bikova. Srednje prosečne vrednost, Minerals are necessary for maintaining biological functions and also are incorporated in plants, animals and human tissues. So far, presence of 89 chemical elements is documented in live organisms, and out of it, 27 are essential, while 16 plays significant role in normal physiological functions. Environmental factors and also antropogenic pollutants influence functions of the reproductive tract and quality of the human and animals semen. Term „trace elements“ is used for those with lower concentration than the iron has. Toxic effects of so called „heavy metals“, are based on their ability to stimulate free radicals and reactive oxygen species formation in the body. This leads to oxidative stress and membrane lipid peroxidation. By this mechanism, they can cause cells damage, enzyme dysfunction and DNK damage. These elements may reach live organisms by food, water and air. Toxic heavy metals are: Pb, Cd, Hg and Ni. Vary small amounts of theese metals in ejaculates can damage sperm cells lower their number and motility. They also exert negative effects on the capacitation process and acrosomal reaction, decrease activity of enzymes involved in antioxidative defense causing changes in testicular tissue. The aim of our investigations was to determine concentrations of zinc, lead, mercury and cadmium in feed and water for breeding bulls, water used for extender preparation and in the content of thawed straws and to analyse their possible influence on the semen quality parametrs. In the all examined samples of feed and water, concentrations of heavy metals were below the acceptable levels, as regulated by appropriate adapted roles and regulations. Sperm concentration and number of sperm cells in a dose were in the satisfactory range as were mean values of the total motile sperm cells, total number of motile cells in a dose and percent and number of cells showing progressive motility. Between groups no statistically significant differences were noted. Mean number of the f

Jednoćelijske alge Prototheca sp. su mikroorganizmi značajni za veterinarsku i humanu medicinu jer više vrsta navedenog roda ima patogeni potencijal i, koliko je danas poznato, to su jedine alge koje izazivaju infekcije životinja i ljudi. Mastitis goveda izazvan prototekama je najčešći oblik prototekoze među životinjama javlja se u vidu hroničnog subkliničkog ili umerenog kliničkog mastitisa. Prototekalni mastitis goveda u najvećem broju slučajeva izaziva vrsta P. zopfii i to genotip 2, a znatno ređe vrsta P. blaschkeae. Na teritoriji Srbije zabeleženi su slučajevi mastitisa rezistentnih na antibiotski tretman u kojima je kao uzročnik potvrđena alga P. zopfii, ali su dosadašnja istraživanja bila ograničenog obima i nisu obuhvatila molekularnogenetičku karakterizaciju uzročnika, tako da nije poznato koji je genotip P. zopfii bio u pitanju. Zbog toga je bilo opravdano da se u ovoj tezi ispita prevalencija mastitisa izazvanih sa P. zopfii na nekim ispitivanim farmam Srbiji i izvrši molekularnogenetička karakterizacija P. zopfii izolovanih u slučajevima kliničkog i subkliničkog mastitisa. Od ukupno 494 uzorka mleka krava obolelih od mastitisa izazvanim algom iz roda Prototheca, prototeka je izolovana iz 39 uzoraka, od toga 32 uzorka su iz mleka krava koje su obolele od subkliničkih mastitisa i 7 uzoraka je iz mleka krava sa znacima kliničkog mastitisa. 4. Ukupno izolovanih algi iz roda Prototheca bilo je 39, od toga Prototheca zopfii genotip 2 identifikovana je u 37 (94,8%) izolata i samo dva izolata su potvrđena kao (5,2%) Prototheca zopfii genotip 1. Ukupno 25 (64,11%) izolata P. zopfii je bilo osetljivo na nistatin, 16 (41,03%) izolata na streptomicin, 9 (23,07%) na kanamicin i 6 (15,38%) na gentamicin, na osnovu čega se nistatin i aminoglikozidni preparati mogu preporučiti u terapiji prototekalnog mastitisa u Republici Srbiji., Onecelled algae Prototheca sp. are Microorganisms important for veterinary and human medicine, because more than one species of said genus has pathogenic potential and how much is known today, these are the only algae that cause infections in animals and humans. Mastitis in cattle caused by Prototheca sp. a is the most common form of protothecosis among animals and it occurs in the form of chronic subclinical or moderate clinical mastitis. Protothecal bovine mastitis in most cases causes type P. zopfii, genotype 2, and much rarer type P. blaschkeae. In Serbia, there were cases of mastitis resistant to an antibiotic that has been caused by the algae P. zopfii, but previous studies were limited in scope and are not included molecular genetic characterization of the pathogen, so it is not known which genotype P. zopfii was concerned. Therefore it was justified that in this thesis we examine the prevalence of mastitis caused by P. zopfii tested on some farms in Serbia and to perform molecular genetic characterization of P. zopfii isolated in cases of clinical and subclinical mastitis. From a total of 494 samples of milk Prototheca sp. was isolated from 39 samples, of which 32 samples were from the milk of cows that are suffering from subclinical mastitis and 7 samples from the milk of cows with signs of clinical mastitis. Total isolated Prototheca sp. was 39, of which was identified 37 (94.8%) Prototheca zopfii genotype 2 and only two samples (5.2%) Prototheca zopfii genotype 1. A total of 25 (64.11%) of the P. zopfii isolates was sensitive to nystatin, 16 (41.03%) isolates was sensitive to streptomycin, 9 (23.07%) and kanamycin, and 6 (15.38%) was sensitive to gentamicin, based on these findings the aminoglycoside and nystatin preparations can be recommend for the treatment of protothecal mastitis in the Republic of Serbia.