Search

The objective of this study was to describe the developmental progression of counterfactual reasoning from childhood to adulthood. In contrast to the traditional view, it was recently reported by Rafetseder and colleagues that even a majority of 6-year-old children do not engage in counterfactual reasoning when asked counterfactual questions ("Child Development," 2010, Vol. 81, pp. 376-389). By continuing to use the same method, the main result of the current Study 1 was that performance of the 9- to 11-year-olds was comparable to that of the 6-year-olds, whereas the 12- to 14-year-olds approximated adult performance. Study 2, using an intuitively simpler task based on Harris and colleagues ("Cognition," 1996, Vol. 61, pp. 233-259), resulted in a similar conclusion, specifically that the ability to apply counterfactual reasoning is not fully developed in all children before 12 years of age. We conclude that children who failed our tasks seem to lack an understanding of what needs to be changed (events that are causally dependent on the counterfactual assumption) and what needs to be left unchanged and so needs to be kept as it actually happened. Alternative explanations, particularly executive functioning, are discussed in detail. (Contains 2 figures and 2 footnotes.)

Previous research yielded conflicting results about when children can accurately assess their epistemic states in different hiding tasks. In Experiment 1, ninety-two 3- to 7-year-olds were either shown which object was hidden inside a box, were totally ignorant about what it could be, or were presented with two objects one of which was being put inside (partial exposure). Even 3-year-olds could assess their epistemic states in the total ignorance and the complete knowledge task. However, only children older than 5 could assess their ignorance in the partial exposure task. In Experiment 2 with one hundred and one 3- to 7-year-olds, similar results were found for children under 5 years even when more objects were shown in partial exposure tasks. Implications for children's developing theory of knowledge are discussed. (Contains 2 tables and 1 figure.)

In a training study, the authors addressed whether or not preschoolers' difficulty with false belief is due to a domain-specific problem with mental states. Following Slaughter's (1998) design, 57 children who failed a false-belief (FB) pretest received two sessions of training on either an FB, false sign (FS), or control task. All children were then posttested on theory-of-mind, FS, and control tasks. Results showed the FB and FS tasks were not only empirically tested as equivalent but also potentially transferable (i.e., FB training enhanced FS posttest performance, and FS training contributed to the understanding of one's own false belief), suggesting that understanding of false beliefs is an ability of representational understanding that is not restricted to mental states. (Contains 1 footnote, 5 tables, and 1 figure.)

This study investigated at what point in development 3- to 6-year-old children begin to demonstrate counterfactual reasoning by controlling for fortuitously correct answers that result from basic conditional reasoning. "Basic conditional reasoning" occurs when one applies typical regularities (such as "If 'whenever' it doesn't rain the street is dry") to counterfactual questions (such as "If it had not rained, would the street be wet or dry?") without regard to actual events (e.g., if street cleaners had just been washing the street). In "counterfactual reasoning", however, the conditional reasoning must be constrained by actual events (according to the "nearest possible world"). In situations when counterfactual reasoning and basic conditional reasoning would yield the same answers, even the youngest children gave mostly correct answers. However, tasks in which the 2 reasoning strategies resulted in different answers proved unusually difficult even for the older children. (Contains 2 tables and 3 figures.)

In a study with 79 3-year-olds, we confirm earlier findings that separating the sorting dimensions improve children's performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task. We also demonstrate that the central reason for this facilitation is that the two sorting dimensions are not integral features of a single object. Spatial separation of the sorting dimensions has no additional significant influence. This finding highlights the important role of objects with respect to children's attentional flexibility. Implications for current theories on the DCCS task and for the development of perspective taking and cognitive flexibility are discussed. (Contains 2 figures and 1 table.)

By combining the false belief (FB) and photo (PH) vignettes to identify theory-of-mind areas with the false sign (FS) vignettes, we re-establish the functional asymmetry between the left and right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). The right TPJ (TPJ-R) is specially sensitive to processing belief information, whereas the left TPJ (TPJ-L) is equally responsible for FBs as well as FSs. Measuring BOLD at two time points in each vignette, at the time the FB-inducing information (or lack of information) is presented and at the time the test question is processed, made clear that the FB is processed spontaneously as soon as the relevant information is presented and not on demand for answering the question in contrast to extant behavioral data. Finally, a fourth, true belief vignette (TB) required teleological reasoning, that is, prediction of a rational action without any doubts being raised about the adequacy of the actor's information about reality. Activation by this vignette supported claims that the TPJ-R is activated by TBs as well as FBs.

The discovery that 3-year-old children have difficulties understanding false belief has fuelled two decades of research directed at understanding why children have this problem. One unresolved question is whether false belief problems are due to difficulties with mental or representational aspects of mental states. This question has implications for current arguments about the domain specificity of theory of mind in typically developing children and in populations with autism and brain damage. We revisit this question, presenting evidence that preschoolers' difficulty with false belief is not a domain-specific problem with mental states but a more general difficulty with understanding representations.

In the preschool years, there are marked improvements in theory of mind (ToM) and executive functions. And, children's competence in these two core cognitive domains is associated with their academic achievement. Therefore, training ToM and executive control could be a valuable tool for improving children's success in school. This article reviews several successful training studies in preschool children showing that these two school-related competencies can be trained. We also discuss methodological factors that may be important for the effectiveness of training programs. Finally, the review outlines implications of brain research for such training interventions.

The Dimensional Change Card Sorting task frequently is used to measure extradimensional shifting abilities in preschool children. In two studies, we investigated what makes this extradimensional shifting task difficult. In Study 1 with 61 2- to 4-year-olds, we showed that extradimensional shifts from one dimension to another are more difficult than reversal shifts within a dimension (even with irrelevant variation on a second dimension). Study 2 with 77 3- and 4-year-olds further confirmed this finding using a computerized paradigm and showed that sorting instructions are critical for 3-year-olds' difficulties with extradimensional shifts. This finding is taken to suggest that 3-year-olds have particular problems with spontaneously classifying one object in two different ways.

Two experiments with 3 1/2- to 6 1/2-year-old children showed that theory-of-mind development is associated with the growth of episodic memory. Episodic memory was assessed by manipulating informational conditions such that they permit or prevent the formation of episodic memories in terms of re-experiencing the recalled event. Only experienced events, e.g. seeing how one puts a picture of a frog into a box, can be remembered by re-experience. Events known through indirect information cannot be re-experienced, e.g. putting pictures into the box when blindfolded and being later shown on video what was on these cards. Children were also tested on a battery of theory-of-mind tasks assessing their understanding of the origins of knowledge. There was a significant interaction in both experiments showing that recall of directly experienced items improved in relation to indirectly presented items the higher children's theory-of-mind scores. The discussion suggests that episodic memory development is specifically linked to the growing ability to introspect an ongoing experience and interpret it as representing an actual past event. (Contains 1 table and 2 figures.)

The dimensional change card-sorting task (DCCS task) is frequently used to assess young children's executive abilities. However, the source of children's difficulty with this task is still under debate. In the standard DCCS task, children have to sort, for example, test cards with a red cherry or a blue banana into two boxes marked with target cards showing a blue cherry and a red banana. Typically, 3-year-olds have severe problems switching from sorting by one dimension (e.g. color) to sorting by the other dimension (e.g. shape). Three experiments with 3- to 4-year-olds showed that separating the two dimensions as properties of a single object, and having them characterize two different objects (e.g. by displaying an outline of a cherry next to a red filled circle on the card) improves performance considerably. Results are discussed in relation to a number of alternative explanations for 3-year-olds' difficulty with the DCCS task.

The objective of this study was to explore factors that affect the difficulty of counterfactual reasoning in 3-5-year-old children and to shed light on the reason why counterfactual reasoning relates to understanding false belief [Cognitive Development, 13 (1998) 73-90]. Using travel scenarios, the difference between simple scenarios, in which each departure point led to exactly one destination, and complex scenarios, in which each of the departure points was cross-connected with all destination points, proved very important. In simple scenarios even 3 1/2-year olds gave 75% correct answers to counterfactual questions, a level achieved on complex scenarios a year, and on false belief questions, irrespective of scenario, 1 1/2 years later. Since simple scenarios require the same kind of reasoning as complex scenarios, this calls into question the suggestion by Peterson and Riggs [Mind & Language 14 (1999) 80-112] that modified derivation is the common denominator for answering counterfactual questions and questions about false belief.

Two experiments with monolingual German-speaking 2.5- to 4.5-year-olds showed a consistent developmental gap between children's memory/inference of what someone wanted and what someone wrongly said or thought. Correct answers emerged with mastery of the false-belief task. It was concluded that the observed gap constrains de Villiers's linguistic determinism, which claims that acquisition of necessary grammatical structure for talking about the mind drives children's ability to think about the mind. (Author/KB)