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AbstractIn this paper I provide a critique of what I refer to as ‘perspectival reason’, which is the idea that the fundamental setup of human beings in relation to the world is in terms of individuals having perspectives on the world. I argue that the idea of the world as something to view and have a perspective on is not a neutral, trans-historical category but a configuration that emerged in modern times when the world became ‘view’ of ‘picture’, as Heidegger has put it. I indicate some of the key problems of perspectival reason in our time, both in education and society. I then work towards an alternative configuration by discussing a number of ‘world-returning philosophies’. I discuss pragmatism and phenomenology as attempts to return the world, and indicate that, while successful in returning (to) the world, they return the self in problematic ways. Through a discussion of ideas from Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion I propose a configuration in which both world and self are ‘returned’ in more meaningful ways. Key in this is the idea of the world as appeal and of the self as the one who responds to this appeal and through this ‘arrives’ in the world. My explorations are intended to highlight why the idea of ‘taking a perspective’ is problematic, and how we can work towards an alternative. I also discuss where the logic of perspectival reason causes problems for education and how the alternative configuration I present provides a productive way forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author explores the notion of sexual difference, which Freud articulated in his vast work. The paper approaches different levels of theoretical and epistemological order, since the way of thinking about "difference" has crucial effects on clinical work. The point of departure was to analyse the changes that are observed in current subjectivities regarding the female condition and the changing itineraries of sexuality and gender, since the analysts' explicit and private theories, as well as their beliefs and biases, are put into play in psychoanalytic listening. The paper focuses on the relationship of psychosexuality and gender with the concept of sexual difference and with "difference" as a category in itself. The objective was to explore the meanings of the concept of "difference", in which sexual difference is certainly included as one of the expressions of "difference". The author's proposal is that there is not a single way of thinking about the notion of sexual difference in Freud's works. This exploration enlightens the coexistence of dualistic and triadic ways of thinking in his oeuvre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both Extensible Markup Language [XML] and Formal Ontologies [ISOs] have something to do with partitioning. XML partitions data using elements. FOs partition domains using representational primitives. On the basis of the partitioning of FOs, the philosophical debate has outlined an epistemological view about FOs, namely perspectivism. For perspectivism, partitioning a domain means making a mental distinction between those entities on which we focus and those that fall outside our interest. This partitioning provides a perspective on the domain. In Tambassi (2023) it has been argued that perspectivism is an underlying assumption of FOs. In this paper, I investigate whether the same is true of XML: that is, whether and how XML is perspectivist. I begin by defining FOs and presenting the main claims of perspectivism in order to discuss how these claims apply to FOs. Then I move on to XML, showing both the perspectivism of XML and how the claims apply to XML. The purpose is therefore purely speculative. Discussing whether XML is committed to perspectivism may help to clarify some of the theoretical assumptions of this markup metalanguage. More generally, the idea is that since the creators of markup languages develop these languages under the guidance of some theoretical assumptions, for the sake of methodological accuracy these assumptions should be subjected to critical analysis rather than remain implicit and unexamined.

Often, it is believed that there are only two attitudes towards truth. One is to dogmatically believe in something as absolute, considering it unquestionably true (this position is sometimes mistakenly attributed to philosophers of the stature of Plato and Aristotle). The other attitude is to accept that one’s opinions are just one among many possibilities, leading to adherence to a relativistic perspective, sometimes labelled as “weak thought.” From this perspective, truth can at most be considered as historically influenced (meaning that what emerges historically as true for a certain period would be deemed so), or otherwise limited (meaning that it would be true as it appears from a certain perspective or for a certain group of people). In reality, upon careful reflection, both of these perspectives prove to be problematic and unsatisfactory. Specifically, we refer to those (like certain believers in God or, in a more modern way, in scientific truth) who consider their opinions indisputably true, thus confusing hypotheses (unproven) with principles (uncontested) in Platonic terms. Equally problematic is the attitude of those who, more modestly, admit that their opinions are as true as any other opinion argued in the same way, or that may seem historically true or true for a certain group of people with an interest in it. This attitude ultimately falls into the classic paradoxes of relativism; for instance, one who holds the opinion that relativism itself is false could easily refute it. In this paper, we will demonstrate that both attitudes represent an illusion of choice, as understanding the truth is a complex and subtle topic that goes beyond these two extreme perspectives.

Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of "will to power" stands as a cornerstone of his philosophy, yet its interpretation remains a contentious issue. Among the various proposed interpretations, the ontological, metaphorical, and psychological perspectives each offer distinct understandings of this complex concept. While definitively establishing the "correct" interpretation is challenging due to the complexities of Nietzsche's writing and expression, this essay argues that the psychological interpretation aligns more effectively with the core tenets of his thought. The essay begins by providing a concise overview of the metaphysical, metaphorical, and psychological interpretations of "will to power." Acknowledging the inherent uncertainty in interpreting Nietzsche's ideas, it argues that the psychological interpretation, emphasizing the "will to power" as an intrinsic human drive for self-overcoming and growth, resonates more strongly with the broader themes of Nietzsche's philosophy, particularly perspectivism. Furthermore, the essay delves into the ethical implications of the psychological interpretation. It addresses concerns that this interpretation might endorse oppression and autocracy as necessary outcomes of the "will to power." Through careful analysis, the essay demonstrates how the psychological interpretation, when understood accurately, does not inherently support such harmful practices. In contrast, it highlights how this interpretation, emphasizing self-mastery and individual responsibility, can potentially contribute to moral development and a pursuit of excellence. Finally, the essay emphasizes the importance of understanding the foundational concepts of his philosophy, such as perspectivism, for accurately interpreting his ideas. By prioritizing evidence-based analysis and nuanced understanding, we can navigate the complexities of Nietzsche's thought and appreciate its enduring relevance in contemporary discussions about ethics, individual responsibility, and the pursuit of a meaningful life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I analyze the tikmũ,ũn recent history through their sacrificial practices and the relationship they establish with the yãmĩyxop (group of singing spirits). As I analyze historically the process of "whitening" the tikmũ,ũn land, which consists of its desertification and reterritorialization through extensive livestock, I observe that there are different territories crossing indigenous and non-indigenous bodies. The article develops two arguments. The first one is that sacrifice mobilizes a construction of the body of the tikmũ,ũn person, which places it on other paths, different from the reterritorialization in agriculture and cattle raising. The second is that if whites and tikmũ,ũn people mobilize different territories in their bodies, this allows me to say that if the point of view is in the body, then possibly it is historical and territorial and, in front of the land, the variable factor is less a culture than a nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing diffusion of perspectivism within the debate on information system ontologies [ISOs] does not correspond to a thorough analysis of what perspectivism specifically consists of. This paper aims to fill this void. First, I show what supporting perspectivism in information system ontologies [PISO] means in terms of (minimal) claims and implications; then I argue that the definitions of ISO implicitly assume PISO's (minimal) claims or, in other words, that ISOs presuppose and maintain PISO. Section 2 presents the main definitions of ISO. Section 3 specifies what claims are common to all perspectivists in ISO. Sects. 4–7 analyze the implications of those claims. Section 8 explores the chance of multiple perspectivisms within ISOs' domain. Finally, Sects. 9–10 assume that, if PISO's (minimal) claims and (their) implications can be inferred from ISO's definitions, then ISOs are perspectivist, or PISO's minimal claims are assumptions underlying ISOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she did what she ought not to have done. That is, 'blameworthiness' implies 'ought not' (BION). There are some good reasons to accept BION, but whether we accept it mainly depends on complex questions about the objectivity of ought and the subjectivity of blameworthiness. This paper offers an exploratory defence of BION: it gives three prima facie reasons to accept it, provides a plausible interpretation of it, and shows how holding out against objections can yield fruitful lessons. Five objections to BION are considered: the objection from conscience, from reasons, from suberogation, from objectivity, and from excuses. Their main problem is to either over-subjectify blameworthiness or to over-objectify obligations. To accept BION, we must occupy a desirable middle ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The approach I propose here to Books VI and VII of Plato’s Republic is to offer some reflections on the organicist and perspectivist readings. Perspectivism seems in some respects to be a variant of organicism. Indeed, both approaches allow for a reassessment not only of the various parts that make up a dialogue, but also, more generally, of the importance of the literary or dramatic form, which is marginalised by the evolutionist reading. The aim of this essay is therefore to try to understand some of the images present in the central books of the Republic, without burdening them with theoretical structures and questionable chronologies, but rather by noting their importance in the overall design of the individual text and their consistence within a broader organism, the entire and unitary Platonic corpus of dialogues. To this end, I will try to highlight the subtle differences between organicism and perspectivism. I will focus on the relationship between literary constructions and theoretical speculations that make the Republic an organically unified text in itself and perfectly consistent with the entire corpus of dialogues. Three images in particular will help me to show how literature and philosophy meet: the sun analogy, the divided line and the allegory of the cave. My aim is not to say what exactly the epistemology of the central books of the Republic consists in, but rather to try to identify the pitfalls in the text when philosophical questions about epistemological issues are separated from literary ones.

RRI does not challenge what this paper calls ‘lyseology’: mobilizing science to convince policy makers and the public that the present possesses some form of lack that should be addressed with a new technology. For a sustained critique of technological fixes as solutions a more radical shift from the persistent old view of a static outside world is required. This entails a process-based understanding of reality and specific consequences thereof for practice. To do so the paper offers an analysis of in what manner current RRI discourse builds on old subject-object ontologies and relies on an outdated worldview. The paper suggests possible pathways of conceiving of research and innovation otherwise: RRI should reorient towards the ontology turn, learn from ethnomethodology and radical reflexivity, as well as from the politics of material participation. This paper proposes that research and innovation should engage with quantum theory inspired alternative worldviews.

It has been claimed that Massimi’s recent perspectival approach to science sits in tension with a realist stance. I shall argue that this tension can be defused in the quantum context by recasting Massimi’s perspectivalism within a phenomenological framework. I shall begin by indicating how the different but complementary forms of the former are manifested in the distinction between certain so-called ‘-epistemic’ and ‘-ontic’ understandings of quantum mechanics, namely QBism and Relational Quantum Mechanics, respectively. A brief consideration of Dieks’ perspectivism will then lead to a consideration of the much-maligned and typically dismissed role of the observer in the measurement process. This opens the door to London and Bauer’s presentation of a form of ‘phenomenological quantum perspectivalism’ that brings together Massimi’s two forms and explicitly eschews the ‘naïve’ realism that creates the above tension. I shall conclude with some reflections on how intersubjectivity can still be established within this framework, focusing in particular on how Massimi’s idea of ‘interlacing’ scientific perspectives can be accommodated, using the example of a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ that gave rise to Bose-Einstein statistics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Hager and Beckett assert that a 'characteristic feature of ... assorted co-present groups is that their processes and outputs are marked by the full gamut of human experiences involved in their functioning'. My paper endorses and further develops this claim. I begin by expanding on their emphasis upon the priority of relations in terms of Dewey and Bentley's transactionalism and Buddhist dependent co-origination and emptiness. Next, I emphasize the importance of embodied perspectives in acquiring meaning and transforming the world. Here, too, we will find surprising Buddhist connections. Finally, I examine the primacy of practice: how we acquire our minds and selves by participating in shared social practices. This stance is shared by philosophers as diverse as Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Dewey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The idea that the dynamical properties of quantum systems are invariably relative to other systems has recently regained currency. Using Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) for a case study, this paper calls attention to a question that has been underappreciated in the debate about quantum relativism: the question of whether relativity iterates. Are there absolute facts about the properties one system possesses relative to a specified reference, or is this again a relative matter, and so on? It is argued that RQM (in its best-known form) is committed to what I call the Unrestricted Iteration Principle (UIP), and thus to an infinite regress of relativisations. This principle plays a crucial role in ensuring the communicability and coherence of interaction outcomes across observers. It is, however, shown to be incompatible with the widespread, conservative reading of RQM in terms of relations, instead necessitating the adoption of the more unorthodox notion of perspectival facts. I conclude with some reflections on the current state of play in perspectivist versions of RQM and quantum relativism more generally, underscoring both the need for further conceptual development and the importance of the iteration principle for an accurate cost-benefit analysis of such interpretations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Real knowledge emerges from "impossible" worldviews. Or, put differently, it is possible to accept knowledge that is produced by people whose ontological presuppositions–their baseline assumptions about the nature of reality–one entirely rejects. How can this fact be accommodated, not by advancing a wishful post-dualism, dangerous post-secularism, or implausible ontological relativism, but by working within the tradition of secular political philosophy so that indigenous knowledge, too, can be a basis for public policy and collective action in secular societies? Via a reframing Amazonian multinaturalist perspectivism–which has so inspired post-dualist civilizational critiques–as a social theory of health and illness that informs contemporary Western epidemiology's struggles to theorize the distribution of health and illness in mass society, this article advances a general approach to recognizing knowledge that has been developed on the other side of boundaries of ontological difference. It argues that the accuracy or efficacy of any particular indigenous knowledge-practice implies the generative potential as theory of the ontological presuppositions that facilitated the knowledge-practice's evolution. Combining the ontological turn's interest in the innovativeness of indigenous concepts with a proposal for superseding its incommensurable worlds and abandonment of the aspiration to more-than-local knowledge, the article shows that indigenous ideas and their underlying ontologies are more than generic alternatives to inspire Western civilizational renewal, and opens a path to their legitimization as actionable knowledge in the terms of secular public reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses some reasons and requirements for intercultural theologising as boundary-crossing interaction to be decolonised and hold decolonising potential itself. Decolonialism being concerned with both those in ‘marginalised’ and in ‘privileged’ positions, this article focusses on some of the latter’s challenges, responsibilities and opportunities. Grounding the argument in writings of scholars from disciplines like linguistics, cultural anthropology, decolonial studies and various strands of theology both from the Global South and the Global West, epistemological motivators for a decolonising theology will be sketched in the first step. The second step involves a consideration of an appropriate methodology called ‘chosen vulnerability’. Central to it would be the learning and using of vernacular languages in order to move towards cross-cultural understanding from emic perspectives. In step three, an attempt at implementing such will be portrayed that was a core component of a recently completed interdisciplinary PhD project. Based on contextual learning of isiXhosa, several church-related concepts in English and isiXhosa were investigated and compared in a subsidiary study. The findings are used to illustrate how chosen vulnerability can enable humble contributions to decolonising theologies. This is achieved through emic approaches and perspectivism. Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article raises awareness for sometimes hidden epistemic inequalities and suggests ways in which those in relative cultural-linguistic power can reduce the imbalance. This is of relevance primarily to intercultural theology. In turn, such insights from intercultural theology can benefit academic research in cross-cultural contexts in general.

Even among scholars who emphasize Nietzsche's naturalism ("the naturalists"), what it actually involves is disputed. This article identifies the foundations of Nietzsche's naturalism and then elaborates on these foundations through a critical analysis of the works of those naturalists who also identify them. Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist, who, epistemically, is a reliabilist, and while he acknowledges the innate limitations of our cognitive inheritance, which is reflected in his perspectivism, he sees no reason to conclude that we cannot grasp the natural world truly. As to the primary issue in scientific explanation, causation, Nietzsche adopts a regularity theory as early as The Gay Science, and, on the basis of this theory, rejects determinism. One consequence of this analysis is that Nietzsche's naturalism is not as restrictive as the naturalists tend to portray it, and this opens up new possibilities for interpreting many of his other commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of digital life have theorized the heuristic value of theoretical and emic boundaries and/or the interconnectedness of online and offline selves, often with a focus on the curation of an online self whose distinctiveness must be methodologically interrogated offline. Through ethnographic analysis of a large group of globally dispersed women who meet online to learn ethical pedagogy in service of a curated, offline self, I argue this split self denotes a self/other distinction on a continuum, with the ethical work conducted in service of an eventual collapse of this dual corporeality. I explain this through a framework of perspectivism, ethics, and the partible person. In doing so, I underscore a theoretical position that posits that the "digital" does not always usher in a "new" way of being, bridging prior anthropological scholarship on Indigenous personhood with a personhood that I argue is similarly enacted within a digital world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a widespread agreement that Nietzsche has developed a kind of position or doctrine called 'perspectivism'. Scholars go on and develop metaphysical, semantic, epistemic, and psychobiological interpretations of the supposed Nietzschean perspectivism or even 'perspectivisms'. They engage in debates about whether this perspectivism is relativistic, realistic, or anti-realistic and what the tenets of perspectivism are. In this paper, I suggest putting an end to this practice. I examine Nietzsche's explicit mentions of the term 'perspectivism', the problems associated with the misunderstanding of this term as a label, attempts to reconstruct perspectivism based on explicit mentions of 'perspective' and related vocabulary, and doctrinal assumptions scholars try to connect with this terminology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use recent developments within philosophy of science and within certain strands of linguistic research to throw light on each other. According to Ronald Giere's perspectivist philosophy of science, the scientific understanding of reality must proceed along different, mutually irreducible lines of approach. Giere's proposal, however, leaves unresolved the problem of how to integrate the ever‐growing multitude of highly diverse scientific accounts of what is, after all, one and the same world. We propose a technique for the alignment of different perspectives that will permit cross‐perspectival explanation, and thus allow for a more holistic picture of reality to emerge. With respect to modern linguistics, however, Giere's perspectivism merely legalises a de facto state of affairs, as this discipline displays the peaceful coexistence of a multitude of different theoretical perspectives. Still, this makes it all the more important to show how the different aspects of language picked out by these different perspectives combine to form one single complex reality. During our investigation, a largely overlooked type of reduction within linguistics comes to light, prevalent in classical as well as current work within speech act theory and politeness theory. We suggest how a more holistic understanding of language can be attained through our technique for integrating different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses some reasons and requirements for intercultural theologising as boundary-crossing interaction to be decolonised and hold decolonising potential itself. Decolonialism being concerned with both those in 'marginalised' and in 'privileged' positions, this article focusses on some of the latter's challenges, responsibilities and opportunities. Grounding the argument in writings of scholars from disciplines like linguistics, cultural anthropology, decolonial studies and various strands of theology both from the Global South and the Global West, epistemological motivators for a decolonising theology will be sketched in the first step. The second step involves a consideration of an appropriate methodology called 'chosen vulnerability'. Central to it would be the learning and using of vernacular languages in order to move towards cross-cultural understanding from emic perspectives. In step three, an attempt at implementing such will be portrayed that was a core component of a recently completed interdisciplinary PhD project. Based on contextual learning of isiXhosa, several church-related concepts in English and isiXhosa were investigated and compared in a subsidiary study. The findings are used to illustrate how chosen vulnerability can enable humble contributions to decolonising theologies. This is achieved through emic approaches and perspectivism. Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article raises awareness for sometimes hidden epistemic inequalities and suggests ways in which those in relative cultural-linguistic power can reduce the imbalance. This is of relevance primarily to intercultural theology. In turn, such insights from intercultural theology can benefit academic research in cross-cultural contexts in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we claim that there is a pluralistic ontological perspectivism inherent to Baruch Spinoza's philosophy. The relationship between his general theory of the composition of bodies and the concepts of affection, immanence, power, and multitudo is essential for the constitution of this notion. The aim of this analysis is the inner foundation of the concept of points of view: it is impossible to think of it as an epistemological feature of an isolated individual, but it is also not possible to unify it by means of a common property. Consequently, Spinozist ontological perspectivism implies a pluralistic theory of points of view which circumvents the problems posed by the closure of the One-All model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The invention of Shipibo visionary paintings in the Western Amazon by the collective of artists and shamans, Barin Bababo, seems to challenge the idealist thesis that the hybridity of contemporary indigenous art and its commercialization in the Western art market would constitute a cultural degradation of "traditional" indigenous art. The works, at the crossroads of shamanic practices based on an animistic worldview and the ability of their creators to weave social networks beyond their ethnic group, appear to represent, on the contrary, a means of expressing a form of resilience in response to the transformations that Shipibo society is currently experiencing in the context of globalization. The "cultural in-between" position of shaman painters, from which the success of their artistic productions with a Western audience of "shaman tourists" derives, challenges the classical dichotomy that opposes "modernity" and "tradition" making of the components of the past a form of cultural renewal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The karst region of Sagada in the Mountain Province of Luzon, Philippines, is famous for its cave entrances graced with pine log coffins. These are the final resting places of the ancient Sagadans, laid to rest after complex rituals. The caves' exterior walls are often adorned with what are termed "hanging coffins." This historical practice has always fascinated me, as its origins and purposes were not clear until I discovered the works of Viveiros de Castro. His intricate and nuanced view on perspectivism has profoundly influenced cultural anthropology. His approach is unconventional and is expressed in academic books and journals in a language filled with complex phrases and concepts that are difficult for the layperson to grasp. Therefore, I have decided to present my findings through a narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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What is philosophically interesting about how soil is managed and categorized? This paper begins by investigating how different soil ontologies develop and change as they are used within different social communities. Analyzing empirical evidence from soil science, ethnopedology, sociology, and agricultural extension reveals that efforts to categorize soil are not limited to current scientific soil classifications but also include those based in social ontologies of soil. I examine three of these soil social ontologies: (1) local and Indigenous classifications farmers and farming communities use to conceptualize their relationships with soil in their fields; (2) categorizations ascribed to farmers in virtue of their agricultural goals and economic priorities relied upon in sociological research; and (3) federal agency classifications of land capability employed by agricultural scientists. Studying the interplay of these social ontologies shows how assessing soil properties and capabilities are the result of previous agricultural strategies informed by culture, agroecological history, weather, soil biodiversity, crop rotation, and the goals held by decision-makers. The paper then identifies the soil relationships and interactions that constitute ontology-making activities. Building on recent work, I outline a novel interactive account of perspectival realism grounded in agricultural extension research and ethnopedological data that captures the haptic nature of farmers’ soil strategies. This interactive account explains how ontologies are chosen, why they are chosen, and how they interact and inform soil management decision-making. The paper concludes by examining the values laden in these ontologies and those which are causally implicated in the choice of soil management strategies.

According to Noë’s perspectivism, the basic objects of perceptual experiences are perspectival properties of a scene, rather than their actual properties. This concept of perspectivism shares a same core with sense datum theory. The core is the result of Noë’s accepting sense datum theory’s main idea: perspectival properties are perceptually basic. However, Noë, by fundamental modification of perspectival properties, tries to secure his theory against certain problems of sense datum theory. Although, according to sense datum theory, objects of perception are subjective, Noë’s perspectival properties are objective. I argue that the modification is not enough. Inferring “I see perspectival properties of a scene” from “I see the scene from a certain perspective” is not necessarily true. Furthermore, the perspectivism is inconsistent with ordinary phenomenology of perceptual experience. In common perceptual experiences, it is not the case that perspectival properties are always seen. But they are eventually recognized with focus and practice. At the end, empirical evidences refute Noë’s perspectivism.

Over the last two decades, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has developed the concept of 'perspectival anthropology' to think philosophically with and through Amerindian cosmology. In this article, I argue that the epistemological roundness of this concept is, in actuality, a by-product of philosophical reification of Amerindian cosmological dynamics. This reification stems from distortive abstractions of specific societal structures, which rely on the silencing of two key phenomena: the fact that the central or unmarked perspective assumed in 'perspectivism' is that of men, and the fact that the valorisation of men's perspective is enabled by the exchange and accumulation of women. By unearthing this exchange system that lies behind the cyclical valuation of males' gaze, I do not seek to denounce the role of actual women in Amerindian societies. My central aim is to demonstrate that both perspectival anthropology's depiction of Amerindian cosmology and what Viveiros de Castro calls 'Western objectivist epistemology' are made possible by the erasure of women's capacity for transcendence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Noë's perspectivism, the basic objects of perceptual experiences are perspectival properties of a scene, rather than their actual properties. This concept of perspectivism shares a same core with sense datum theory. The core is the result of Noë's accepting sense datum theory's main idea: perspectival properties are perceptually basic. However, Noë, by fundamental modification of perspectival properties, tries to secure his theory against certain problems of sense datum theory. Although, according to sense datum theory, objects of perception are subjective, Noë's perspectival properties are objective. I argue that the modification is not enough. Inferring "I see perspectival properties of a scene" from "I see the scene from a certain perspective" is not necessarily true. Furthermore, the perspectivism is inconsistent with ordinary phenomenology of perceptual experience. In common perceptual experiences, it is not the case that perspectival properties are always seen. But they are eventually recognized with focus and practice. At the end, empirical evidences refute Noë's perspectivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La oposición a proyectos mineros, protagonizada por movimientos sociales enraizados en comunidades originarias o campesinas, como sucede en el conflicto de Conga (Perú), presenta una especial dificultad para su análisis debido a la importancia de ceremonias en los que se consumen enteógenos, que sirven para contactar con los espíritus y facilitar la obtención de información, la realización de diagnósticos, la elaboración de pronósticos y el diseño de planes. Esta clase de movimientos sociales exigen análisis de carácter cultural que subrayen la brecha entre los contendientes, la cual también afecta a los propios marcos ideológicos y a los modelos teóricos que habitualmente usan los propios activistas y los investigadores. El articulo termina sugiriendo que el mapa de cuatro ontologías propuesto por Descola, en el que se establecen otras tantas relaciones entre lo humano y lo no humano, es muy útil para analizar los conflictos en términos de brechas ontológicas. The opposition driven by social movements rooted in native or peasant communities against mining projects, such as the Conga’s ones (Peru), shows a special difficulty for the analysis due to the importance of ceremonies in which entheogens are used to contact with spirits and to enable the production of information, diagnoses and plans. This kind of social movements require a cultural analysis that underlines the cultural gaps between the collective actors that also affects the ideological frameworks and the theoretical models that are used by the activists and the researchers. At the end, the article concludes that the four-ontology map proposed by Descola, which establishes four relationships between the human and the non-human, is very useful in order to analyze conflicts in terms of ontological gaps.

В статье рассматривается актуальный для современного литературоведения вопрос о зрительной дистанции и повествовательно-визуальные механизмы в русской литературе эпохи модерна. В работе представлено широкое понимание точки зрения, охватывающее позиции автора, повествователя или рассказчика, точки зрения героев, а также горизонт читательских ожиданий. Отмечается особое – немиметическое – зрение и характерный для рассматриваемой эпохи разброс зрительной дистанции от перспективизма и авторских поисков метасмыслов до максимально приближенного и почти растворенного в герое «бесперспективного» зрения. Делается вывод о двойственности модернистского подхода, изымающего перспективу и вместо мышления дающего эффекты и переживания, и одновременно предлагающего перспективизм и поиск метасмыслов.