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Peter of Spain's doctrinal content developed in Summulae logicales has been interpreted in various ways by the modern scholarship. As a result, when describing his ontological commitment, a number of different, often opposing, labels were ascribed, ranging from doctrinal neutrality to realism or anti-realism. Starting from the varieties of interpretations, we propose an assessment of Peter of Spain's ontological commitment regarding the universal, by arguing for the existence in his Summaries of two intertwined tendencies, one realist, another antirealist. The former tendency will be argued in accordance with his theory of predicables, signification, supposition and appellation; the latter one, will be tracked in a series of distinctions: via logicae vs via naturae, praesentia vs existentia, res vs dispositio. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I seek to clarify some features of fray Luis de León's theory of names which he presents in a passage at the beginning of De los nombres de Cristo by making a comparison between that passage and some scholastic treatises on logic, especially the Summulae by Peter of Spain and the homonymous work by Domingo de Soto. Specifically, I expect to show that the theory can be fully understood only on these grounds. I shall deal particularly with the concepts of "simple term", "suppositio" and "significatio", and the way in which fray Luis articulates them, with the result that the scholastic elements can be clearly recognized by those who are acquainted with them and, at the same time, contribute with their essential philosophical meaning to the fundamental objectives of the work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Change in the human past, studied by historians, includes changes in philosophy's past, which can be explained by causes, motives and reasons. In the case of philosophy, must explanatory antecedents of change always be philosophical? Should philosophers ever treat non-philosophical reasons as belonging to the history of philosophy? Saying 'never' is absolutely internalist, while 'sometimes' rejects this absolutely internalist rule. To show that 'sometimes' is the better answer, I examine two case histories from the early modern period: these cases, framed by a taxonomy of historical narrative, eliminate absolute internalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Minerals are common ingredients in ancient materia medica. Peter of Spain, Latin Petrus Hispanus (c. 1215-1277), doctor, philosopher and the consecrated Pope John XXI, gives numerous receipts of minerals, metals, and animal concretions taken from several authors in his work Treasury of the Poor. One of his sources, Lapidarius, possibly refers to the work De Lapidibus by Marbode Bishop of Rennes (1035-1123), the Lapidarius for excellence, one of the most famous works of medieval literature. This article intends to identify Hispanus' Lapidarius and the sources of the five receipts figuring in the Treasury of the Poor, the prescriptions lying in the belief in the healing power lying of touch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Relatively recent literature on supposition theory seems to use different modern logical tools of interpretation that can be generally described as formalizations. Since the act of formalizing may be understood as a process of changing its object in the sense of making it more formal, an assessment of this kind of approaches is necessary. Accordingly, our main goal in this paper is to analyze the formality of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition and to evaluate its interpretation as a quantification theory. Our main thesis is that although Peter's theory presents certain weak notions of formality, the formality presupposed by the quantificational interpretation is nowhere to be found in his considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of thinking about consequences in the Middle Ages divides into three periods. During the first of these, from the eleventh to the middle of the twelfth century, and the second, from then until the beginning of the fourteenth century, the notion of natural consequence played a crucial role in logic, metaphysics, and theology. The first part of this paper traces the development of the theory of natural consequence in Abaelard's work as the conditional of a connexive logic with an equivalent connexive disjunction and the crisis precipitated by the discovery of inconsistency in this system. The second part considers the accounts of natural consequence given in the thirteenth century as a special case of the standard modal definition of consequence, one for which the principle ex impossibili quidlibet does not hold, in logics in which disjunction is understood extensionally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper aims to reconsider our approaches to the suppositio theory (in the particular case of Peter of Spain's Summaries of logic) in light of a new hypothesis of the double nature1 of medieval logic. Starting from the existing points of view, i.e. the theory of suppositio as a theory of reference and suppositio as a theory of an untranslatable, this paper will examine their underlying commitments to the nature of medieval logic. Such an analysis will entail for the former approach a commitment to a formal nature, while for the latter to a non-formal one. The possibility of a new approach emerges when both natures can be traced in Peter's theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The constellation language-logic in medieval philosophy (1): St Augustine to St Aquinas This series of two articles provides an in-depth overview of some of the most prominent (and some of the most underpublished) medieval thinkers’ stance on the constellation of language and logic, thus as a combined and condensed problem in Western philosophy between the 5th and 15th centuries. The articles form part of a rehabilitating series of modern-critical articles on understated and marginalised themes, texts and figures in medieval philosophy. The positions of the well-known philosophers that are covered in the two articles, St Augustine, Peter Abelard, St Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, are juxtaposed with some less familiar philosophical positions, amongst others those of Boethius, Peter of Spain, John Wyclif and Peter de Rivo.

Gerald Odonis' logic is generous in its acceptance of ontological counterparts of linguistic expressions. He claims that universals have an objective status and are independent of our mental operations. This article takes a closer look at his views on the meaning of what he calls esse tertio adiacens, i.e., the type of being expressed in propositions of the form 'S is P'. To a certain extent Odonis' analysis resembles Peter of Spain's account of compositio. Unlike his predecessor, however, Odonis thinks that the 'being' used in any true statement, regardless of whether the subject exists or not, is univocal. It turns out that Odonis' account is more in line with John Duns Scotus' intensionalist theory of propositional composition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]