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The article investigates the voting determinants for government partners of the first populist government in Western Europe, the first Conte cabinet. Although the Five Star Movement (FSM) and the League share a common populist root, they differ in their ideological morphology: the FSM embodies an almost pure populism with inclusionary tendencies, while the League expresses an exclusionary populism clearly anchored to the Right. The article explores how populism affects voting choices for these two parties, looking at the interconnections between the thin-centred populist ideology, other host ideologies and policy preferences. We show the importance of populism as a predictor of voting choices for these two parties, as well as marked ideological differences between the two electorates. Moreover, support for the main policies of the government has been mixed, a symptom of the poor cohesion between these two parties.

Innumeracy, that is, the inability to deal with numbers and provide correct estimates about political issues, is reported to be widespread among the public. Yet, despite the recognition that a conspiracy mindset is an increasingly common phenomenon in Western democracies, this has not been considered as a potential correlate of innumeracy. Using data from an online sample of respondents across 10 European countries, we show that those with a higher propensity to hold a conspiracy worldview tend to overestimate the actual share of the immigrant population living in their own country. This association holds true when accounting for country heterogeneity and other cognitive, affective and socio-demographic factors. Employing a comparative design and refined measurements, the article contributes to our understanding of how a conspiracy mentality may influence perceptions of relevant political facts, questioning basic processes of democratic accountability. This research received financial support from the project ‘Bridging the gap between public opinion and European leadership: Engaging a dialogue on the future path of Europe EUENGAGE’ (H2020-EURO-2014-2015/H2020-EURO-SOCIETY-2014, Grant no. 649281) funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.

This article explores people?s preferences for different containment strategies and policy programmes for managing COVID-19 risks. Using a survey experiment administered to an online sample of 1?562 Italian respondents in April 2020, we test whether and to what extent individual preferences are influenced by different framings of equivalent scenarios on gains and losses attached to alternative policy measures aimed at containing the health and economic costs of the pandemic. We find that subjects tend to be more risk-averse or risk-seeking depending on whether they are confronted with a positive (gain) or a negative (loss) description of the consequences of the proposed policy initiatives. The results yield relevant implications for our understanding of citizens? support for national and EU-wide responses to the coronavirus pandemic and the role of framing in contexts of crisis.

The Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union has recently come to the forefront as a potential force of integration. This study explores the consequences (if any) of such a move, investigating how likely it is for Common Security and Defense Policy to be politicized and become a new area of dissent. The article explores conditions of politicization at three different levels of analysis: (a) the systemic level, where Common Security and Defense Policy position in a bi-dimensional political space (left–right and anti-pro EU) is discussed; (b) the party level, where potentially successful issue entrepreneurs of Common Security and Defense Policy are identified; (c) the individual voter level, where the probabilities of being mobilized by issue entrepreneurs of Common Security and Defense Policy are assessed. Our analysis suggests that although Common Security and Defense Policy is prone to be politicized and right-wing parties are the most likely group to do so, this move may backfire as right-wing voters are less likely to be mobilized on Common Security and Defense Policy compared to their left-wing counterpart. We discuss the implications of these results for the conceptualization of politicization and European integration.

Research demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of American identity arguing that the normative content of American identity relates to political ideologies in the United States, but the sense of belonging to the nation does not. This paper replicates that analysis and extends it to the German and British cases. Exploratory structural equation modeling attests to cross-cultural validity of measures of the sense of belonging and norms of uncritical loyalty and engagement for positive change. In the 2010s, we find partisanship and ideology in all three nations explains levels of belonging and the two content dimensions. Interestingly, those identifying with major parties of the left and right in all three countries have a higher sense of belonging and uncritical loyalty than their moderate counterparts. The relationship between partisanship, ideology, and national identity seems to wax and wane over time, presumably because elite political discourse linking party or ideology to identity varies from one political moment to the next.

Italian foreign politics is facing tough challenges in the near future. For more than 60 years, the Italian foreign policy compass was set on two poles, the European Union and the United States. Sometimes alternatively, much more often conjointly, these two polar stars oriented each and every Italian government’s choice since the end of Second World War. All this has been changing over the last few years. In this context, the article intends to introduce the special issue on Italian foreign policy drawing a stylized map of theoretical approaches that knits together the dispersed theoretical and empirical studies of Italian foreign policy, using a couple of theoretical perspectives as light posts in orienting the articles in this special issue. This introduction is organized in four sections. First, it discusses the approaches that explicitly combine together domestic and international factors in explaining foreign policy. Next, it maps studies on the Italian foreign policy within these frameworks. Then the main characteristics of Italian foreign policy, using these theoretical perspectives, are discussed. The article concludes summarizing how the contributions in this special issue fits into these theoretical frameworks and help shed light on present Italian foreign policy.

This special issue focuses on EuroPolis, a unique experiment in ‘deliberative democracy’ at the European level convened in Brussels soon before the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. A European wide random sample of the 27 member countries at the time was gathered to deliberate about two key issues--climate change and immigration as well as its voting intentions. The articles in the special issue focus on this Deliberative Poll, both quantitatively and qualitatively to assess what it tells us about ambitious versions of a ‘European wide public sphere.’ Can the citizens of Europe deliberate together across all the barriers of language and nationality? Can there be a credible process of European wide ‘public will formation’ about substantive policy issues and about voting?

Research suggests that the rightist discourse on immigration appeals to left-leaning citizens with lower levels of education. The opposite is, however, not true for right-wing voters with lower educational levels, and this asymmetry leaves left-wing parties at a disadvantage compared with the right on immigration and integration issues. Deliberative theory promises that discussion, information and reflection can promote a more balanced political discussion and a more enlightened citizen. This article assesses the extent to which deliberative polling increases the ideological awareness of citizens with lower educational levels. More specifically, it gauges the extent to which especially less well educated left-wing voters � those whose attitudes research finds to be particularly out of tune with their ideological predispositions regarding immigration and integration � adjust their attitudes as a consequence of deliberate exposure to informational input and the presentation of two-sided arguments. Use is made of unique data generated during the first European-wide deliberative polling project, �EuroPolis�, held in 2009. The results indicate that less well educated left-wing voters indeed have slightly more negative attitudes towards immigrants than leftist voters with secondary or post-secondary educational levels. Turning to the micro-mechanisms of attitude change in a deliberative setting, the analyses show that both levels of education and ideological predispositions play a role in the extent to which participants of the deliberative poll adjust their attitudes. In three out of four models, evidence is found that less well educated left-leaning citizens are indeed most likely to adjust their attitudes on immigration and integration after being presented with a more balanced discussion of the topic.

Transatlantic Policymaking in an Age of Austerity: Diversity and Drift. Edited by Martin A. Levin, Martin Shapiro. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004. 344 pp., $29.95 (ISBN: 1-589-01031-0). In the literature on public policymaking, interest in explicit cross-Atlantic comparisons has been a casualty of the somewhat artificial distinction between comparative and American politics. The prevalent image has emphasized a one-way diffusion of US ideas and practices to European countries, with different degrees of absorption by the latter. Transatlantic Policymaking in an Age of Austerity tries to offer a more nuanced and complex picture of what is, in reality, a two-way street between Europe and the United States—with several turns, stops, and drifts along the way. In Transatlantic Policymaking in an Age of Austerity Martin Levin, Martin Shapiro, and their contributors explicitly compare a wide set of domestic policymaking areas in different European and North American nations. The major goal of the book is to explain how different national institutional structures on both sides of the Atlantic cope with common exogenous challenges. The book develops a story of persisting transatlantic divergences behind a facade of common challenges and apparent convergences in policy solutions. Politics, on both sides of the Atlantic, is very much “reform without change, change without reform,” as Jacob Hacker, one of the contributors, characterizes it. But, behind this general, albeit superficial, pattern, the book emphasizes the variety of divergent paths, resulting from domestic political dynamics whose rhythm is imparted by the various specific national institutions and political structures. Looking at different countries, the various chapters examine, at different levels of theoretical articulation, how national policymaking confronts common challenges in ways that are largely shaped by context-specific and path-dependent processes. The result is a quite diversified picture of policies across countries. In some areas, progressive convergence has occurred between European and US experiences. In other areas, divergence persists. In still others, a disjointed pattern in the way the policies evolve prevails. Transatlantic Policymaking in an Age of …

This article analyzes a period usually neglected in empirical studies of public opinion and European integration: the formative years between the early 1950s and the late 1960s. The analysis is based on one country – Italy – in which the European process was a source of deep political cleavage in the formative phase. The study of the sources and dynamics of support in these years sheds a different light on the determinants of support. More specifically, a pooled multivariate logistic analysis of six surveys conducted between 1952 and 1970 shows two things. First, it shows that public support in Italy was driven mostly by considerations that were affective and political rather than economic and utilitarian. Second, it explains under which conditions the political factors behind support (and opposition) for European integration in the 1950s and 1960s changed over time, mostly in reactions to international events and to developments in European institutionalization. The article points to the bottom-up nature of change in public support for European integration; changes in public opinion affected party positions, rather than vice versa.

Measuring support for or opposition to the international use of force is not an easy matter. As earlier research (e.g., Mueller, 1973; Larson, 1996a; Everts and Isernia 2001; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004) has shown, people are particularly sensitive to the circumstances under and purposes for which the use of force is either envisaged or actually taking place. Hypothetical cases as well as questions about the use of force before the decision to use this instrument has actually been taken may be especially misleading us with respect to what can be expected in a concrete and specific historical case. Timing is also a relevant element in view of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, or the tendency of people to support the use of military force, despite hesitations, once their government has taken a decision to do so. This is a well-known phenomenon that deserves to be mentioned in this connection (Mueller, 1973).

Ever since public opinion became a powerful force in politics (and, probably, even before that), a vexing question for scholars as well as policymakers has been to determine and interpret to what degree and under what conditions the public is prepared to support the use of military force.

The US policy of ‘rebalancing to Asia’ is likely to have major implications for transatlantic relations as well as for the role of rising powers, such as China. US public opinion and leaders are largely aware of this eastward shift in attention and this awareness can be considered, albeit in a somewhat indirect way, an indicator of support for the policy. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, Europeans seem to be less aware of the fact that the Far East is becoming the main chessboard of international relations in a multipolar global order. Nevertheless, when objectively informed about China, people on both sides of the Atlantic are less in favour of a shift in interests toward Asia and their negative perceptions of China are significantly correlated to a hesitancy in supporting a rebalancing policy. Moreover, if people perceive Beijing as a threat, especially an economic threat, they are even less likely to support a shift of interests to the Far East, the only exception being American elites, who tend to increase their support for the rebalancing strategy in the presence of a Chinese economic threat.

To understand the present state of public opinion in an Atlantic context, it is necessary to take a more long-term historical perspective. The interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy has grown steadily since the end of World War II. In Chapter 1 we began our analysis by offering an overview of the interaction between the research program on this topic and the political events that prompted this growing interest over the years.

The history of transatlantic relations makes abundantly clear that Europeans and Americans, while sharing many interests, values and views, have often also had divergent ideas on specific policies. While this is hardly disputed, several scholars and commentators further claim that, with developments such as the end of the Cold War and the growing unilateralism of American foreign policy, combined with the increasing economic assertiveness of the European Union, the nature of transatlantic relations has now fundamentally changed and that Europeans and Americans no longer share the same view of the world, whatever may have been the historical situation. This is neither the first time the death bell has been rung for the Atlantic community1 nor the only case in which assessments of the transatlantic relations run widely apart. For some observers, the ‘history of American-European relations after World War II appears to present itself as an endless series of conflicts’ (Lundestad, 2003: 3), but others take a different perspective and see the North Atlantic Area as a stable ‘zone of peace. … that sets it apart from other regions of the world and political orders of past eras’ (Ikenberry, 2008: 6–7).

Measuring support for, or opposition to, the international use of force is not an easy matter. As earlier research (Mueller, 1973; Larson, 1996a; Everts and Isernia 2001; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004) has shown, people are particularly sensitive to the circumstances under, and purposes for, which the use of force is either envisaged or actually taking place. Hypothetical cases as well as questions about the use of force before the decision to use this instrument has actually been taken may be especially misleading with respect to what can be expected in concrete and specific historical cases. Timing is also a relevant element in view of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, or the tendency of people to support the use of military force, despite hesitations, once their government has taken a decision to do so (Mueller 1973; Brody, 1991; 2000).

It is perhaps inevitable that proponents of each of the various views on the causes and nature of the alleged transatlantic divide will look for — and sometimes find — arguments and data from public opinion research results that tend to confirm their own differing hypotheses. At the same time, the core issue of where and why American and European publics differ on questions of war and peace and the use of military force in particular — as has been shown in Chapter Three — has not yet been adequately addressed. Continuing the analysis, we now want to supplement more conventional presentations of results of surveys on this issue by digging a bit deeper into the nature and structure of the transatlantic divide by looking primarily at general attitudes, or the level of political ideology, and then systematically comparing the relative explanatory power of these different dimensions of the Atlantic community in accounting for support for the use of force in hypothetical and real situations.

Interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy has grown steadily since the end of the Second World War. We distinguish at least three different waves of research on this topic and examine two main components of the present policy debate: the need for an Atlantic community and agreement on the means to reach common goals. As to the first issue, we explore the extent to which Atlanticism—defined as the willingness to cooperate among European partners and the US on problems perceived as common—is still high in the 2000s. We find considerable variation between European countries and the US. The left–right cleavage is still relevant in explaining attitudes toward collaboration across the Atlantic both in the US and in several European countries. As to the means, we look at the issue of support for the use of military force in Europe and the United States. On the basis of the available data, support for the use of force is much higher, across the board, in the US than in Europe. On the other...

A number of social sciences studies have built a "familialistic-parochial-localistic" paradigm since the early 1960s in order to characterise the Italian political culture. Such a paradigm was criticised in the last decade. This article wants to test it empirically on the basis of available opinion polls. It appears that the feeling of national identity is weak if we consider it only under its "civic" aspect (i.e. the satisfaction vis-à-vis the political system) ; once we include the idea of being part of a cultural community, then such a feeling is clearly quite more significant and Italy appears as a more "normal" nation than it usually seems., Un certain nombre de travaux de sciences sociales ont tôt mis en évidence un paradigme "familaliste-paroissial-localiste" pour caractériser la culture politique italienne. Ce paradigme a été soumis à la critique dans les années 90. Cet article se propose de le tester empiriquement sur la base des sondages disponibles. Il en ressort que le sentiment d'identité nationale italien n'est faible que si l'on le considère sous son aspect strictement civique ; si l'on inclut l'idée de faire partie d'une communauté culturelle, alors celui-ci se révèle nettement plus consistant, et l'Italie apparaît comme une nation moins "anormale" qu'il n'y paraît., Isernia Pierangelo, Pérés Hubert. Changement et continuité dans la culture politique italienne. In: Pôle Sud, n°19, 2003. L'Italie du politique, sous la direction de Christophe Roux . pp. 131-153.

Though the impact of deliberative polling on attitude change has received ample attention in the literature, micro models of attitude change before, during, and after deliberation are understudied. The relative strength of three competing views of the way attitudes change—the heuristics, systematic, and deliberative models—is assessed, using the quasi-experimental data of the EuroPolis deliberative project and comparing a group of people who participated in the deliberative poll with a control group. The results are: (1) in line with the systematic model, predispositions play a larger role than in the heuristics or deliberative models; (2) predispositions play a different role for participants and nonparticipants; (3) predispositions shape attitude formation in different ways depending on the issue at hand. On some issues the beliefs of participants change as a consequence of deliberation and become more complex and nuanced than before. This is, however, not the case for immigration issues where deliberation seems to strengthen predispositions.

IntroduzioneLa guerra contro la Repubblica Federale di Jugoslavia ha evidenziato i problemi della politica estera italiana degli anni '90. Con non più del 40% dell'opinione pubblica stabilmente a favore dei raid aerei contro la Serbia ed il Kosovo, una veemente opposizione del Vaticano e del Papa in prima persona ed una maggioranza di governo divisa al suo interno tra negoziatori ad oltranza ed auspici di una immediataescalationterrestre, si riproponeva, con maggiore evidenza del passato, il ridotto margine di autonomia dell'esecutivo nel settore della politica di sicurezza. A poco meno di due anni dalla crisi albanese, la leadership politica italiana si è trovata così ad affrontare l'ennesima prova di politica estera, per giunta sul terreno delle armi, un terreno sul quale nell'ultimo quarantennio repubblicano raramente un governo si era avventurato. Rispetto all'ambiente tut to sommato «placido» nel quale la politica estera italiana ha operato nel secondo dopoguerra, gli anni '90, con un ininterrotto susseguirsi di crisi (dal Golfo alla Somalia, dall'Albania alla Bosnia, per finire con il Kosovo) hanno prodotto un maggior numero di sfide, in aree molto più vicine e rilevanti per gli interessi nazionali italiani e in un quadro di minore possibilità di far ricorso al proprio tradizionale alleato, gli Stati Uniti, per risolvere i propri fondamentali problemi di sicurezza. Da qui la necessità di costruire un consenso nazionale intorno alle scelte del governo e, di conseguenza, il crescente interesse per il ruolo che l'opinione pubblica assume nella politica estera italiana. Il Kosovo tuttavia non è il primo caso in cui l'opinione pubblica entra nei calcoli dei decisori nazionali. In questo saggio intendiamo esplorare questo ruolo in un'altra recente crisi che ha visto coinvolta l'Italia, quella relativa al dissolvimento della ex-Jugoslavia, con particolare riferimento alla crisi in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Come diremo nelle conclusioni, da questa esperienza è possibile trarre alcune considerazioni che sembrano dimostrarsi valide anche nel caso del Kosovo.

Since the rise of mass politics, the role national identities play in international relations has been debated. Do they produce a popular reservoir easily tapped for war or bestow dignity thereby fostering cooperation and a democratic peace? The evidence for either perspective is thin, beset by different conceptions of identity and few efforts to identify its effects independent of situational factors. Using data drawn from new national surveys in Italy and the United States, we advance a three-dimensional conception of national identity, theoretically connecting the dimensions to conflictive and cooperative dispositions as well as to decisions to cooperate with the United Nations in containing Iran's nuclear proliferation and Sudan's humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Attachment to the nation in Italy and the United States is found to associate with less support for militarist options and more support for international cooperation as liberal nationalists expect. This depends, however, on containing culturally exclusive conceptions of the nation and chauvinism.

The American Presidential election in November 2004 has heightened interest in the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. One of the more specific questions is what the consequences of the re-election of President Bush will or could be in this connection. Nowhere is this truer than on both sides of the Atlantic given the differences that have roiled the US-European relationship in recent years.