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This paper defends the claim that if a person P exists, there can be true positive comparisons between P's existence and P's never having existed at all in terms of what is better or worse for P. If correct, this view will have significant implications for various fundamental issues in population ethics. I try to show how arguments to the contrary fail to take note of a general ambiguity in comparisons when compared alternatives contain their own different standards (or, in the case of non‐existence, a lack thereof) on which to base these comparisons. After having answered arguments against the possibility of making positive comparisons, the paper develops a positive account of how to make existence/non‐existence comparisons in terms of personal value whilst accepting that a person's non‐existence fails to make any contact with the relevant categories of personal value. The guiding idea is the following: When some item satisfies some relevant standard, we can, I argue, infer that it satisfies this standard better than something that fails to satisfy this standard (be this failure due to empirical or conceptual reasons). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sosa, Williamson, and Pritchard - to name three prominent epistemologists - have all endorsed safety in one way or another, and many others have followed them. Safety for Sosa requires truth in all close-by possible worlds in which the belief is held on the same basis.[7] For Pritchard, safety is a necessary condition of knowledge. There are differences between the formulations provided by Sosa, Pritchard and Williamson. Contrast this view with Pritchard's who says that 'I am sympathetic to the idea that there is a way of thinking about the sensitivity principle such that it is equivalent to the safety principle (Pritchard [29], fn 18)'. 28 Pritchard, Duncan " Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?. [Extracted from the article]

It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is also presented. Therefore, no reason to reject evidentialism arises in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the approach to evidentialism, role of non-epistemic commitments, and transparency. Topics discussed by the author include reliability of a method which determines justification, normative legitimacy of friendship which is important to a good life, and introduction of radical pragmatism which leads to disruptive influence of friendship for the re-evaluation of ones character.

One of the guiding ideas of virtue epistemology is to look at epistemological issue through the lens of practical philosophy. The Gettier Problem is a case in point. Virtue epistemologists, like Sosa and Greco, see the shortcoming in a Gettier scenario as a shortcoming from which performances in general can suffer. In this paper I raise some doubts about the success of this project. Looking more closely at practical philosophy, will, I argue, show that virtue epistemology misconceives the significance of Gettier structures in the practical domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to some classical authors, the region south-west of the Caspian Sea was inhabited by the large tribe of the Cadusians (Greek Kαδouσιoι, Latin Cadusii). During the Achaemenid Period, several armed conflicts between the Imperial Persian forces and the warlike Cadusians occurred. Of particular importance is the disastrous defeat of Artaxerxes II in 38o B.C. From the archaeological point of view, little has been known about the material culture of the Achaemenid Period (Iron Age IV) in Talesh and Gilan. Until recently, only a few burial contexts from the South of Gilan could be dated to the period between the 6th and 4th centuries B.C. However, during the last two decades, Iranian archaeologists excavated numerous Bronze and Iron Age graveyards in the Talesh Region. A number of burial contexts at sites, such as Maryan, Mianroud or Vaske can securely be dated to the Achaemenid Period. With this new material basis, it was possible to subdivide the Iron Age IV into different subsequent phases. Furthermore, it is likely that the material culture described in this article could be at least partially attributed to the Cadusians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification, thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After sketching my own solution to the Value of Knowledge Problem, which argues for a deontological understanding of justification and understands the value of knowing interesting propositions by the value we place on believing as we ought to believe, I discuss Alvin Goldman's and Erik Olsson's recent attempts to explain the value of knowledge within the framework of their reliabilist epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a philosophical inquiry into the elements of interest in truth. The "Standard View" of belief is defined through a desire for objective accuracy, but is then criticized through the dualistic assertions of philosopher William James regarding further desires of removing false belief. The epistemology of Roderick M. Chrisholm and Ernest Sosa are also engaged within the debate.

The article presents a speech given by University of York scholar Christian Piller before the Royal Institute of Philosophy's 2004 annual conference with the theme "Preferences and Well-Being". Piller discussed the question of whether human beings have attitude-related and content-related reasons to prefer or desire something.

Discusses the book "Practical Reality," by Jonathan Dancy and the link between desires and reasons for acting. Comparison with the arguments in the book "Principa Ethica," by G.E. Moore; Conflicts between objectivism and subjectivism; Assessment of the examples presented by Dancy in his book.

Identifies the technical error in the argument against the value theory of practical reason forwarded by David Lewis. Theory of rationality; General strategy used by Lewis; Comments on prior criticisms of Lewis' arguments; Lewis' use of the difference between how expectations and beliefs change in the light of new evidence.