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A Polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cell (PEMFC) is one of the most important applications for decarbonization of energy using hydrogen as an energy source and is considered a promising future power source due to its high efficiency, low operating temperature, fast startup, and low noxious emissions. In particular, improvement in durability of PEMFC is one of the major issues to spur the commercialization of the PEMFC system. Therefore, to improve the durability of PEMFC systems, diagnostic strategies are required to identify faulty conditions of PEMFC systems such as fuel starvation, dehydration, flooding, load cycling, and startup-shutdown (SU/SD). The problematic form of the membrane electrode assembly (MEA) that causes a decrease in the performance of PEMFCs in steady-state and dynamic operating conditions includes Pt dissolution, ionomer degradation, carbon corrosion [1] , and mechanical problems of the membrane in some circumstances. Among them, the undesired corrosion reaction, namely, the electrochemical carbon oxidation reaction, results in a drastic decrease in electrochemical double layer capacitance (EDLC), generation of oxygen functional groups in carbon supports, and severe electrochemical surface area (ECSA) fading [2, 3], followed by deteriorated PEMFC performance. Typically, the high potential inducing carbon corrosion reactions would occur during SU/SD and fuel starvation conditions. In detail, as for fuel starvation, a temporary shortage of H2 supply to one or several cells in a PEMFC stack causes the cell voltage reversal, accompanied by a potential strike over 1.0 V vs. RHE (Figure 1) with significant electrode degradation [4 , 5]. Also, the generation of hydrogen/air boundary at the anode due to the gas crossover through the membrane results in a high potential (~1.4 V vs. RHE), accelerating the decomposition of carbon support [6]. Therefore, in this work, to investigate the effects of high potential inducing electrode degradation on PEMFC performance, we conducted accelerated stress tests (AST), and in particular, we studied the correlation between electrode degradation behaviors as well as structural properties of porous carbon such as ionic resistance, EDLC with PEMFC performance in the systemic point of view. Specially, we could see the contrasting degradation behaviors and various performance decay rates using electrochemical impedance spectroscopy (EIS) analysis. EIS can be used to isolate the contribution of many processes to performance loss, allowing investigation of the effect of carbon corrosion-induced catalyst layer changes on fuel cell performance [ 7]. The measured EIS data is evaluated through the parametric fitting of the transmission line model (TLM) to the EIS spectrum. In addition, relaxation time distribution (DRT) analysis for direct analysis of internal resistance factors by reinforcing the TLM-based impedance analysis results was applied as a diagnostic method to evaluate electrode degradation. During the ASTs, electrochemical measurements (i-V, CV, LSV, and EIS) were performed to estimate the degree of PEMFC degradation, we also conducted ex-situ surface analysis of MEA using SEM, TEM, and XPS to elucidate the specific degradation components. References [1] Sorrentino, Antonio, Kai Sundmacher, and Tanja Vidakovic-Koch. "Polymer electrolyte fuel cell degradation mechanisms and their diagnosis by frequency response analysis methods: a review." Energies 13.21 (2020): 5825. [2] Macauley, Natalia, et al. "Carbon corrosion in PEM fuel cells and the development of accelerated stress tests." Journal of The Electrochemical Society 165.6 (2018): F3148. [3] Kwon, JunHwa, et al. "Identification of electrode degradation by carbon corrosion in polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cells using the distribution of relaxation time analysis." Electrochimica Acta (2022): 140219. [4] Bentele, D., et al. "PEMFC Anode Durability: Innovative Characterization Methods and Further Insights on OER Based Reversal Tolerance." Journal of The Electrochemical Society 168.2 (2021): 024515. [5] Tovini, Mohammad Fathi, et al. "Degradation mechanism of an IrO2 anode co-catalyst for cell voltage reversal mitigation under transient operation conditions of a PEM fuel cell." Journal of The Electrochemical Society 168.6 (2021): 064521. [6] Bisello, Andrea, et al. "Mitigated Start-Up of PEMFC in Real Automotive Conditions: Local Experimental Investigation and Development of a New Accelerated Stress Test Protocol." Journal of The Electrochemical Society 168.5 (2021): 054501. [7] Kwon, JunHwa, et al. "A Comparison Study on the Carbon Corrosion Reaction under Saturated and Low Relative Humidity Conditions via Transmission Line Model-Based Electrochemical Impedance Analysis." Journal of The Electrochemical Society 168.6 (2021): 064515. Figure 1

In this work, we study the dependence of water content on the carbon corrosion reaction by applying an external potential (1.4 V vs RHE) under saturated and low (30%) relative humidity (RH) conditions via a transmission line model (TLM)-based impedance analysis in a polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cell (PEMFC). High potentials inducing carbon corrosion reaction cause electrode thinning, make the supporting carbon structure less porous, decrease the electrochemical surface area (ECSA), and dehydrate the ionomer, leading to fast performance decay in the cell. Particularly, in this work, we discuss the main cause of performance decay in PEMFCs in view of the structural deformation of supporting carbon using the ionic resistance and double layer capacitance in non-faradaic impedance and charge transfer resistance in faradaic impedance to elucidate the different degradation behaviors of membrane electrode assembly (MEA) under saturated and low humidity (RH 30%) conditions. As a result, it is confirmed that carbon corrosion severely changes the structural properties of the supporting carbon, such as pore depth and circumference, and the specific pore deformation with the evolution of oxygen-containing functional groups on the carbon surfaces subordinately induces the severe degradation in cell performance with the water drainage issues, namely, flooding.

The history of Samsung and its central office shows the influence of exogenous social and economic change on business-group structures and the endogenous development of capacity in a business group. This paper investigates how transaction cost operates in regard to group size and the functions retained or otherwise, centralized or decentralized, by central office. In relation to business-group development, the effectiveness of transaction cost and active capacity-building are examined and weighed. Entrepreneurs reacting to external changes have raised group capabilities and sought to maintain group integrity. The central-office activities of allocation, ratification, nurturing, and sharing are also discussed and conceptualized.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has been involved in active discussion on the introduction of the property tax. Yet the current land management system is unsustainable mainly because land supply is limited. This is because the system of lump sum grants produces distorted interests among suppliers and consumers of land. The property tax can be both a cure for these problems and create an alternative financial source of revenue for local governments. We suggest a theoretical model that proves the superiority of a property tax over lump sum grants.

English Abstract: The emergence of China in the international financial order can be analyzed in three aspects: strengthening its position within the IMF system led by the West, establishing a new financial order through multilateral development banks (MDBs) like the AIIB and NDB, and the internationalization of the renminbi (RMB). China has steadily demanded an increase in its share in the IMF. Following the effectuation of the reform plan in 2016, China became the third largest member of the IMF and the RMB is now included in the SDR basket. China also succeeded in launching the AIIB by formulating a consensus on the necessity for launching an alternative multilateral development bank in Asia where the ADB had a monopoly. On the other hand, RMB internationalization is executed based on a set of internal and external goals: stabilizing inflation and the engine for internal reform, and consolidating the international status of China. As a result, RMB settlements accounted for approximately 2% in world trade, while investment accounted for 16.6% in 2015. However, the RMB still accounts for only 0.6% of the global bond market, and only 1.1% of global foreign reserves. As such, although the internationalization of the RMB has achieved some degree of success, it is hardly keeping up with the extent to which China’s economic power is growing.For the China-led financial order to take root, China should continue to pursue further reforms and openness regarding free convertibility, capital accounts, and the exchange rate. China, however, is maintaining a cautious approach. Some of the reasons for this are as follow. First, there are concerns about an outbreak of financial crisis through the opening up of China’s capital account. Second, there are fears that there will be an increase of non-performing loans and decrease of interest rate in the event of non-interference by China’s financial authorities. As China also has tried to maintain a managed floating system and to allow capital opening only on an experimental basis, it will not be easy for it to expand its influence in the international financial market in a short period of time. Moreover, as the recent appreciation of the yuan has weakened, the impetus for internationalization of the RMB has weakened.Korean Abstract: 2016년 들어 AIIB가 운영을 개시하고, 위안화가 IMF의 SDR 통화바스켓에 편입되면서 국제금융질서에서 중국의 위상이 날로 높아지고 있다. 이에 본 연구는 중국 주도의 신금융질서 태동의 의미와 전망, 중국 중심 국제금융기구의 구조와 운영, 위안화 국제화와 통화블록 형성 가능성 등을 분석하였다. 이를 바탕으로 한국의 중장기 정책대응 방향과 함께 기업의 인프라 건설 참여방안, 민간 금융기관의 인프라금융 참여방안, 정부의 정책 지원방향을 제시함으로써 급변하는 국제금융질서에 대한 한국의 대외 입장 정립과 국익 확보에 기여하고자 하였다.

Under what conditions do business groups become large, and under what conditions do they become integrated? As business units with ambiguous boundaries, especially in East Asia, business groups have been the subject of many studies, both theoretical and empirical. Although previous studies on business groups have generally followed the performance approach, we introduce two dimensions of group-likelihood – extension and integrity – as the substance of business groups. On the basis of this theoretical background, we analyze the influences of various elements on group-likelihood, especially in China, by observing 1561 listed companies in the Chinese A stock market. We conclude that (i) marketization decreases only extension, not integrity; (ii) surplus resources increase both; (iii) state ownership increases extension, whereas private ownership increases integrity; (iv) indirect control increases extension, whereas direct control increases integrity; and (v) government promotions increase both. These conclusions help understand the substance of the business group phenomenon and clarify the complex business conditions in China, an economy undergoing incremental transition for more than 30 years.

Korean Abstract: 북한의 금융시스템은 중앙은행 중심의 일원적 은행제도(monobank system)에 기초하고 있다. 조선중앙은행은 재정활동과 더불어 중앙은행기능과 상업은행 기능까지 수행하고 있다. 이러한 기본 틀은 고난의 행군, 화폐개혁 등을 거치면서 국가통제력의 약화, 시장경제 영역의 확대와 함께 적지 않은 변화를 겪었다. 중앙은행의 자금공급기능은 약화되었으며, 그 틈새로 사금융이 자리를 잡고 있다. 특히, 2009년의 화폐개혁에 이은 물가와 환율 급등으로 북한 원화와 금융기관에 대한 신뢰가 추락하였으며, 달러라이제이션(dollarization) 현상이 심화되고 있다. 이처럼 북한에서는 민간부문의 저축이 금융기관을 통해 기업의 투자재원으로 공급되는 금융 본연의 기능이 작동하지 못하는 데다 핵 문제 등으로 국제금융시장 접근도 불가능하여 경제발전을 위한 내·외자 동원이 난관에 봉착해 있는 실정이다. 북한은 최근 들어 내자동원의 중요성을 인식하고 나름대로 예금 증대와 외화 흡수수단을 강구하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 또한 중앙은행법, 상업은행법 등을 제정하여 이원적 은행제도의 이행의지를 내비치기도 했다. 그러나 북한의 현 상황은 일부 금융 운용방식 변경이나 제도 개선만으로 해결될 수 없으며, 금융이 경제발전을 견인하기 위해서는 근본적인 개혁이 필요하다. 본고에서는 중국과 베트남의 금융개혁 경험을 분석함으로써 북한의 금융개혁에 주는 시사점을 모색하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 북한의 현 금융상황 파악과 함께 중국·베트남의 금융개혁 과정을 개혁이전부터 초기 제도정비기까지에 초점을 맞추어 구체적으로 살펴보았다. (후략)English Abstract: North Korea’s financial system is based upon the mono-banking system centered around the Central Bank of the DPRK. The Central Bank of the DPRK serves diverse functions - aside from financial activities, it also acts simultaneously as a central bank and a commercial bank. Such framework, however, underwent considerable changes with events such as the Arduous March and the monetary reform in 2009, along with weakening of state control and increase in marketization. The Central Bank’s function of providing capital has attenuated, with private finance filling the gap. Especially, the 2009 monetary reform triggered a spike in both the price level and exchange rates, sparking the disbelief towards the North Korean won and financial institutions as well as worsening the dollarization trend. North Korea is facing challenges in utilizing domestic and foreign capitals to foster economic growth. The financial sector which is supposed to channel private saving into investment through financial institutions is malfunctioning, and North Korea’s nuclear issues makes it incapable of accessing the foreign finance market. North Korea seems to know the significance of domestic finance in stimulating the economy, and is seeking to foster savings and absorb foreign capitals. The Central Bank Act or the Commercial Banking Law also indicates the nation’s willingness to move towards the two-tier banking system. However, North Korea’s current situation cannot be resolved merely through a partial change in operational methods nor through institutional adjustments and therefore a fundamental change is necessary in order for the financial system to fulfill its role as a catalyst for economic progress. This research aims to use China and Vietnam’s experience of financial reforms to draw out implications for North Korea’s financial reform. Along with an analysis about current North Korea’s situation, we focus on China and Vietnam’s reform process, specifically from pre-reform to early institutional settlement phase. (the rest omitted)

Korean Abstract: 중국은 개혁‧개방 이후 2011년까지 투자와 수출에 의존하여 연평균 약 10%의 고속성장을 해왔다. 하지만, 이러한 성장 방식에 한계를 느낀 중국정부는 제12차 5개년 규획(2011~2015년)을 통해 투자 주도에서 소비 주도로 경제성장 방식의 전환을 추진해오고 있다. 이는 성장률 하락을 용인하더라도 경제성장에서 투자에 대한 의존도를 줄이고 소비를 확대하겠다는 의지로 풀이된다. 그러나 2012년 이후 글로벌 경기침체가 지속되면서 수출 부진과 투자 및 소비 둔화로 인해 경제성장률이 7%대를 기록하여 이른바 ‘뉴노멀 시대’에 진입하였다. 특히 2011년 이후 소비 증가율이 둔화되고 있어 중국 내수시장의 성장 속도에 대한 전망이 초미의 관심사가 되고 있는 상황이다. 이에 본 연구는 중국정부의 정책적 의도와 달리 소비가 기대만큼 활성화되지 못하고 있는 원인을 실증분석을 통해 규명하고, 소비진작 정책을 살펴봄으로써 중국의 소비 주도형 성장 전략을 평가하고자 하였다. 또한 이를 통해 한국경제에 미치는 영향을 진단하고 ‘뉴노멀 시대’ 우리의 대중 전략 수립을 위해 시사점을 제시하였다. 본 연구는 여섯 개 장으로 구성되어 있다. 서론에 이어 제2장에서는 글로벌 금융위기 이후 추진되고 있는 중국정부의 소비촉진정책을 다루었다. 특히 제12차 5개년 규획시기부터 본격적으로 추진되고 있는 가계저축률 축소 전략(농민공의 시민화, 사회보장 확대, 소비자금융 확대), 가계 가처분소득 증대 전략(임금 인상, 서비스업 진흥, 위안화 절상, 직접보조금 지급), 소비구조 전환 전략(산아제한 완화, 주거비용 비중 축소)의 세 가지 측면에서 살펴보았다. 제3장에서는 중국의 소비 현황을 파악하기 위해 가계소비 규모, 소비 격차, 소비구조, 품목별 소비시장 동향을 살펴보았다. 제4장에서는 소득불균형 심화, 인구구조 변화, 미흡한 사회보장제도, 낮은 도시화율, 소비자금융 발달 부진, 높은 주택가격을 중국의 소비 제약 요인으로 제시하고 각각의 실태를 파악하였다. 2009년 이후 도농 간 소득격차가 다소 줄었으나, 지역 간(동부연해지역과 서부내륙지역) 소득격차와 지니계수로 본 계층 간 소득격차는 여전히 큰 것으로 나타났다. 제5장에서는 중국의 소비 결정요인을 규명하기 위해 중국 성별 데이터를 활용하여 실증분석을 실시하였다. 실증분석 결과 중국의 소비에 영향을 미치는 결정적인 요인으로는 경제성장과 경제발전 수준, 가계소득, 투자, 노인부양비율, 서비스업 발전수준, 금융 발전수준, 도시화, 교육지출, 최저임금인상 등으로 나타났다. 경제성장과 경제발전 수준은 소비에 유의미한 마이너스 영향을 미치고 있는 것으로 분석되었다.English Abstract: China heavily depended on investment and exports for economic growth since its opening up and reform, successfully maintaining an average annual growth rate of 10% until 2011. But the Chinese government, realizing the limits of such investment-driven growth model, has been pushing for a paradigm shift to a consumption-driven growth since the 12th Five Year Plan (2011~2015). This shows the government’s firm will to lower its dependence on investment for economic growth and expand consumption, even at the cost of declining growth rate. But since 2012, global sluggish economy has led to a slowdown of exports, investments and consumption, causing China’s economic growth to dwindle down to a whopping 7% and thus, signaling the country’s entrance into the “era of new normal.”Considering such background, this research aims to investigate why consumption has not been vitalized to the extent the Chinese government wanted, using an empirical analysis; it also seeks to evaluate the China's efforts to boost consumption, and, from them, its consumption-driven growth strategy. Finally, this study analyzes the impact China’s consumption-oriented growth model has on the Korean economy, presenting several suggestions for establishing Korea’s new China strategy in this “era of new normal.” This paper is divided into six chapters. After the Introduction, Chapter 2 looks into the Chinese government policies to boost consumption, which it began in earnest after the Global Financial Crisis. Three main policies are especially emphasized: China’s strategy to decrease household saving rate, its strategy to increase household disposable income and its strategy to change the consumption structure. In Chapter 3, this paper investigates the trend of China’s household consumption, its consumption gap across various strata, its consumption structure and the trend of the consumption market according to industry sectors. As an index that reveals China’s consumption expenditure, China’s household consumption increased more than five-fold from around 4 trillion 700 billion yuan in 2000 to around 24 trillion 150 billion yuan in 2014. But income disparity, an unwelcomed side effect of China’s high-speed growth, is widening the consumption gap between urban and rural areas, between classes, and between regions. China’s retail sales growth, which had been in a steady rise since 2000, has slowed down after 2010. In Chapter 5, this paper uses province-level data to conduct an empirical analysis to examine factors that determine China’s domestic consumption. The results show that factors including economic growth, level of economic development, household income, investment, elderly support ratio, development of the service sector, financial development, urbanization, education expenditure, and the rise in the minimum wage are mainly responsible for influencing China’s domestic consumption.

Korean Abstract: 중국과 북한이 관광협력을 추진하게 된 배경은 서로 조금씩 차이가 있다. 먼저 중국의 대북 관광협력은 양국간 정치관계에 영향을 받았으며, 동북3성 진흥전략이라는 거시적인 틀 내에서 추진되고 있다. 또한 중국은 관광산업 개발이라는 정책기조하에 북ㆍ중 관광협력을 전개해왔다. 반면 북한은 외화를 확보하기 위한 수단으로 관광산업을 육성하기 시작했으며, 그 과정에서 중국은 북한의 주요 관광협력국가로 자리매김 하였다. 또한 북한은 중국과의 관광협력을 통해 경제개발에 필요한 기반시설을 마련하고 있는 것으로 보여진다. 북ㆍ중 관광협력은 양국간 관광객의 상호 왕래보다는 중국 관광객의 북한 여행이 거의 대부분인 편중된 형태로 이루어지고 있다. 실제 2012년 한 해 동안 중국을 방문한 북한 관광객 수는 4,500명인 반면, 북한을 방문한 중국 여행객 수는 베이징, 옌지ㆍ훈춘ㆍ투먼, 선양ㆍ단둥 출발지만 기준으로 할 때 약 5만~6만 명이었다.본 연구에서는 북중관광이라는 주제와 관련하여 거의 처음으로 수행된 종합적 조사사례로서 전반적인 여건 및 실태조사에 초점을 두었다. 그러나 향후 북한 내 관광산업 기반여건 및 관광수요 등 특정주제에 대하여 좀 더 심도있는 연구가 진행된다면 남북 관광협력계획 등의 수립과정에 효과적으로 활용될 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.English Abstract: China is the most significant partner to North Korea in economic cooperation of tourism. In 2012, 4,500 North Koreans traveled China, while at least 50,000 Chinese traveled North Korea. It is between April and November that Chinese tourists visit North Korea. During winter, North Korea close its door to foreign tourists due to a electronic power shortage, ice formation, problem in heating supply, and other limitation in environmental factors.There are two different types of tour programs in North Korea, in terms of border city tour and Pyongyang and other city tour. The first one focuses on traveling border cities between the North and China, while tour programs in the second one concentrate on traveling Pyongyang and its nearby cities. Vehicle, train, or walking on foot is main transportation in the border program, while airplane, cruise, train, and vehicle are main transportation for the interior city tour. Average cost for the border program is approximately 700~2,500RMB per person, and it is 1,700~6,500 RMB per person for the Pyongyang and nearby city program. Yanji, Hunchun, Tumen, Shenyang, Dandong, and Peking are gate cities for traveling North Korea. Travelers from Yanji, Shenyang, and Peking are available for airplane, train, and vehicles, while those departing from Hunchun, Tumen, and Dandong take only train or vehicles.There are 1,864 international travel agencies in China, and among them only selected number of agencies which make contract with national travel agencies in North Korea, in terms of Chosun International Travel Agency, Chosun International Youth Travel Agency, and Chosun International Physical Education Travel Agency obtain authority to send Chinese trip to North Korea. There are approximately 15 authorized agencies in Yanji, Hunchun, and Tumen. In Shenyang and Dandong, it is about 10 agencies, and there are approximately 10 agencies in Peking.It is estimated that approximately 50,000~60,000 Chinese traveled North Korea in 2012. It also estimated that North Korea earned approximately 21.7million ~34.6million US dollar through Chinese travelers in 2012. When the fact that North Korea earned 86 million US dollar through Kaesong Industrial Complex in 2012 is considered, economic cooperation size in tourism between the North Korea and China is not small enough to be ignorant.Based on the paper results, fundamentally growth potential in tourism cooperation between North Korea and China is not high, because of limited Chinese tourist demand to North Korea, poor infrastructure and system, and low rate of return in North Korea tour goods. But, it could be positive factor that Chinese demand for overseas travel is growing fast. And it is hard to estimate trend of china's tourism demand to North Korea, because china travel agency started to deal with travel good in North Korea, recently.

Korean Abstract: 2010년 UN 안전보장이사회가 결의(UNSCR: United Nations Security Council Resolution) 1929를 채택하면서 국제사회는 강도 높게 이란 경제를 압박해왔다. 그러나 이란의 최대 무역국인 중국은 UNSCR 1929 외에 추가적인 제재를 도입하지 않겠다고 밝혔고, 이는 국제사회의 대이란 경제제재의 실효성을 저해한다는 비판을 초래했다. 한국을 비롯하여 제재에 참여한 국가들의 이란 내 사업은 철수 직전에 놓인 반면, 중국은 기존 경쟁국들의 공백을 활용하여 이란 내 입지를 굳히고 있다. 본 연구는 국제사회의 압박에도 불구하고 중국과 이란이 긴밀한 관계를 유지하는 원인을 파악하기 위해 양국의 경제 관계뿐만 아니라 정치·외교적 관계까지 전면적으로 분석했다. 이를 바탕으로 대이란 경제제재에 참여한 한국이 향후 이란과 어떤 전략적 관계를 맺어야 할 것인지에 대한 시사점을 도출하고자 했다.English Abstract: In response to United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1929 in 2010, the United States (U.S.), member states of European Union (EU), Korea, and other countries have imposed strong restrictions on Iran’s nuclear, energy, financial, and other sectors. However, China, the largest trade partner of Iran, only agreed to UNSCR 1929 and it has been criticized for weakening international sanctions against Iran. China has expanded business in Iran by filling the void consequences of that Korea and other participants have been forced to reduce business with Iran. This paper examines current amicable relations between China and Iran in terms of economic, political and diplomatic relations amid international sanctions against Iran. Analyzing current relations, this study provides policy implications for Korea to prepare strategic plans toward Iran.

Korea-China trade passing through the initial growth period (1992-1997), adjustment period (1998-2001), and second growth period (2002-2005), is now passing through its fourth phase, the stabilization period (2006-present). Although the scale of trade has increased, there is limited accessibility of Korean exports into the Chinese domestic market while processing trade still takes large share. - In the case of Korea’s trade with China, there is a strong connection with investment in China as an investment dependent export structure. However, following from the recent strengthening of local procurement by Korean business subsidiaries in China, there has been a decrease in the export inducement effect through investments. - Despite Korean shares in the Chinese import market holding second place after Japan at 9.6% as of 2011, shares in the domestic market are lower at 6.3% following Japan (11.3%), the US (9.1%), and Germany (7.5% in 2010). Korea’s investment in China, passing through the exploratory period (1989-1991), entrance period (1992-1997), adjustment period (1998-2001), growth period (2002-2008), and transition period (2009-present), has been diversified both in industry and region. However, there has been a recent decline. - After China’s admission to the WTO, the goals of Korea’s investment in China has changed from low-wage toll processing to the domestic market. In regards to industries, there has been a gradual transition from early light industries to heavy chemical industries, as well as a recent increasing focus on service industries. - In order to energize recent inactive investment, there is a need for policies that work to (a) cooperate to expand pioneering investments into the domestic market and (b) move the existing bases of production to the inland mid-western regions that are still needed by toll processing businesses, (c) establish and utilize new Korean industrial complexes, or (d) support the small and medium-sized enterprises which have business items to invest in China. There is an emerging need by both Korea and China to create a paradigm of mutually beneficial cooperation by concluding the FTA and uncovering new cooperative fields. - The reduction of tariffs and overcoming of barriers to entrance into the service industry, through the Korea-China FTA, can provide significant momentum for advancement into China’s domestic market. - In the finance and monetary area, Korea-China cooperation has not yet reached a level of real economy, however, in the future, if there is an increase in the international use of the RMB and a lowering of the barriers to the Chinese financial market, there will be a great increase in the possibility of actual cooperative endeavors. - In Korea’s 17 future growth engine industries and China’s 7 strategic industries, because of the abundance of overlap, there is a need to make a specific cooperative strategy according to areas where the two countries have its own strength and where the two countries experience comparative disadvantage in the world market.

The earthquake that struck Japan has seriously damaged that country's industrial output, mainly due to deficiencies in electricity supply and damage to distribution networks caused by the disaster. - The region directly affected by the earthquake accounts for 6.2 percent of Japan's GDP, while sectors such as general machinery and electrical machinery represent close to 10 percent. Disruptions in supply of Japanese parts and materials supply chain are hurting manufacturing companies in East Asia and in other areas around the world. - East Asian countries' dependence on Japan for parts and materials is high, with 29 percent for Taiwan and 25.2 percent for South Korea, while the ASEAN-4 (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) combined equal 21.6 percent. Thus, it is expected that East Asia's production network will be severely impacted. - A sudden and steep rise in the price of non-replaceable parts, and concomitant supply disruption is projected. This may result in a surge in demand for replaceable parts produced in South Korea and Taiwan. The ASEAN-4 account for 18 percent of exports to Japan combined, a relatively high figure. As a result, an economic recession in Japan raises the possibility of stagnation in the ASEAN-4 economies. Operations of Japanese companies in such Asian countries as China, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines were given serious pause. Although the earthquake's impact on the companies in those countries is predicted to be limited, the close monitoring on the potential influence on each industrial sector is required. - Taiwan, a country with a large consumer electronics industry that is highly dependent on component parts from Japan, is considering diversification of its import channels, lowering import tariffs, and prioritizing supply within the domestic market. The damage to industries from the earthquake can occur at two ends – demand and supply. - On the demand side, the decline of ASEAN-4 exports to Japan can start a regional economic downturn. - On the supply side, there is a possibility of cost pressures and increase in prices of industrial product price all over East Asia.