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BackgroundIn 2022, a nationally representative longitudinal survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, but those prevalences decreased in 2023. This study examines changes in those prevalences from 2023 to 2024, an election year in the USA.MethodsParticipants were members of Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Wave 3 of the survey was conducted May 23-June 14, 2024; invitations to participate were sent to all respondents to prior waves who remained in KnowledgePanel. Outcome measures concern justification for the use of violence to advance any of 17 specified political objectives, personal willingness to engage in political violence at 4 levels of severity and against 9 target populations, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions. Year-to-year change is based on the means of aggregated individual change scores, which have a potential range from 0 (no change) to ± 2.ResultsThe 2024 completion rates were 88.4% (8896 respondents/10,064 invitees) overall, 91.6% (8185 respondents/8932 invitees) for invitees in 2024 who had responded in 2023, and 62.8% (711 respondents/1132 invitees) for invitees in 2024 who had responded in 2022 but not in 2023. After weighting, 50.9% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.5%, 52.3%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (24.9) years. From 2023 to 2024, the prevalence of the view that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 political objective did not change (2024: 26.2%, 95% CI 25.0%, 27.5%; 2023: 25.3%, 95% CI 24.1%, 26.5%). There were no changes from 2023 to 2024 in willingness to damage property, threaten a person, injure a person, or kill a person in an act of political violence, and no changes in expectations of firearm use in situations where respondents considered political violence justifiable. Changes on other measures were infrequent (17 of 58 comparisons in the main analysis) and small where they occurred (with 2 exceptions, change

BACKGROUND: In recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a rise in political violence. Prior research has found that an individuals social network is associated with their likelihood of engaging in various forms of violence, but research on social networks and political violence in the US context is limited. This study examined associations between social network size and endorsement of political violence in a recent nationally representative survey and explored how the relationship varied by use of social media as a major news source, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and membership in a marginalized or privileged racial or ethnic group. METHODS: This was a nationally representative cross-sectional survey study of adults aged 18 and older in the US, administered from May 13-June 2, 2022. The exposure was social network size, defined by the number of strong social connections. We examined three violence-related outcomes: support for non-political violence, support for political violence, and personal willingness to engage in political violence. We estimated prevalence ratios for associations using survey-weighted Poisson regression with robust standard errors, adjusting for hypothesized confounders and including interaction terms to examine effect measure modification. RESULTS: The sample included 8,620 respondents. Median age was 48.4 years (95% CI = 47.9-48.8), 51.5% were female (95% CI = 50.4-52.7%), and 62.7% self-identified as non-Hispanic White (95% CI = 61.4-65.9%). In adjusted models, those with zero strong connections were more likely than those with 1-4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in general (PR = 2.43, 95% CI = 1.47-4.01). Those with 50 + strong connections were more likely than those with 1-4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in at least one situation (PR = 1.19, 95% CI = 1.03-1.37) and were more likely to report being willing to personally use political violence (PR = 1.52, 95% CI = 1.13-2.04). Associations varied somewhat by social media use, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and racialized identity. CONCLUSIONS: Individuals who reported very few and very many strong social connections were more likely than others to support political violence or be personally willing to engage in it in one form or another. Findings point toward potential intervention and prevention opportunities.

OBJECTIVE: This study investigates the association between replacement thinking, status threat perceptions, and the endorsement of political violence among non-Hispanic white adults in the United States. It explores how perceived threats to social status can drive support for extreme measures aimed at preserving white hegemony, addressing a gap in research on factors contributing to political violence, a public health concern. METHODS: The 2022 Life in America Survey provided data for this cross-sectional study, focusing on status threat and replacement thinking among non-Hispanic white respondents. Status threat was inferred from relative income, education level, and racial segregation in residential census tracts, while replacement thinking was derived through agreement with the statement in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants. The outcome was the endorsement of political violence. Analysis utilized a survey-weighted robust modified Poisson model. RESULTS: Among 5,976 non-Hispanic white respondents, 18.7 % supported political violence in at least one scenario. A U-shaped relationship was observed between racial segregation and political violence endorsement: respondents from more diverse communities were less likely to support political violence. Those endorsing replacement thinking were 233 %-229 % more likely to endorse political violence than those who did not, dependent on income levels. White respondents without a high school degree were 29 % more likely to endorse political violence. CONCLUSION: The study found a positive association between replacement thinking, markers of status threat, and political violence endorsements among non-Hispanic white Americans. These findings emphasize the need for research and interventions to mitigate these perceptions and prevent political violence.

BACKGROUND: Surveys have found concerningly high levels of agreement that the United States will experience civil war soon. This study assesses variation in expectation of and perceived need for civil war with respondent sociopolitical characteristics, beliefs, firearm ownership, and willingness to engage in political violence. METHODS: Findings are from Wave 2 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May 18-June 8, 2023. All respondents to 2022s Wave 1 who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, half the sample was female (50.7%, 95% CI 49.4%, 52.1%); the weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. Approximately 1 respondent in 20 (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly or very strongly that in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States. About 1 in 25 (3.8%, 95% CI 3.2%, 4.4%), and nearly 40% (38.4%, 95% CI 32.3%, 44.5%) of those who strongly or very strongly agreed that civil war was coming, also agreed strongly or very strongly that the United States needs a civil war to set things right. Expectation of and perceived need for civil war were higher among subsets of respondents who in Wave 1 were more willing than others to commit political violence, including MAGA Republicans, persons in strong agreement with racist beliefs or statements of the potential need for violence to effect social change, persons who strongly approved of specified extreme right-wing political organizations and movements, firearm owners who purchased firearms in 2020 or later, and firearm owners who carried firearms in public all or nearly all the time. CONCLUSIONS: In 2023, the expectation that civil war was likely and the belief that it was needed were uncommon but were higher among subsets of the population that had previously been associated with greater willingness to commit political violence. These findings can help guide prevention efforts.

BACKGROUND: A 2022 survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, of beliefs associated with such violence, and of belief that civil war was likely in the near future. It is important to determine the durability of those findings. METHODS: Wave 2 of a nationally representative cohort survey was conducted May 18-June 8, 2023; the sample comprised all respondents to 2022s Wave 1. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions; changes from 2022 to 2023 are for respondents who participated in both surveys, based on aggregated individual change scores. RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, 50.7% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.4%, 52.1%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. About 1 in 20 respondents (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly/very strongly that in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States, a 7.7% decrease. In 2023, fewer respondents considered violence to be usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives [25.3% (95% CI 24.7%, 26.5%), a 6.8% decrease]. However, more respondents thought it very/extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they consider political violence justified, I will be armed with a gun [9.0% (95% CI 8.3%, 9.8%), a 2.2% increase] and I will shoot someone with a gun [1.8% (95% CI 1.4%, 2.2%), a 0.6% increase]. Among respondents who considered violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 political objective, about 1 in 20 also thought it very/extremely likely that they would threaten someone with a gun (5.4%, 95% CI 4.0%, 7.0%) or shoot someone (5.7%, 95% CI 4.3%, 7.1%) to advance such an objective. CONCLUSIONS: In this cohort, support for political violence declined from 2022 to 2023, but predictions of firearm use in political violence increased. These findings can help guide prevention efforts, which are urgently needed.

Recent scholarship on the legacy of political violence has revealed two findings that deviate from the literature, a positive correlation between political engagement and the experience of violence and no correlation between religiosity and the experience of violence among Crimean Tatars after the 2014 Russian annexation. In this replication using the original dataset, we show that their findings were based on a coding error, unwise use of factor analysis and insufficient attention to missing values. After correcting the acknowledged coding errors, political violence negatively correlates with political engagement. But we move on to argue that a diverse pattern of missing data suggests that Crimean Tatars may have found some questions politically sensitive after the 2014 annexation, which may underestimate the effect of the experience of violence on religiosity. We conclude by integrating the new findings into the literature on the legacy of political violence and by reiterating the importance of replication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ancient Athenian historian Thucydides' account of the civil and interstate wars of classical Greece proved particularly illuminating for British commentators writing at the time of the French Revolution (1789–99). However, despite a growing scholarly interest in Thucydides' Nachleben in historical and political thought, little has been said on this period of his reception. This paper aims to address that gap. It suggests that, while Thucydides remained something of a minority interest, a curious mix of historians, journalists and political commentators turned to his History to explore the possibility that it might illuminate contemporary events. They were particularly interested in Thucydides' account of the stasis on Corcyra (modern Corfu), and its role in spreading instability, civil strife and war throughout Greece. These commentators used Thucydides to think through the similarities and differences between ancient and modern iterations of political violence and sometimes appropriated his language to existing political vocabularies and categories of thought. This resulted in innovative interpretations of Thucydides' text that emphasized the affinities between stasis in Antiquity with the idea of civil war, sedition, political instability and decline and fall in the contemporary world. It also led to the emergence of nuanced ideas of the lessons and warnings that could be drawn from Greek history as presented by Thucydides and how they could be applied to the turbulent politics of the 1790s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, there has been an increase in right-wing populist governments, with diverse causes and consequences. At one extreme, there were scenes of populist violence that shocked the world, such as the invasions of the American Capitol in 2021 and of Praça dos Três Poderes in the Brazilian capital in 2023. What are the socio-spatial origins and characteristics of the participants in the invasion in Brasília on January 8, 2023, and how do these features shed light on the phenomenon of populist violence? Using a new database produced from the municipalities of individuals implicated in investigations, we tested the recurring explanations for the rise of Bolsonarism —anti-Workers Party sentiment and elements of geography of resentment —to explain the event of January 8. We found a spatial pattern that configures two regions of high density of origin of the participants in populist violence. Furthermore, a significant relationship was verified between the increase in the evangelical population, the percentage of votes for Lula in the second round, and the distance to the Federal District. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2021 assault on the United States (US) Congress was the result of a prolonged process in which dangerous forms of identification, solidarity, and restricted citizenship were activated among a significant segment of American society. Drawing upon five leading Mexican newspapers, this paper analyzes the efforts made within the Mexican civil sphere to control the meaning of the assault on the US Capitol. By doing so, this paper expands the scope of civil sphere theory by revealing the international connections among discourses in which civil and anti-civil semantics seek to translate the threats to democracy highlighted by this event. This translation represents an effort on the part of the distinct communicative and regulatory institutions to shape global semantics regarding the meaning of democracy. At an empirical level, our findings provide compelling evidence regarding the convergence between right-wing and left-wing illiberal strands in the public sphere. These contributions to civil sphere theory can draw researchers' attention to the ways in which global disputes over events that occur in specific national spaces are constructed. Additionally, it broadens the analytical horizon for future research on civil dynamics in Latin America and other regions that face disputes over the meaning-making of contemporary democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on a dataset comprised of 67 interviews with police personnel across Canada, as well as documents, videos and social media content, this paper examines five different types of "harms" perpetrated against police officers by individuals and groups espousing right-wing anti-authoritarian beliefs. The harms identified are: 1. actions intended to overwhelm and drain police, 2. cop-baiting, 3. doxing, 4. legal and pseudo-legal harassment and 5. politically motivated violence. Aside from presenting impacts on individual officers, this paper also considers some of the larger potential effects on the institution as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Targeted killings are a prominent strategy for combatting terrorism and are regularly claimed to deter political violence. Employed against terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden and others who are argued to be prominent terrorist threats, a growing body of evidence suggests that targeted killings do not achieve their desired general deterrent impacts. Yet, this strategy still enjoys great political support and targeted killings continue to be touted as examples of previous counterterrorism success even before their impacts could be observed. Aiming to disentangle whether there is an empirical basis for these divergent claims regarding the impacts of targeted killings, this study examines the impact of the killing of bin Laden on global patterns of terrorist fatalities. Employing group-based and dual trajectory models, our findings indicate that regardless of whether an explicit cut-point is included in the analysis, the killing of bin Laden coincided with a global increase in terrorist fatalities in many but not all countries, some of which had previously declining trajectories of fatalities from terrorism. The potential impacts of future targeted killings and general deterrence are discussed along with the need to consider terrorism consequences beyond national borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources may be questioned multiple times. However, criminal and military interrogation research focuses on single-instance interrogations. The current study employed a role-playing paradigm to examine the effect of interrogation approach on various elicitation-relevant outcomes and information gain across repeated questioning sessions using a direct approach and the Scharff Technique. In the study scenario, participants (N = 68) were given information on an extremist group planning a bombing, were given an information management dilemma, and were subsequently questioned. Participants in the Scharff Technique condition were questioned using the Scharff Technique at Time 1 and direct questioning at Time 2. Direct Approach condition participants received direct questioning at both times. All participants provided a greater information contribution at Time 2 compared to Time 1, regardless of assigned condition. Compared to participants in the Direct Approach condition, participants in the Scharff Technique condition perceived Time 1 interrogators as more knowledgeable and Time 2 interrogators as less knowledgeable. This suggests a backfire effect when switching from the Scharff technique to direct questioning. Interrogators should carefully consider the decision to employ the Scharff technique if it may be followed up with more traditional questioning approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the contributions of 'formers', individuals who were previously affiliated with groups advocating violent extremism but who now work as researchers and practitioners in the P/CVE field. There are a limited number of studies assessing the value added of formers to P/CVE programs. We make two significant contributions to the body of work. First, we examine how formers can contribute not only to P/CVE practice, but to academic research of terrorism, and how their insights and experience can be employed for improving research designs and interview completion rates and responses. Second, none of the extant works incorporates the views of formers themselves in the assessments. Four of the co-authors of this article are formers who publish peer-reviewed and policy institute research, and they present their perspectives on who counts as a former, and how their individual backgrounds inform and bolster their research and praxis. We encourage researchers of political violence to emulate other fields of social science and incorporate appropriately trained formers as subject-participants to improve research in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hate speech found in social media a place to flourish. In the Argentinean context, new right-wing parties have disrupted the political arena, winning the elections of 2023. Many of these new right-wing figures grew in popularity due to their use of social media, on a background of increasing political violence. In this article, we use quantitative and qualitative tools to investigate the prevalence of hate speech targeting women politicians and analyze the role of different political affiliations in promoting such discourse. Furthermore, we propose a model that predicts users' political alignments based on their profile descriptions, allowing us to explore the distribution of hate speech among different political orientations. Our results provide a descriptive account of the relationship between hate speech by politicians and other users and shows that right-wing political figures and supporters are strong emissors of hate speech, while women, especially those from the left-wing are more prone to receive violent content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractFor adolescents, developing a strong and positive ethnic identity is a crucial life task that significantly impacts their well-being. This task can be especially challenging for those from multiethnic families in areas with social divisions and political conflicts. This qualitative study applies the Identity Process Theory to better understand the social-psychological challenges and coping strategies employed by adolescents from multiethnic families (an Arab father and a Jewish mother) in Israel. Twenty adolescents aged 12–18 (60% boys; mean age = 15.2 years, SD = 1.9) residing in Arab localities in southern Israel participated in semi-structured interviews about their experiences during the “Swords of Iron” war. Participants were recruited using a snowball sampling method. The results revealed four main themes reflecting the challenges faced by these adolescents, as well as four main coping strategies. Collectively, the twenty multiethnic adolescents expressed difficulties navigating their conflicting identities, experiencing peer rejection, displaying negative emotions due to the political situation, and witnessing tension and conflicts between their parents. The coping strategies employed by these adolescents included flexing their ethnic identity, disengagement and avoidance, confronting the situation, and seeking family support. Although findings are based on a nonrepresentative sample, they offer valuable insights for developing interventions and culturally sensitive practices to promote effective coping strategies that may foster resilience in adolescents from multiethnic families living in conflict regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-2000 period in Zimbabwe is known as the decade of the crisis because of rising poverty, hyperinflation, a collapsed economy, poor service delivery, political violence, and a myriad of problems that made the lives of the majority of Zimbabweans precarious. It was also the period of the land reform programme which the government embarked on to, among many other reasons, galvanise the ruling party’s waning political fortunes. The land reform programme was complemented by an ultra-nationalist imaginary which took the form of the 75% (later upgraded to 100%) local content policy for radio and television. The policy was meant to create cultural support for ZANU – PF’s land exercise by rejecting the cultural products of western countries. These western countries, in ZANU – PF parlance, were enemies of Zimbabwe because of their oppositional stance towards the land reform exercise. Thus, the 100% local content became a way of policing musical production to make it agree with this anti-western stance. The Urban Grooves movement of the post-2000 period emerged from this policy change and dominated Zimbabwe’s airwaves for a decade. This movement was not a musical genre per se but a mish-mash of genres comprising dancehall, soul, Afro-pop, house, hip-hop, among others. Using Zimbabwe’s hip-hop music, with special reference to the late King Pinn’s ‘I Salute You’, this paper explores how youth artists operated in post-2000 ZANUfied and Mugabeist Zimbabwe. Did their musical practices pander to the policing whims of the state? Did they, contrary to the state’s expectations, come up with alternative identities that sought to challenge the ZANUist political hegemony of their time? If youth cultures can act as conveyors of alternative phenomenological forms of social and political reality and as indicators of ideological resistance, how have Zimbabwean hip-hop artists acted as conveyors of ideological resistance? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to shed light on the forms and effects of anti-gender politics in a country that is widely regarded as being gender-equal. The empirical focus is on political debates and policy changes concerning gender equality and the rights of marginalized sexual and racial groups in Sweden between 2020 and 2024. The existing literature on the anti-gender trend focuses mostly on the discourses and strategies of ultraconservative actors. In contrast, we examine the perspective of gender-progressive institutional actors to gain a better understanding of how the political elite perceives ongoing change and the impact of this trend on liberal democracy. We conducted a thorough analysis of parliamentary debates and interviewed parliamentarians and employees of state institutions. Our findings demonstrate that anti-gender politics in the country is inextricably linked with the use of political violence and the further normalization of exclusion. Thus, we argue that struggles around gender in Sweden can be framed as a case of insidious de-democratization. This trend is defined as a set of relatively small-scale discourses and practices that further discrimination, silencing, and intimidation of already marginalized groups, and have gradual and cumulative effects of eroding the normative foundations of liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Endogeneity problems have plagued efforts to estimate the impact of military expenditures on economic growth. This paper addresses this problem with two instruments for military expenditures: the value of arms imports during periods of peace and the number of neighboring states suffering interstate violence. While positively correlated with military expenditures, the value of arms imports is unlikely to be determined by economic growth because of the time lag which exists, which in many cases runs into several years, between the placement of purchase orders for these arms and their delivery. The number of neighboring states suffering interstate violence captures regional 'political uncertainty', which spurs military spending without capturing the actual scale of domestic political violence which may directly affect economic growth. Several diagnostic tests show that both these instruments are highly correlated with military expenditures and fulfill overidentification restrictions. The results from empirical analyses of panel data on 133 countries during the 1960-2012 period indicate that an increase in military expenditure/GDP of 1 percentage point reduces economic growth by 1.10 percentage points. These results are robust to the application of 2SLS, LIML, and GMM estimators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2021, four months after the fatal insurrection of the "Save America" rally at Capitol Hill, 420 supporters of Donald Trump participated in an online study. Although it was not possible to recruit specifically for those involved, a subsample reported being present and active in the insurrection (n = 38), with several involved in the storming of the Capitol Building (n = 28). Individuals' construing was examined through the repertory grid technique, combined with measures of fusion to the group and willingness to undertake hypothetical extreme pro-group actions. Relatively low cognitive complexity was observed in those actually or hypothetically willing to be involved in the most extreme actions, suggesting that they were the least able to adapt to the world around them. A more positive and meaningful view of the self was developed on becoming a Trump supporter, and fellow Trump supporters were construed more positively than anti-Trump activists. Repertory grid and fusion scores were associated with both actual and hypothetical extreme action. Findings assist in the advancement of understanding why some individuals undertake extreme acts on behalf of a political leader, whilst others do not. With political environments becoming increasingly polarized around the globe, such knowledge is vital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the first dedicated study on how verbal violence is strategically and instrumentally used in social movements. Its primary objective is to contribute to the emerging debate on protest violence. Its secondary objective is to enrich the interdisciplinary field of swearing research by identifying 'political swearing.' Based on data on Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Movement, I identify four major instrumental uses of political swearing: attacking enemies of the movement, mobilization and politicization, identity-building, and 'personal political emotion work.' I find that political swearing can directly hurt people and indirectly do so by initiating violent enchainment processes. I also find that political verbal violence yields instrumental utility for social movements. This study's data include in-depth interviews with 30 informants, documentary and video data, and participant observation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Social networks and religious identity. From cyberfundamentalism to political violence" analyzes various sociological and anthropological studies on religious identities today, highlighting the influence of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the construction of identities. It addresses the use of social networks by different religious communities, such as Muslims and Christians, and reflects on the relationship between religion, identity, and political violence in a global context. It emphasizes the importance of overcoming racism and building an intercultural society based on respect. [Extracted from the article]

Using intimacy-geopolitics as its framework, this paper examines multi-sited violences enabled by digital technologies as interwoven forms of remote warfare. As political geographers have highlighted the 'trickling down' of digital weapons technologies from military to police practice, this analysis has tended to stop at the scale of the state. We extend this work by examining technology-enabled coercive control (TECC) within the context of domestic violence through the lens of remote warfare. TECC includes the way abusers use digital technologies to surveil, track, monitor, harass and terrorise their intimate partners. In examining TECC through the lens of remote warfare, this paper contributes to geographic literature by illustrating the common tools and tactics that the military, police and domestic violence abusers use to engage in political violence across sites and scales. We also emphasise the way survivors feel and experience TECC in order to illustrate the intimate emotional dynamics of political violence enabled by digital technologies. We argue that centring intimacy in this way helps to expose how control and domination work within remote warfare – at all scales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Social networks and religious identity. From cyberfundamentalism to political violence" analyzes the presence of religion in Western and non-Western societies, as well as the configuration of religious identities. It focuses on proselytism from different perspectives, including the relevance of Islamic feminisms. It addresses how religion interacts with social networks and examines the role of religion in different societies, with geographical examples such as Sarajevo and San Andrés. [Extracted from the article]

Security sector reform often involves integrating marginalized groups into the police. Extensive discussion surrounds the benefits of inclusion to the marginalized group, but we know little about impacts on the dominant group. I argue that exposure to out-group police can increase dominant group civilians' trust in the out-group, opening the door for further reforms and increasing the likelihood of peace. I explore dominant group citizens' responses to out-group police officers in Israel. First, using a survey experiment, I find no evidence that exposure to Arab (marginalized) police officers leads to backlash by Jewish (dominant) civilians. Then, drawing on multiple surveys and panel data on the identity of officers at every station over six years, I find that exposure to Arab police is associated with increased trust in Arabs among Jews. This trust extends to both everyday situations like willingness to live next door to an Arab and to beliefs about Arabs' intentions to commit political violence. Collectively, these results contradict fears that backlash by the dominant group might spoil peace, opening the door for police integration as an important part of peace processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Protest is a low-intensity form of political conflict that can precipitate intrastate armed conflict. Data on protests should therefore be informative in systems that provide early warnings of armed conflict. However, since most protests do not escalate to armed conflict, we first need theory to inform our prediction models. We identify three theoretical explanations relating to protest-repression dynamics, political institutions and economic development as the basis for our models. Based on theory, we operationalize nine models and leverage the political Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) to generate subnational forecasts for intrastate armed conflict in Africa. Results show that protest data substantially improves conflict incidence and onset predictions compared to baseline models that account for conflict history. Moreover, the results underline the centrality of theory for conflict forecasting: our theoretically informed protest models outperform naive models that treat all protests equally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Families suffer in particular ways during the violence and targeted deprivation of freedom and resources within political violence (PV), which includes wars, armed conflicts, and military occupations. While evidence is accumulating about the disproportionate impacts of PV on parents and children, we lack a clear, globally integrated understanding of how families suffer—and survive—PV. There is an urgent need to synthesize existing work to refine our understanding of parental experiences within PV—with particular attention to both how PV creates suffering for parents, and how parents strategize, caring for their families within the most horrendous of circumstances. In this systematic scoping review, authors explore how political violence impacts parenting. Using predetermined search strategies and inclusion criteria (peer-reviewed, empirical articles, published in English), searches within multiple databases, and tests of interrater reliability, 112 articles (quantitative, qualitative, and mixed method) were identified. Authors organized and coded findings, determined common themes, and built a conceptual model connecting and integrating findings. Findings point to two crucial areas of parenting within PV: parenting efficacy and parenting practices, demonstrating how these are simultaneously compromised by and amplified within PV. Results uncover how much parenting within PV is intertwined with parental psychological and social well-being, and that parents cope with a variety of internal and external resources, including culture, community, religion, activism, flight, and emotional and logistical reconfiguration. Implications include that, within and after PV, interventions must focus on parental well-being, as well as the social and political situatedness of parents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coup "handbooks" emphasize the capture the incumbent leader as a key objective for plotters to enact successful regime change. However, the literature has yet to empirically assess this relationship. We also lack a robust understanding of how leaders prevent their own capture during coups d'état. Using novel data on leader statuses during coups from 1950 to 2017, I find evidence that incumbent leader capture has a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of coup success. The findings also suggest that leader capture will be less likely if the regime pre-emptively creates a counterweight presidential guard unit, responsible for providing proximate security for the core leadership. These data and findings provide new insights into the dynamics of in-progress coups, focusing on the operational strategies employed by both sides. It also demonstrates the diversity of independent effects that specific types of counterweight forces have on specific coup outcomes, encouraging further study in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between hate crimes and terrorism remains a significant policy and academic concern. We provide the first empirical exploration of this relationship in New Zealand, drawing upon an original dataset of right-wing violent extremist (RWVE) incidents between 1997 and 2022. Employing analytical models of escalation and reaction we find evidence of connectivity between hate crime and terrorism, indicating that the links between them have significance for threat assessments of RWVE. We argue that the "either/or" implications of the "close cousins-distant relatives" dichotomy in existing literature on hate crime-terrorism linkages is misleading and identify new dynamics relevant for examining this relationship and monitoring the potential for violent hate crime acting as a barometer for more extreme activity, including terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to the Global Terrorism Database, the use of firearms in terrorist attacks has been on the rise, and firearms-based attacks are the most lethal. In the aftermath of mass-casualty attacks perpetrated with firearms, policymakers across the world advocate tightened gun control to restrict terrorists' access to both licit and illicit guns. However, academic research on the linkages between firearms availability, gun control legislation, and terrorism is scarce. This study fills this research gap by conducting a systematic cross-sectional analysis of the linkage between gun control, licit and illicit stocks of firearms, and terrorist attacks in 2015–2019, based on a novel dataset incorporating the Global Terrorism Database and the Small Arms Survey. Our estimation using OLS regression shows a strong relationship between the availability of firearms and the incidence of gun-based terrorism, especially for lone wolf attacks. Furthermore, terrorists in stable, democratic countries are comparatively more likely to select firearms as their weapon of choice. Conversely, strict gun control only slightly alleviates the overall risk of terrorism in stable countries but does not impact weapon selection. In unstable countries in the grip of intrastate conflict, gun control significantly reduces lone wolf-style attacks, while organized multi-perpetrator attacks are not deterred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Larq Journal for Philosophy, Linguistics & Social Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ideological religious nationalism (IRN) is a worldview that advocates the integration of religious beliefs with national policy and laws and the religious moralization of politics. However, the psychological mechanisms, individual differences, and socio-political consequences related to IRN are unclear. Across five studies (NTotal = 1,349), we established construct validity for a novel scale assessing IRN that is adaptable across different contexts. Results showed that stronger IRN relates to distinct psychological motives, domains of religiosity, and views of one’s nation. Results also showed that stronger IRN relates to supporting policies that promote religious-national integration and support of political violence. Lastly, results show that this novel IRN scale can be used across different contexts and has incremental validity beyond similar but distinct measures of religious nationalism. Overall, results showed that IRN can successfully capture people’s integration of their religious beliefs with their views about their nation’s identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biodynamic agriculture is akin to organic farming, but with some twists. It involves complex, multi-step, and seasonally appropriate techniques, which together work to ‘regenerate’ the agrarian environment. While biodynamic agriculture is predominately practiced in the Global North and associated with the teachings of the German Anthroposophical thinker Rudolf Steiner, Demeter (biodynamic) certification came to Indian tea plantations in the 1990s along with other third-party certification programs (e.g. fair trade). Biodynamic narratives of ‘regeneration’ on tea plantations in Darjeeling as I argue in this article, are green washing, at best. Biodynamic production and its attendant performances are a means of regenerating a fundamentally extractive industry for consumers desirous of redemptive stories about the ecologies that bring their comestibles into being. Biodynamic practice and marketing on plantations highlights, in the framing of this special issue, a kind of ‘plant intimacy’. But this ‘plant intimacy’ is a fetishized and romanticized representation of plantation work that occludes history, forms of violence and difference and political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Understanding health literacy and its predictors is fundamental for adolescents to have healthy lives. This study investigated the association between exposure to violence and other factors with health literacy levels among Palestinian middle school students. Methods: This cross-sectional study included middle school students. We used the validated Arabic version of the Health Literacy Assessment Scale for Adolescents to measure health literacy levels, and asked adolescents 11 questions to assess whether they were exposed to various forms of violence. We used binary logistic regression to identify the factors associated with each health literacy subscale. Results: Among the 816 students, 20.4%, 30.5%, and 50.5% had low functional, confusion, and communication health literacy levels, respectively. Exposure to political violence was significantly associated with lower levels of functional health literacy (OR: 2.65, 95%CI: 1.71–4.08) and low confusion health literacy (OR: 1.96, 95%CI: 1.31–2.94). Domestic and school violence were associated with low levels of confusion health literacy (OR: 1.82, 95%CI: 1.30–2.55). Conclusion: Exposure to different forms of violence predicted low levels of health literacy among Palestinian middle school students. This study identified the need for middle school students to acquire the skills required to analyse and integrate the health information they receive. Therefore, there is a need for regular interventions that target an increase in their critical health literacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political violence has, for a very long time, been a focus of academic interest in various disciplines, probing the relentlessly cyclic nature of violence and counter-violence. This essay looks at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with reference to the map of links by means of which Bion conceptualized the relations between two individuals, giving special attention to how negative configurations of these links impede contact with truth on both sides. Relating to theoretical writings by Baudrillard, Benjamin, and Arendt, this essay suggests replacing planar with spatial thinking and the condition of revenge with that of forgiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attempted assassination of Donald Trump led to widespread concern that the event would escalate political violence between U.S. partisans. While some politicians pleaded for Americans to unite against political violence and "turn down the temperature" on partisan hostility, others continued to engage in inflammatory rhetoric and blame. Using a national survey in the field at the time of the assassination attempt, we take the temperature of America's partisans before and after the event. We exploit the natural variation induced by the assassination attempt and large daily survey coverage (preattempt: 3,572; postattempt: 703; and 690 in a panel) in the days before and after the attempt to estimate the causal effects of extreme partisan violence on measures of partisan animosity and identity. Using panel and cross-sectional interrupted time series analysis, we find no evidence that the event increased tensions or support for retaliatory violence in the immediate aftermath. On the contrary, Republicans, including MAGA Republicans, became significantly less supportive of partisan violence against Democrats. Republicans also did not become more hostile toward Democrats; instead, their attachment to their own party significantly increased. Democrats experienced no change in attitudes. While nearly a third of Americans have no positive feelings toward the other party, and a supermajority have negative feelings, this animosity was not exacerbated by an extreme but salient instance of partisan violence. Despite the ills of modern political conflict, extreme partisan violence did not cause an immediate upsurge in support for violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on infrastructure studies in Latin America, specifically on the collapse of the Talavera bridge in Lima, Peru, in 2017. The social, political, and cultural implications of infrastructure in the region are discussed, highlighting inequality, failures, and associated violence. It analyzes how infrastructure generates power relations and affects different social groups, as well as its role in the transformation of landscapes and social relationships. The importance of studying infrastructure from an anthropological perspective to understand its complexity and its effects on society is addressed. [Extracted from the article]

This paper examines the interplay between memory, history, nationalism, and visual cultures by focussing on a framed photograph of a revolver gifted to Kamala Dasgupta's family by the Calcutta (Now Kolkata) police after Indian independence. Once used in an attempted assassination during the anti-colonial struggle, the revolver has become an anomaly in the nation's collective memory – a 'floating signifier' with an unfixed meaning. Analysing the photograph as a media spectacle and a symbol within national myths, I argue that it disrupts linear narratives of progress that dominate nationalist historiography. The article shows how Kamala's act of procuring the revolver has been overshadowed by her comrade Bina Das's violent act. Drawing on theories of the spectacle, national temporality, and subaltern studies, I illustrate the selective commemoration of revolutionary violence in India. The research in this paper demonstrates how precarious and subaltern histories such as Kamala's can destabilise established national narratives and pluralise temporal orders of the nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Myanmar is in a protracted revolutionary situation. State military authority has been greatly weakened but has not collapsed in the face of an array of armed and unarmed forces, new and established, which have fought against the junta that seized power in 2021. What forms of solidarity have contributed to the making of a revolutionary situation in Myanmar? How have they been sustained? Where and why has solidarity been hindered or broken? These questions animate the contributions to this Special Issue. To introduce them, this article explains the adoption of "revolution" as a category to describe and interpret events in Myanmar since the military coup. It does this by juxtaposing the period of transition in the 2010s, and interpretations of it, with the post-coup situation. It argues that as the transition paradigm became commonsense, it constrained understanding about happenings in Myanmar. Everything was debated in reference to an anticipated future state. Against that way of proceeding, the article advocates for description and interpretation of the revolutionary situation that turns on its radical contingency and eventfulness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bamar majority's institutionalised dominance and the exclusion of other ethnic groups from the Bamar's notion of national identity has been a cause of conflict in Myanmar. The 2021 coup has, however, underscored the need for co-operation between Bamar and ethnic forces against the military. Drawing on Graeber's conceptualisation of revolutions as opportunities to disrupt "unequal structures of imaginative identification" and Walton's consideration of Burman privilege akin to Whiteness, this article examines shifts in inter-ethnic dynamics. How have new forms of inter-ethnic solidarity demonstrated by the Bamar majority towards other ethnic groups challenged unequal structures of privilege since the coup? Through textual analysis of statements by Bamar revolutionary leaders and semi-structured interviews with members of ten ethnic communities, the article explores ethnic reactions to changing attitudes of Bamar elites and ordinary Bamar citizens. Findings suggest that Myanmar's ongoing revolutionary situation has prompted the Bamar majority to reflect on their privilege. Yet, the quality of Bamar solidarity towards ethnic minorities varies among different Bamar socio-political groups, ranging from instrumental alliances to a shared vision for social justice. The article concludes that although inter-ethnic solidarity building remains a work in progress, some positive steps towards ethnic and class emancipation have been made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Myanmar's unofficial minorities encompass diverse religious and ethnic groups excluded from Myanmar's list of 135 officially recognised "national races." They face exclusion due to their citizenship status as well as societal prejudices and entrenched discrimination against minority communities. Yet, debates over politics, federalism, and power-sharing in Myanmar primarily concern the relationship between the officially recognised ethnic minorities and the majority Bamar population. The Spring Revolution has opened the door to "rethink federalism," suggesting that moving beyond historically entrenched binaries of unity or ethnonational federalism may be on the table. Understanding how unofficial minorities face discrimination and disenfranchisement as well as inclusion, is imperative in not only imagining a new political system following a successful Spring Revolution, but in expanding the revolutionary process. Yet, discussions related to minorities and diversity have centred on the pre-coup model of ethno-nationalist federalism as a post-revolution power-sharing arrangement. With minority rights tied to increased autonomy for minority-dominated territories, how do minorities without territory meaningfully participate in or benefit from the revolution? How can the recognition of Myanmar's unofficial minorities – an estimated 10% of the population – be ensured? "Rethinking federalism" highlights relationships between territory, citizenship, and belonging in the Spring Revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021 ended a period of semi-civilian rule (2011–2021), bringing the country once again under direct military rule. Recent research into the religious responses to the coup in its early phases indicate that the mass protests were characterised by global internet culture, inter-religious solidarity, and new visions for a plural and democratic Myanmar. The Buddhist Sangha, it is often claimed, remained silent and mainly supportive of the military. Through a multi-method approach to textual analysis, qualitative interviews, and field work, this article seeks to analyse possible shifts in the ways that Buddhism has contributed to both justification of the military's action and resistance to it. It is argued that Buddhist support for the coup must be understood not only within an instrumentalist framework, but also through what is referred to in this article as a Buddhist Ideology of Order. In opposition to this, a Buddhist revolutionary movement is identified. It envisions radical societal transformations, including of institutional Buddhism itself. Finally, the data show that pro-revolutionary activities go well beyond established monastic revolutionary networks, indicating broader Sangha engagements in the Myanmar Spring Revolution than has often been assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role do prison protests play in revolutions? This article examines the prison protests that have occurred since the military coup, situating them as integral and instructive elements of an unfolding revolutionary situation. The analysis explores the character and significance of such protests at a moment of fierce and violent political contestation. It documents and contextualises them and develops an argument about their contemporary significance informed by the academic literature on prisons and revolution and prisons and protest. The article shows how the prison today is a revolutionary battlefront characterised by the activation and vulnerability of prisoners' bodies, the interrelation between collective and individual actions and consequences, and the connection between events outside and inside the prison. Today's protests resonate evocatively with those of the past. They are sometimes a deliberate intervention in bigger struggles and sometimes a response to the everyday and immediate provocation of inhumane conditions. Whatever the range of forms, patterns, drivers, and triggers of prison protests, the most common response from the authorities is violence, often with deadly effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]