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In this study, we examine the impact of the STAR highway located in Batangas province, Philippines, on the public finance of the cities and municipalities through which it directly passes. Specifically, we exploit a unique, disaggregated dataset on tax (property and business taxes) as well as non-tax revenues (regulatory fees and user charges) of the cities and municipalities in the Batangas province. We find, based on our two specifications of a modified difference-in-difference model, that the STAR highway had a robust, statistically significant, and economically growing impact on business taxes. We also find that this so-called "highway effect" also extends to municipalities located in a neighboring province to Batangas. Furthermore, based on more careful inspection and robustness checks, it appears that the STAR highway had a significant impact not only on business taxes, but also on property taxes and regulatory fees. These findings support the widely held belief that infrastructure investments matter; further, our micro-case study suggests that infrastructure investments can indirectly boost tax and non-tax revenues through their power to reduce transportation costs and enhance the activity of firms and workers located along the highway.

Employing the panel convergence method of Phillips and Sul (2007) to the nominal deviation indicators of two recent unofficial constructions of the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) index, this paper examines the existence and extent of convergence in the movements of East Asian currencies against the ACU. Empirical results reveal that intra-East Asian exchange rate movements have not converged to form a cohesive, unified bloc where currencies share homogenous movements, regardless of whether one examines the data on intra-East Asian exchange rate movements before or after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Instead, a separate number of convergent clubs or blocs in the region have formed in recent years. Finally, and most importantly, economies in the region are, generally, converging at different speeds to two opposing poles of convergence: groups of relatively depreciating currencies, and groups of relatively appreciating currencies.

Developing economies are seeking to promote financial inclusion, i.e., greater access to financial services for low-income households and firms, as part of their overall strategies for economic and financial development. This raises the question of whether financial stability and financial inclusion are, broadly speaking, substitutes or complements. In other words, does the move toward greater financial inclusion tend to increase or decrease financial stability? A number of studies have suggested both positive and negative ways in which financial inclusion could affect financial stability, but very few empirical studies have been made of their relationship. This partly reflects the scarcity and relative newness of data on financial inclusion. This study contributes to the literature on this subject by estimating the effects of various measures of financial inclusion (together with some control variables) on some measures of financial stability, including bank non-performing loans and bank Z scores. We find some evidence that an increased share of lending to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) aids financial stability, mainly by reducing non-performing loans (NPLs) and the probability of default by financial institutions. This suggests that policy measures to increase financial inclusion, at least by SMEs, would have the side-benefit of contributing to financial stability as well.

With the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the world's largest trading nation (measured by trade value) and second largest economic power (measured by GDP), its economic influence over the neighboring emerging economies in East Asia has also risen. The PRC introduced some exchange rate flexibility in July 2005, and in the wake of the global financial crisis has been pursuing a policy to internationalize its currency, the renminbi (RMB). Clearly the exchange rate policy of the PRC has significant implications for exchange rate regimes in emerging East Asia. This paper examines the behavior of the RMB exchange rate and the impact of RMB movements on those of other currencies in emerging East Asia during the period 2000 - 2014. We apply the Frankel-Wei regression model to identify changes in the RMB exchange rate regime over time and a modified version of the model, developed by the authors in their earlier paper, to estimate the RMB weight in an emerging East Asian economy's currency basket. We find that the US dollar continues to be the dominant anchor currency in the region, while the RMB has taken on increasing importance in the currency baskets of many East Asian economies in recent years. The paper also explores how monetary and currency cooperation - led by the PRC and Japan - can promote intra-East Asian exchange rate stability under the pressure of rising financial market openness in the PRC.

Developing economies are seeking to promote financial inclusion, i.e., greater access to financial services for low-income households and firms, as part of their overall strategies for economic and financial development. This raises the question of whether financial stability and financial inclusion are, broadly speaking, substitutes or complements. In other words, does the move toward greater financial inclusion tend to increase or decrease financial stability? A number of studies have suggested both positive and negative ways in which financial inclusion could affect financial stability, but very few empirical studies have been made of their relationship. This partly reflects the scarcity and relative newness of data on financial inclusion. This study contributes to the literature on this subject by estimating the effects of various measures of financial inclusion (together with some control variables) on some measures of financial stability, including bank non-performing loans and bank Z-scores. We find some evidence that an increased share of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) aids financial stability, mainly by reducing non-performing loans (NPLs) and the probability of default by financial institutions. This suggests that policy measures to increase financial inclusion, at least by SMEs, would have the side-benefit of contributing to financial stability as well.

This paper examines whether the renminbi (RMB) has supplanted the US dollar as the major anchor currency in the currency baskets of East Asian economies. First, we systematically demonstrate that existing techniques to address the problem of severe multicollinearity in estimations of the Frankel-Wei regression model, with the movements in both the RMB and the US dollar included on the right-hand side of the equation, remain limited in providing stable and robust results. Then we propose a simple modification of the Frankel-Wei regression model to estimate the RMB weight in an economy's currency basket. Using this new approach, we find that there is not yet an RMB bloc in East Asia, contrary to claims made by some recent studies. We find that the US dollar continues to be the dominant anchor currency in the region. The RMB has taken on some importance in the currency baskets of many East Asian economies in recent years and this appears to have occurred at the expense of the yen. In short, despite the rising importance of the RMB, it has not eclipsed the US dollar as the dominant anchor currency in East Asia.

The purpose of this study is to better understand the likely impact on Asian economies and financial institutions of various recent global financial reforms, including Basel III capital adequacy and liquidity rules. Part one reviews the lessons of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 and their relevance for Asian economies. Part two describes the major regulatory reforms that have been announced and possible concerns about their impacts on emerging economies. Part three reviews the literature aimed at quantifying the impacts of Basel III capital adequacy rules. Part four develops our methodology and analysis of the quantitative impact of Basel III capital adequacy rules on a panel of Southeast Asian financial institutions with emphasis on the effect on economic growth. Finally, the study concludes with a discussion on the policy implications of the results obtained from the previous section for Asian financial sectors and economies. Overall, we find that the Basel III capital adequacy rules are likely to have limited impacts on economic growth in Asia, but other financial regulations, including liquidity standards and rules for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, could have stunting effects on financial development in the region.

An Asian Currency Unit (ACU) index is constructed using an alternative procedure which minimizes a basket or portfolio of assets expressed in terms of national currencies. Using this estimated ACU index and an ACU Deviation Indicator, the main finding of this study based on the current trajectory of East Asian currencies relative to this regional ACU average or benchmark is that there is a formation of two contrasting groups of countries in the region - one a group of strong currencies and the other a group of weak currencies. We emphasize that the implication of this contrasting trajectory in East Asian intra-regional exchange rates is to disturb the competitive trading relationships in the region which may result in wasteful beggar-thyneighbor policies in the region. As emphasized by other recent studies, e.g., Kawai and Takagi (2012), the region needs a kind of framework for exchange rate policy coordination that will promote intra-regional exchange rate stability. We suggest several ways in which the region can capitalize on using this ACU index in the immediate term for surveillance purposes, particularly, for purposes of assessing "over- and undervaluation" of the individual currencies from the regional ACU average and for flagging emerging vulnerabilities in individual economies in the region.

The results highlight the conflicting interests of countries - to stabilize exchange rates or to keep the option of exchange rate depreciation in order to maintain competitiveness of domestic tradable producers. With deepening integration in East Asia, however, the desire for exchange rate stability will eventually outweigh the desire to maintain a protectionist tool. How extensive the pressures will be in East Asia will depend not only on how many countries seriously desire to be in the more integrated economic area in which Factory Asia operates, but also on their institutional and political readiness to commit in such schemes at the cost of renouncing an important policy instrument.

The possible crucial role of international bank lending in transmitting adverse economic disturbance from developed economies to emerging economies in the 2008–2009 global financial crisis has placed capital flows into sharper scrutiny in academic and policy discussions. The authors construct macro-and micro-panel data on international bank lending to six Asian economies—Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—to analyze a number of objectives. The paper first examines the influence of critical determinants not only to overall international bank lending but also to cross-border bank lending, and obtained one finding that cross-border lending by international banks tend to pull out from host economies during difficult times in source economies, whereas such retrenchments are not evident on an aggregated basis. This suggests that encouraging brick-and-mortar affiliates of international banks to “set up shop†in recipient economies may be the judicious choice for these economies. The paper next examines the differences between subsidiaries and branches of international banks in terms of their ability to shield themselves from the financial difficulties of their global parent banks and thus their ability to continue lending in destination markets. The results show that foreign bank subsidiaries are more capable in this regard. This finding carries with it the attraction of favoring an organizational banking structure that is biased toward subsidiaries. However, national banking regulators should remember that apart from encouraging a host of other domestic and cross-border initiatives, encouraging the entry of brick-and-mortar subsidiaries of international banks should not be viewed as a panacea to financial stability concerns of economies in Asia and in emerging markets in general.

The possible crucial role of international bank lending in transmitting adverse economic disturbance from developed economies to emerging economies in the 2008 - 2009 global financial crisis has placed capital flows into sharper scrutiny in academic and policy discussions. The authors construct macro-and micro-panel data on international bank lending to six Asian economies - Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand - to analyze a number of objectives. The paper first examines the influence of critical determinants not only to overall international bank lending but also to cross-border bank lending, and obtained one finding that cross-border lending by international banks tend to pull out from host economies during difficult times in source economies, whereas such retrenchments are not evident on an aggregated basis. This suggests that encouraging brick-and-mortar affiliates of international banks to "set up shop" in recipient economies may be the judicious choice for these economies. The paper next examines the differences between subsidiaries and branches of international banks in terms of their ability to shield themselves from the financial difficulties of their global parent banks and thus their ability to continue lending in destination markets. The results show that foreign bank subsidiaries are more capable in this regard. This finding carries with it the attraction of favoring an organizational banking structure that is biased toward subsidiaries. However, national banking regulators should remember that apart from encouraging a host of other domestic and cross-border initiatives, encouraging the entry of brick-and-mortar subsidiaries of international banks should not be viewed as a panacea to financial stability concerns of economies in Asia and in emerging markets in general.

This study seeks to address a number of rising policy concerns from the aftermath of the recent subprime crisis. Did foreign bank lending decline sharply and transmit the financial shocks from the advanced economies to the SEACEN emerging markets? Was the decline driven by the drying-up in supply of cross-border loans or more by the sharp decline in the demand for this funding? Does greater exposure of foreign banks to a host country lowered the sensitivity of its claims to shocks originating from their own economies? Do bank claims to a country affected by the aggregate changes in claims to another country? How about the stability of these flows? In short, this study aims to ascertain the various multi-faceted aspects of this international bank lending.

Our study brings into light the evidence of a fundamental role of the Chinese renminbi in shaping the exchange rate behavior of other major Asian currencies. We obtain results suggesting that there is an additional dimension to the ‘fear of appreciation’ or ‘fear of floating in-reverse’ behavior, initially coined by Levy-yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007)with regards to the cases of these major Asian currencies. In particular, we find that there is a greater degree of aversion to appreciation of these same Asian currencies, specifically, the Philippine peso and the Thailand baht against the renminbi than against the US dollar. This heightened fear of appreciation against the Chinese currency confirms that trade competition indeed matters in this part of the world and that the fear continues to play a central role in the exchange rate management behavior of major Asian currencies. This is understandable as the rising role of China as a major trading hub in the region as well as globally, must then render the renminbi to exert a significant influence to the rest of the currencies in the region.

We demonstrate that the economies of Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand, which are among the first group of emerging markets to embrace the inflation targeting framework of monetary policy, tend to adopt a form of an asymmetrical exchange rate behaviour wherein appreciation pressures are restrained more substantially than depreciation pressures. In short, these four Asian economies exemplify aversion to appreciations such that greater flexibility is allowed only one side of the market. Formal econometric tests using the smooth transition autoregressive and the Markov regime switching models confirm this hypothesis of aversion to appreciation and show that the central banks of these four economies tend to tolerate more of depreciations than of appreciations of their local currencies against the US dollar.

The primary objective of this study is to examine the evidence of occurrences of extreme market pressure of currencies of a number of Asian economies against the US dollar during the period of 2000-2009. In particular, we are interested in investigating the severity of these pressures during the recent US sub-prime crisis of 2007-2009. Were the currencies of these economies subjected to indiscriminate selling pressures during the period of the crisis? Was the heightened severity of the selling pressures associated with a particular event during the subprime crisis, such as the collapse of the Lehman Brothers? Our findings confirm the globally indiscriminate impacts of the sub-prime crisis on the countries examined and the greatest impact was felt and experienced by these economies around the time of the Lehman-Brothers’ collapse during the last quarter of 2008. Our findings offer far-reaching implications in terms of the linkages between macroeconomic and financial stability.