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This study probes the limits and possibilities of US military efforts to facilitate the transition from warfighting to nation-building. Most comparative studies conceive the complexity of this transition along a spectrum from conflict to humanitarian assistance to post-conflict stabilization. While the last two stages have often been interpreted as a coordinated act of civil-military 'nation-building'; the spectrum, in fact, represents an ideal type simplification. At one level, outcomes depend on the players involved, including: sovereign nations, national militaries, international and regional institutions, UN peacekeepers, private security contractors, and non-governmental humanitarian providers, among others. On the other hand, because the number, types, and causes of case outcomes are highly diverse and contingent upon many possible factors (among them for example: political, economic, military, organizational, humanitarian, cultural, and religious), institutions like the US military face serious difficulties both planning and coordinating post-conflict scenarios. Assuming this complex backdrop, the present study offers a qualitative analysis of two recent US government reports by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) on US military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, the US government sought to 'nation-build' by facilitating post-war stabilization and humanitarian assistance, detailing its genuine efforts to record both processes. While results indicate some limited successes in both cases, they also indicate a familiar pattern of uneven performance failures consistent with other cases internationally. The analysis concludes with recommendations for further research that may better control the contingencies of post-conflict management.

"Established by President Karzai under the Afghan MoI in August 2010, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program is a complementary component of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. A primary goal of VSO/ALP is to enhance security, governance, and development, and link local villages to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) via the districts and provinces. The ALP program was designed to provide protection and stability in villages/areas where the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were insufficiently strong to prevent armed insurgent infiltration and activities. The ALP initiative is considered by the Coalition as a cornerstone of a successful COIN strategy. The MoI had approved 99 districts for ALP units as of April 2012. Of these, 59 districts had completed the required MoI validation process, which includes approval by both village elders/shura and Coalition partners, for a force of 12,900 ALP. The Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC), and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), in coordination with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Afghan National Police (ANP), have committed to the development of an ALP force. This entails significant shared responsibilities and capabilities on the part of the Coalition forces. CFSOCC-A is the Executive Agent responsible for planning and execution of the ALP program. IJC is responsible for coordination with CFSOCC-A and general support of the program and the ALP units operating in IJC battle space. NTM-A/CSTC-A has the responsibility for managing the use of U.S.C. Title 10 fiscal resources for equipping the ALP, and for building the capacity of the MoI in support of the ANP and ALP. ISAF has the overarching responsibility to plan, direct, and integrate the contributions of these three commands in support of ALP development."--DTIC.

This analysis examines the progress Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are making in the broader context of the ideological, civil, military and economic conflict affecting Afghanistan and Pakistan. It analyzes the historic consequences of missed opportunities in the early years of reconstruction, and how a lack of troops and of effective local training programs has made it possible for the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and Haqqani networks to gain strength and expand their capabilities.

Afghanistan stands today at a crossroads. The progress achieved after six years of international engagement is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country. The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid, and without a clear and consistent comprehensive strategy to fill the power vacuum outside Kabul and to counter the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy, and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans.

This analysis examines the progress Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are making in the broader context of the ideological, civil, military and economic conflict affecting Afghanistan and Pakistan. It analyzes the historic consequences of missed opportunities in the early years of reconstruction, and how a lack of troops and of effective local training programs has made it possible for the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and Haqqani networks to gain strength and expand their capabilities.