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Presidential research commonly focuses on the most prominent cases of going public by presidents in semi-presidential regimes: such as expressing a lack of trust in the cabinet members. However, it is also important to understand the day-to-day functioning of semi-presidential republics and routine efforts by the presidents to insert themselves into government decisions. Moreover, presidents in parliamentary republics may also try to influence the government through the power of the public word. In this article, we conceptualize going public as an instance when a president weighs in on the performance of the cabinet and/or individual minister in the media. We analyze the focus and intensity of these instances in semi-presidential (Lithuania) and parliamentary (Latvia) regimes. Our main finding is that on average, presidents are more routinely active in public under semi-presidentialism. We also find that the intensity and focus of presidential attention on the cabinet are highly correlated to the media attention. Furthermore, presidents go public more often during the first year of their terms and pay more attention to foreign and defense policy than to other areas. Our results tend to support the presidency-centered arguments that emphasize the institutional prerogatives and political culture in the explanation of presidential activism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates presidents' foreign and defence policy activism under Portugal's premier-presidential system from 1982 to 2021. First, the article discusses the extant literature on intra-executive conflicts in semi-presidential systems. Then, it provides an overview of Portugal's experience with semi-presidentialism since 1976 and the powers of the Portuguese president. The third section describes all significant foreign and defence policy presidential interventions from 1982 to 2021 that resulted in disputes with the prime minister. This section estimates presidents' and prime ministers' ex-ante preferences over the issues at stake. We verify which preference is closest to the ex-post content of the policy implemented – if it is the president's, it counts as a presidential win. We identify the formal and informal means by which presidents acted. Informal means are essentially going public tactics. In addition, we inductively pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions under which presidents intervene and succeed. The article's main findings are two: first, the president's second term, absence of a strictly unified executive and a majority cabinet are separately necessary but jointly sufficient for presidential interventions to occur; second, formal powers are a necessary but insufficient condition for presidential victory. Finally, we speculate on the policy, institutional, and electoral consequences of presidential activism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cabinet shuffles in multiparty democracies do not equally affect all posts as they are caused by changes in the composition of government coalitions and by shifting political conditions. With data from the 340 individual cabinet appointments in Chile's presidential system in seven presidential terms (1990–2022), we find that the type of cabinet position and prior experience as cabinet ministers impact the length of service, but party members do not last longer than independents and neither do ministers with technocratic credentials. Ministers in low‐prestige positions are less likely to being sacked. As cabinet stability is associated with the delivery of public policies, studying the determinants of longer cabinet positions helps identify factors that contribute to governability and good governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The May 2023 elections in Turkey—comprising both parliamentary and presidential races—represented a pivotal moment in the country’s political history. These elections provided a crucial evaluation of the hyper-presidential system instituted after the 2017 constitutional transition. This article delves into the impact of the 2023 electoral outcomes on Turkey’s party system within the context of Turkey’s transition to a presidential system. It examines the ramifications of institutional changes, such as the introduction of winner-takes-all dynamics and alliance laws, on party system dynamics. Our findings indicate substantial transformations in key aspects of the party system, including increased polarization, heightened fragmentation, enhanced volatility, and intensified personalization. Through empirical analysis, showcasing the evolving dynamics of these challenges within the Turkish party system and their consequences for both the party system’s structure and the broader political regime, we offer insights into potential future trajectories for Turkey’s political landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis manuscript extensively reviews applications, extensions, and models derived from the Bayesian ideal point estimator. We focus our attention on studies conducted in the United States as well as Latin America. First, we provide a detailed description of the Bayesian ideal point estimator. Next, we propose a new taxonomy to synthesize and frame technical developments and applications associated with the estimator in the context of the United States Congress and Latin American governing bodies. The literature available in Latin America allows us to conclude that few legislatures in the region have been analyzed using the methodology under discussion. Also, we highlight those parliaments of Latin America embedded in democratic presidential systems as novel scenarios for operationalizing the electoral behavior of legislative bodies through nominal voting data. Our findings show some alternatives for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/Context: The article analyzes the partisan nature of ministers in Uruguay (96 % of the total) during the period 1985--2024, based on the institutional and political constraints of cabinet appointments. Given that the president has moderate legislative powers, nominations are used to build majorities capable of approving government initiatives and preventing the opposition from censuring ministers in Parliament. As the political system operates based on the logic of the party government model, the article explores the consequences of its application by analyzing the behavior of the ruling party's caucus in a sample of ministerial interpellations conducted in Parliament. Methodology: The research is a case study based on statistical analysis of original data. The main hypothesis considers four independent variables (size of the president's legislative contingent, party cohesion, type of government, and evolution of the government period) and a series of control variables. Conclusions: The study confirms that Uruguayan presidents make strategic use of ministerial appointments, based on the assumption that the relationship between powers functions as a typical party government model, similar to that observed in parliamentary regimes. Presidents appoint highranking partisan ministers when they have support in Parliament and the party is strongly cohesive. They appoint mid- and low-ranking partisan ministers when the president forms coalitions and when the party is less cohesive. Finally, they prefer new or discreet partisan ministers when the president loses his coalition or during the last years of the mandate. Originality: It analyzes the appointment of ministers in Uruguay under a presidential system that, despite not having excessive legislative powers, resembles the typical party government model of parliamentary regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/context: Based on a definition consistent with the party government model, this article proposes a flexible typology to categorize and classify variants of partisanship in Latin American coalition presidential systems. Methodology: We advance a measurement strategy that, based on the assumptions of governmental partisanship, allows representing the individual-organizational link of cabinet members as committed, eventually consolidated, and hierarchical. This typology enables to measure the concept of governmental partisanship nominally, ordinally, and dichotomously. Conclusions: The measurement strategy makes it possible to observe a significant range of partisanship variation in Latin American coalition presidential systems. Additionally, it provides insights into how presidents decide on the composition of their cabinet. Originality: We propose an innovative approach to categorize and classify variants of partisanship in government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Angola is governed under a presidential system characterised by a weakly institutionalised parliament ruled by the MPLA liberation movement since independence. UNITA, the largest opposition party in parliament, is also a liberation movement and former belligerent in the protracted Angolan civil war. Despite facing an uneven playing field, UNITA has seen its share of parliamentary seats increase in successive post-war elections. This makes it a relevant case study to understand patterns of elite formation and political representation more broadly. This article examines the composition of UNITA parliamentary elites in Angola in post-civil war legislatures, and how UNITA members of parliament (MPs) perceive representation tasks and engage in constituency-focused activities. We do so through a longitudinal study of post-civil war legislatures (from 2008, 2012, 2017 and 2022), drawing on new biographical data and interviews with MPs. We argue that, following the transition from rebel movement to political party, parliament became an arena in which UNITA was able to achieve a nationwide reach by integrating MPs with diverse backgrounds and by engaging with constituents. Additionally, while institutional rules favour national over local representation, MPs seem to invest in and value links with constituents. The study highlights how nationwide recruitment and connections with constituents contribute to elite formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractScholars have paid scant attention to how state–society relations are shaped in contexts where democratic and authoritarian institutions co-exist under new forms of authoritarianism. Furthermore, the realm of youth citizenship in such regimes is a nascent area warranting deeper exploration. This study draws on the case of Turkey to address these gaps by investigating why political parties, which previously marginalised young voters, have fervently mobilised youth during elections that paradoxically coincided with the process of autocratisation. We employ a content analysis of party programmes, election manifestos, and social media campaign content of major political parties, as well as secondary sources on Turkish and youth politics spanning from 1983 to 2023, to address this puzzle. Our analysis unveils three key findings. Firstly, transformative events such as the Gezi Park Protests and digital activism have invigorated youth political involvement, compelling both government and opposition parties to prioritise youth electoral engagement. Secondly, the shift from a parliamentary to a presidential system has heightened political parties’ focus on securing the youth vote to win elections. Lastly, political parties strive to align youth political values with their own ideologies, and the process of election campaigning provides ample opportunities for such a goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1980s, the new public administration approach became a trend worldwide. This approach had an impact in many countries. Turkey has been affected by this change in the management paradigm. Especially in the 2000s, reforms in the administrative field were realised within this framework. This study examines the changes in Law No. 5393 within the framework of the new management paradigm. "innovation" and "norm control" have been influential factors in realizing these changes. The study aims to follow the transformation of municipal legislation in Turkey through the distinction between the first and last days and to reveal the differences. There is no similar research in the literature in terms of date constraints. In this respect, the study is essential in contributing to the literature. As a result of the study, 39 amendments were found within the scope of the law in approximately 15 years. The majority of these amendments took place in recent years. Most of the modifications are related to the changes in the division of powers and duties within the Presidential Government System and changes in the names of institutions. However, the addition of paragraphs on terrorist organization affiliation has elaborated the Law in terms of content. In addition, the Constitutional Court issued seven annulment decisions. These findings suggest that the quality of legislation is relatively low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are ministerial portfolios distributed among coalition parties in Asian-Pacific democracies? Studies of power-sharing in Asia tend to focus on democratization processes rather than executive cabinets, although government coalitions occur regularly in the region. Using an original dataset of governments in 27 Asian-Pacific democracies from 1945 to 2018, I examine the bargaining advantage of the formateur party - the party managing the government formation process - over other parties entering government. We know from existing studies, mainly on Europe, that government parties holding larger shares of legislative seats receive larger shares of cabinet posts. I argue that portfolio allocation also depends on institutional context, and use the substantial institutional variation across countries in my dataset to test implications of this argument. I find that formateur parties have a greater advantage over coalition partners in presidential systems than in parliamentary ones, but that this advantage diminishes as political constraints facing the formateur increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic nationalism and state intervention recently gained attraction in many countries including Turkey. This paper questions whether Turkey has changed its economic policy framework towards a statecentric model and, if so, whether these changes are well thought-out and sustainable. The examination of key areas of state capitalism, that is the monetary, industrial, trade, financial, and state economic enterprise (SEE) policies put forward in the officially adopted five-year plans and annual programs, suggests that the changes in the economic policy framework began after the 2008 global crisis and accelerated after the transition to a presidential system. Upon examination, the policy framework does not reflect a definitive, coherent, and wholistic approach but rather a pragmatic attitude that swings back and forth, which exposes the country to swings in the global system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on policy responsiveness to public opinion highlights differences owing to political institutions—both electoral and governmental. Electoral institutions that produce coalition governments tend to reduce responsiveness in between elections. Government institutions that divide powers horizontally, by contrast, appear to increase that responsiveness. These findings point to the role of institutional "friction" in shaping what governments do, though the two sources appear to produce different effects—one harmful and the other helpful. This paper explores this apparent contradiction. We revisit and clarify theoretical assumptions and outline alternative models of the effects of friction. Extending previous tests, now in 18 countries, we find clearer evidence supporting that earlier research and more firmly establish friction as the mechanism, particularly as regards the influence of electoral systems. The two institutional sources of friction appear to influence responsiveness in different ways, which has implications for politics and policy that we consider in the concluding section. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the revision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to the developments that took place in the management of the executive branch, article (130) mentioned the issue of the resignation of the president, only in short terms. In this paper, it is stipulated that "the president submits his resignation to the leader and continues to perform his duties until his resignation is accepted." Therefore, there was no specific reference to the terms and procedures for the president's resignation. It was also not mentioned that the law determines the details of this issue. Although there has been no case of the resignation of the president in the Islamic Republic of Iran, we cannot ignore the research on the terms and procedures for the resignation of this political official. Based on this, this paper, using a descriptive-analytical method and adopting a comparative approach, discusses the subject of the terms and procedures for the resignation of the president and, inspired by the constitutions of different countries, triesto present a clear outline regarding the above-mentioned subject.

With the referendum held in 2017, the government system in Türkiye has been changed and the 'Presidential Government System" has been adopted Through this new system, fundamental changes have been experienced in the institutional structure of Turkish political life and continue to be experienced One of the areas where change is reflected is parties and elections. With the new government system, the difficulty for a single candidate to reach the 50%+1 target required to win the elections led parties and candidates to "alliance politics". Two alliances, one of the Republic and the other of the Millet, entered the 2018 elections. These alliance relations also had an impact on the 2019 local election results. In addition to these alliances, 3 more alliances were added to the 2023 elections. Alliances are seen as important political actors today. This study aims to examine the issue of "alliance politics", which is a new situation for Türkiye. Although it is thought that the issue primarily concerns inter-party relations and alliances, it should also be evaluated in terms of why alliances are needed, legislation related to elections, voters, representation, and the voting system. In the study, a literature analysis, and qualitative analysis which is one of the qualitative research methods, will be used While scanning the studies on alliance politics and cross-party alliance, Google Scholar, Dergipark, library databases, thesis, and internet resources including the discussions of scientists will be used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides a comparative analysis of the presidential systems of Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay, covering the period between 1989 and 2022, with the aim of examining the factors that motivate a person in the head of a ministry to seek the presidential candidacy. The central argument holds that both the incumbent president and the political parties have the purpose of taking advantage of a person's passage through a Cabinet of State to boost his or her presidential candidacy within the political organization. The selected cases are justified due to the existence of historical moments in which ministers have left their posts to compete for the presidency in these countries. The methodology employed in this study follows a multimethod logic. First, quantitative logistic regression analysis is used, followed by qualitative press analysis of ministers' careers to support the theoretical argument. The most notable results highlight that having a political profile, being a member of the president's political party and having held a political ministry are influential factors when running in presidential elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The composition of cabinets under presidential regimes has constituted one of the top topics of the litterature in political science in recent years. However, nothing has been said about the proper size of those cabinets. That is, why some cabinets are 37 ministers large when other is formed by just 13 members? We carry on a theory of cabinet size under presidential regimes, using insights from both parliamentarist and presidentialist literature. Our model is composed of five hypotheses relying on an original dataset of 161 observations across 19 presidential countries of the Americas. Our main finding is that the inclusion of independents and/or technocrats impacts significantly on lowering cabinets' size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We know little about how coalitional strategy affects the electoral fates of political parties in presidential democracy. The literature on coalitions in parliamentary systems shows a negative impact of entering government, while the coattail effects literature on presidential systems suggests some benefits. Combining elements from both approaches, we argue that there is a conditional electoral effect of joining the cabinet under coalitional presidentialism. Even considering presidentialism's heightened attribution of responsibility to a unipersonal executive, we find that coalition parties do indeed place a meaningful electoral wager whenever they choose to enter the president's cabinet as identifiable allies. Leveraging data on Brazilian elections held at national and local levels over 24 years and employing an innovative measure of portfolio salience, we show that the payoff of this wager is contingent on control of the most highly-valued cabinet positions and on the popular approval of the president. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most important phase of administration activity is the “supervision” phase, where the difference between the objective and what is achieved is revealed. Supervision, whether private or public, is a target control mechanism that arises as a result of the management activities of all administrative units. In this regard, supervision is not only the final stage of management activity, but also a starting stage, showing the decisions it takes and the shortcomings it emphasizes, and the activities other management units should or should not follow the same path. There are three key functions of public administration, and the state, the supreme user of public power, is the sovereign power to provide governance, the power to lay down binding rules and the power not to keep its own sovereignty above the law. This latter function also requires the state to be subject to a supervisory mechanism. It is this necessity that has led to the state being subjected to internal control in various ways, and has resulted in the creation of political (legislative), administrative (executive) and judicial control mechanisms. The study deals with the purpose, history and scope of political supervision. After statements were made about the functioning of the political control mechanism in the world and in Turkiye, the point was highlighted that political supervision, which was a blood-loss against the executive control, came with the Presidential System, and what should be done to strengthen political control within the framework of the "limitation of powers against society", which is one of the most important features of modern democracies [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The subject of the article is the analysis of the causes, course and effects of the October 2020 revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Particular emphasis is placed on the consequences of this revolution, especially on the change of the system of government in Kyrgyzstan and its impact on security in the region of Central Asia. The entirety of the normative provisions of the Constitution of May 5, 2021, and in particular the regulations regarding the mutual relations between the executive and legislative powers, proves that the presidential system of government established on its basis in Kyrgyzstan differs significantly from the classical model of such a system of government. This is evidenced primarily by the right of legislative initiative granted to the President of Kyrgyzstan, the right to participate in parliamentary sessions, and the right to determine the subject of its sessions. The October Revolution did not affect the security architecture in Central Asia directly. However, the adoption of the presidential system of government in Kyrgyzstan, the difficult economic situation, as well as unresolved social problems may result in further mass social protests in this country in the future, which may have a significant impact on the relations, especially with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sakarya University Journal of Law Faculty (SHD) is the property of Sakarya University Journal of Law Faculty (SHD) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When and under what conditions do ideologically similar nationalist parties adopt different positions and discourses about refugees and immigrants? We address this question by examining nationalist parties' approaches toward Syrian refugees in Turkey. Documenting these differences based on an original Twitter dataset and party manifestos, we argue that electoral dynamics under the new presidential system have shaped nationalist parties' discourses about refugees in the country. In particular, we explore how pre-electoral alliances and a strategic opening in the political space have motivated nationalist parties to amplify, ambiguate, or silence their otherwise conservative and nativist refugee discourses. Additionally, we maintain that urbanization has influenced the discursive strategies of nationalist party elites toward immigrants and refugees, giving rise to contradictory forms of nationalism in urban areas, including both far-right and liberal nationalisms. Overall, this study offers valuable insights into the complex interactions between refugee politics, electoral dynamics, nationalism, and urbanization in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2023 Turkish elections marked a historic juncture in the nation's political trajectory. Amidst economic, social, and political upheavals, coupled with a devastating earthquake, the elections served as a decisive evaluation of the newly inaugurated presidential system. With the incumbent Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) lagging in polls for the first time in over twenty years, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the People's Alliance faced formidable opposition yet managed to score a victory in the second round. This article delves into the contrasting campaign strategies of the two leading candidates, Erdoğan and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. We argue that while Erdoğan's campaign leaned on negative tactics and exclusionary populism, emphasizing counter-terrorism, identity politics, and regime maintenance, Kılıçdaroğlu's strategy championed positive messaging buoyed by inclusive populism, spotlighting democratization, good governance, and regime change. Within an overarching competitive authoritarian context, these distinct strategies highlighted the intricate dynamics between campaign narratives and voter perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of MEMLEKET: Politics & Administration / Siyaset Yönetim is the property of Local Governments Research, Assistance & Education Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores under what political conditions a “responsible prime minister” can emerge in a presidential system, focusing on South Korea after the 1987 democratization. Under presidentialism, premiers lack the constitutional resources to make themselves into a “responsible prime minister” independent from the president. Even such political resources as high popularity, deep trust from the president, and influence over the legislature are not enough to make them a “responsible prime minister”. Thus, most premiers remain a highly compliant subordinate of their president in Korea. By contrast, in a multi-party system Kim Dae-jung (DJ) sought to invite a third party, the United Liberal Democrats, into the “DJP Alliance” in order to win a highly competitive presidential election and therefore had to yield the prime-ministerial post to the head of the coalition partner party, Kim Jong-pil (JP). Under these political conditions, JP could be a “responsible prime minister” as an exception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do interest groups target legislators to approach or lobby under strong presidentialism? This article explores two hypotheses. First, interest groups and lobbyists seek to access committee chairs with gatekeeping power, even in those jurisdictions where the executive holds (most) exclusivity to initiate legislation (Gatekeeping Hypothesis). Second, interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills on issues that concern them but only on policy areas outside the executive's exclusive sphere (Legislative Activity Hypothesis). We test these hypotheses with evidence from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. We have coded and analysed 6479 lobbying audiences and over 2300 bills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Objective/Context: What characteristics does the presidential primary system adopt? And what are the effects of the primaries on the Honduran political system? Honduras is among the precursor countries in Latin America to adopt the primary system as a mechanism of internal democracy within party structures to select their presidential, legislative, and municipal candidates. Although parties are not obliged to use primaries to select their candidates, the law mandates it for those political groups that have more than one internal movement. Thus, over the years, after eight experiences--in some political parties--the system has become established. The objective of this work is to analyze the origin of the presidential primary system in Honduras, its characteristics, and its effects on the political system. Methodology: This involves analyzing all primary elections held since their adoption to the present. Conclusions: the evidence indicates that, while the primary election system has allowed for the resolution of internal conflicts within parties, it has also contributed to the consolidation of political clientelism in the country. Originality: this work provides tools for analyzing the process of selecting presidential candidates in a political context of low programmatic competition, clientelism, and high personalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/context: The system of presidential primaries was introduced into the Bolivian system in 2018 and was applied only once in 2019. This article aims to analyze the causes, characteristics, and effects of the compulsory and simultaneous primary system in Bolivia. Methodology: The characteristics of the party system, the method of selecting presidential candidates from 1982 to the present, the existing dynamics in the Legislature, the results of the 2019 primary elections, the current context, and regulations with a view to the 2025 general elections will be analyzed. Conclusions: This study shows that the presidential primaries were not on the agenda of the parties and were used by the ruling party to legitimize its presidential ticket. Therefore, using its legislative supermajority and control of other state organs, the primaries are introduced under the exclusive control of the leadership, which vertically decides whether they will be competitive or not. Originality: The detail and characteristics of this study offer a high degree of novelty and propose new elements for comparison and academic debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on varying perspectives on corporatism in Mexico, tracing its economic origins linked to presidentialism and industrial society. Topics include discussed by Arnaldo Córdova and echoed by Ilán Bizberg and Alberto Aziz in their views on state-controlled syndicates; and historical complexities, state-syndicate dynamics, and political agency within Mexico's authoritarian framework.

Copyright of Taiwan Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Türkiye, once distinguished as the sole Islamic society abolishing Islamic law, has undergone a transformative shift under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, veering towards Islamic law and a presidential system, diverging from its Western legal roots. To safeguard freedom of religion or belief, which is Islam, the establishment of an Islamic judicial system is imperative in a secular state. Islam is a comprehensive and perfect system that encompasses all aspects of human life. In promoting the upholding of fundamental human rights, especially the right to freedom of religion or belief, Türkiye can ensure that its legal framework supports the rights and beliefs of all its citizens, especially Muslims. This note critically examines the imperative for establishing an Islamic judicial court system. Tracing historical roots to the Ottoman Empire and Atatürk's secularisation efforts, the note also refers to legal, historical, and social dimensions. Emphasising the necessity for an Islamic court to address familial and financial disputes, it explores the intricacies of coexistence between Islamic principles and the existing secular legal framework. The discussion spans the interconnectedness of religiosity, the right to freedom of religion, and the implications of an Islamic judicial system on Türkiye’s legal, societal, and economic fabric. Drawing comparative insights from other secular nations, the article underscores the multifaceted considerations involved. Conclusively, it advocates for a nuanced approach that balances the preservation of Islamic values with the principles of justice and inclusivity within the Turkish legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In democracies where the executive has bill initiation powers and controls the legislative agenda, most laws enacted should come from executive-initiated bills. In Chile's strong presidential system where the executive has broad legislative powers, one in three laws enacted are legislator-initiated. We postulate 5 hypotheses on the effect of the attributes of the authors of a bill on its success. We test them using sequential logit models, to distinguish between partial and overall success (passing the original chamber and getting enacted, respectively). We utilise the 6005 legislator-initiated bills introduced in the Chamber of Deputies of Chile (1990–2018) – 15.2% of those bills passed the chamber and 8.1% were enacted. Bills concurrently authored by government and opposition legislators are more likely to pass. Having more authors increases a bill' chances of passing in the first chamber but not the changes of overall passage. A higher presence of first-term legislators reduces the chances of passage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional integration changes domestic decision-making structures, relations among social forces, and power distribution in different ways. China influences Turkey's domestic dynamics through involvement in economic cooperation, geostrategic alliances, and factional alliances. Concurrent and conflicting decision-making processes and foreign policy informality shape Turkey's engagement with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This research conceptualizes political informality as an authoritarian governance tool within the legal boundaries but outside of bureaucratic rationality. Turkey's attempts to be involved in the BRI have contributed to informalization as an authoritarian strategy of the ruling party (AKP). This research concerns a case study on the now Chinese-owned Kumport to demonstrate how informalization of state-business relations shapes Turkey's transnational relations. The findings point out to the negative consequences of this informalization on the Chinese investments in Turkey's logistics sector. The decrease in the power of the relatively Weberian bureaucracy of Turkey under the new presidential system led to the marginalization of Kumport in global shipping routes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article focuses on reevaluating theories of executive power amidst the growing authoritarianism in the United States. Topics include critiques of Anti-Unitarian and Strong Unitarian views of presidential authority, proposing instead a Limited Unitarian theory that acknowledges broad presidential powers within constitutional boundaries to prevent potential tyranny.

Protection of human rights is crucial in a democratic state. This article examines the potential impeachment of a president based on human rights violations. The research explores the legal framework regulating such acts, including the President's denial of a constitutional court decision. Such as the denial of Constitutional Court Decision Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 which decided that as long as the Job Creation Law is declared conditionally unconstitutional it is not allowed to issue implementing regulations from the law, however, the President still issued Presidential Regulation Number 113 of 2021. President's actions have violated the UDHR, and the 1945 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. The study uses normative research methods, including statutory and comparative approaches, and analyses legal materials using constitutional and historical interpretations. The findings suggest that Indonesia, the United States of America, South Korea, and the Philippines have incomplete arrangements for impeaching presidents based on human rights violations. Second, there is still a void in the regulation in the event of constitutional defiance of the Constitutional Court decision by the President of Indonesia. Therefore, researcher suggests limiting the meaning of violations in impeachment which is only limited to the President of Indonesia oaths in Article 9 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Thus, if the President does not comply with Constitutional court decision, he can be held accountable with impeachment mechanism. Therefore, it is necessary to add the qualifications of President of Indonesia misconduct through amendments to Article 10 paragraph (3) letter d of Constitutional Court Law.

This article discusses the power and limitations of the presidency in democratic Indonesia. It highlights the instability of the early post-Suharto period, with multiple presidents being impeached or facing political challenges. However, since 2004, Indonesia has experienced stable presidencies, disproving the theory that a multi-party system is incompatible with presidential rule. The author explores the concept of "coalitional presidentialism," where presidents build coalitions with political parties, state institutions, and influential non-state actors to establish well-functioning administrations. While this strategy has brought stability to the presidential system, it has also led to a decline in democratic accountability. The article concludes by questioning whether the next president will strengthen coalitional presidentialism or revive democratic accountability. [Extracted from the article]

"Introduction to Intelligence: Institutions, Operations, and Analysis" by Jonathan M. Acuff et al. is a primer that provides an overview of various aspects of intelligence, including institutions, operations, comparative international intelligence systems, counterintelligence, analytical methodologies, and ethical issues. The authors present three perspectives on the role of intelligence: scholarship in the service of government, actionable-oriented, and provision of alternative views to policymakers. However, the book lacks in-depth coverage of certain topics, such as domestic intelligence in the United States, interagency rivalries, the role of private contractors, and the Snowden scandal. The chapter on comparative intelligence services contains inaccuracies and gaps, particularly in the sections on the United Kingdom, France, and Israel. The chapters on intelligence operations, counterintelligence, and covert action provide only brief overviews and could benefit from more in-depth treatment. While the book serves as a basic introduction to intelligence, it falls short compared to other leading texts in the field. [Extracted from the article]

A contradiction about the role of the President has emerged between the Roberts Court's Article II jurisprudence and its major questions doctrine (MQD) jurisprudence. In its appointment and removal decisions, the Roberts Court claims that the President is the "most democratic and politically accountable official in Government" because the President is "directly accountable to the people through regular elections," an audacious new interpretation of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Tight presidential control of agency officials, the Roberts Court argues, lends democratic legitimacy to the administrative state. We identify these twin arguments about the "directly accountable president" and the "chain of dependence" as the foundation of "Roberts Court presidentialism.". Meanwhile, each of the major questions policies over the past three decades is the product of the "directly accountable president" and the "chain of dependence" in action: presidents campaigning on the policy, directing agencies to adopt the policy, and then publicly taking credit and responsibility for the policy. Nevertheless, the Roberts Court has almost always ignored the President's role in major questions policies and instead blamed the agency for overstepping its delegated power. The erasure of presidential involvement serves the Court's narrative of blaming "unaccountable bureaucrats," rather than either granting the policy more democratic legitimacy for its presidential backing or holding the President accountable for overstepping the separation of powers. The erasure suggests that the Court has an underlying ambivalence or anxiety about the problems of presidential power, which Roberts Court presidentialism has exacerbated. Ironies abound: the Court relies on a theory of presidential accountability, but then retreats from holding presidents accountable; it expands the power of unaccountable judges based on a narrative of "unaccountable bureaucrats.". The rule of law requires consistent reasoning. We suggest doctrinal opportunities to resolve the contradictions between the Roberts Court's Article II presiden-tialism and its major questions' erasures of presidents, including: appointment and removal doctrine; the contours of the MQD and its potential extension to statutory delegations of authority to the President; the future of Chevron deference; and the application of the non-delegation doctrine. The Roberts Court can untangle the "chain of dependence" with more consistency in either direction, but perhaps the most important lessons from these contradictions are recognizing the value of judicial restraint and acknowledging the costs of direct presidential power over agencies, not just the benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research addresses the role played by the Autonomous Constitutional Bodies (OCA) within presidentialism in the Mexican political system. It starts with the analysis of the presidential regime and the Mexican variant, paying special attention to the democratic transition in the 1990s. Subsequently, it analyzes from a constitutional and political point of view, one of the main Mexican constitutional innovations that paved the way for the creation of the OCAs, which facilitated the loss of constitutional powers of the head of state and the end of imperial presidentialism. To facilitate their understanding and legal configuration, the specific case of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) is analyzed, which exemplifies well the limits of these institutions, but also their capacity to modernize and democratize the Mexican State. However, this type of institutions would apparently be redesigning the political system in terms of the separation and division of the powers of the State, but without achieving true autonomy and limits for governments with a majority in the chambers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies determinants of political actors' visibility in the news, and their stability over time, observing the press coverage received by Chilean politicians in the elite press since the beginning of the democratic transition in 1991 and until 2019. In dialogue with theories of news values, we test how political positions in a markedly presidential system, the belonging to a government coalition, gender, and the association to conflict frames behave as determinants of the presence and prominence of politicians in the news in the three decades following the recovery of democracy in Chile. We have three key findings. Firstly, the visibility of political actors in the news follows a clear institutional hierarchy led by the president and cabinet members. Secondly, female politicians are less likely to be mentioned or have speaking space in newspapers than male politicians. Lastly, although an association with conflict-framed news boosts politicians' visibility, such association is unable to disturb structural power hierarchies, and the value of conflict does not increase over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The attempt to purify Indonesia's multiparty presidential system was only reflected after the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. However, it took work to implement it. In practice. Various measures have been taken, including party alliances and introducing voting barriers in parliamentary elections. Therefore, analysing the relationship between electoral thresholds and their ideal proportions in the form of legal-political reforms to strengthen the Indonesian presidential system is interesting. This is in line with the purpose of this study, which is to uncover and analyse the legal politics of electoral thresholds in an attempt to strengthen the presidential system of government in Indonesia. The approach adopted in this study is a theoretical approach with legal, conceptual, comparative and historical approaches. This study concludes that the legitimate political renewal of the electoral vote threshold is not closely related to efforts to strengthen Indonesia's system of multiparty presidential government. The ideal way to reform the legal, political threshold for electoral votes would be to set the parliamentary threshold at 2.5%, but at the same time tighten controls over the parties participating in the election, and the 2.5% threshold serves as President to maintain a balance between the parliamentary and presidential thresholds. In addition, it is also important to strengthen consensus (consensus democracy) among coalition political parties. There is still a desire to abolish the presidential threshold through the People's Representative Council (DPR) instead of the Constitutional Court (MK). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is recognized as one of the world's populist politicians who are steadily increasing in number around the world. During Erdoğan's 22 years in power, Türkiye first experienced a period of significant economic and democratic growth, which was then significantly reversed with the 2016 coup attempt and the presidential government system that Türkiye adopted based on a referendum. Simultaneously with this regression in Türkiye, the content and opportunities offered by social media applications have improved. Appropriately, politicians attach more importance to these platforms for political communication. Although the number of studies in the field of political communication is increasing, visual political communication is not being widely researched. Erdoğan's Instagram posts are important examples of his populist political understanding within the scope of visual political communication. Hence, in this study, 242 image posts shared by Erdoğan via his Instagram account in 2022, which constitute a total of 685 photos due to Instagram's feature of sharing multiple photos per post, were analyzed. It was found that Erdoğan made significant use of Instagram visuals in constructing his image as "one of the people" and as a tool to maintain his claim to masses that he was "one of them." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Euro Latinoamericana de Análisis Social y Político (RELASP) is the property of Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Facultad de Ciencia Politica y Relaciones Internacionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The study includes the analysis of the effects of different government systems on voter behavior by using a comparative method. In the comparative method used in the study, the effect of the different government systems applied in both countries on the voter behavior by using causality links is tried to be explained by conceptual abstraction through the structure of the executive bodies, election dates and election systems. Government systems are basically divided into three as presidential, semipresidential and parliamentary systems according to the nature of the relationship between the legislature and the executive, which are the main organs of the state. The government systems that are the subject of the study are the semi-presidential system applied in France and the presidential system applied in Turkey. In the study, the effect of different government systems applied in France and Turkey on voter behavior is examined under three main headings through strategic voting behavior. First of all, it is tried to reveal how the executive power is used in both countries and the effect of this power on the behavior of the voters, especially in the elections. Secondly, an evaluation is made on the behavior of voters based on the dates of the presidential and parliamentary elections, which are effective on the executive power. Finally, the effects of different government systems applied in both countries and different electoral systems applied on voter behaviors are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]