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The document discusses the advice provided by the Belgian Competition Authority on legal price fixing measures in favor of the agricultural sector in Belgium. It highlights the complex relationship between agricultural policy and EU competition rules, emphasizing the need for a balance between the interests of the agricultural sector and competition principles. The document explores legislative proposals aimed at strengthening the economic position of the agricultural sector and the implications of price control, supply chain control, and fair income proposals on competition, consumer prices, and market dynamics. The advice underscores the challenges of intervening in agreements and profit margins, while acknowledging the need for market interventions in exceptional circumstances. [Extracted from the article]

Lockdown restrictions reduce the spread of COVID‐19 but disrupt livelihoods and lifestyles that can induce harmful behavior changes, including problematic lockdown drinking fueled by cheap alcohol. Exploiting differences amongst the four constituent countries of the United Kingdom, we use triple difference analysis on alcohol retail sales to examine the efficacy of minimum unit pricing as a price control device to help curb excessive consumption in a pandemic setting. We find the policy is remarkably effective and well‐targeted in reducing demand for cheap alcohol, with minimal spillover effects, and consumers overall buying and spending less. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests whether cash shortages observed during the hyperinflation in Venezuela reduced consumption. Volumetric consumption indices are constructed for two types of goods: basic and non-basic goods, using data from Nielsen Venezuela at the national level. We find that cash shortages did reduce basic goods consumption but did not affect non-basic goods. The greatest consumption losses occurred between the forced demonetization of December 2016 and the peak of hyperinflation (September 2018). Those losses range between 3 and 10% points (p.p.) of the monthly consumption that would have been observed without the monetary restrictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the political economy of fiscal dominance during the Chilean government (1970–73) of Salvador Allende. Fiscal dominance appears when the monetary authority complies with the fiscal authority's demand to buy treasury bonds and monetise the deficit. It is argued that persistent fiscal dominance is inflationary, especially without robust fiscal and monetary rules. The Allende government financed the deficit with present taxes, debt (future taxes) and monetary issuance (inflation tax), causing the crowding‐out effect and, together with other policies such as expropriation and price controls, collapsed the demand for money, triggering hyperinflation. The lessons of Chile clarify the fiscal trigger of the inflation, stagnation, and widespread poverty that has affected Latin American countries in recent decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a historical and analytical reconstruction of a debate that never happened between John Kenneth Galbraith and Abba Lerner over the issue of price controls. While they adopted a similar analysis of underemployment inflation, shared by many post Keynesians, Lerner and Galbraith remained fundamentally opposed as to the effectiveness of price controls. Indeed, while both agreed on the relevance of price controls in the specific context of World War II, they disagreed over including price controls within the conventional framework of economic policies, as illustrated by their respective stances in the debate surrounding the stagflation of the 1970s. Throughout the paper, we provide the rationales behind their divergence on price controls by investigating its theoretical, epistemological, and normative roots. Finally, we put into perspective the contemporary debates about price control in the context of resurgent inflationary pressures with some salient points drawn from our reconstruction of the debate that opposed these two pioneering post Keynesians economists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The Pilot Plan of National Centralized Volume-Based Procurement (NCVBP) was adopted to cope with the rapid increase in drug expenditures. This research aimed to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the NCVBP on antiviral medications for the hepatitis B virus. Methods: Data on nucleoside analogs (NAs) medications of hepatitis B virus monthly procurement records in the pilot cities from January 2018 to December 2019 were extracted from the China Drug Supply Information Platform (CDSIP). The impacts of the NCVBP on purchased volumes, expenditures, and pre-defined daily dose costs were evaluated by interrupted time-series (ITS) analysis using Stata 16.0. We constructed two segments with one interruptive point (March 2019). Results: Compared to the same period between pre-and post-intervention, the purchased volume of NAs medications were increased by 92.85%, and selected medications were increased by 119.09%. Analysis of changes in the level of NAs medication followed a decrease in purchased expenditure (coefficient: 5364.88, p < 0.001), meanwhile, the purchased volume was increased with statistical significance (coefficient:605.49, p < 0.001). The Defined Daily Dose cost (DDDc) of NAs medication followed a decrease (coefficient: 8.90, p < 0.001). The NCVBP reform was followed by an increase of 618.41 ten thousand Defined Daily Dose (DDD) (p < 0.001) in purchased volume and a reduction of 5273.84 ten thousand Chinese Yuan (CNY) (p < 0.001) in the purchased expenditure of selected medications in the level. The DDDc of selected medications decreased in the level (coefficient: 9.87, p < 0.001), while the DDDc of alternative medications increased in the slope (coefficient:0.07, p = 0.030). The purchased volume and expenditure of bid-winning products increased by 964.08 ten thousand DDD and 637.36 ten thousand CNY in the level (p < 0.001). An increase of 633.46 ten thousand DDD (p < 0.001) in purchased volume and a reduction of 4285.32 ten thousand CNY (p < 0.001) in the purchased expenditure of generic drugs in the level was observed. Conclusion: The NCVBP reduced the DDDc of NAs medication, improved the utilization of the selected medications, and promoted the usage of generic products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/Context: This article reconstructs the struggle that consumers and the state waged to contain inflation and consumer scarcity in mid-twentieth-century Chile. Methodology: Drawing on records from Chile’s Ministry of Economy and print media, it first assesses how in the 1930s, mobilized consumers and Chile’s national price control office worked together to create an expectation that a strong interventionist state could prevent inflation and shortages by monitoring and regulating the speculative behavior of private merchants. Then, by examining the writings of leading economic thinkers of the postwar era, it details how the state’s understanding of rising prices and scarcity increasingly turned to structural matters of economic production and distribution, particularly in Chile’s rural economy. Originality: While most scholarship on inflation and scarcity in twentieth-century Latin America tends to either focus on the intellectual debate surrounding shortages and price volatility or on the grassroots political experience with these problems, I show how interactions between consumers and the state created a paradox. On the one hand, consumers came to expect that the state had an immediate duty and capacity to minimize short-term economic hardship. But on the other hand, by continuing to identify inflation and scarcity as problems driven by individual acts, many consumers, including some of the political left, lost faith in the state’s long-term planning capacity. Conclusions: The article concludes by showing how in the early 1970s, during a period of heightened class conflict, the state’s embrace of a longer-term, structural approach to inflation and scarcity drove a wedge between Salvador Allende’s Unidad Popular (up) government and its political base.

Copyright of CienciAmérica is the property of Revista Cienciamerica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Background In India, due to a lack of population-level financial risk protection mechanisms, the expenditure on healthcare is primarily out-of-pocket in nature. Through Drug Price Control Orders (DPCOs), the Indian Government attempts to keep medicine prices under check. The aim of this study was to measure the potential impact of DPCO 2013 on the utilization of antibiotics under price regulation in India using large nationally representative pharmaceutical sales data. Methods We used interrupted time series analysis, a quasi-experimental research design to estimate the impact of DPCO 2013 on the utilization of antibiotics in the private sector in India. Indian pharmaceutical sales data set, PharmaTrac from a market research company—All Indian Origin Chemists and Distributors Limited—was used for the study. The data are collected from a panel of around 18,000 stockists across 23 different regions of the country. The primary outcome measure is the percentage change (increase or decrease) in the sales volume of the antibiotics under DPCO 2013, measured in standard units (SUs). Results Our estimates suggest that post-intervention (after notification of DPCO 2013) there was an immediate reduction (level change) in the sales of antibiotics under DPCO 2013 by 3.7% (P > 0.05), followed by a sustained decline (trend change) of 0.3% (P > 0.05) as compared to the pre-intervention trend at the molecule level, but both changes were statistically insignificant. However, in terms of ‘average monthly market share,’ the DPCO 2013 notification resulted in a sharp reduction of 579% (P 0.05) (trend change) in the ‘market share of antibiotics under DPCO’ as compared to pre-intervention trend. Conclusions The impact of DPCO 2013 in terms of the overall increase in the utilization of antibiotics under price regulation was limited but there was a switch from non-price controlled antibiotics to price regulated antibiotics (notified under DPCO 2013). We argue that policies on price control need to be complemented with continuous monitoring of market behavior to have a measurable and long-term impact.

Background: In India, due to a lack of population-level financial risk protection mechanisms, the expenditure on healthcare is primarily out-of-pocket in nature. Through Drug Price Control Orders (DPCOs), the Indian Government attempts to keep medicine prices under check. The aim of this study was to measure the potential impact of DPCO 2013 on the utilization of antibiotics under price regulation in India using large nationally representative pharmaceutical sales data. Methods: We used interrupted time series analysis, a quasi-experimental research design to estimate the impact of DPCO 2013 on the utilization of antibiotics in the private sector in India. Indian pharmaceutical sales data set, PharmaTrac from a market research company—All Indian Origin Chemists and Distributors Limited—was used for the study. The data are collected from a panel of around 18,000 stockists across 23 different regions of the country. The primary outcome measure is the percentage change (increase or decrease) in the sales volume of the antibiotics under DPCO 2013, measured in standard units (SUs). Results: Our estimates suggest that post-intervention (after notification of DPCO 2013) there was an immediate reduction (level change) in the sales of antibiotics under DPCO 2013 by 3.7% (P > 0.05), followed by a sustained decline (trend change) of 0.3% (P > 0.05) as compared to the pre-intervention trend at the molecule level, but both changes were statistically insignificant. However, in terms of 'average monthly market share,' the DPCO 2013 notification resulted in a sharp reduction of 579% (P < 0.05) (level change) followed by a sustained increase of 9.5% (P > 0.05) (trend change) in the 'market share of antibiotics under DPCO' as compared to pre-intervention trend. Conclusions: The impact of DPCO 2013 in terms of the overall increase in the utilization of antibiotics under price regulation was limited but there was a switch from non-price controlled antibiotics to price regulated antibiotics (notified under DPCO 2013). We argue that policies on price control need to be complemented with continuous monitoring of market behavior to have a measurable and long-term impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Luridica Montenegrina is the property of University of Donja Gorica, Faculty of Legal Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Tariffs or price control has been a controversial subject in recent years. The debate between legal experts and economists is still a hot topic in any discussion. Tariff control regulated in the work creation omnibus law seems to be a topic that must be discussed again regarding this regulation’s urgency. Are specific prices so impressive that the government can intervene in regulating them? This article examines the urgency of rules regarding price controls to create a healthy competitive environment. After conducting a critical literature review, it was analyzed with critical analysis and looking at the objective of competition law was to maximize welfare by protecting competition. The results in this article indicated that the government could only intervene in regulating price-fixing only if companies’ pricing could harm the country’s economy and consumer welfare. The government, therefore, had an interest in regulating the price ceiling. Meanwhile, the price floor, which was believed to be pro-consumer and could promote consumer welfare had no interest and should not have been limited by the government.

To control pharmaceutical spending and improve access, the United States could adopt strategies similar to those introduced in Germany by the 2011 German Pharmaceutical Market Reorganization Act. In Germany, manufacturers sell new drugs immediately upon receiving marketing approval. During the first year, the German Federal Joint Committee assesses new drugs to determine their added medical benefit. It assigns them a score indicating their added benefit. New drugs comparable to drugs in a reference price group are assigned to that group and receive the same reimbursement, unless they are therapeutically superior. The National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds then negotiates with manufacturers the maximum reimbursement starting the 13th month, consistent with the drug's added benefit assessment and price caps in other European countries. In the absence of agreement, an arbitration board sets the price. Manufacturers accept the price resolution or exit the market. Thereafter, prices generally are not increased, even for inflation. US public and private insurers control prices in diverse ways, but typically obtain discounts by designating certain drugs as preferred and by restricting patient access or charging high copayment for nonpreferred drugs. This article draws 10 lessons for drug pricing reform in US federal programs and private insurance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the nonlocal problem for differential variational inequalities (DVIs) in Hilbert spaces. We proved that under some suitable conditions the considered problem is Hyers–Ulam stable and has a unique solution. It is shown how the abstract results can be applied to study the linear differential complementarity systems and a price control model. Some examples are given to illustrate the obtained results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Themis: Revista de Derecho is the property of Themis Asociacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Centralizing procurement for prescription drugs has the potential to reduce drug spending by creating economies of scale and by improving purchasing power. In March 2019, the Chinese government launched a volume-based purchasing (VBP) pilot program using a competitive bidding process to purchase accredited generic drugs for which branded drug substitutes were available. We performed an interrupted time-series design to estimate the change in monthly drug purchase quantity and spending comparing 14 months before and 7 months after the VBP pilot. We obtained monthly prescription drug purchase data for all purchases from public medical institutions in the three large pilot cities (Beijing, Shanghai and Xi'an) and two non-pilot cities (Changsha and Zhengzhou) between January 2018 to September 2019. We used negative binomial regression and log-linked Gamma Generalized Linear Model for purchase quantity and spending respectively. We evaluated heterogeneity of impact by pilot city, drug type (selected or non-selected drugs), and therapeutic class (cardiovascular disease, mental disorder and cancer) separately. The implementation of the pilot reform was associated with a 132% (95%-CI: 104–165%, p < 0.001) increase in the purchase quantity of selected drugs in pilot cities compared to an 17% decrease (95%-CI: 9–25%, p < 0.001) in control cities. In contrast, the purchase quantity of branded and other drugs in pilot cities decreased by 38% (95%-CI: 27–46%, p < 0.001) and 77% (95%-CI: 71–81%, p < 0.001), respectively; while in control cities, these remained at similar levels. Overall, in pilot cities, there was a 35% (95%-CI: 28–41%, p < 0.001) decrease in the purchase spending for all drugs in the first post-policy month, from 8.1 billion CNY estimated in the absence of VBP down to 5.3 billion CNY; in control cities, the change was negligible. The largest reduction in spending occurred for drugs for the treatment of cardiovascular diseases. The evidence suggests a positive impact of the VBP pilot in reducing overall drug spending and increasing the use of accredited generics in three pilot cities. This overall trend is not observed in two non-pilot cities. Assessments of long-term impact of the VBP policy on additional key outcomes including drug prescriptions, drug utilization, patients' health outcomes and payments on drugs are needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Centralizing procurement for prescription drugs has the potential to reduce drug spending by creating economies of scale and by improving purchasing power. In March 2019, the Chinese government launched a volume-based purchasing (VBP) pilot program using a competitive bidding process to purchase accredited generic drugs for which branded drug substitutes were available. We performed an interrupted time-series design to estimate the change in monthly drug purchase quantity and spending comparing 14 months before and 7 months after the VBP pilot. We obtained monthly prescription drug purchase data for all purchases from public medical institutions in the three large pilot cities (Beijing, Shanghai and Xi’an) and two non-pilot cities (Changsha and Zhengzhou) between January 2018 to September 2019. We used negative binomial regression and log-linked Gamma Generalized Linear Model for purchase quantity and spending respectively. We evaluated heterogeneity of impact by pilot city, drug type (selected or non-selected drugs), and therapeutic class (cardiovascular disease, mental disorder and cancer) separately. The implementation of the pilot reform was associated with a 132% (95%-CI: 104–165%, p < 0.001) increase in the purchase quantity of selected drugs in pilot cities compared to an 17% decrease (95%-CI: 9–25%, p < 0.001) in control cities. In contrast, the purchase quantity of branded and other drugs in pilot cities decreased by 38% (95%-CI: 27–46%, p < 0.001) and 77% (95%-CI: 71–81%, p < 0.001), respectively; while in control cities, these remained at similar levels. Overall, in pilot cities, there was a 35% (95%-CI: 28–41%, p < 0.001) decrease in the purchase spending for all drugs in the first post-policy month, from 8.1 billion CNY estimated in the absence of VBP down to 5.3 billion CNY; in control cities, the change was negligible. The largest reduction in spending occurred for drugs for the treatment of cardiovascular diseases. The evidence suggests a positive impact of the VBP pilot in reducing overall drug spending and increasing the use of accredited generics in three pilot cities. This overall trend is not observed in two non-pilot cities. Assessments of long-term impact of the VBP policy on additional key outcomes including drug prescriptions, drug utilization, patients’ health outcomes and payments on drugs are needed.

This paper analyzes the effects of carbon pricing on the economy, focusing specifically on the power sector under retail-price control. A simulation analysis using a CGE model implicates that it is desirable not to bestow the power sector with carbon pricing waiver to avoid a severe burden to the economy in terms of real GDP and real consumption. And excessive carbon price burden on GHG emissions in the power sector under Korean emissions trading system, where not only direct but also indirect emissions are covered, can and needs to be relieved through intensity-based (output-based) updating allocation of allowances to the power sector. Finally, we have reached a somewhat counter-intuitive conclusion that we can achieve higher economic efficiency by treating both fossil and non-fossil power plants equally when implementing the output-based updating allowance allocation for the power sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: To control the surging prices of KF94 masks amid the Covid-19 pandemic in South Korea, the government mandated 80% of medical masks to be sold as "public masks" at a fixed price. The mask prices came down quickly, ensuring public health and suppressing the spread of the pandemic, and the sales of KF94 masks reverted to the free market system on July 12, 2020. This paper aims to evaluate the unintended consequence of public masks to mitigate any negative effects for future deployment. Methods: The relationship between the offline and online prices of KF94 masks and the production quantity of medical masks was estimated using the data after July 12, 2020 (the "free market" period), and, given the regression results, counterfactual analyses were conducted to predict what the offline and online prices of KF94 masks would have been before July 12, 2020 (the "public masks" period) had the sales of medical masks reverted to the free market system a month earlier than July 12, 2020. Results: The prolonged deployment of public masks distorted the ratio of offline and online prices of KF94 masks and kept the prices artificially high at its later stage. How much higher? The online price of privately sold KF94 masks would have been roughly thirty to forty percent lower and the offline price roughly three to four percent lower if public masks ended four weeks earlier. Conclusion: The government intervention achieved its intended consequence of controlling the surging prices of KF94 masks at the early days of Covid-19, but the prolonged use of public masks had the unintended consequence of distorting market outcomes. The lesson? The government intervention should be kept brief, and the free market system should return as soon as the crisis subsides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]