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Socrates’ final argument in the Protagoras is premised on the surprising identification of the pleasant with the good and argues that virtue is the “art of measurement” that can be easily taught to the Many. The view that virtue can be taught is also espoused by Socrates elsewhere, notably in the Phaedrus. However, while the Protagoras identifies virtue with the art of calculating the greatest pleasure, which is identified with the greatest good, in the Phaedrus virtue is shown to consist in the ceaseless search for the good. I argue that the picture of virtue presented in the Protagoras is in agreement with that of the Phaedrus in that the Protagoras depicts the first stage of the process of learning genuine virtue, which is outlined as a whole in the Phaedrus. The argument of the Protagoras then works as a protreptic: it teaches an elementary way of thinking about the ends of one’s actions and opens up the way toward genuine virtue.

We combine linear temporal logic (with both past and future modalities) with a deontic version of justification logic to provide a framework for reasoning about time and epistemic and normative reasons. In addition to temporal modalities, the resulting logic contains two kinds of justification assertions: epistemic justification assertions and deontic justification assertions. The former presents justification for the agent's knowledge and the latter gives reasons for why a proposition is obligatory. We present two kinds of semantics for the logic: one based on Fitting models and the other based on neighborhood models. The use of neighborhood semantics enables us to define the dual of deontic justification assertions properly, which corresponds to a notion of permission in deontic logic. We then establish the soundness and completeness of an axiom system of the logic with respect to these semantics. Further, we formalize the Protagoras versus Euathlus paradox in this logic and present a precise analysis of the paradox, and also briefly discuss Leibniz's solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Socratic narration in Plato's Protagoras begins with the appearance of a young man. Early in the morning, a boy who had just learned that the sophist from Abdera is in town and who is yearning to meet him, goes to Socrates to request his accompanying. It is for this young man, and thanks to him, that Socrates, after a careful examination, decides to attend the gathering at Callias' house to converse with Protagoras. According to the narrative, the boy is the true catalyst for Socrates' attention and dedication to the sophist and, consequently, the real promoter and instigator of the dialogue. This paper mainly aims at shedding some light on the ethos and psychology of this young man named Hippocrates. Far from the picture often presented of him, merely of an innocent and helpless young man exposed at the dangers of the sophists’ teachings, this work stresses the boldness and excitement of a passionate and impulsive fellow whose irrationality is a potential threat not only for himself, but especially for those surrounding. In addition to the analysis of his ethos and psychology, the paper opens discussing to what extent and in what sense Hippocrates may be considered an associate of Socrates, and ends up speculating, relying on the Protagoras, about the possible causes that brought to the corruption of the souls of youth’s as such.

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This article analyzes the dialogue between Xerxes and Demaratus in book VII of Herodotus' Historiae. The dialogue argues in defense of the supremacy of nomos. That is why many scholars consider this passage as an echo of the discussion around the antithesis nomos-physis, in which the defense of the supremacy of nomos can be thought as influenced by the political thought of Protagoras of Abdera. This paper intends to show that Herodotus' discourse runs as an "act of intellectual intervention" within the debate of φύσις-νόμος during the fifth century B. C. However, we do not think about the Historian influenced by Protagoras, but as his particular reception within nomos-physis discussion, in which Herodotus' position is antagonic towards Protagoras. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Socrates' final argument in the Protagoras is premised on the surprising identification of the pleasant with the good and argues that virtue is the "art of measurement" that can be easily taught to the Many. The view that virtue can be taught is also espoused by Socrates elsewhere, notably in the Phaedrus. However, while the Protagoras identifies virtue with the art of calculating the greatest pleasure, which is identified with the greatest good, in the Phaedrus virtue is shown to consist in the ceaseless search for the good. I argue that the picture of virtue presented in the Protagoras is in agreement with that of the Phaedrus in that the Protagoras depicts the first stage of the process of learning genuine virtue, which is outlined as a whole in the Phaedrus. The argument of the Protagoras then works as a protreptic: it teaches an elementary way of thinking about the ends of one's actions and opens up the way toward genuine virtue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Hypnos is the property of Hypnos / Instituto Hypnos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to a fragment of Porphyry (410 F Smith = 80 B 2 DK), containing a dialogue on the theme of plagiarism, Plato made use of the same arguments as Protagoras' Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος against monistic thinkers, most likely the Eleatics. My paper aims to analyse Porphyry's testimony to assess some aspects of Protagoras' reflection on being through a comparison with parallel sources, in particular Plato's dialogues (Theaetetus, Euthydemus, Sophist, Parmenides). I conclude that it is plausible to suppose that, within the framework of a more general reflection on ὀρθοέπεια, Protagoras viewed the notion of being in Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος from a linguistic perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antilogies, or pairs of symmetrically opposed speeches or arguments, were generally ignored by Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Diogenes Laertius, and, later, by Eduard Norden, Hermann Diels, and most modern scholars of antiquity. As a consequence, until the end of the twentieth century CE, antilogies have been ignored or, at best, treated as a minor literary device to be mentioned only with reference to individual writings. Nevertheless, during the second half of the fifth century, antilogies were a crucially important form of argument and persuasion in 'sophistic' thought, philosophy, historiography, comedy and tragedy, and other fields. In order to redress the historical neglect of the art of antilogy, this essay provides an inventory (doubtless incomplete) of some 30 antilogies composed by playwrights such as Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides, and, most importantly, 'sophists' such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus and Antiphon (in addition to a few other writers of the same period). Building on this inventory, the second part of the essay seeks to establish identifying features of antilogy and assess its cultural significance in the Athenian context (in the second half of the fifth century BCE). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses Protagoras' account of how political communities come to be in Plato's Protagoras. The paper argues against recent readings of Protagoras' culture story that attempt to assimilate it to Aristotle's account by claiming that the text prefigures the Aristotelian thesis that human beings are political animals by nature. Instead, the paper suggests that Protagoras' account is part of a different tradition of political thinking, political conventionalism, that is among others associated with Democritus and Epicurus and his followers and that is known as social contract theory in one of its most fully developed forms. Key characteristics of this tradition are an emphasis on the lack of security in the original condition of humankind and human weakness as the primary reason why human beings decided to live together in communities. However, while Protagoras' account clearly prefigures a kind of political conventionalism, the paper also points out that this account lacks an important feature of social contract theory, namely, agreements as the means by which humankind transitioned from the original condition to life in communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the author analyses the new concept of education and upbringing, which emerged at the time of the first philosophical reflections on the place, role and importance of education for a community. The fifth century B.C. represents one of the most significant periods in the advancement of European culture, when problems of education and upbringing were first raised to the level of philosophical analysis. The crisis of the old traditional way of life and the emergence of democracy as the new form of political action created the need for re-examining the previous forms of education and designing a new one which would meet the needs of the new age. Moreover, a new understanding of paideia emerged. It was no longer the term signifying the education of children but was used for the whole shaping of Man in accordance with the new ideal of human nature. During that process, Sophists played the most significant role. As teachers of political arete, they simultaneously raised the general education of citizens to an unprecedented level and developed formal education with a particular emphasis on rhetoric, grammar, dialectics and mathematics. This paper also explores different forms of teaching that the Sophists employed as well as their influence and relevance in the development of teaching in the following centuries.

The present essay is a study and an analysis of important theoretical principles that we might find in Protagoras. Subject of this dialogue are moral virtues: their unity/plurality and teachebility or unteachebility. Virtues generally are wisdom, justice, piety, temperance and courage. Reading Protagoras and studying its parts with some points taken from other dialogue Meno, can light on the former; because Meno’s theory of anamnesis (teaching or knowledge is recollection) as a perspective describes the meaning of to teach or teaching (Meno, 79-80). Protagoras wanting this meaning and only takes teaching as a transition of arts and virtues from the elder to the young. Our disscution of Socrates and Protagoras's ideas on education is not only based on their differences and contrarieties but also on their similarities and intractions: coversations that are going between the philosopher and the sophist depict a relative convergence of their opinions on the education of the young. Symbol of the mentioned convergence is the principal view that emerges at the end of Protagoras; Socrates suppose and say we (I and Protagoras) must revise our opinions until arrive at a consequence on the teachebility or unteachebility of the virtues: if virtue is knowledge (wisdom), then it is teachable. (Protagoras, 361a-c). This result is at the same time repeated in Meno (87) and is one of theoretical principles.

Practical reductionism is a program based on the claim that the sole relevant information in the sphere of practical deliberation (and of its moral evaluation) is how good the envisaged action is, while the other traditional concepts offering practical and moral orientation - especially virtues - are at best superfluous (if they recommend the same as the inquiry of goodness) and in all other cases unintelligible and harmful (in so far as they pretend to be something good but recommend suboptimal action). Practical reductionism can be utilitarian, if the sole or dominant criterion of goodness is utility, and it can be cognitively optimistic, if it counts with the possibility to achieve perfect knowledge of the good itself and of the situation in which it should be applied. Such utilitarian and cognitively optimistic practical reductionism is a main topic in Plato's Laches, and it (or some of its relatives) is present in several other dialogues, notably in the Charmides and the Protagoras. My aim in this paper is to elaborate the concept of practical reductionism (in close regard to the Laches), to show its presence in some other texts, and finally to consider the philosophical contribution of such a bizarre thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Socrates' use of performative contradiction against sophistic theories is a recurrent motif in Plato's dialogues. In the case of Plato's Theaetetus and Gorgias, Socrates attempts to show that Protagoras' homo mensura doctrine and Gorgias' doctrine of the power of logos are each performatively contradicted by the underlying activity of philosophical dialogue. In the case of the Theaetetus, Socrates' strategy of performative contradiction hinges on Protagoras' failure to perform in the way that he theorized the sophist performing—namely, being able to change appearances through logoi (Theaetetus 166d–167d). In parallel fashion, Gorgias' account of the power of rhetoric is performatively contradicted by the orator's inability to prevail over Socrates, instead resorting to insincere responses to Socrates' questions in order to save face—a dialogical "performance" that ties directly to Socrates' portrait of Gorgianic rhetoric as a matter of pandering to the audience (Gorgias 460a–465a). Plato's aim in dramatizing these performative contradictions, I argue, is to illuminate both the proximity between Socrates and the great sophists, particularly with respect to Socrates' practice of elenchos, but also the distance between Socrates and the sophists in how they conceive of our situatedness within the world of human concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical humanism was evident in the system of one of the most controversial traditions in the history of western philosophy; the sophisticated few. The Sophist. And one of the major currents of this tradition is humanism. This humanism is at the instance of Protagoras, the most foremost, one of the most respected and wealthiest of the sophists. For him, man is the measure of all things and this position informed the intention of this paper being an existential analysis of the humanism of Protagoras. While this paper after analysis was able to appreciate the expediency of the humanocentric disposition of Protagoras, it also keenly pointed out that when this mode of humanism is taking to its logical conclusion, human existence will not only be plagued with lots of challenges but also could be misunderstood and misdirected and it will berth humanity into a sort of existential anarchism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The setting for the greater part of the Protagoras is the notorious home of Callias. But that space is continuously re-imagined and refocalized by the various characters, Socrates included. The narrative thus passes from the comic stage and the Underworld to council-chamber, epideictic auditorium, panhellenic assembly, panhellenic prytaneum of the wise, symposium (devoted to literary culture and the testing of one's fellow-symposiast), an occult Sparta, the Delphic seat of the Seven Sages, and the agora. With this last the contest of narrative spaces comes full circle, clearing the way for a better use of Callias's home and hospitality (361d). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the sophistic method of "antilogic" ("double arguments", "contrasting arguments", "opposed speeches", "two-fold arguments"). The main goal is to show that it is a method that, in the light of the doctrine presented in Plato's Theaetetus, is based on philosophical foundations. The work of G.B. Kerferd was crucial for the research on the art of antilogic, as it broke with the unequivocally negative understanding of this method adopted by the earlier research tradition. Late testimonies of Diogenes Laertius, Clement of Alexandria, Seneca and Eudoxus point to Protagoras of Abdera as the creator and promoter of the antilogic. These testimonies are confirmed by references to the method of "opposed speeches" contained in the comedies of Aristophanes, in the tragedies of Euripides and in the anonymous treatise Dialexeis. Plato's report on the doctrine attributed to Protagoras in the Theaetetus reveals the philosophical context of the antilogic. The so--called "secret doctrine", based on the acceptance of appearances and of the privacy of perceptions (man-measure doctrine), the rejection of truth and falsehood, and acceptance of the contradictory judgments results from the new vision of reality in flux. Therefore, the "secret doctrine" presents a consistent and coherent project leading to a new concept of logic and language and lays the foundations for the method of "double arguments". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses two broadly logical issues related to Protagoras' measure doctrine (M) and the self-refutation argument (SRA). First, I argue that the relevant interpretation of (M) has it that every individual human being determines all her own truths, including the truth of (M) itself. I then turn to what I take to be the most important move in the SRA: that Protagoras recognises not only that his opponents disagree with him about the truth of (M), but also that they hold that (M) is false simpliciter. By recognising that his opponents do not make the relativising concession he makes for them, he is forced to accept that (M) is false. I go on to argue that several other defenders of the SRA end up with a regress which is difficult to end and might not favour anti-Protagoreans. On my reading, by recognising what his opponents believe, Protagoras is barred from adding qualifiers, and the possible regress doesn't get off the ground. I conclude with brief discussions of how Protagoras might try to avoid the result of the SRA and the argument's role in this part of the Theaetetus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antilogies, or pairs of symmetrically opposed speeches or arguments, were generally ignored by Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Diogenes Laertius, and, later, by Eduard Norden, Hermann Diels, and most modern scholars of antiquity. As a consequence, until the end of the twentieth century CE, antilogies have been ignored or, at best, treated as a minor literary device to be mentioned only with reference to individual writings. Nevertheless, during the second half of the fifth century, antilogies were a crucially important form of argument and persuasion in ‘sophistic’ thought, philosophy, historiography, comedy and tragedy, and other fields. In order to redress the historical neglect of the art of antilogy, this essay provides an inventory (doubtless incomplete) of some 30 antilogies composed by playwrights such as Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides, and, most importantly, ‘sophists’ such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus and Antiphon (in addition to a few other writers of the same period). Building on this inventory, the second part of the essay seeks to establish identifying features of antilogy and assess its cultural significance in the Athenian context (in the second half of the fifth century BCE).

One’s mastery of speech conventions is considered an essential qualification for an educated individual, especially a scholar of English. Teaching writing to non-native English majors, writing instructors feel the burden to adopt the Current-traditional pedagogy. It is a process that stresses students’ internalization of speech conventions and treats students as passive recipients. Current-traditional pedagogy is inadequate to foster future scholars. This article offers a plan for teaching freshman writing inspired by the ideas and values of Protagoras and Isocrates and identified as New Sophistic pedagogy. Good speech/logos lies on good reasoning defined by one’s knowing himself/herself and one’s sociopolitical awareness. Thus, the proposed pedagogy focuses on students’ intellectual and emotional maturity. The writing instructor understands his/her moral responsibility to guide his/her students, and the students realize their leading role in the learning process. It consists of three cycles of deliberative discourse: Monologic argument, Mediation, and Negotiation. Through the different argumentation types, students understand that speech/logos mirrors one’s mind, his/her true essence. Progressively, students prepare themselves as true scholars by cultivating personal and social identity and feeling empathy for the other.

The paper argues for an analytic interpretation of Protagoras' myth in Plato's dialogue by showing that its goal is not so much to reconstruct the origins of civilization as to identify some essential features of humankind. Against the widespread opinion that human progress depends on the development of technai , Protagoras claims that political art is the most important one, insofar as it is the condition for the existence of society. More concretely, the emphasis on the political art also serves to bring light to what is distinctive of Protagoras as opposed to the other sophists and poets. As clearly shown in the dialogue, Protagoras can thus present himself as the only teacher who is capable of imparting the teachings suited to the needs of the new world of the polis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is no category of thought more deliberately or explicitly relegated to a subordinate role in Plato's dialogues than Sophists and sophistry. It is due to Plato's influence that terms "sophist" and "sophistry" handed down to us have unilaterally negative associations—synonymous with lies and deception, obscurantism and false reasoning. There are several reasons to be dubious of this standard view of the Sophists and their practices. The primary reason addressed in this essay is that the surviving fragments of the Sophists do not accord with this standard view, a discrepancy that is particularly acute in the case of the 5th-century sophist Protagoras. This essay attends to Protagoras's doctrines concerning antilogos, the sophistic practice of contradiction and negation. I contend that sophistic antilogos was a paradoxical practice that embodied metaphysical stakes for language and discourse. I challenge the standard view of Sophists and their antilogos by reconstructing a speculative counter-definition: a method for instantiating through language an ontology of flux and becoming over and against what would come to be a Platonist metaphysics of enduring, pure Being. I do this through a comparative analysis of Protagoras and the second century C.E. South Asian Buddhist thinker, Nāgārjuna. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common 4th century B.C. view according to which Homer was regarded as a poet and a wise man, the leading and most honorable, to the point of being considered “the educator of Greece” (Pl. Resp. 606e-607a), is strongly supported by the Platonic dialogues. The works of Plato are the main available source to get to know not only the great pedagogical esteem for Homer, but also the several educational traditions that used or relied on Homeric poetry in Classical Athens. We are certainly used to thinking of Socrates as standing out for contesting or blaming such customs and methods provided by rhapsodes, sophists and common people (Pl. Resp.; Ion; Hp. mi.). But conversely, he is also often depicted quoting, alluding to or remaking on Homeric passages when presenting his own views. Socrates even claims to feel a certain friendship or reverence for the poet and declares to be charmed by contemplating things through him, whom he considers to be amongst the few deserving to be called “philosophers” (Pl. Resp. 595b; 607c-d; Phdr. 278b-279b). The puzzling twofold nature of the Socratic attitude towards Homer, coupled with the fact that Plato would become a figure as honored as the poet was, led ancient literary criticism to focus on the Platonic use and sharing of material and techniques proper to Homeric poetry. Works like those of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Maximus of Tyre, Longinus and above all Proclus, not only pointed out the philosopher’s debt to the poet, but even considered him to be an admirer of the Homeric genius unlike anyone else, and whose emulation basically attempted to reach and outperform the pedagogical power that the legendary poet had (Dion. Hal. Pomp. I, 13; Max. Tyr. Or. 26; [Longinus]; Subl. XIII, 2-3; Procl., In R. VI, 163.13-164.7; 202.7-205.23). With an analogous spirit, studies of contemporary Platonists suggest that the dialogues were shaped using the Homeric text, especially the Odyssey, as a template, and making Socrates appear as going through equivalent experiences to those of Odysseus’ “νόστος”. With respect to Protagoras, previous attempts focused on explicit references to books X and XI, placing the dispute with the sophist and the events at Callias’ house in the symbolic context of Odysseus’ encounter with Circe and the following journey into the underworld. I attempt to bring that reading one step further, paying special attention to the narrated character and the dramatic context for the singing of those episodes and the parallel ones in Protagoras. In first place, I consider the whole dialogue refiguring the episode in the Odyssey that works as a dramatic frame for the singing of Odysseus’ past adventures, the arrival at Phaeacia and the reception at Alcinous’ court. I regard Odysseus’ need to sing the Apologue as a call for hospitality to secure a safe passage home, working as a pattern for Socrates’ need of a tale at his own appearance in Athens to fulfill and secure a philosophical education in the city. In second place, I take into consideration the metanarrative dimension of such remaking. Since Socrates’ narration comes in response to a certain “Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης”, a “praiser of Homer” (Pl. Prt. 309b1), as Odysseus’ Apologue is to Demodocus the “ἀοιδὸς”, I examine how the dialogue could evince a dispute for pedagogical primacy amongst the different narratives and uses of poetry in Athens, a dispute that the Platonic narrative would attempt to surpass precisely by imitating Homer.

Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato's Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras , ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw—the soul's domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1974, Prof. María Luisa Acuña (1931-2020) carried out the first Spanish version of Plato’s Protagoras made by an Argentinian woman. It was published by the Facultad de Humanidades of the Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE). Prof. Acuña is the author not only of the translation but also of the notes to the Spanish as well as to the Greek texts. Her work is a valuable contribution to Classical Studies in Argentina and, more widely, to all Spanish-speaking countries, because it truly has many virtues. This can be seen, for example, in the agile rhythm of the first scenes in the prologue (which has a noticeable colloquial style, almost funny at times), in lexical choices, in the translator’s deep knowledge of Plato’s technical vocabulary and thought and in the erudition that the notes show. The aim of this essay is to highlight some of these virtues and, in general, to share my own reading experience of this remarkable version of Protagoras.

Socrates’ use of performative contradiction against sophistic theories is a recurrent motif in Plato’s dialogues. In the case of Plato’s Theaetetus and Gorgias, Socrates attempts to show that Protagoras’ homo mensura doctrine and Gorgias’ doctrine of the power of logos are each performatively contradicted by the underlying activity of philosophical dialogue. In the case of the Theaetetus, Socrates’ strategy of performative contradiction hinges on Protagoras’ failure to perform in the way that he theorized the sophist performing—namely, being able to change appearances through logoi (Theaetetus 166d–167d). In parallel fashion, Gorgias’ account of the power of rhetoric is performatively contradicted by the orator’s inability to prevail over Socrates, instead resorting to insincere responses to Socrates’ questions in order to save face—a dialogical “performance” that ties directly to Socrates’ portrait of Gorgianic rhetoric as a matter of pandering to the audience (Gorgias 460a–465a). Plato’s aim in dramatizing these performative contradictions, I argue, is to illuminate both the proximity between Socrates and the great sophists, particularly with respect to Socrates’ practice of elenchos, but also the distance between Socrates and the sophists in how they conceive of our situatedness within the world of human concerns.

By comparing Protagoras' and Callicles' arguments, the author outlines two accounts that respond to the questions raised by the changing social realities of 5th century BC Athens. The two sophists' views are comprised of several complementary elements: 1) viewing humans as beings driven by pursuit of pleasures and avoidance of pain; 2) distinguishing law from nature; 3) views of morality as grounded in nature; 4) demanding that laws be adjusted to natural standards of justice and good life. A key point of disagreement can be found in Protagoras' myth, where he distinguishes between natural principles that apply only to humans and those that pertain to the rest of the natural world. This draws an important distinction between Protagoras and Callicles: Protagoras' democratic man seeking to influence the outcomes of collective political decision-making in an egalitarian community is contrasted by Callicles' aristocrat who is meant to freely govern over their inferiors.

The article considers the logical and philosophical doctrine of sophists, which, according to some modern researchers, was more philosophical than their ancient critics recognized. A comparison of the provisions of Aristotle's hermeneutics with preserved fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias shows that the doctrine of sophists was a kind of holistic philosophy, which anticipated the philosophy of dialogue of the XX century. Despite the fact that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle tried to overcome the relativism and anti-ontologism of the doctrine of sophists, some elements of its dialogueism were preserved in subsequent philosophy in dialectics and rhetoric. The first thing you should pay attention to is the difference between the dialogical form of the presentation of philosophy in Plato and dialogue as the fundamental basis of thinking that we find among sophists. The dialogueism preserved in the dialectic of Plato and the rhetoric of Aristotle is more a technical method of convincing the interlocutor than a hermeneutical basis, which it is in the philosophy of dialogue and in the method of Socratic discussion. The linguistic turn that occurred in the philosophy of the 20th century includes not only an increased interest in language and accuracy of expression. No less important is the new formulation of the question of the nature of the language. Is language a tool for the formulation of thought as Aristotle believed and followed by representatives of modern analytical philosophy, or does it have its own fundamental status, as representatives of the philosophy of dialogue believe? In this context, it is very important for the philosophy of dialogue to find in the thinking of the pre-Socratics those predecessors who already two and a half thousand years ago charted the paths for modern thought. The first part of the article analyzes the relationship between Aristotles hermeneutics and hermeneutics of sophists.

Offering a re-evaluation of all the available evidence, including passages from Aristotle's Rhetoric, Poetics and Sophistici Elenchi, Diogenes Laertius' biographical sketch as well as the grammar scene in Aristophanes' Clouds, this article argues that Protagoras' engagement with grammatical questions must have been more sophisticated and thorough than is often assumed. In Protagoras' discovery of grammatical gender, formal considerations – most likely inspired by the analysis of personal names – played a more fundamental role than semantic ones, and his typology of πυθμένες λόγων equally presupposes the formal recognition of at least verbal mood, if not also tense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article suggests the philosophical pragmatist approach to the notions (ideas, concepts) as to the components of social practices in the historical process. The question of their contents and interrelations shifts from the epistemic level to the practical one, in this way indicating the dimension of pragmatic intellectuality. It is pointed out that in various times the agents of pragmatic intellectuality (despite their status in the social hierarchy and occupation) used to employ in their practices the notions in perspective of the improving effect on the human’s life. From the angle of the history of philosophy, the pragmatic intellectuality means an attitude of critical choice, comparison, and holistic arrangement of the notions in view of close grasping the novel practices which might be advantageous for the community. The history of philosophy justifies the fact that the pragmatic intellectuality has been generated by the tensions between various divisions of the social practices and set a locus of their transformation. The notion of the culture of democracy is interpreted not as a fixed theoretical criterion but as a changing through history vision of the community’s future, as well as the notion of practically possible social-cultural changes and the ways to make human life better. The features of pragmatic intellectuality are as follow: the priority of the future before the past, social hope, self-reliance, flexible and dynamic correction of notions, ideas, images on account of the humane interests, changes in the culture of thinking and senses, self-realization as self-transformation. The article relies on the works of the classics of American philosophical pragmatism and the writings by the authors on the akin topic.

Protagoras and Aristotle’s conceptions of virtue are without doubt different. The former conceives it as the exercise of certain moral qualities that are indispensable to the attainment or maintenance of what is useful to oneself and to those who dedicate themselves to the affairs of the city. The latter conceives it as a strong and immutable state of character, which is the condition for the realization of the individual’s and of the city’s Eudaimonia. It would seem, however, that Protagoras and Aristotle converge on this point: the subsistence of a city does not depend upon a ruler who holds the science of ruling well with which he rules, but rather on well educated and excellent rulers and citizens, which is the condition for good political exercise. My aim here is to indicate the affinity between the political conceptions of Protagoras and Aristotle concerning the end of civic education as a guarantee of justice in the city.

O pensamento do sofista Protágoras seria, no âmbito da filosofia grega, uma nova maneira de compreender o mundo, diferente dos seus antecessores. Vemos em Protágoras a passagem da cosmologia para a antropologia. É claro que esta novidade não ocorreu repentinamente. A antropologia já se encontra em germe em Heráclito, que, juntamente com Parmênides, exerceu uma grande influência sobre Protágoras. É no cenário destes dois pensamentos, aparentemente antagônicos, e no auge da democracia, que surge uma nova doutrina, um deslocamento do pensamento sobre a physis para o pensamento sobre o homem.

Em Protágoras , Sócrates questiona o sofista sobre a possibilidade do ensino da virtude. A partir disso, os intérpretes exploram vários temas que o diálogo compreende: a pedagogia, a ética ou a linguagem. Nós, por outro lado, tentaremos explorar o tema sobre a teoria da história presente na argumentação de Protágoras, nos afastando das propostas interpretativas convencionais. Portanto, a nossa proposta consiste em mostrar como Protágoras viabiliza uma compreensão progressiva da história, pois, com o ensino da virtude, os homens podem transmitir as experiências éticas para as gerações futuras, acumulando tais experiências e culminando em um progresso.

The article focuses on Lear, Meyer and Vasiliou who have engaged with three central chapters of PMP deeply. Topics include considered that PMP argues that the refutation of the Many account of akrasia reveals the explanatory poverty of the psychology of competing forces assumed by the Many and Protagoras, and psychological hedonism/eudaemonism is a new psychological principle that might replace the discredited psychology.

The article focuses on Plato's moral psychology as the PMP argues against interpretation that while Plato maintains NDG throughout the dialogues, he argues for PE only in the Protagoras, as a hypothesis that could justify the sophists' claims to teach virtue, a hypothesis that depends on the further hypothesis that pleasure is the good.

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Copyright of Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper is a review of Johan van der Walt's The Concept of Liberal Democratic Law. It proceeds through a genealogy of the articulations and alignments of the three terms - kosmos, physis, nomos - that form the backdrop of the book's main thesis. In a discussion of tragedy and of the natural philosophers (Anaximander) it argues that Greek thought sustained a deep unity of the practical, the ethical, and the aesthetic, and looks at van der Walt's interpretation and defence of public reason in that light. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is no category of thought more deliberately or explicitly relegated to a subordinate role in Plato’s dialogues than Sophists and sophistry. It is due to Plato’s influence that terms “sophist” and “sophistry” handed down to us have unilaterally negative associations—synonymous with lies and deception, obscurantism and false reasoning. There are several reasons to be dubious of this standard view of the Sophists and their practices. The primary reason addressed in this essay is that the surviving fragments of the Sophists do not accord with this standard view, a discrepancy that is particularly acute in the case of the 5th-century sophist Protagoras. This essay attends to Protagoras’s doctrines concerning antilogos, the sophistic practice of contradiction and negation. I contend that sophistic antilogos was a paradoxical practice that embodied metaphysical stakes for language and discourse. I challenge the standard view of Sophists and their antilogos by reconstructing a speculative counter-definition: a method for instantiating through language an ontology of flux and becoming over and against what would come to be a Platonist metaphysics of enduring, pure Being. I do this through a comparative analysis of Protagoras and the second century C.E. South Asian Buddhist thinker, Nāgārjuna.