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Controlling report length in dream content analysis comprises a significant methodological problem. Individual differences occur in report length which can influence category coding and rating scales. Differences are also found in dream content by sex and age. The aim of this study is to determine the bias of certain variables in dream content analysis when using rating scales, coding systems and questionnaires. As such, an evaluation was performed of the bias of these variables on the relationship between anxiety upon awakening, social threats (ST) and terrifying threats (TT) established in a previous study. Methods: The sample consisted of 215 dreams collected in dreamers' homes (63 belonged to men and 152 to women). The dreamer's level of anxiety upon awakening was assessed with the CEAD. The level of social and terrifying threats in the content of the dreams was also assessed. Other variables entered into the analysis were sex, age, dream length, number of hours before answering the questionnaire, number of hours' sleep and the frequency with which the dreamer suffers nightmares. Results: Use of the Mann Whitney U found significant differences by sex in the dreamer's nightmare frequency (z=-2.53 p=.011), in terrifying threats in the dream (z=-2.03 p= .042) and by dream time (z=-2.51 p=.012). The Spearman Rho correlation coefficient indicated a positive relationship between anxiety upon awakening and nightmare frequency (Rho=.26 p<.001). Social and terrifying threats were also positively correlated with word count and the number of dream characters (Rho=.37 p<.001, Rho=.17 p=.010). Both anxiety upon awakening and social and terrifying threats were negatively correlated with the age of the dreamer (RhoCEAD-AGE=-.20 p=.006, RhoST-AGE=-.30 p<.001, RhoTT-AGE=-.37 p<.001). Possible biases due to sex, age, word count and the number of characters were statistically controlled by means of partial correlation. Through the use of partial correlations, the significance between anxiety upon awakening, social threats and terrifying threats in the dream was observed to be maintained (rCEAD-TS=.17 p=.025, rCEAD-TT=.19 p=.011). Conclusion: The sex, age of the dreamer, the report word count and the number of dream characters must be controlled in research into dream content. In addition, after eliminating these biases, a significant relationship was confirmed between threats which appear in the dream and the dreamer's level of anxiety upon awakening.

Humans are cognitive entities. Our behaviors and ongoing interactions with the environment are threaded with creations and usages of meaningful information, be they conscious or unconscious. Animal life is also populated with meaningful information related to the survival of the individual and of the species. The meaningfulness of information managed by artificial agents can also be considered as a reality once we accept that the meanings managed by an artificial agent are derived from what we, the cognitive designers, have built the agent for. This rapid overview brings to consider that cognition, in terms of management of meaningful information, can be looked at as a reality for animal, humans and robots. But it is pretty clear that the corresponding meanings will be very different in nature and content. Free will and selfconsciousness are key drivers in the management of human meanings, but they do not exist for animals or robots. Also, staying alive is a constraint that we share with animals. Robots do not carry that constraint. Such differences in meaningful information and cognition for animal, humans and robots could bring us to believe that the analysis of cognitions for these three types of agents has to be done separately. But if we agree that humans are the result of the evolution of life and that robots are a product of human activities, we can then look at addressing the possibility for an evolutionary approach at cognition based on meaningful information management. A bottom-up path would begin by meaning management within basic living entities, then climb up the ladder of evolution up to us humans, and continue with artificial agents. This is what we propose to present here: address an evolutionary approach for cognition, based on meaning management using a simple systemic tool. We use for that an existing systemic approach on meaning generation where a system submitted to a constraint generates a meaningful information (a meaning) that will initiate an action in order to satisfy the constraint [1,2]. The action can be physical, mental or other. This systemic approach defines a Meaning Generator System (MGS). The simplicity of the MGS makes it available as a building block for meaning management in animals, humans and robots. Contrary to approaches on meaning generation in psychology or linguistics, the MGS approach is not based on human mind. To avoid circularity, an evolutionary approach has to be careful not to include components of human mind in the starting point. The MGS receives information from its environment and compares it with its constraint. The generated meaning is the connection existing between the received information and the constraint. The generated meaning is to trigger an action aimed at satisfying the constraint. The action will modify the environment, and so the generated meaning. Meaning generation links agents to their environments in a dynamic mode. The MGS approach is triadic, Peircean type. The systemic approach allows wide usage of the MGS: a system is a set of elements linked by a set of relations. Any system submitted to a constraint and capable of receiving information from its environment can lead to a MGS. Meaning generation can be applied to many cases, assuming we identify clearly enough the systems and the constraints. Animals, humans and robots are then agents containing MGSs. Similar MGSs carrying different constraints will generate different meanings. Cognition is system dependent. We first apply the MGS approach to animals with “stay alive” and “group life” constraints. Such constraints can bring to model many cases of meaning generation and actions in the organic world. However, it is to be highlighted that even if the functions and characteristics of life are well known, the nature of life is not really understood. Final causes are difficult to integrate in our today science. So analyzing meaning and cognition in living entities will have to take into account our limited understanding about the nature of life. Ongoing research on concepts like autopoiesis could bring a better understanding about the nature of life [3]. We next address meaning generation for humans. The case is the most difficult as the nature of human mind is a mystery for today science and philosophy. The natures of our feelings, free will or self-consciousness are unknown. Human constraints, meanings and cognition are difficult to define. Any usage of the MGS approach for humans will have to take into account the limitations that result from the unknown nature of human mind. We will however present some possible approaches to identify human constraints where the MGS brings some openings in an evolutionary approach [4, 5]. But it is clear that the better human mind will be understood, the more we will be in a position to address meaning management and cognition for humans. Ongoing research activities relative to the nature of human mind cover many scientific and philosophical domains [6]. The case of meaning management and cognition in artificial agents is rather straightforward with the MGS approach as we, the designers, know the agents and the constraints. In addition, our evolutionary approach brings to position notions like artificial constraints, meaning and autonomy as derived from their animal or human source. We next highlight that cognition as management of meaningful information by agents goes beyond information and needs to address representations which belong to the central hypothesis of cognitive sciences. We define the meaningful representation of an item for an agent as being the networks of meanings relative to the item for the agent, with the action scenarios involving the item. Such meaningful representations embed the agents in their environments and are far from the GOFAI type ones [4]. Meanings, representations and cognition exist by and for the agents. We finish by summarizing the points presented and highlight some possible continuations. [1] C. Menant "Information and Meaning" http://cogprints.org/3694/ [2] C. Menant “Introduction to a Systemic Theory of Meaning” (short paper) http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/MGS.pdf [3] A. Weber and F. Varela “Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 97–125, 2002. [4] C. Menant "Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations. An Evolutionary Approach" http://www.idt.mdh.se/ECAP-2005/INFOCOMPBOOK/CHAPTERS/10-Menant.pdf http://crmenant.free.fr/2009BookChapter/C.Menant.211009 [5] C. Menant "Proposal for a shared evolutionary nature of language and consciousness" http://cogprints.org/7067/ [6] Philpapers “philosophy of mind” http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-mind

This paper investigates the effectiveness of creative versus uncreative leadership using EVOC, an agent-based model of cultural evolution. Each iteration, each agent in the artificial society invents a new action, or imitates a neighbor’s action. Only the leader’s actions can be imitated by all other agents, referred to as followers. Two measures of creativity were used: (1) invention-to-imitation ratio, iLeader, which measures how often an agent invents, and (2) rate of conceptual change, cLeader, which measures how creative an invention is. High iLeader increased mean fitness of ideas, but only when creativity of followers was low. High iLeader was associated with greater diversity of ideas in the early stage of idea generation only. High Leader increased mean fitness of ideas in the early stage of idea generation; in the later stage it decreased idea fitness. Reasons for these findings and tentative implications for creative leadership in human society are discussed.

Evolutionary advantages of consciousness and intersubjectivity are part of current philosophical debates on the nature of consciousness. Both are linked and intersubjectivity is sometimes considered as a form of consciousness [1]. Regarding the evolution of consciousness, studies tend to focus on phenomenal consciousness [2]. We would like here to bring the focus on self-consciousness and continue the build up of a corresponding evolutionary scenario. We also propose to introduce a possible evolutionary link between self-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Our starting point is the evolutionary scenario based on the evolution of intersubjectivity that goes thru the identification with conspecifics at pre-human primate time frame [3, 4, 5]. The scenario considers that such identification with conspecifics brought the non self-conscious auto-representation carried by our prehuman primate ancestors to merge with the representations of conspecifics. The latter transferred to the auto-representation the characteristics of an entity existing in the environment, and by this way introduced some first elements of self-consciousness for our pre-human ancestors. In addition, an anxiety increase coming from the identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics produced an evolutionary engine based on anxiety limitation. We want here to complement this evolutionary approach by introducing the improvement of action programs as a contributor to the evolutionary advantages of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness. We look at the possibility for a subject to improve the action programs that conspecifics implement. The performance of identification with conspecifics allows the subject to consider that errors made by conspecifics are potentially her own errors, and consequently allows the subject to correct the errors of conspecifics for her own benefit. We describe the process of non successful action identification from the perspective of an observer and present the synergetic action program improvements with their contribution to the evolution of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness. We add this contribution to the existing evolutionary scenario on self-consciousness and introduce a possible evolutionary link between self-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. We use for that the relation existing between phenomenal consciousness and pre-reflexive self-consciousness [6] and propose to link the latter to the proposed evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. We finish by summarizing the points addressed and by introducing some possible continuations.

The evolution of life on Earth has produced an organism that is beginning to model and understand its own evolution and the possible future evolution of life in the universe. These models and associated evidence show that evolution on Earth has a trajectory. The scale over which living processes are organized cooperatively has increased progressively, as has its evolvability. Recent theoretical advances raise the possibility that this trajectory is itself part of a wider developmental process. According to these theories, the developmental process has been shaped by a yet larger evolutionary dynamic that involves the reproduction of universes. This evolutionary dynamic has tuned the key parameters of the universe to increase the likelihood that life will emerge and produce outcomes that are successful in the larger process (e.g. a key outcome may be to produce life and intelligence that intentionally reproduces the universe and tunes the parameters of ‘offspring’ universes). Theory suggests that when life emerges on a planet, it moves along this trajectory of its own accord. However, at a particular point evolution will continue to advance only if organisms emerge that decide to advance the developmental process intentionally. The organisms must be prepared to make this commitment even though the ultimate nature and destination of the process is uncertain, and may forever remain unknown. Organisms that complete this transition to intentional evolution will drive the further development of life and intelligence in the universe. Humanity’s increasing understanding of the evolution of life in the universe is rapidly bringing it to the threshold of this major evolutionary transition.

The evolution of life on Earth has produced an organism that is beginning to model and understand its own evolution and the possible future evolution of life in the universe. These models and associated evidence show that evolution on Earth has a trajectory. The scale over which living processes are organized cooperatively has increased progressively, as has its evolvability. Recent theoretical advances raise the possibility that this trajectory is itself part of a wider developmental process. According to these theories, the developmental process has been shaped by a larger evolutionary process that involves the reproduction of universes. This evolutionary process has tuned the key parameters of the universe to increase the likelihood that life will emerge and develop to produce outcomes that are successful in the larger process (e.g. a key outcome may be to produce life and intelligence that intentionally reproduces the universe and tunes the parameters of ‘offspring’ universes). Theory suggests that when life emerges on a planet, it moves along this trajectory of its own accord. However, at a particular point evolution will continue to advance only if organisms emerge that decide to advance the evolutionary process intentionally. The organisms must be prepared to make this commitment even though the ultimate nature and destination of the process is uncertain, and may forever remain unknown. Organisms that complete this transition to intentional evolution will drive the further development of life and intelligence in the universe. Humanity’s increasing understanding of the evolution of life in the universe is rapidly bringing it to the threshold of this major evolutionary transition.

EVOC (for EVOlution of Culture) is a computer model of culture that enables us to investigate how various factors such as barriers to cultural diffusion, the presence and choice of leaders, or changes in the ratio of innovation to imitation affect the diversity and effectiveness of ideas. It consists of neural network based agents that invent ideas for actions, and imitate neighbors’ actions. The model is based on a theory of culture according to which what evolves through culture is not memes or artifacts, but the internal models of the world that give rise to them, and they evolve not through a Darwinian process of competitive exclusion but a Lamarckian process involving exchange of innovation protocols. EVOC shows an increase in mean fitness of actions over time, and an increase and then decrease in the diversity of actions. Diversity of actions is positively correlated with population size and density, and with barriers between populations. Slowly eroding borders increase fitness without sacrificing diversity by fostering specialization followed by sharing of fit actions. Introducing a leader that broadcasts its actions throughout the population increases the fitness of actions but reduces diversity of actions. Increasing the number of leaders reduces this effect. Efforts are underway to simulate the conditions under which an agent immigrating from one culture to another contributes new ideas while still ‘fitting in’.

A philological and comparative analysis of the lexical items concerning personhood in Ancient Hebrew, Ancient Greek and Modern English reveals semantic shifts concerning the relative lexical concepts. Ancient Hebrew presents an essentially holistic idea of personhood, whereas, via Biblical translations and Greek philosophical influences, the Western World has conceptualized humans as being dualistic in nature. I analyze the polysemy and semantic shifts in the lexicon used for "body" and "soul" in Ancient Hebrew and Ancient Greek, which are the two linguistic systems known by St. Paul of Tarsus, and then confront them with Paul's usage context, and finally with Modern English, hypothesizing a possible case of linguistic relativity.

Historically Christianity owes much to Judaism. St. Paul’s Christianity, however, changed the way of thinking of many of the first Jews because of a new way of reasoning about selfhood, the human body, and human cognition. Without wanting to treat certain theological concepts, I want to underline how modern science’s view of the person is closer to traditional Judaism than it is to Christianity, and how Paul’s “error” was diffused throughout the Western world, by analyzing the semantics of linguistic references to the body, the soul, and emotions. What was St. Paul’s error? The question means to be both allusive and provocative. He was born by the name Saul in the city of Tarsus, in modern Turkey, during the height of its splendour as a Roman-Greek city. Paul grew up as a “free man”, that is, as a Roman citizen in a cosmopolitan environment. He is considered to be the most influential and productive of the testimonies of the Christian thought throughout Asia Minor and Western Europe. His epistles circulated throughout his time and continue to influence millions of followers, who often interpret his thoughts in contrasting manner, but nonetheless attest to his authority. An erudite Greek-Roman, persecutor of the first Christians, Paul battled to spread the story of Jesus of Nazareth. His ideology, indeed, is a blend of Greek-Roman thought and of what he learned from the first Christians. The Hellenic characteristics of his faith created a divergence from traditional Judaic thought within what was to become the Christian creed though his influence. As a matter of fact, Christianity came to have a more coherent structure because of Paul, and Christian belief in a way is more Paul’s thought than it is Jesus’. Jewish teaching circa selfhood was quite holistic. The Hebrew word nephesh is often translated as “soul” but also means “body”, whereas Paul clearly distinguishes the two, talking about a co-existence, “concupiscence” and the necessity of dominating the body to exalt the spirit. I will examine the semantic changes in words dealing with body and soul, and how Paul’s authority eventually influenced the Western world’s way of reasoning about such concepts.

It is agreed by most people that self-consciousness is the result of an evolutionary process, and that representations may have played an important role in that process. We would like to propose here that some evolutionary stages can highlight links existing between representations and the notion of self, opening a possible path to the nature of self-consciousness. Our starting point is to focus on representations as usage oriented items for the subject that carries them. These representations are about elements of the environment including conspecifics, and can also represent parts of the subject without refering to a notion of self (we introduce the notion of "auto-representation" that does not carry the notion of self-representation). Next step uses the performance of intersubjectivity (mirror neurons level in evolution) where a subject has the capability to mentally simulate the observed action of a conspecific (Gallese 2001). We propose that this intersubjectivity allows the subject to identify his auto-representation with the representations of his conspecifics, and so to consider his auto-representation as existing in the environment. We show how this evolutionary stage can introduce a notion of self-representation for a subject, opening a road to self-conciousness and to self. This evolutionary approach to the self via self- representation is close to the current theory of the self linked to representations and simulations (Metzinger 2003). We use a scenario about how evolution has brought the performance of self-representation to self-consciousness. We develop a process describing how the anxiety increase resulting from identification with endangered or suffering conspecifics may have called for the development of tools to limit this anxiety (empathy, imitation, language), and how these tools have accelerated the evolutionary process through a positive feedback on intersubjectivity (Menant 2004, 2005). We finish by summarizing the points addressed, and propose some possible continuations.

The notion of representation is at the foundation of cognitive sciences and is used in theories of mind and consciousness. Other notions like ‘embodiment’, 'intentionality‘, 'guidance theory' or ‘biosemantics’ have been associated to the notion of representation to introduce its functional aspect. We would like to propose here that a conception of 'usage related' representation eases its positioning in an evolutionary context, and opens new areas of investigation toward self-representation and self-consciousness. The subject is presented in five parts:Following an overall presentation, the first part introduces a usage related representation as being an information managed by a system submitted to a constraint that has to be satisfied. We consider that such a system can generate a meaningful information by comparing its constraint to a received information (Menant 2003). We define a representation as being made of the received information and of the meaningful information. Such approach allows groundings in and out for the representation relatively to the system. The second part introduces the two types of representations we want to focus on for living organisms: representations of conspecifics and auto-representation, the latter being defined without using a notion of self-representation. Both types of representations have existed for our pre-human ancestors which can be compared to today great apes.In the third part, we use the performance of intersubjectivity as identified in group life with the presence of mirror neurons in the organisms. Mirror neurons have been discovered in the 90‘s (Rizzolatti & al.1996, Gallese & al.1996). The level of intersubjectivity that can be attributed to non human primates as related to mirror neurons is currently a subject of debate (Decety 2003). We consider that a limited intersubjectivity between pre-human primates made possible a merger of both types of representations. The fourth part proposes that such a merger of representations feeds the auto-representation with the meanings associated to the representations of conspecifics, namely the meanings associated to an entity perceived as existing in the environment. We propose that auto-representation carrying these new meanings makes up the first elements of self-representation. Intersubjectivity has allowed auto-representation to evolve into self-representation, avoiding the homunculus risk. The fifth part is a continuation to other presentations (Menant 2004, 2005) about possible evolution of self-representation into self-consciousness. We propose that identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics has increased anxiety, and that the tools used to limit this anxiety (development of empathy, imitation, language and group life) have provided a positive feedback on intersubjectivity and created an evolutionary engine for the organism. Other outcomes have also been possible. Such approach roots consciousness in emotions. The evolutionary scenario proposed here does not introduce explicitly the question of phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995). This question is to be addressed later with the help of this scenario.The conclusion lists the points introduced here with their possible continuations.

The essay is critically examines the conceptual problems with the influential modularity model of mind. We shall see that one of the essential characters of modules, namely informational encapsulation, is not only inessential, it ties a knot at a crucial place blocking the solution to the problem of understanding the formation of concepts from percepts (nodes of procedural knowledge). Subsequently I propose that concept formation takes place by modulation of modules leading to cross-representations, which were otherwise prevented by encapsulation. It must be noted that the argument is not against modular architecture, but a variety of an architecture that prevents interaction among modules. This is followed by a brief argument demonstrating that module without modularization, i.e. without developmental history, is impossible. Finally the emerging picture of cognitive development is drawn in the form of the layers in the fabric of mind, with a brief statement of the possible implications.

Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here.

Information and meaning exist around us and within ourselves, and the same information can correspond to different meanings. This is true for humans and animals, and is becoming true for robots. We propose here an overview of this subject by using a systemic tool related to meaning generation that has already been published (C. Menant, Entropy 2003). The Meaning Generator System (MGS) is a system submitted to a constraint that generates a meaningful information when it receives an incident information that has a relation with the constraint. The content of the meaningful information is explicited, and its function is to trigger an action that will be used to satisfy the constraint of the system. The MGS has been introduced in the case of basic life submitted to a "stay alive" constraint. We propose here to see how the usage of the MGS can be extended to more complex living systems, to humans and to robots by introducing new types of constraints, and integrating the MGS into higher level systems. The application of the MGS to humans is partly based on a scenario relative to the evolution of body self-awareness toward self-consciousness that has already been presented (C. Menant, Biosemiotics 2003, and TSC 2004). The application of the MGS to robots is based on the definition of the MGS applied to robots functionality, taking into account the origins of the constraints. We conclude with a summary of this overview and with themes that can be linked to this systemic approach on meaning generation.

The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years before consciousness as we know it for humans. The interest of such an approach is that the analysis of selectional advantage is done at an evolution step sigificantly simpler that the step of Human Consciousness. We analyse how evolutionary advantages have resulted from this specific Self Awareness step. This is done by taking into consideration the possibility for a subject to identify with a conspecific at this level of evolution. We use the results made available by Mirror Neuron researchs where intersubjectivity and some level of identification with conspecifics have been evidenced for non human primates. Selectional advantages related to Self Awareness are analysed two ways: - Reformulating the performances of imitation and of development of language. - Showing that Self Awareness within group life can naturaly produce an important increase in fear/anxiety for a subject, and that the means implemented by the subject to overcome this fear/anxiety can act as significant evolution advantages opening the road to Human Consciousness. Such approach brings new elements supporting the view that consciousness is grounded in emotions. It also proposes some more evolutionist explanations to the widely dicussed subject of Empathy (S. Preston & F. de Waal) in terms of specific behaviour implemented to limit fear/anxiety increase. This approach also provides some explanation for limited anxiety within dolphins and introduces a basis for a possible phylogenesis of emotions.

Comment on Keenan's (2003) hypothesis that self-recognition, Theory-of-Mind, and self-awareness are located in the right hemisphere

Many elements of culture made their first appearance in the Upper Paleolithic. Previous hypotheses put forth to explain this unprecedented burst of creativity are found wanting. Examination of the psychological basis of creativity leads to the suggestion that it resulted from the onset of contextual focus: the capacity to focus or defocus attention in response to the situation, thereby shifting between analytic and associative modes of thought. New ideas germinate in a defocused state in which one is receptive to the possible relevance of many dimensions of a situation. They are refined in a focused state, conducive to filtering out irrelevant dimensions and condensing relevant ones.

This paper presents an Artificial Life and Neural Network (ALNN) model for the evolution of syntax. The simulation methodology provides a unifying approach for the study of the evolution of language and its interaction with other behavioral and neural factors. The model uses an object manipulation task to simulate the evolution of language based on a simple verb-noun rule. The analyses of results focus on the interaction between language and other non-linguistic abilities, and on the neural control of linguistic abilities. The model shows that the beneficial effects of language on non-linguistic behavior are explained by the emergence of distinct internal representation patterns for the processing of verbs and nouns.

Determining whether or not an entity is capable of acting intentionally is a fundamental cognitive skill that emerges in the first year of infancy, and the inability to act is a key aspect distinguishing dead from living things. Though young children’s understanding of death is generally thought to be poor, an understanding of death as the permanent cessation of agency might develop early in childhood. This study tested the cessation-of-agency hypothesis cross-culturally, by examining the differences between children’s judgments about sleeping and dead animals. The results showed that children understand that death entails the permanent cessation of the ability to act by age 4 in two different cultures. This is consistent with a view that those distinctions that are most crucial for adaptive decision-making are the ones that develop earliest.

It is argued that cognitive capacities can be understood as the outcome of the collective action of a set of agents created by tools that explore possible behaviours and train the agents to behave in such appropriate ways as may be discovered. The coherence of the whole system is assured by a combination of vetting the performance of new agents and dealing appropriately with any faults that the whole system may develop. This picture is shown to account for a range of cognitive capacities, including language.

In 1995 Christenfeld and Hill published a paper that purported to show at one year of age, infants resemble their fathers more than their mothers. Evolution, they argued, would have produced this result since it would ensure male parental resources, since the paternity of the infant would no longer be in doubt. We believe this result is false. We present the results of two experiments (and mention a third) which are very far from replicating Christenfeld and Hill’s data. In addition, we provide an evolutionary explanation as to why evolution would not have favored the result reported by Christenfeld and Hill.

from Introduction: Animal communication systems and human languages can be characterised by the type of cognitive abilities that are required. If we consider the main semiotic distinction between communication using icons, signals, or symbols (Peirce, 1955; Harnad, 1990; Deacon, 1997) we can identify different cognitive loads for each type of reference. The use and understanding of icons require instinctive behaviour (e.g. emotions) or simple perceptual processes (e.g. visual similarities between an icon and its meaning). Communication systems that use signals are characterised by referential associations between objects and visual or auditory signals. They require the cognitive ability to learn stimulus associations, such as in conditional learning. Symbols have double associations. Initially, symbolic systems require the establishment of associations between signals and objects. Secondly, other types of relationships are learned between the signals themselves. The use of rule for the logical combination of symbols is an example of symbolic relationship. Symbolisation is the ability to acquire and handle symbols and symbolic relationships.