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On 28 July 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra announced its disengagement from militant international Islamist organization al-Qaeda and became Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In January 2017, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham rebranded yet again when it merged with several other Syrian groups to establish Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS formed a civilian ‘Syrian Salvation Government’ to manage its regions. Among the transformations was in its attitudes towards the looting and destructions of antiquities, which had become endemic in Syria. HTS had targeted archaeological sites for destruction and looting. After its disengagement from al-Qaeda, HTS reopened the Idlib Museum in 2018, and claimed to protection of antiquities. This article aims to study the reasons and motives for the transformation in strategy of HTS regarding Syrian tangible heritage during the ongoing war in Syria and argues that this strategy remains one in which Syrian heritage is exploited for political gain within the context of a larger conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractWhat role does rebel governance play on the level of civilian casualties stemming from foreign fighters (FF)? I focus on the connection between rebel group governance and the amount of civilian victimization that FF conduct. I argue that inclusive governing structures can decrease the amount of disembeddedness that FF experience, which decreases their propensity for violence against civilians. To make my argument, I use a process tracing model to analyze the evolution of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s governing structure in Yemen and what impact that has on the violence that is experienced by civilians. I use primary literature and sources along with secondary literature gathered from the NEXIS database to detail the two phases of AQAP: (2008–2011) and (2012–2016). The analysis is largely supportive of the argument that rebel governance can have a positive impact on FF civilian victimization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Natana J. DeLong-Bas, a renowned scholar of Islamic studies, argues that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, considered a religious reformer and intellectual, should not be held responsible for spawning the Jihadist culture. Instead, she posits that this culture emanated from the ideology of Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). DeLong-Bas maintains that contemporary Salafi Jihadi ideologues, such as Sayyid Qutb, were influenced by Ibn Taymiyya's views, while Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab developed his own principles and was not merely a copyist of Ibn Taymiyya's teachings. According to DeLong-Bas, after Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's death, his genuine path was distorted by the emergence of Neo-Wahhabism. Contrary to popular belief, she asserts that the Wahhabi path itself remains intact, but the current Saud Dynasty has been distancing itself from the authentic Wahhabi principles. DeLong-Bas further suggests that groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, following the Salafi Jihadi ideology, are attempting to lead the Saud Dynasty towards Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's utopian vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the intricate dynamics surrounding female involvement in jihadism in Bangladesh. Drawing on expert interviews and surveys, the study uncovers a multifaceted picture of this phenomenon. Three distinct categories of factors – push, pull, and facilitating – emerge as central in explaining the surge in female participation within militant groups in the region. Push factors, which encompass grievances and vulnerabilities arising from personal crises, poverty and family breakdown, create an environment ripe for radicalisation. The concept of "humiliation by proxy," where global Muslim victimisation serves as a motivating force, further deepens our understanding of this process. Pull factors reveal that ideological allure, the pursuit of glory, adventure, and the evolving gender roles offered by groups like the Islamic State play a significant role in attracting women to extremist ideologies. The article underscores that the desire for paradise is not confined to men alone but extends to women. Facilitating factors, such as influential family members and online platforms, are pivotal in shaping female radicalisation. Cultural loyalty, particularly from husbands and fathers, empowers them to influence women towards extremism. The internet acts as a powerful tool, facilitating exposure to radical ideologies and virtual group bonding, creating echo chambers that reinforce extremist beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares and contrasts the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons programs of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State through the framework of organizational structure, typology, ideology and CBRN incidents (selected case studies). A three-step CBRN model explaining the use of CBRN weapons by both groups is proposed. This model suggests that the use of CBRN weapons is predicated on three factors: leadership at the strategic level; acquisition of material at the operational level and technical capabilities at the tactical level. It is found that the failure of both groups in developing and carrying out large-scale CBRN attacks boils down primarily to the lack of technical capabilities and the difficulties associated with acquisition of materials. It is argued that the future CBRN threat landscape will likely be dominated by the threat of small-scale, localized attacks using crude chemical or biological agents by lone actors or autonomous cells as opposed to larger-scale centrally directed attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research shows that humour plays a significant role in the formation of a collective identity and 'creates a sense of internal cohesion' based on shared experiences [Fominaya, C. F. (2007). The role of humour in the process of collective identity formation in autonomous social movement groups in contemporary Madrid. International Review of Social History, 52(S15), 243–258. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859007003227]. In this paper, we focus on humour in jihadi English magazines. This study is based on 82 English magazines published by the Taliban, ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This research takes a mixed method of analysing data both qualitatively and quantitatively. The findings point to a statistically significant difference amongst these groups in the type of humour they utilise. In general, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and TTP show similar patterns in the types of humour they employ, a pattern that often stands in stark contrast with ISIS. ISIS is more likely than Al-Qaeda, the Taliban or TTP to use dehumanising and mocking humour while less likely than these groups to use situational humour, which is a less negative form of humour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a framework to make moral sense of terrorism. The framework consists in a test, referred to as the MODAL test, which is an acronym standing for five tests or principles for determining the moral defensibility or indefensibility of terrorism. The five principles concern the motives for terrorism, its objectives, destructiveness, availability of alternatives, and likelihood of success. This approach makes it conceivable but highly unlikely in practice that a terrorist act is morally justified. The MODAL test does not claim to be an exhaustive framework for analysing the moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of terrorism but rather a practical analytical tool aimed at securing a reliable grasp of the tricky question of the relation between morality and terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the years, political scientists and policymakers have striven to understand the circumstances under which terrorists fail, operationally and strategically. However, the question of failure has less frequently been approached through the lens of any one specific tactic. This article asks: how should one define and understand the sources of suicide bombing failure? After introducing a new definition of suicide bombing failure, the article next uses probit model analysis to test planner (or "architect") versus militant (or "attacker") sources of failure by using a unique dataset detailing the suicide bombing efforts of three of the most active African jihadist terror groups which leveraged suicide terrorism from 2007 to 2020 — al-Shabaab, "Boko Haram," and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ("AQIM"). It finds evidence that choices made by these groups' "architects," are most commonly correlated with suicide bombing failures, rather than operational failures by "attackers" themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discursive struggles for legitimation are a constitutive feature of the politically guided deployment of force. This dynamic of political communication frequently entails engaging with multiple audiences, such as international, local, and intra-group. As it compels actors to diversify their narrative strategies, it often results in conflicting statements. We argue that a particular discursive strategy, which we call the collectivization of the self, provides actors with an instrument to address different audiences with a singular narrative. We present this strategy through a content and qualitative analysis of Bin Laden's statements on terrorist actions and Bush's speeches on the intervention in Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article introduces a new dataset on terrorist attack activity by jihadis in Western Europe. The dataset was built over nearly two decades at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. It records not only attacks that were launched, but also plots that were foiled by counterterrorism. The rationale behind the dataset is that analyses based on launched attacks may misrepresent the scale and nature of terrorism. The article shows that if we were to measure the jihadi threat to Europe by attacks only we would miss out on 58.2% of the total attack activity. We also show that while attack data signify a trend towards small attacks by individuals, these data hide the fact that terror networks persist in plotting big attacks that get foiled. We discuss how analyses based on attacks only may distort comparative analyses of different types of terrorists across countries, as well as causal analyses of terrorism drivers. By including foiled plots we gain a fuller picture of terrorism. The Jihadi Plots in Europe Dataset allows the gauging of different aspects of the threat from Al-Qaida and Islamic State in Europe. The dataset documents when and where terror plots occur, whether or not they result in attacks, and different types of information about perpetrators and how they operate. The Dataset offers a reliable overview of jihadi terrorism in Europe for research and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On July 31, 2022, the Biden Administration successfully eliminated al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan via drone strike. This killing represented a continued implementation of U.S. policy forged after the September 11th attacks to eliminate al-Qaeda members wherever they seek shelter. Nevertheless, the United States has refrained from filing an Article 51 notification of self-defense to justify its use of force against Afghanistan. With the United States asserting that the Taliban was "unwilling or unable" to neutralize Zawahiri's threat, existing international law fails to provide clear guidelines on addressing this determination. The following Note attempts to examine the legality of the strike through implementation of the Deeks Factors Test of "unable or unwilling." Further, this Note advocates for a U.N. Resolution to establish a robust "unable or unwilling" framework, to provide states with a standard to consider when assessing the use of force against non-state actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this essay is to recall what motivated bin Laden to risk his life, his family, his fortune, and his reputation in confronting the military might of the United States in order to (1) rid the Muslim world of the U.S. presence, (2) overthrow repressive, apostate Muslim regimes not governed by Sharia law, and (3) destroy the state of Israel. The point of understanding bin Laden's motives is not to excuse any aspect of the barbarous acts he committed, but rather to capture as fully as possible the magnitude of the threat he posed and that which al Qaeda and similar groups, buttressed by his martyrdom, continue to pose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concepts of human rights and international justice are products of the 20th century and of the so-called enlightened Western civilisation. As the 21st century began, the War on Terror was declared by the US–UK coalition, leading to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths in the Middle East, as well as long-lasting insecurity in all areas of human life. Yet more than 20 years on, justice and accountability are still pending, when it comes to state violence, while a policy of "kill-not-capture" has dominated responses to violent non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS fighters, hampering any efforts at reconciliation and peace, and adding to regional and global injustice and insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Neue Politische Literatur is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What explains the emergence of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as parties in civil wars? This study provides the first large-N analysis of this question, studying a sample of states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, 2003–2020, contributing to ongoing debates among peace and conflict scholars about jihadist rebels in civil war. Theoretically, it is argued that higher levels of state repression and states' military capabilities should impact the preferences of local groups and increase the likelihood of a 'transnationalization'. On the other hand, it is hypothesized that increases in bureaucratic state capacity should reduce the risk of such transnationalization. A series of penalized logistic regressions yield support for the hypotheses regarding state repression and bureaucratic capacity, but not military state capacity. The findings point towards the importance of bureaucratic capacity building as well as the potentially adverse consequences of excessively repressive counterterrorism strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most terrorist groups are active close to their native area of operation. Why then do some terrorist groups expand to foreign territories? In an exploratory attempt, this article draws parallels between organised crime group transplantation frameworks and the transnational activities of terrorist groups. Utilising transplantation studies, we introduce a conceptual criminological framework that integrates both push and pull factors influencing the transnational movement of terrorist groups. To validate this framework as a pilot test, we apply it to al-Qaeda's operations in the Sahara-Sahel region, relying on open-source data. Our findings, while preliminary, indicate the potential of this unified transplantation approach in offering deeper insights into the transnational behaviours of terrorist groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, with the benefit of hindsight, analyzes the accuracy (and inaccuracy) of my February 2001 article in the American Behavioral Scientist seeking to answer, "what is the future of terrorism?" I discovered that Shakespeare had it right, "The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars, But in ourselves if we are underlings." There are two major factors that produce and sustain international terrorism—state sponsorship of individuals and groups that carry out terrorist acts and the actions of nation states that create an aggrieved class that is inspired to use violence to try to achieve political objectives or simply to avenge a perceived wrong. The conclusion reached in 2001 remains valid—Prevention and preparation can pay important dividends in deterring terrorism. But a government's response must be tempered with reason and prudence. Security and law enforcement policies must reflect the values and the vision that protect and uphold freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I analyze the warnings I gave prior to the new millennium concerning the possibility of terrorism visiting American soil. The sources of the problem are discussed in detail. These warnings were not showcased in academic journals gathering dust on some university library shelve. They were given to a variety of governmental agencies as well as discussed in the mainstream media. My sources are revealed for all to see. Unfortunately, my prognostications proved accurate when hijacked planes slammed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in the discipline of counterterrorism studies since al-Qaeda's catastrophic attacks against the United States on 9/11 along 10 dimensions: defining terrorism, group and lone actor typologies, causes of terrorism, terrorist psychologies, radicalization and recruitment, organizational dynamics, modus operandi, incident chronology databases, forecasting and predicting terrorism, and countering terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to present the causes, chronological course and effects of the attack carried out on 11 March 2004 in Madrid, taking into account differences and contradictions in reports about these events. The author analyses the actions taken by the Spanish authorities to ensure anti-terrorist security in the country, including the creation of structures to fight Islamic terrorism and Muslim extremism. He also discusses the problems and challenges faced by Spanish services fighting political violence and illegal migration of people from high-risk countries, which affect the state of state security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2023, Bangladesh faced a complex security situation marked by the resurgence of Al-Qaeda-centric threats, as the influence of Islamic State-affiliated groups seemingly declined. The breakaway factions from established militant groups actively recruited and trained members for surprise attacks, with a specific focus on key installations like prisons. At the same time, extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir were also active in major cities. At any rate, Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies undermined militant groups' ability to coordinate attacks through arrests and timely identification of emerging threats. As a result, Bangladesh's ranking in the 2023 Global Terrorism Index improved. Though Bangladesh has made progress in addressing security threats, sustained vigilance and counter terrorism efforts remain essential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several historical literatures in the field of Strategic Studies (Gray, 2013; Heuser, 2010; Kane, 2013) have always centered its Hellenic and ancient Oriental origins, ignoring (or negating) the contributions of other cultures (African, Islamic, etc.) to the discipline. Furthermore, in the modern era, references to the Islamic strategy of warfare have been reduced to one of its components: Jihad (Bar 2008, Zabel 2007, Spencer 2019). This is due, in part, to the recent theology of Islamic militants (Al Qaeda, for example), who have portrayed (erroneously) Jihad as the sole strategy of Islamic warfare in contemporary times. As a result, this research highlights the contributions of Islamic thoughts on Peace and Warfare. This paper aims to highlight major Islamic scientific thoughts on warfare through a historical attempt. The goal of this exercise is to correct two errors: first, to reintroduce Islamic perspectives on peace and warfare into the canon of Strategic Studies, and second, to correct the contemporary perception of Islamic warfare contributions as primarily jihadist in nature. This study employs comparative historical research methodology to describe the vast literature of Islamic strategic thoughts and events in order to demonstrate the historical shortcomings of the west's rejection or ignorance of Islam's contributions to the field of strategic thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a growing interest in the terrorism problem, in general, and the strategy of suicide bombing, in particular. Between 1996 and 2016, Turkey experienced several deadly suicide attacks by groups like the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, al‐Qaeda, and the Islamic State. These attacks can be explained by individual‐oriented, institutional, socio‐psychological/economical/identity, and structural theories. However, a central question now is why there have been no suicide attacks since 2016—that is, until the attempted bombing of the Ministry of the Interior on October 1, 2023. This article advances five main reasons for this success: a shift in Turkey's antiterrorism strategy, the introduction of new technologies, terror groups' concerns about losing legitimacy among supporters, the failure of these organizations to achieve their objectives through suicide terrorism, and changes in Turkey's external environment. The article concludes that, as the October 1 attack demonstrates, the renewal of suicide terrorism is likely, given Ankara's sole focus on the institutional and international/structural aspects of the problem, which does not allow enough attention on individual and sociological factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Annals of Criminology is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores the role of a spiritual punishment unique to Islam, the punishment of the grave, in motivating jihadi terrorism. It argues that the exemption from this spiritual punishment granted to jihadi martyrs may be a 'pull' factor in the radicalisation of some Muslims. To date the punishment of the grave has been discussed only in passing in the research literature on jihadist radicalisation. To address the resultant gap in our knowledge, this article describes the concept, documents its neglect in the study of jihadist radicalisation, investigates the prevalence of this concern amongst believers, ranging from the nominally affiliated to violent extremists, and the use of the concept by prominent jihadist figures and organisations to attract and train new martyrs. Arguing that a concern with the punishment of the grave is a crucial but overlooked aspect of the heightened religiosity -- and based on its expression perhaps uniquely instrumental in identifying believers left with limited options, including violence -- the article advocates recognising it as a significant and useful additional marker of radicalisation, especially in the context of prisons. Increased awareness of the concept and the extraordinary fear it often generates will help to better attune strategies used to prevent and deradicalise individuals to the religious struggles driving some Muslims to sacrifice their lives in lethal acts of terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article models the geography of the 9/11 network members' many travels from the moment the hijackers first boarded a plane to the United States until they killed 2,977 people on 11 September 2001. Building on publicly available sources, and for the first time in the literature, we address the spatiality of the terrorist network through two related concepts. First, we focus on colocation and show that the scale and sophistication of the 9/11 attacks did not require copresence to be successful. Individuals from a cell did not spend most of their time together. We then focus on co-destination and find that the need for coordination required that the 9/11 hijackers followed the same itineraries between cities. In other words, the travel geography of the four Al Qaeda cells responsible for the attacks closely mirrors the network's cell-based social structure. Then as now, the case of the 9/11 attacks suggests that spatializing social networks is an important window to understanding the emergence of terrorist networks and disrupting their patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On October 7, 2001, 3 weeks after 9/11, U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan; bombers struck Taliban headquarters and Al Qaeda training sites. By early December, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been defeated and had fled. However, a war that began so successfully in 2001, eventually ended ignominiously on August 30, 2021, almost exactly 20 years later, with a U.S. withdrawal and a total Taliban victory. The speed of the Taliban's triumph shocked everyone. The entire campaign, costing US$2.3 trillion and 2,488 U.S. lives, had failed—utterly. The United States had lost its longest-ever war. How is it possible to explain a defeat of that magnitude? This article seeks to address this question. Although numerous factors played a role, this article identifies three principal factors: the environment, the local politics, and the Taliban. Afghanistan is a very difficult place to conduct large-scale military operations. The West never came to terms with the local politics and consequently undermined their own efforts. Finally, although they were not militarily sophisticated, the Taliban were politically astute and very resilient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shame avoidance or repair can serve as a powerful source of motivation, a view shared by violent Islamist (VI) organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Qaeda, whose respective propaganda activities seek to shame sympathizers into action by dislodging them from positions of inactivity or indecisiveness. Utilizing concepts contained in Benford and Snow's notion of experiential commensurability, this article will examine how VI organizations seek to induce shame among their targets of mobilization by facilitating comparison and instilling a sense of accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious extremism is arguably the most controversial topic in the post 9/11 era. This divisive and sensitive topic not only has pitted academics, policy makers, and political parties against each other but also has become a source of passionate discord among the public. This article surveys a number of perspectives on the relationship between Islam and extremism and notes that a constructivist perspective offers a better account of the relationship between Islam and extremism as well as provides more possibilities for the contributions of Islamic actors to peacebuilding in the region than others. Indeed, despite its limitations, constructivism offers a better picture by de-emphasizing an essentialist account of Islam and by bringing Islam into the debate on peace and extremism. The article first briefly reviews three key views for understanding the relationship between Islam and extremism: correlation, denial, and constructivist perspective. It then applies the constructivist perspective on al-Qaeda narratives and concludes with a discussion of the utility of such a perspective for peace making in Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilizing social media profiles, court documents and media reports, this article analyzes the Malaysian foreign fighter networks in Iraq and Syria between 2012 and 2019. It is found that the Malaysian foreign fighter phenomenon is primarily driven by charismatic personalities, i.e., influential figures who were able to attract individuals into the Middle East. The attempted movement of fighters into Iraq and Syria can be divided into three phases corresponding to three personalities; the first led by Al Qaeda linked Yazid Sufaat, the second by Ajnad al-Sham linked Lotfi Ariffin and the third by Islamic State (IS) linked Muhammad Wanndy Mohd Jedi. Contrary to popular belief, the first wave of Malaysian militants had joined Syrian-based rebel groups like Ajnad al-Sham instead of IS with the shift occurring after Lotfi Ariffin's death in September 2014. The three phases also highlight the shift in recruitment strategy from physical recruitment to the purely online sphere. A radicalization driver model of Malaysian fighters is proposed and it is argued that the two main factors that drove Malaysian fighters into the conflict zones are (1) External factors: charismatic personalities; romanticization of jihad; moral factors and ideological factors; and (2) Internal factors: discontent with the government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Middle Eastern Studies / Ortadoğu Etütleri is the property of Turkmen Cooperation & Cultural Foundation Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article delineates a particular orientation to combining professional legal training and anthropological scholarship that I call ethnographic lawyering. Ethnographic lawyering takes legal form as an object of anthropological analysis, loosely inspired by the Marxist jurist Evgeny Pashukanis's theorization of law as a social relation. If ethnographic method in anthropology entails theorizing from the concepts and experiences of interlocutors, then ethnographic lawyering analytically centers the subjectivities, logics, and relationalities that legal form both presupposes and animates. Ethnographic lawyering brings to light the contingent lives of legal form. To demonstrate this method, the article uses the example of conspiracy in early US court cases involving Al Qaeda, informed by the author's experiences as an attorney and anthropologist in litigation arising from the war on terror. An ethnographic lawyering approach illuminates how conspiracy's distinct forms in criminal law, the law of evidence, and tort law each bring far‐flung subjects, events, and actions together into reified entities even as they atomize and recombine social relations. This dynamic tension resembles the vertiginous nature of conspiracy theorizing in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did Syria collaborate with al-Qaeda's Iraqi branch after 2003 and with ISIS during the Syrian civil war? States' support for terrorist groups is risky, but cooperation with jihadi actors who see the Syrian regime as an enemy and wish to impose a radical Islamic rule in its stead is particularly dangerous. This paper argues that such ideologically-unlikely partnerships reveal the workings of the instrumental logic behind state-sponsored terrorism. Collaborating with terrorist groups is a rational strategy. States such as Syria will partner with ideologically-incompatible terrorist groups when they judge there to be a greater and more urgent threat from a third actor; when they believe the partnership would give them unique capabilities or produce special, otherwise unattainable effects; and when they believe they can shield themselves from the relationship's potential adverse effects. The Syrian case also shows that such a pairing is likely to have limited utility. In order to have meaningful impact, the terrorist group must have a significant role, but the greater this role is, the higher the direct danger the group poses to its ally and the greater the likelihood of international action against the sponsoring state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last three decades, East Africa has turned into a crucial arena in the fight against transnational Islamist terrorism, harbouring Al-Qa'ida's leadership and subsequently giving rise to one of the most active organisations, Al-Shabaab. Much has been written on jihadism in the region. However, the scholarship still lacks a comprehensive historical analysis shedding light on the dynamics that have favoured its survival and development. This article fills such a gap, reviewing the evolution of transnational Islamist terrorism in East Africa from the early 1990s up to the present day. The article sheds light on the realpolitik of East African terrorism, showing how militants have consistently sought to adapt to and exploit (1) the political morphology of the region and (2) emerging tensions between local groups and national authorities to survive setbacks, expand their influence and gain supporters. The article concludes by arguing that tackling social and political fractures on the ground is of fundamental importance to effectively dismantle terror networks and fight instability in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although originating in Algeria, AQIM and its allies had by 2012 become so entrenched in the Sahel that they were in de-facto control of vast swathes of territory in northern Mali. This article explains how and why GSPC/AQIM established itself in the Sahel, and why the group eventually decided to take the fight to the Sahelian countries, where they had previously found sanctuary. Relying on hitherto unused primary sources, this article is the first to show that the leadership of AQIM and al-Qaida Central did not want to engage in direct conflicts with the Sahelian states. The eventual shift of strategy in the region was brought about by the increasing numbers of Sahelians in AQIM's southern brigades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a descriptive analysis of intelligence operations carried out by the United States and its allies against the presence of jihadist groups on the Internet during the period 2001–2020. In contrast to actions aimed at eliminating the virtual spaces in which terrorists operate, the intelligence operations analysed here are designed to erode terrorists' trust in such spaces without compromising intelligence sources. The article argues that the combination of cyberattacks and psychological operations in the form of honeypots and sabotage have achieved considerable success in terms of reducing terrorist activities on the Internet and undermining the effectiveness of propaganda initiatives undertaken by terrorist groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relatives are a potentially rich source of insight regarding foreign fighters' pathways into Islamist fundamentalism. However, a small fraction of the literature that explores Salafi-jihadist trajectories examines the testimonies of extremists' families. Based on qualitative interviews with relatives of five Danish, non-returned male foreign fighters, this article explores how and why—according to their relatives—the men were initially attracted and reaffirmed their commitment to violent jihadism. Findings reveal tensions within the data between ascribing responsibility to the men and mitigating their responsibility. Yet, the article suggests that the relatives' testimonies should not be perceived simply as using "neutralization techniques" nor as exculpatory narratives, since there is a tendency for the relatives to acknowledge and even accept the men's deviance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the reasons why content moderation and control in cyberspace, being a primary means of online countering violent extremism (CVE), does not work as intended. It makes four main arguments. Firstly, despite years of efforts from CVE stakeholders, the propaganda of militant Islamist VEOs is still easily accessible on the Internet. This study has mapped hundreds of addresses engaged in digital jihadist activities at the turn of 2020–2021. It effectively proves that the current approach to online CVE brought few tangible effects. Secondly, these programs have been unevenly applied to militant Islamist organizations. There have been groups which represent violent extremist ideology but are not actively combated by stakeholders. As a result, these groups have been able to establish a solid foothold on the surface web. Thirdly, the efficiency of CVE strategies based on content takedowns are decreased by the relative ease of terrorists reestablishing banned communication channels, the availability of vast alternatives for online propaganda dissemination, the introduction of impractical legislation by governments, overlapping jurisdictions on the Internet and the "Streisand effect." Finally, adequate strategies aimed at curbing digital jihad should be primarily based on offline and online activities which fall outside of the remit of CVE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates group fragmentation in the al-Qaeda and Islamic State ecosystems, employing network analysis to examine the impact of specific network conditions on the probability of a faction splitting. Using new datasets of faction–faction (FF) and terrorist–terrorist (TT) relationships, the article tests 18 hypotheses exploring connections between factional splits and the number, polarity, and strength of FF and TT relationships, among other factors. The article offers three major findings. First, a greater number of relationships between factions is positively correlated with the probability of fragmentation. Second, having a small or moderate number of a faction's members belonging to another faction increases the probability of a split, but more significant cross-factional membership decreases the probability. Third, both high-degree centrality of a faction's leader and significant variations in the degree centrality within a faction's leadership structure is correlated with increased probability of a split. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study employs frame theory tools to describe the identity and ideology of Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). The aim is to identify elements that make the two groups' mobilization effective. The article utilizes the concept of identity fields, to explore how the two groups divide in-group and out-group identities in protagonists, antagonists, and audiences and the concept of core framing tasks to examine how their ideology materializes in diagnoses, prognoses, and calls to arms. The results indicate that AQ frames its identity as the protector of Muslims from the evil West and IS as the sole legitimate religious authority guiding Muslims to true Islam. AQ and IS prioritize and contextualize their ideological frames differently, despite both adhering to the same ideology, namely Salafism-Jihadism. AQ mobilization tends to rely more on political frames whereas IS framing is almost exclusively religious. Both groups, however, appropriate political and religious frames already extant in the minds of Muslim audiences in order to mobilize potential adherents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While al-Qaeda is a product of specific circumstances in the Middle East, the bitter irony of its September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States is that American policy in the region before those attacks unwittingly contributed significantly to its birth and development and that American policy subsequent to the attacks created new opportunities for similar organizations to flourish, even as al-Qaeda itself lost ground to those organizations. Organizationally and ideologically, al-Qaeda was the product of the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the successful war against Iraq in 1990-91, the two most prominent success stories in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States. This essay will treat Washington's unintentional participation in the development of al-Qaeda and the group's ideological development in an analytical narrative of the founding, growth, success and eventual decline of what for Americans is the prototypical terrorist organization of the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]