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US state governments frequently provide firms with targeted subsidies. In exchange, recipients promise to create or retain a certain number of jobs in the subsidizing state. Using novel hand-collected data, we address three questions: (i) the extent to which firms meet job creation targets promised in their applications, (ii) the factors that determine which firms meet the targets, and (iii) the benefits to firms from meeting those targets. We find that 63% of subsidies awarded to publicly traded U.S. firms between 2004 and 2015 meet their promised job creation targets. Firms with poorer labor practices are less likely to meet their targets, as are politically connected firms that receive subsidies in election years. Conversely, promised job targets are also more likely to be met for subsidies accompanied by government press releases but less likely to be met for subsidies accompanied by firm press releases; the latter likely reflects the fact that firms put out press releases for larger subsidies with more ambitious job targets. In terms of consequences, firms that meet job targets are more successful at obtaining subsequent subsidies both in and out of subsidizing states. However, while firms' success in meeting job targets is associated with an uptick in positive media coverage, this does not flow through to ESG ratings, even on scores specific to community impact. Our results should be of interest to both academics and policymakers interested in the design of state-level economic incentives.

US state governments frequently provide firms with targeted subsidies. In exchange, recipients promise to create or retain a certain number of jobs in the subsidizing state. Using novel hand-collected data, we address three questions: (i) the extent to which firms meet job creation targets promised in their applications, (ii) the factors that determine which firms meet the targets, and (iii) the benefits to firms from meeting those targets. We find that 63% of subsidies awarded to publicly traded U.S. firms between 2004 and 2015 meet their promised job creation targets. Firms with poorer labor practices are less likely to meet their targets, as are politically connected firms that receive subsidies in election years. Conversely, promised job targets are also more likely to be met for subsidies accompanied by government press releases but less likely to be met for subsidies accompanied by firm press releases; the latter likely reflects the fact that firms put out press releases for larger subsidies with more ambitious job targets. In terms of consequences, firms that meet job targets are more successful at obtaining subsequent subsidies both in and out of subsidizing states. However, while firms’ success in meeting job targets is associated with an uptick in positive media coverage, this does not flow through to ESG ratings, even on scores specific to community impact. Our results should be of interest to both academics and policymakers interested in the design of state-level economic incentives.

Investment funds that claim to focus on socially responsible stocks have proliferated in recent times. In this paper, we verify whether ESG mutual funds actually invest in firms that have stakeholder-friendly track records. Using a comprehensive sample of self-labelled ESG mutual funds (as identified by Morningstar) in the United States from 2010 to 2018, we find that these funds hold portfolio firms with worse track records for compliance with labor and environmental laws, relative to portfolio firms held by non-ESG funds managed by the same financial institutions in the same years. Relative to other funds offered by the same asset managers in the same years, ESG funds hold stocks that are more likely to voluntarily disclose carbon emissions performance but also stocks with higher carbon emissions per unit of revenue. Despite these findings, ESG funds hold portfolio firms with higher average ESG scores. We show that ESG scores are correlated with the quantity of voluntary ESG-related disclosures but not with firms’ compliance records or actual levels of carbon emissions. Finally, ESG funds appear to underperform financially relative to other funds within the same asset manager and year, and to charge higher fees. Our findings suggest that socially responsible funds do not appear to follow through on proclamations of concerns for stakeholders.

I examine the relation between firms’ financial conduct and wage theft. Wage theft represents the single largest form of theft committed in the United States and primarily affects firms’ most vulnerable employees. I show that wage theft is more prevalent (i) when firms just meet or beat earnings targets and (ii) when executives’ personal liability for wage theft decreases. Wage theft precedes financial misconduct while the theft is undetected, but once firms are caught engaging in wage theft they are more likely to shift to engaging in financial misconduct. My findings highlight an economically meaningful yet previously undocumented way in which firms’ financial incentives relate to employee treatment.

Many studies report that audit fees are discounted in the year of an auditor change and regulators have long been concerned that such fee discounting could impair audit quality. We find significant bias in the way studies have tested for fee discounting. The bias exists because interim procedures are usually performed by both the predecessor and successor auditors but only the successor’s fee needs to be disclosed. Accordingly, the disclosed fee during the auditor change year usually relates to a partial year of auditing services. We find that the evidence for fee discounting disappears after correcting for this measurement bias.

I study whether firms that receive targeted U.S. state-level subsidies are more likely to subsequently engage in corporate misconduct. I find that firms are more likely to engage in misconduct in subsidizing states, but not in other states that they operate in, after receiving state subsidies. Using data on both federal and state enforcement actions, and exploiting the legal principle of dual sovereignty for identification, I show that this finding reflects an increase in the underlying rate of misconduct and that this increase is attributable to lenient state-level misconduct enforcement. Collectively, my findings present evidence of an important consequence of targeted firm-specific subsidies: nonfinancial misconduct that potentially could impact the very stakeholders subsidies are ostensibly intended to benefit.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is decentralized, wherein field offices coordinated at the state level undertake inspections. We study whether this structure can lead to interstate frictions in sharing information and how this impacts firms’ compliance with workplace safety laws. We find that firms caught violating in one state subsequently violate less in that state but violate more in other states. Despite this pattern, and in keeping with information frictions, violations in one state do not trigger proactive OSHA inspections in other states. Moreover, firms face lower monetary penalties when subsequent violations occur across state lines, likely due to the lack of documentation necessary to assess severe penalties. Finally, firms are more likely to shift violating behavior into states with greater information frictions. Our findings suggest that internal information within regulators impacts the likelihood and location of corporate misconduct.

An influential emerging literature documents strong correlations between carbon emissions and stock returns. We re-examine those data and conclude that these associations are driven by two factors. First, stock returns are correlated only with unscaled emissions estimated by the data vendor, but not with unscaled emissions actually disclosed by firms. Vendor-estimated emissions systematically differ from firm-disclosed emissions and are highly correlated with financial fundamentals, suggesting that prior findings primarily capture the association between such fundamentals and returns. Second, unscaled emissions, the variable typically used in academic literature, is correlated with stock returns but emissions intensity (emissions scaled by firm size), an equally important measure used in practice, is not. While unscaled emissions represent an important metric for society, we argue that, for individual firms, emissions intensity is an appropriate measurement choice to assess carbon performance. The associations between emissions and returns disappear after accounting for either of the issues above.