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Mutual funds investing in illiquid corporate bonds actively manage Treasury positions to buffer redemption shocks. This liquidity management practice can transmit non-fundamental fund flow shocks onto Treasuries, generating excess return volatility. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that Treasury excess return volatility is positively associated with bond fund ownership, and this pattern is more pronounced among funds conducting intensive liquidity management. Causal evidence is provided by exploiting the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's 2017 Liquidity Risk Management Rule. Evidence also suggests that the COVID-19 Treasury market turmoil was attributed to intensified liquidity management, an unintended consequence of the 2017 Liquidity Risk Management Rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades new forms of distributions to shareholders such as share buybacks have found their way in standard dividend distribution policies of companies. Also, accounting rules have evolved and refer nowadays more to fair value consideration (for example in IFRS) which leads to an increased recognition of unrealised profits in distributable profits. The European Law Institute (ELI) recommendations (Biondi, Yuri, Colin Haslam and Corrado Malberti. 2025. "ELI Guidance on Company Capital and Financial Accounting for Corporate Sustainability." Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium 15 (s1): s21–88.) propose to modernise European company law regarding distributions, equity capital maintenance, and non-distributable reserves. The aim of the ELI recommendations is to ensure that payments made to shareholders, primarily in the form of dividends but also share buybacks, do not worsen the financial situation of companies and, therefore, endanger their continuity and resilience through time and circumstances, undermining their long-term capacity to cope with social and environmental commitments. We provide illustrative examples for eight ELI recommendations: restricting the dividend distribution of share premiums, stricter legal reserve requirements, the setting up of non-distributable reserves for gains from certain accounting measurements, for current value measurement of provisions, for capitalized development costs, for equity method holding gains, for held own-shares, and for goodwill. Our numerical examples show how the application of the ELI recommendations limits distributable profits and, therefore, contributes to sustain a sound financial situation of companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Open-end mutual funds can use redemption in kind to satisfy investor redemptions by delivering securities instead of cash. We find that funds that reserve their rights to redeem in kind experience less redemption after poor performance. Evidence from actual in-kind transactions reveals several unique mechanisms for redemption in kind to mitigate fund runs, including the delivery of more illiquid stocks and stocks with greater tax overhang. Funds suffer less from the adverse impact of outflows on their performance. However, redeeming investors bear significant liquidation costs when they sell securities, costs associated with destabilization in the prices of these securities. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the failure of the taxpayer in Connelly v. United States and its impact on business succession and estate tax planning. It summarizes the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion on the value of corporate-owned life insurance policy on the decedent's life and shares redemption when determining corporate shares value for estate tax purposes. It discusses the effect of purchase agreements on the valuation of life insurance proceeds in determining the fair market value of a business.

We identify fixed-income mutual funds as an important contributor to the unusually high selling pressure in liquid asset markets during the COVID-19 crisis. We show that mutual funds experienced pronounced investor outflows amplified by their liquidity transformation. In meeting redemptions, funds followed a pecking order by first selling their liquid assets, including Treasuries and high-quality corporate bonds, which generated the most concentrated selling pressure in these markets. Overall, the estimated price impact of mutual funds was sizable at a third of the increase in Treasury yields and a quarter of the increase in corporate bond yields during the COVID-19 crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has become a common practice for restaurant firms to spend amounts exceeding their earnings on share buybacks by depleting their cash reserves or even by borrowing money. Given restaurant firms' limited ability to generate internal cash and the high cost of debt financing, using these means to finance share buybacks could jeopardize restaurant firms' long-term success. However, little is known about the factors influencing restaurant firms' tendency toward this seemingly aggressive buyback behavior. This study revealed that the more restaurant firms' earnings reduce, the greater their tendency is to conduct such aggressive share buybacks. This result could provide some evidence that managerial self-serving behavior plays a role in aggressive share buybacks in the restaurant industry. The study also demonstrated that the positive impact of reduced earnings on aggressive buybacks becomes stronger as a firm's degree of franchising increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the legislative norms that provide for the joint liability for damages caused by a corporate group of persons, the current practice of the Supreme Court regarding the resolution of corporate disputes on squeeze-out procedures. The history of the emergence and conditions of application of the doctrine of "lifting the corporate veil" have been studied. It was recognized as appropriate by the court to apply the doctrine of "lifting the corporate veil" in order to ensure the effective protection of minority shareholders as an extraordinary measure in case of abuse by the members of the corporate group of the right to control the company and joint actions in the process of implementing the mandatory sale of shares with the aim of buying out the shares of minority shareholders at an undervalued cost. Corporate structures of the MP Azovstal PrJSC, Avdiyiv Coke Chemical Plant PrJSC, Ukrainian Graphite PrJSC, MMK Ilycha PrJSC, DTEK Dniproenergo JSC, Zakarpattiaoblenergo PrJSC, which conducted squeeze-out procedures were analyzed. These companies conducted squeeze-out procedures using corporate structures, affiliated subsidiary companies, related persons. The beneficiaries (beneficiaries) of the acquired 100 % corporate control were determined, the application of the doctrine of "lifting the corporate veil" and bringing the members of the corporate group to joint and several liability were investigated. The issuer, the applicant of the public irrevocable claim, its affiliated persons and persons acting jointly, the ultimate beneficial owner are recognized as the proper defendants in disputes related to squeeze-out procedures. The specified persons, who make up a single corporate group, are jointly and severally liable to the minority shareholders for the damages caused in the process of the squeeze-out procedure. Derivative suit is offered to spread over the losses caused by company officials to its shareholders in the procedures of redemption, compulsory redemption and compulsory sale of shares. Disputes of compulsory sale of shares in the squeeze-out procedure belong to the subject jurisdiction of commercial courts as disputes on deeds of shares, regardless of the dispute parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a dynamic heterogeneous agent industry model, we examine the impact of manager remuneration schemes on firms' investment decisions and on the evolution of their competitiveness and share values. Whereas an increase in the share-based manager remuneration component is always beneficial to the manager, it is beneficial for shareholders only if such a change in the remuneration scheme is adopted by all firms in the industry. In that case, productivity growth is slowed down and workers' real wages are reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate behaviors and performance of a supply chain, in which a supplier uses buyback contracts to transact with a retailer under stochastic market demand. We compare ex-ante versus ex-post buyback pricing—the supplier decides the buyback price before demand realization in the former, but after demand realization in the latter. Theoretical analyses predict that the retailer order quantity and the supply chain efficiency are lower under ex-post buyback pricing. However, in experiments with human subjects playing both the supplier and retailer, we observe the opposite: the retailer order quantity and the supply chain efficiency are significantly higher under ex-post buyback pricing. Several behaviors are found significant. First, the supplier exhibits weaker advantageous fairness concern under ex-ante buyback pricing than under ex-post buyback pricing. Second, the supplier over-weights the buyback cost under the former, but under-weights (reciprocates) under the latter. Third, the retailer's fairness concern is weaker under the latter. Fourth, the retailer exhibits trust behavior with the supplier under the latter. These drivers lead to less rejection and higher order quantity under ex-post buyback pricing than under ex-ante buyback pricing. Our results shed light on how human behaviors change with the decision timing and benefit supply chain performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate share buybacks are under attack, mainly from the political left, but also to some degree from the right. Critics advocate increasing the tax on buybacks in the hope of inducing firms to invest more and in ways that benefit workers. This attack on buybacks reflects a misunderstanding of basic (textbook‐level) finance principles. The approach advocated by critics will backfire at growth‐stage firms, which will invest less, not more, because a payout‐tax increase will reduce the supply of equity infusions. At mature firms that are generating ample free cash flow, managers can easily evade the (unattractive‐for‐shareholders) real investments that critics desire by investing retained cash in financial assets. Buyback critics should recognise that punishing cash payouts per se would be counterproductive, and should focus instead on making a case for legislation that creates incentives that directly promote the specific behaviours they desire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores liquidity management practices in Czech open-ended bond and equity funds. I reconstruct cash flows stemming from investors and securities, and cash flows related to purchases and sales in portfolios and margin calls to study liquidity transformation and liquidity management in investment funds. I study how portfolio illiquidity and current market conditions influence the joint behavior between investor redemptions and funds' liquidity management. I point to a strong propensity to reduce the liquid buffers rather than sales of securities to meet redemptions in bond funds. The propensity increases with portfolio illiquidity. I show equity funds historically tended to dash for cash in response to investor redemptions during a severe market turmoil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Buy-sell agreements are a necessary part of any business succession plan. S corporations (whether electing limited liability companies or electing C corporations) are popular forms of doing business. The two basic buy-sell agreement structures are cross-purchase or stock redemption (entity). This article compares and contrasts the attractions and limitations of both structures, with particular attention paid to life insurance funding and the mechanics and taxation at death or retirement. It reviews variations--wait- and-see, one-way, and asset sales--as they are affected, then reviews many of the factors to be considered in choosing the appropriate structure. In the end it concludes that every plan needs to be tailored to the specific circumstances of each business. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Die Unternehmensbesteuerung (Ubg) is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Arab Journal of Administrative Sciences is the property of Kuwait University, Academic Publication Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The narrative of pervasive short‐termism caused by the stock market, and the need to protect corporations and the economy from it, is now a well established one. Frenetic short‐term trading and aggressive activists chasing immediate increases in profit prevent corporations from thinking about the requirements for their own long‐run success. Institutional investors squeeze cash out of the corporate sector by pressuring companies into excessive share buybacks instead of supporting long‐term investments in R&D and skills development. The relentless pressure for short‐term results also causes companies to neglect long‐term social problems like climate change, human rights, and inequality as they seek to meet the stock market's expectations for quarterly earnings. That this set of views is so widely accepted, and allowed to pass unchallenged, even in relatively sophisticated business and policy‐making circles, makes Mark Roe's new book particularly important and timely. In a measured, balanced, and utterly non‐polemical fashion, and using the highest quality academic evidence, the Harvard Law professor weighs the evidence for and against the charge that stock‐market short‐termism is a serious problem for the U.S. economy. Spoiler alert: he finds that there is no compelling case to answer. Stock‐market‐driven short‐termism is at most a minor problem. This finding matters because rather than railing against share buybacks, putting sand in the wheels of shareholder activism, and seeking to insulate corporate managers from investor pressure, Professor Roe contends that our policymakers should instead be focusing action on areas that are much more likely to have positive outcomes for society. Chief among them have been failure to resist the persistent decline in government‐funded (not corporate sector) R&D or to beef up regulation and regulatory staffing to ensure that companies bear the costs of externalities that are currently offloaded onto society. While ignoring these opportunities, we continue to devote too much attention to policies and actions—such as efforts to tax buybacks and limit shareholder activism—that are bound to be ineffective at best, and counterproductive at worst. Missing the Target is essential reading for policymakers, regulators, and anyone else interested in corporate governance, financial markets, and regulation that can and will actually make a positive difference to the rest of us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the role of institutional investors in determining firms' decisions whether to reduce dividends and share buybacks during the Covid‐19 pandemic. Our simple model predicts that the probability of cuts in payouts is linked to the holdings and types of institutions. We link our model to the attention‐based theories of the firm. We posit that the highly proximate nature of the pandemic may encourage greater risk aversion in organizations. Consequently, the presence of institutions that actively engage with managers results in a reduction in shareholders' payouts during the pandemic to enable firms to deal with increased uncertainty, while institutions that seek short‐term value releases reduce the probability of cuts. We test our hypotheses using novel hand‐collected data on shareholders' payout cuts in the UK during the Covid‐19 lockdown. We find that in firms with larger institutional holdings, shareholders' payouts are more likely to be reduced as a response to the pandemic. However, institutional heterogeneity matters as institutions with a view to improve firms' long‐term growth are more likely to affect corporate payout decisions. In contrast, institutions that focus on regular income (e.g. pension funds) seem to resist cuts even in the aftermath of a severe exogenous shock like the Covid‐19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the issues concerning the Companies Amendment Bill of 2021 which seeks to amend the existing Companies Act of 2008. Topics include the objectives of the Bill to facilitate the ease of conducting business in South Africa, the proposed salient amendments to the Companies Act under their respective pillars, and the need for lawmakers to ensure the growth of South African economy by attracting investors and harnessing appropriate talent.

Purpose: This paper investigates stakeholders' perspectives of share buybacks in the context of time-horizons of investment decisions and strategy. Design/methodology/approach: We use in-depth interviews with stakeholders from eight listed UK firms as well as examine their publicly available data. Findings: Findings suggest that share buybacks involve a wide range of stakeholders' rational interests and long-term management perspectives as they enable firms to strategise operational plans towards their long-term corporate goals. Research limitations/implications: The findings are based on interviews with a small number of share buyback firms and the findings, therefore, may not be generalised to all firms. Practical implications: The results show that share buybacks may be part of the long-term interests of firms and not necessarily used as part of short-term EPS increases as suggested in the extant literature. Originality/value: The findings contribute to the literature on corporate pay-out policies in the context of short-term financial objectives vs long-term strategic objectives of stakeholders. They show that share buybacks can be an important part of firms' long-term strategic considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we examine the differences in Investment, Employment, and Share repurchase sensitivities to uncertainty between firms with varying investor horizons. We test for these effects using two macro‐based uncertainty measures (Baker et al., 2016; Ahir et al., 2018). The results show that in uncertainty times, greater short‐term investor ownership is associated with less investment and hiring, and more net share buybacks. These findings are consistent with the preference of short‐horizon investors of seeking to divest in the near future, thus, wanting to maximize current stock prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fire sales induced by investor redemptions have powerful spillover effects among funds that hold the same assets, hurting peer funds' performance and flows, and leading to further asset sales with negative bond price impact. A one‐standard‐deviation increase in our fire‐sale spillover measure leads to a 45 (90) bp decrease in peer fund returns (flows) and a two percentage point increase in the likelihood of a large bond price drop. The results hold in a regression‐discontinuity design addressing identification concerns. Timing, heterogeneity, instrumental‐variable, and placebo tests further support the price‐impact mechanism. Model‐based counterfactual and stress‐test analyses quantify the financial stability implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]