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We propose a model of strategic renegotiation in which businesses are sequentially interconnected through their liabilities. This financing structure, which we refer to as a credit chain, gives rise to externalities, as each lender's willingness to provide concessions to its borrower depends on how this lender's own liabilities are expected to be renegotiated. We highlight how government interventions aimed at preventing default waves should account for private renegotiation incentives and interlinkages. In particular, we contrast the consequences of targeted subsidy and debt reduction programs following economic shocks, such as pandemics and financial crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study firms' decisions to withhold loan covenant details by focusing on a unique disclosure-related cost. Prior research documents the prevalence of tight initial covenants that are selectively relaxed in future renegotiations. This uncertainty in renegotiation outcomes can generate a disclosure-related cost because disclosing a snapshot of initial covenants with a high likelihood of violation could lead to harmful outsider reactions (e.g., trade credit cuts) to violations that may be eventually cured. We hypothesize and find that, when firms are likely to face tighter initial covenants and more renegotiations, they are more likely to withhold covenant details, particularly when under pressure from trade creditors. Our inference is robust to controlling for firms' obligation to disclose (i.e., contract materiality) and future performance. Prior research has found that the precise covenant details of many loans are not publicly available. We are the first to offer a systematic explanation related to disclosure costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the problem of voluntary participation in negotiations regarding the provision of public goods. In contrast to earlier studies, in our model, a negotiation is followed by renegotiations. First, players decide whether to participate in a negotiation, and the participants produce a public good. The participants then renegotiate the level of the public good with nonparticipants in the preceding negotiations. We show that with these renegotiation opportunities, many players may participate in providing the public good in the preceding negotiation. In some cases, all players participate in the preceding negotiation and the public good is produced efficiently. Our findings indicate that more players participate in the provision of public goods if they have strong bargaining power in the renegotiations. Hence, this problem may not be as severe as reported by previous studies. Our results may be consistent with the recent developments in voluntary projects for international river management. • We present a simple model of voluntary negotiation on providing public goods. • Players can choose whether to join a negotiation providing public goods. • There are opportunities to renegotiate the agreement of the initial negotiation. • The opportunities may induce many players to join the public good provision. • The public goods may be supplied efficiently by the participation of all players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we address the remunicipalization question from a novel perspective: by looking at "who is at the helm". Using a comprehensive panel dataset covering the complete universe of French drinking water services from 2009 to 2021, we show that the type of local governments in charge of supervising water services (inter-municipal cooperation or not) influences the decision to remunicipalize. We argue that this is because the costs of negotiating the remunicipalization of water services as well as the level of involvement in the investment and supervision of water services vary according to the type of local government. We conclude by discussing the lessons to be learned from our study concerning the future of remunicipalizations in France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal framework on amendments to Public-Private Partnership Contracts as provided by the Public-Private Partnership Law No. 18,786. To this end, within the scope of unilateral amendments, the consequences of imposing such amendments in an illegitimate manner and the possibility of unilaterally imposing a limitation of the contract's subject matter are examined. Additionally, aspects regarding bilateral amendments to Public-Private Participation Contracts and possible limitations applicable to the subject matter on which they may be based, are addressed. This paper also studies the possible consequences that non-compliance with the formal requirements established in the applicable law may have on the validity of the amendment in question. Finally, the grounds for renegotiation and, especially, the case of illegitimate unilateral amendments as an additional ground not expressly provided for in the applicable law, are analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A notary is a public official who is given the mandate to make authentic deeds, one of which is through business contracts. In practice, business contracts often experience various updates for one reason or another. As part of a notary's duties to make business contract deeds, the notary also has the responsibility to ensure that all procedures and contract clauses do not conflict with the law. This research will discuss considerations about the role of notaries in preparing business contract documents, potential sources of disputes related to the implementation of business contracts and provisions for resolving disputes related to business contract deeds. To discuss this problem, an empirical juridical approach will be used through analytical descriptive research. The research concludes that the presence of a notary takes into account the interests of the parties when drafting business contract deeds so that they can anticipate possible conflicts that may arise. The authenticity of a notarial deed becomes absolute with the commitment of the parties concerned to continue to rely on consultation and agreement in resolving disputes that may arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a debt-run model to study the effects of liquidity injections on debt markets in the presence of a renegotiation option. In the model, creditors decide when to withdraw their funding and equityholders can renegotiate the contract terms of debt. We show that when equityholders have a large bargaining power, liquidity injections into distressed firms can rather cause more aggressive runs from their creditors, hurting the debt value. This outcome occurs because equityholders can strategically utilize the renegotiation option as a bankruptcy threat, pushing down the debt value below the potential liquidation value of the firm. In such a scenario, a deterred default resulting from emergency capital injections could be detrimental to creditors.

The Children of God (now The Family International [TFI]) emerged in the countercultural moment of the 1960s on the radical fringe of the Jesus People movement and evolved into a controversial new religious movement that has generated significant scholarly research over the past 5 decades. This article will review the history of TFI, with particular focus on its latest shift to online religion, and reflect on the research published throughout its history and how this has engaged with the cycles of organizational change that have characterized the movement. The history of TFI highlights the dynamic nature of new religions, and their potential to strategically adapt and revise beliefs and practices to accommodate changing cultural contexts. Research of TFI's journey from radical communalism to virtual community offers insights into novel ways in which new religions may be disrupted and socially reconstructed in the digital information age, and the renegotiations of belief, worldview and identity this may entail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common for suppliers to underestimate costs in procurement auctions, thereby decreasing the bid price and profit on completion of the supply, and potentially resulting in supply disruptions. We study the bidding decisions of suppliers that underestimate costs when the buyer uses first‐price or second‐price sealed‐bid procurement auctions. We study the effects of underestimating costs on the bid prices and performance decisions under different auction modes and propose renegotiations after procurement auctions to cope with supply disruptions. The results show that: (1) using first‐price or second‐price auctions, underestimating costs does not guarantee a positive profit on completion of the supply. When the winning supplier's degree of underestimation is high enough, underestimating costs may cause supply disruptions. (2) When the buyer faces supply disruptions, if the expected payment for re‐selecting another supplier is not less than a certain threshold value, the buyer can prevent supply disruptions through renegotiations after procurement auctions. (3) Compared to the situation where all suppliers' budgeted costs are accurate, underestimating costs always decreases the supplier's profit. For the buyer, when the supplier completes the supply under the original or renegotiated contract, underestimating costs can decrease the procurement costs. Finally, we show the main conclusions with numerical examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public-private partnership (PPP) renegotiations and their outcomes have been studied extensively in Latin America and Europe but not in the United States. Therefore, this study evaluates factors triggering U.S. PPP renegotiations by examining six highway PPPs located in California (2), Indiana (1), and Virginia (3). The findings suggest exogenous macroeconomic shocks, project and political complexity, and institutional inexperience are the most compelling triggers behind U.S. PPP renegotiations. These findings also highlight America's distinct political and institutional environment – i.e. favourable to buy-outs as well as debt restructuring via bankruptcy – as a possible explanation for the absence of opportunism among U.S. PPP renegotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a unifying framework generalizing established theories we characterize under which conditions Joint Ownership of assets creates the best cooperation incentives in a partnership. We endogenise renegotiation costs and assume that they weakly increase with additional assets. A salient sufficient condition for optimal cooperation incentives among patient partners is if Joint Ownership is a Strict Coasian Institution for which transaction costs impede an efficient asset reallocation after a breakdown. In contrast to Halonen (2002) the logic behind our results is that Joint Ownership maximizes the value of the relationship and the costs of renegotiating ownership after a broken relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores an understudied aspect of women's transnational labour migration, namely how left-behind men negotiate the changes in their status in the domestic and public spheres when their daughters or wives migrate for work and become primary earners in the family. A case study of Syrian Christians in a village in Central Kerala with a long history of women's transnational labour migration demonstrates how left-behind men refashion their masculine identities by reasserting their role as family protectors when they lose their traditional role as family providers. The article illustrates how left-behind men employ diverse social and discursive practices in domestic and community spheres to reconstruct their gendered sense of self and resist the social stigma of failed masculinity. It also demonstrates how the Church, which continues to be a dominant institution influencing the personal and political lives of Syrian Christians, has become an arena for left-behind men to reassert their patriarchal status at home and in the community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: In the transition to college, students with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) often face difficulties. Parental support may aid in the successful adjustment to college, and a strong parent-child relationship (PCR) may optimize the balance between autonomy and support necessary during this transition. Method: Few studies have examined this; therefore, a qualitative study using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was conducted. First- and second-year college students with ADHD participated in open-ended, one-on-one interviews (N = 11; 64% women, 91% White). Results: The two broad categories of findings included Parental Support and the Renegotiation of the Parent-Child Relationship. Participants described feeling supported by their parents in the progress toward their short- and long-term goals. Students described this support as helpful when they managed or initiated the contact, but as unhelpful when the parent was perceived as over involved. They described a strong PCR in this transition as helpful to their adjustment and enjoyed the renegotiation of the PCR in terms of their own increased autonomy and responsibility. Many additional themes and sub-themes are described herein. Conclusion: Optimal levels of involvement and support from parents in the context of a strong PCR is beneficial for adjustment to college for those with ADHD. We discuss the clinical implications of our findings, such as therapists helping families transition to college, and working with college students with ADHD on an adaptive renegotiation of the PCR in their transition to adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the coordinated outcomes. The set of communication-proof equilibria is a small and relatively homogeneous subset of the set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players' beliefs and interim Pareto efficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave the principal unaware of relevant options. By doing so, the agent increases the principal's cost of distorting the agent's choices and increases the principal's willingness to grant him higher information rents. We further show that the principal may use the option of renegotiation as a tool to implement actions that are not describable to her at the contracting stage. If the agent renegotiates, his proposal signals information about the payoff state. Due to her limited awareness, the principal makes a coarse inference from the agent's recommendations and, as a result, accepts a large number of the agent's proposals, which ultimately benefits both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses three features that characterise the authoritarian restoration following what is known as the Arab springs of 2011: a) the recourse to technocratic governments, b) the proliferation of discourses on the depoliticisation of governance and c) the postponement of the renegotiation of the old social contracts. Added to this is the importance of the international nexus, given that strategic allied states at a global level and international financial institutions embrace a formula that ensures stability and facilitates the implementation of neoliberal reforms. However, this authoritarian technopopulism fails to address the economic demands of the population, nor does it provide avenues of political inclusion or a framework for drawing up a new social contract; at best, it serves momentarily as a structure to contain the protests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines some thoughts on relational contracts. Such a contract can involve an implicit agreement to behave in certain ways, that includes the use of explicit, legally enforceable contracts, which may be rewritten as play proceeds. The use of implicit contracts involves a series of challenges not encountered with a legal contract that irrevocably specifies all contingent behavior. What agreements are credible? What threatened punishments will withstand efforts to renegotiate? To what extent can a long-run player establish a reputation for a particular kind of behavior? Can information design and Bayesian persuasion usefully be viewed through this lens? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a sample of 1525 withdrawn deals from 1981 to 2015 in the United States, we find that target firms close to their 52‐week high prices after merger announcements have lower withdrawal probabilities. The effect is different across merger waves. The out‐wave deals are sensitive to the target reference prices while in‐wave deals are not. Moreover, targets with post‐announcement prices close to 52‐week high tend to have higher withdrawn returns and receive higher adjustments of offering prices in renegotiation. Overall, our results suggest that target post‐announcement stock prices significantly affect deal outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides novel evidence that corporate political influence operates through renegotiations of existing government contracts. Using detailed data on contractual terms and renegotiations around sudden deaths and resignations of local politicians, the estimates show that politically connected firms initially bid low and successfully renegotiate contract amounts, deadlines, and incentives. The effects hold across different industries and contract types, enhance firm value, and persist around the exogenous increase in contract supply due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Overall, this paper establishes an unexplored link between political influence, ex post renegotiations, and ex ante bidding of government contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within a formal model of international agreements in the shadow of renegotiations and domestic competition, we highlight three important ways elections shape international agreements. Elections determine who will be in control of policy in the future, which affects how leaders bargain today. Elections also determine the deals policymakers will agree to. Finally, proposers have the opportunity to shape the contours of domestic political competition with what is offered in pre-electoral bargaining. We identify that several canonical results in the literature – like the Schelling conjecture or the idea that hawkish leaders have an innate bargaining advantage over dovish leaders – only hold under certain restrictions on how voters evaluate their leaders. In contrast, we show paradoxically that when voters are prospective, electoral incentives shade the ability for domestic leaders to negotiate better deals for their publics. Counterintuitively, this leads to hawks agreeing to more conciliatory agreements than doves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to generate some recommendations for the future improvement of the content of the Association Agreement (AA) between the European Union (EU) and Central America (CA). Although the political conditions for renegotiation are currently complex, it is possible to present some reflections on the provisions of the Agreement and its eventual modification, especially to strengthen synergies with the environmental and climate change commitments, such as the commitment to effectively implement the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement of the countries of the region. The article presents recommendations for potential renegotiation on key components of the Agreement, including the preamble; objectives; exceptions; sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS); technical barriers to trade; investment provisions; intellectual property rights; trade and sustainable development; dispute resolution; and cooperation and political dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I demonstrate that transacting parties may expend resources on ex ante contracting, which may not be legally enforceable, to help build and maintain their long-term relationships. I first introduce three legal concepts, namely scaffolding, managerial provisions, and formal relational contracts, which highlight the recent trend towards more detailed contracts. These concepts indicate that the role of detailed contracts is not to improve judicial contract enforcement, but to enhance clarity and alignment of interests and to reduce renegotiation costs, which ultimately support the parties' relationships. I then proceed to present and analyze a simple reduced-form model, which demonstrates that the parties' efforts for ex ante contracting are not necessarily monotonic with the level of alignment of their interests. Furthermore, I discuss recent contracting practices in Japan and attempt to provide an explanation for the lack of change observed in these practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-sectoral strategic negotiation is a key challenge in PPPs. Based on framing and game theory, we investigate the effect of sectoral agency, affect, and bargaining domain on sectoral agents' bargaining behaviour in a PPP renegotiation scenario. Results confirm that public agents are more likely to bargain for satisfactory, 'good enough' contracts than private agents, who maximize their utility. This difference is stronger in the loss vis-a-vis the gain domain. These experimental findings advance our understanding of psychological mechanisms underlying cross-sectoral negotiations, suggesting that public managers and policy-makers account for partners' dissimilar bargaining logics to prevent asymmetric loss socialization in PPPs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie ( KZfSS) is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyzes the occurrence of renegotiation costs in dynamic, binary agency models with a risk‐averse agent. I investigate technological interdependence arising from complementary tasks or substitutable tasks across periods. In addition, I analyze stochastic interdependence between periods. The analysis leads to two results. First, the timeliness of performance measures leads to zero costs from renegotiation. Surprisingly, timeliness may arise even in the case of stochastic interdependence. Second, neither technological nor stochastic interdependence is sufficient for renegotiation losses. The former finding is in line with results obtained in the LEN model, but the latter contrasts. In the binary agency model, renegotiation does not harm efficiency as long as raising incentives in the second period is ineffective for inducing higher effort in the first period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have long observed that states play off overlapping international institutions against one another in an effort to advance their policy objectives. This article identifies a strategy utilized by the EU in response to regime complexity that I term "backdoor bargaining." Unlike forum-shopping, regime-shifting, and competitive-regime creation strategies, which states use to move multilateral negotiations to an institution that they expect will produce a more favorable outcome, backdoor bargaining involves a state using negotiations within one institution to gain an advantage in negotiations taking place at another distinct institution in a regime complex. I demonstrate the plausibility of backdoor bargaining by showing that the EU used the renegotiation of the Food Aid Convention as a strategy to gain bargaining leverage in the agriculture negotiations at the World Trade Organization. The article also offers insights into the potential consequences of international regime complexity for the EU as a global actor and the coherence of its foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In many Petroleum contracts, the parties put renegotiation clause in order to keep longtime balance, so that if the balance disrupted, the parties should be obliged to renegotiate in order to rehabilitate the contract balance. So if renegotiation process didn’t reach result, what will happen to the contract? Also in which circumstances the parties have right to recourse arbitration? Do arbitrators have the right to adjust the contract? In one side, keeping the balance was the first base of the agreement, and by disrupting the balance the continuation of contract would become unfair and in contrast with common intention, and on the other side, termination of the contract without party consent is impossible. In the absent of arbitration clause, one parties can recourse to the arbitration tribunal, so that the tribunal can arbitrate the case if it is deduced from implicit agreement or enforceable law that it has jurisdiction. In case of putting adjustment right for arbitrator, he can adjust it. otherwise, it can be understood from the first intention of the parties, economical logic, principles of international trade law and the principle of similarity of arbitrator and judge authorities that the arbitrator has right to use adjustment.

Copyright of Review of African Political Economy is the property of Review of Political Economy (ROAPE) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the last decade, Hugh Grant has been going through something resembling a career revival. After retreating from his roles as an English gentleman and romantic lead during the mid-2000s, Grant has recently re-emerged to garner critical acclaim in productions, such as Paddington 2 (2017), The Gentlemen (2019), and The Undoing (2020). What these roles have in common is that Grant has abandoned his days as prince charming in favour of a series of unlikeable characters and morally complex villains. This article analyses how this turn to villain signifies a renegotiation of Hugh Grant's star image and how this career revival stands into contact with his previous persona. Combining a close reading of some of Grant's recent films, together with a discussion of press discourse and interviews, I account for how Grant's villain performances are shaped and mediated by different artistic, commercial, and discursive forces. As such, I elucidate how Grant's renegotiation of his image helps distances himself from his previous career phase, is utilised by filmmakers to subvert audience expectations, and invites us to question the patriarchal and English imperialist attitudes that lay embedded in his previous performances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A primary concern in mergers and acquisitions is the risk the deal may be cancelled before it is completed. We document that "interim risk" varies asymmetrically with the aggregate market return. Deals tend to be renegotiated when the market rises, but cancelled when the market crashes. These effects are conditional on the method of payment and the contracting stage of the deal, consistent with a mechanism of ex post renegotiation. Variation in interim risk over time alters the method of payment in mergers and the firms that are targeted and acquired. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Supplemental Material: The e-companion and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4315. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cadernos Argentina Brasil is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The small to medium-sized enterprise ('SME') sector is the largest and most productive in Australia. Like all established market-based economies, ours is characterised by the use of contracts as a mechanism for exchange. Contracts often require variation in response to variables such as under-pricing, resource availability, changes in scope, and rising product costs, so SMEs (and larger businesses) will frequently encounter the process of renegotiation. The rules applicable to contract renegotiation seldom receive attention in academic writing. Moreover, the attitudes toward, understandings of, and experiences with the doctrine of renegotiation among Australian SMEs are scarcely researched. This article expounds the law of renegotiation before reporting on selected findings from a largescale empirical study designed to fill these knowledge gaps, among others, in the literature. The results provide invaluable insight into how this critically important sector perceives and deals with contract law and the doctrine of renegotiation, and underscores potential areas for improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]