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Depending on the nature of vulnerability of the civilian population, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) provides general protection against the effects of hostilities and special protection in case of falling under the power of the enemy. The general protection covers the entire civilian population of all the parties involved in the conflict, no matter whose territory or power they may find themselves in and without any discrimination as to race, nationality, religion or political beliefs. General protection applies to all situations where the civilian population is vulnerable to hostilities, and it is aimed at alleviating the suffering brought by war. In order to provide effective protection against the consequences of hostilities, IHL envisages the establishment of special protected zones, prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian objects, introduces precautionary measures before attacks and against the effects of attacks, and recognizes the right to humanitarian assistance. Civilians located in the territory ruled by a hostile power enjoy special protection because of their higher level of vulnerability to threats, blackmail and other forms of arbitrary treatment. This protection applies to a variety of situations where civilians have fallen in the power of the enemy, and it encompasses three categories of civilians. The first category includes the nationals of one party to the conflict who were residing on the territory of the hostile power and who were caught there at the outbreak of hostilities. The second category includes civilians living in the territory of their own country who have fallen under the power of the enemy forces which occupied that territory during the armed conflict and placed it under their effective control. The third category includes civilian internees in the enemy or occupied territory who were detained in special internment camps by one of the parties in conflict, and whose position is very similar to the treatment of prisoners of war.

In international humanitarian law, the status of a prisoner of war (POW) is given to certain categories of persons involved in armed conflicts who fall into the power of an adverse party. The most important category among them are combatants, i.e. members of the armed forces. However, the notion of a POW is much wider as it includes non-combatants, i.e. persons who accompany the armed forces without being their actual members. The protection guaranteed to POWs under the international humanitarian law is a compromise between two distinct interests. On the one hand, the main interest of the Detaining Power that holds prisoners in captivity is to weaken the enemy’s military forces by hindering their further participation in fights. On the other hand, the interest of the POWs is to be protected in accordance with the basic international human rights standards. The protection of POWs in international humanitarian law is twofold. In addition to the basic protection principles, there are series of specific and very detailed rules governing the content of this protection. These rules apply to all aspects of captivity, starting from the moment of capturing POWs and their subsequent treatment until the termination of captivity. In the minutest detail, these rules regulate a number of significant issues relevant to the POWs life in captivity, such as: evacuation; interrogation; quarters in prisoner camps; food and clothing; hygiene and medical care; assistance of medical and religious personnel; religious services, intellectual and physical activities; discipline in detention camps; military ranks; transfers; labour; financial resources; relations with the outside world and authorities; disciplinary and penal liability. Captivity may be terminated in the course of hostilities due to the prisoner’s death, a successful escape, a release on parole or promise, direct repatriation or accommodation in a third (neutral) country, and a prisoner exchange. After the cessation of active hostilities, all POWs must immediately be released and repatriated. Unreasonable delay of repatriation of prisoners of war constitutes a grave violation of international humanitarian law and is therefore qualified as a war crime.

In international humanitarian law there are only a few rules which directly protect the environment. These rules are contained in the Additional Protocol I of 1977, the ENMOD Convention of 1976 and the Convention on Conventional Weapons, as well as in its Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons. In addition, there are a number of rules within this branch of law which indirectly protect the environment during armed conflicts. The most important among them are the general principles of international humanitarian law (military necessity, proportionality and distinction) which are applicable to all states due to their character of being customary law. Moreover, some treaty provisions provide for indirect environment protection, and they are contained in the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilians and the Additional Protocol I.

Every year, a large number of journalists are killed or injured in line of professional duty or on account of the results of their investigative journalism, particularly in the course of armed conflicts. Unfortunately, there is no single document in international law which would embody specific rules on the protection of journalists. Instead, the protection of journalists in international law is exercised on the basis of general rules contained in human rights treaties and special provisions of international humanitarian law. In the past period, there have been several attempts to adopt a special treaty on the protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions. The first efforts came from some professional journalists’ associations at the end of the 1960s but the proposed drafts did not obtain necessary state support. Given the frequency of casualties involving journalists, the United Nations also engaged in improving the international protection of journalists. The UN General Assembly requested from the Human Rights Commission to draft a convention providing for the protection of journalists on dangerous missions. In 1971, the Human Rights Commission adopted a preliminary draft of an international convention and the next year it produced the Draft Articles of the International Convention on the Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Professional Missions in Areas of Armed Conflict. Unfortunately, neither of the proposed legal texts has been officially adopted by the General Assembly to the present day. For the lack of a special treaty governing this issue, the protection of journalists is nowadays based on the rules of international law which are contained in human rights treaties and international humanitarian law. Although they do not contain specific legal provisions on the protection of journalists, human rights treaties contain some fundamental human rights which are valuable for the protection of journalists, such as: the right to life, the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment, the freedom of expression and the freedom of movement. Some of these rights provide for their physical protection while others enable the exercise of their professional activities. Unlike human rights treaties, international humanitarian law does contain special provisions on the protection of journalists. International humanitarian law distinguishes between accredited war correspondents and 'independent' (free-lance) journalists. Both categories of journalists are regarded as civilians but war correspondents are given the status of prisoners of war in case they are captured by enemy. As all other civilians, journalists lose their protection if they take a direct participation in hostilities.

Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) are a third generation of EU association agreements, which are specially designed for the Western Balkan counties. By their legal nature, they are preferential trade agreements including political clauses which make provisions for the countries of this region to become candidates for the EU membership but without an automatic right of admission to EU. Concurrently, they are mixed agreements, which implies that they must be ratified not only by the non-member states but also by the EU and all its Member States. In light of such a complex and lengthy ratification process, an interim agreement is concluded alongside the SAA. The decision of the EU Council and the ratification of the associated state is sufficient for its entry into force. Stabilisation and Association Agreements fall into the category of primary sources of the EU legal system, along with other international treaties, and they have a higher legal force than the secondary legislation. Hence, they constitute an integral part of EU Law and no transposition measures are required for their application. On the other hand, the SAA may have a direct effect in the Member States’ legal systems if they contain clear and precise provisions whose application is not conditional to the adoption of any subsequent implementation measures. In its jurisprudence, the EU Court of Justice has recognized the direct effect of association agreement provisions on the creation of free trade zones, which facilitate the freedom of movement of capital, goods and services between the associated states and the EU and its Member States. When it comes to the free movement of workers, the direct effect is possible on grounds of provisions regulating the prohibition of discrimination of workers who are legally employed on the territory of the Member States, particularly in terms of employment, working conditions and wages. The practical consequence of recognizing the direct effect of these provisions is the opportunity for the citizens and legal entities of the Western Balkans to acquire certain rights within the EU legal system. Thus, they will be entitled to directly refer to the provisions of the SAA in the proceedings instituted before the courts of Member States and the EU Court of Justice, and to seek protection of their rights arising thereof, in accordance with the standards similar to those enjoyed by the EU citizens.

There is no common agreement in le gal theory on the origin of International Humanitarian Law (the law of war) as part of International Public Law. However, there is a prevailing standpoint that its genesis is closely associated with the adoption of the First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (1864). The modern International Humanitarian Law, as a comprehensive system primarily based on written documents, was created in mid-19th century but its roots are to be found in distant past. The origins of warfare rules and humanitarian customs may be traced back to the early organized societies and their first armed conflicts. Being forerunners of the contemporary International Humanitarian Law, these rules and customs may be found in all cultures and civilizations worldwide. Consequently, the origins of International Humanitarian Law may be traced throughout history; starting from the rules and customs of ancient eastern civilizations, Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, we may further explore the impact of Christianity and the development of chivalry rules of warfare in the Middle Ages, which would eventually take us to the modern times which are marked by a number of significant events in this field, such as: the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia, the consolidation of customs and warfare laws in the legal doctrine, the adoption of military manuals and warfare guidelines, and turning the rules on warfare and mere social usage (customs) into international customary law. Eventually, in the second half of the 19th century, there was a relevant climate in the international community which enabled the adoption of multilateral treaties which would oblige all or the majority of state parties to collect, consolidate and further develop the unwritten rules of customary law of war. Concurrently, there was a strong movement for the codification of international law of war, by confirming the recognized customary rules in these multilateral treaties. The first multilateral treaties signed in this area actually marked the beginning of modern International Humanitarian Law.

Having in mind that the process of fragmentation of International Public Law (IPL) has enabled the formation of numerous legal regimes, it is necessary to understand and analyze the relationship between two legal orders - IPL as a general legal regime and European Union (EU) Law as a specialized legal regime in such a broader context. Although preconditions for deciphering the relationship between these two legal orders were created with the creation of community law, the focus of research for decades was the crystallization of the internal relationship between the newly created community law and national legal orders. Only in recent years has there been a growing interest in deciphering the external relationship of EU Law to IPL. Given that IPL does not provide an answer to the question of relations with other legal orders, nor does it impose a method of incorporating its own norms, the answer to the basic research question concerning the relation between IPL and EU Law must be sought in EU Law. Although the EU, just as other international legal subjects, is obliged to respect IPL, it has the freedom to develop the relation to IPL on its own terms and merits. Therefore, after confirming that IPL and EU Law represent complete and comparable legal orders, the dissertation is conceptually the conceptual framework of the dissertation is based on research through the prism of basic institutes of each legal order: subjects, formal sources and responsibilities as reference indicators of the relation between the two said legal orders. Chapter II makes a comparison of legal subjects in the legal orders under consideration. In the trinity of subjects of law, both within IPL and EU Law, there is a certain similarity in terms of subjects, but also a great variance. Therefore, a true comparison can be made only in terms of States, which are the undisputed, original and full subjects of both legal orders. However, it may be noted that the degree of freedom in accordance with the concept of full sovereignty is higher in the domain of IPL than in EU Law, where the concept of sovereignty was reconceptualized into shared sovereignty. Additionally, the law-making power of States is significantly reduced within EU Law, due to the obligation of loyal cooperation between Member States, whose scope is not always discernible. In contrast, when concluding international treaties in IPL, States are only limited by imperative norms. Given that IO as subjects IPL cannot be compared with EU institutions, there was a need for reconceptualization of compared subjects. The EU, as a specific IO, was compared to typical governmental IOs, which ultimately revealed its many specific features. The different status of individuals is one of the basic demarcation lines between IPL and EU Law. Having in mind that their subjectivity is only in statu nascendi in certain areas, the status of individuals as legal subjects in IPL is disputable. On the other hand, in this segment, EU Law has moved away from the logic of the general IPL, having granted individuals the status of the legal subjects. However, after a deeper analysis, such a clear distinction is blurred as it is substatially diminished. It follows that the subjectivity of individuals in EU Law is at a higher stage of development than the subjectivity in IPL, not only in terms of granted subjective rights but also in terms of their established procedural capacity. Chapter III examines the relation between IPL and EU Law through the prism of formal sources, primarily international treaties, international customary law and general legal principles. For a long time, the qualification of the relation of EU Law to IPL in legal doctrine was based solely on the analysis of the relation of EU Law to a group of international agreements of economic nature, subsequently extending such an inductive conclusion to the entire general IPL, which later proved to be incorrect. Although one of the proclaimed goals of the EU is "strict observance and the development of international law", a deeper analysis of CJEU case-law actually shows that EU Law has developed ways to avoid the use of international treaties and customary law within it through various judicial techniques and principles. Having in mind that the reception of international treaties and customary law in EU Law alone cannot achieve their full effect, the issue of their incorporation is only the first of two key issues. The true attitude towards the formally proclaimed goal of strict observance of IPL is perceived at the level of the effect of international legal norms, originating either from treaties or international customary law. The established strict and inadequate test of direct effect in the narrow sense prevents the direct effect of international provisions, for which reason legal doctrine offers a solution in the form of redesigning and/or extending this principle. Therefore, the Court of Justice should de lege ferenda build a different test concerning the application of the principle of direct effect in a so-called broader or external sense, in order to enable greater observance, application and effect of international legal norms within the EU legal system. This would also facilitate their better integration, which is only perfunctory and formal for the time being. The relation between the general IPL and EU Law may also be observed by comparing the general legal principles of IPL and the general legal principles of EU Law. Having in mind their specific dichotomy, practice reveals that they are used as a means of both dividing and approximating these legal orders. Finally, in Chapter IV, after analyzing the regimes of responsibility in IPL and EU Law, research results revealed certain similarities as well as numerous differences. In principle, the comparison of responsibility in these legal orders is complex due to thier hybrid and multifaceted character. In IPL, the hybrid character of responsibility is reflected in the pervading elements of private and public law, as well as in the possibility of pursuing state responsibility in cases involving both illegal and legal acts. Unlike most internal legal systems (including EU Law), the basic criterion of division in IPL is the illegality of an act. What both IPL and EU Law have in common is a shifting focus from the narrow issue of violation of law and its reparation to a broader context. In this sense, both legal orders tend to achieve a dual goal. In addition to ensuring the protection of the subjective rights of the injured party, which is achieved through compensation as one of the fundamental principles of law, they also strive to achieve a higher goal which is embodied in the proper functioning of the entire legal order. The regime of responsibility in EU Law is also multi-hybrid, given that it is a specific mixture of private and public law segments, and that it recognizes responsibility for both illegal and legal acts. The discernible hybridity of EU Law has another distinctive dimension in relation to IPL, bearing in mind that EU Law drew inspiration not only from IPL but also from national legal orders. Thus, the element distinguishing EU law from IPL constitutes an element of similarity with national orders; it is reflected in instituting a clear classification into contractual and non-contractual liability. Hence, the basic focus and the basic criteria for classifiaction of responsibilities are different in the two legal systems. Nevertheless, IPL has had a significant impact on EU Law in the field of accountability, given that the concept of accountability of states in IPL has served as a direct inspiration for the birth of a parallel concept within EU Law. Although it is quite delicate and complex to compare two hybrid sets of responsibility regimes stemming from IPL and EU Law, it is prima facie observed that the concept and regulation of responsibility in general IPL is at a much lower level than in EU Law. We may observe hesitancy even in the stance of the International Law Commission, which should be the flagship of codification. In contrast, in EU Law, this task is resolutely performed by the Court of Justice. The analysis of relevant indicators shows that the qualification of the formely existing monistic relationship between EU Law and IPL has changed. Therefore, although it is logical to conclude that their relation is dualistic, such a statement is not entirely true. It would be too harsh and incorrect to claim that there has been a clear-cut shift from monism to dualism, or from an open to a closed relationship with the IPL. Considering the need for a nuanced understanding of the approach of the Court of Justice to IPL, such simple and one-sided attributes are not recommended. In effect, the constitutional architecture of the EU legal order and the insistence on its external autonomy must constantly find a delicate balance between the formal respect for international law as one of the proclaimed goals of the EU and the demand to defend the autonomy and integrity of its own legal order. It is concluded that the internally built autonomy of the EU legal order (in relation to national legal orders) had to be confirmed on the external level (in relation to IPL). Accordingly, the so-called external autonomy implies that EU Law does not rely entirely on the rules and logic of IPL. Therefore, the dual nature of EU Law and its hybridity play a key role in determining its relation to IPL. Although it is part of the system of general international law, EU Law as a self-contained legal regime is characterized by the hybridity of basic legal institutes, and it is a mixture of rules of IPL and the peculiarities of its legal order. The relation of EU Law to IPL was primarily shaped by the Court of Justice, which played a key role as a quasi-constitutional court, preserving and nurturing the autonomy of the EU legal order in relation to IPL, while concurrently taking into account the obligation to respect IPL in principle. However, having in mind that proclamations and practice are often different, the dissertation critically analyzed the proclaimed general attitude of respecting IPL by considering the method of reception and the effect of its norms within EU Law, with the aim of deciphering the true relationship between these legal orders. In practice, the observance of IPL appears in its negative form, as avoidance of application. In other words, there are numerous legal technics and legal arguments that essentially aim to avoid international obligations without raising the subsequent question of responsibility. Through the work of its judicial bodies, EU Law has created an array of legal instruments which are manifested as a specific combination of doctrines, application tests, legal principles and methods of interpretation by means of which EU Law defends its basic values and basic principles as an expression of identity and autonomy from the rules established in another order - the international legal order. By combining the tests of direct effect, methods of transformation, standards on the seriousness of damage, exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, the duty of loyal cooperation, as well as frequent transformations of international legal norms into internal law, EU Law has strongly diverged from IPL. Therefore, dualistic pluralism would be the most suitable theoretical framework that could most accurately explain such a nuanced, complex and dynamic relation.

Пратећи напредак у развоју мисли и схватању значаја културног наслеђа за човечанство, које је од времена хуманизма и ренесансе препознато као наслеђе које свима припада, имамо у развоју међународног права тенденцију да се и заштита тог наслеђа укључи у међународноправнип поредак. У процесу стварања институционализованог облика међународне сарадње у различитим областима друштвеног живота кроз оснивање међународних организација, након Другог светског рата се оснива Унеско, агенција Уједињених нација за образовање, науку и културу, чија је једна од функција да обезбеђује очување и заштиту културног наслеђа, као и да у том смислу даје препоруке за усвајање међународноправних инструмената. Конвенције о културном наслеђу, усвојене под окриљем Унеска, предмет су анализе у овој дисертацији. За разумевање међународноправног режима заштите културног наслеђа, неопходно је упознати се са међународноравним оквиром и принципима међународног права, а затим се прави историјски преглед развоја идеје о културном наслеђу као заједничком наслеђу свих и међународноправних норми којима се оно настоји заштити. Након тога се посебно бавимо питањем дефиниције културног наслеђа, будући да се она разликује од конвенције до конвенције. У главном делу дисертације, најпре се анализирају инструменти међународног права којима се културно наслеђе штити у оружаном сукобу, пре свега Конвенција о заштити културних добара у случају оружаног сукоба из 1954. године и њена два протокола, али и други иснтрументи међународног хуманитарног права који се односе на заштиту културног наслеђа. Посебно се указује на конвенционални режим којим се настоји успоставити равнотежа између принципа војне потребе и заштите културног наслеђа, као и на прописане мере заштите и поштовања тог наслеђа, у миру и у рату. Указује се и на значај режима посебне и побољшане заштите за културно наслеђе од највеће важности за човечанство, којима се настоји спречити да заштићени објекти страдају у војним операцијама за време сукоба, као и процедуре предвиђене за iii транспорте културних добара. The developments in understanding the significance of cultural heritage for mankind, which since the Renaissance times has been recognized as the heritage belonging to all, have been accompanied by the tendency to integrate the protection of that heritage into international legal order. In the process of creation of institutionalized forms of international cooperation in different areas of social life through the establishment of international organisations, the aftermath of WWII sees the founding of the UNESCO, the UN agency for education, science and culture, whose function, among others, is to ensure the preservation and protection of cultural heritage and to give recommendations for the adoption of international legal instruments which should serve that purpose. The conventions on cultural heritage, adopted under the UNESCO auspices, are the subject matter analysed in this thesis. In order to understand the international legal regime which regulates the protection of cultural heritage, it is necessary to first present the international legal framework and principles of international law, as well as a historical overview of the development of the idea of cultural heritage as a common heritage of all people аnd of the international norms intended for its protection. After that we shall specifically deal with the definition of cultural heritage, as it differs from one convention to the other. The most substantial part of the thesis is dedicated to the analysis of the international legal instruments regulating the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict: the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954 and its two Protocols in the first place, but also other instruments of international humanitarian law dealing with the protection of cultural heritage. Particular emphasis is placed on the conventional regime aiming to set a balance between the principle of military necessity and the protection of cultural heritage, and the measures prescribed to protect and respect that heritage in peace time and in war. The importance of the regime of special and enhanced protection of cultural heritage of utmost importance for mankind, aiming to prevent destruction or damage to protected objects in military operations and prescribing procedures for their transport, is further underlined. The issues of import and export of movable cultural heritage from occupied territories are particularly regulated in an attempt to prevent unprecedented looting and seizure of works of art and other antiquities in the period of WWII.

The area of freedom, security and justice was established by the EU constituent treaties and it was set as a special objective of the European integration. This area has undergone dynamic stages of institutional and normative development to become an integral part of the EU today. It would be difficult to imagine the existence of the EU without it. Historical development of the Union showed that protection of the basic citizens‘ values is not possible without clearly defined policies and joint cooperation of the Member States in the area of internal affairs and judiciary. Sensitivity of this cooperation stems from transferring national responsibilities to supranational level in the areas that are the core of every state‘s sovereignty. Use of legal force apparatus and criminal law jurisdiction have been until recently a national issue, and the Member States have been keeping this area from breakthrough of international or, in the case of EU, deeper mutual cooperation at any cost. The area of freedom, security and justice consists of three areas. The European area of freedom and free movement of people has been created by the Single Market. In addition to the advantages for the Union‘s citizens and citizens of third countries, the Single Market has enabled expansion and transfer of criminal activity in the area without internal borders. The European area of security entails police cooperation of the Member States on preserving security within the area of freedom and free movement of people. The cooperation in this area is the basis for efficient joint preventive and repressive action on fighting crime, especially serious crime with cross-border dimension. The European area of justice consists of elements of criminal law and civil law cooperation of the Member States. Joint definitions of criminal offences and sanctions, mutual recognition of verdicts and guaranteeing the rights of suspects or accused in a criminal procedure are crucial issues of the cooperation that has led gradually to supranational norms of the EU criminal law.

Теорија о формалним изворима међународног права, и поред својих несавршености, представља најсигурнији водич за откривање међународноправних норми. У теорији међународног права постоји консензус у вези са тим да је један од формалних извора права и међународни обичај, али је све остало у вези са овим извором међународног права спорно: начин настанка, његови саставни елементи, однос тих елемената, као и његово мењање и нестајање. У дисертацији се најпре указује на то да је схватање правне природе међународне обичајне норме детерминисано схватањем аутора о правној природи и системском карактеру међународног права. Следећи део дисертације је посвећен концепту извора права. У њему се најпре приказују постојећи доктринарни ставови о концептима материјалних и формалних извора права, да би се затим посебна пажња посветила концепту међународног обичајног права. У вези са тим се закључује да постоји веома убедљиво оправдање за инсистирање на прављењу разлике између материјалних и формалних извора права, а да сâмо име међународно обичајно право открива да међународне обичајне норме не настају спонтано, већ су резултат циљно-рационалне одлуке субјеката који имају правно стваралачку способност. Одређење међународне обичајне норме из Статута Међународног суда правде указује на постојање два елемента међународне обичајне норме: праксу и opinio iuris. У дисертацији се критички преиспитују постојећи доктринарни ставови у вези са природом и односом ова два елемента у процесу настанка међународних обичајних норми. Такав истраживачки поступак у дисертацији је показао да је раздвајање материјалног и субјективног елемента међународне обичајне норме могуће из аналитичких разлога, али да су они заправо нераскидиво повезани. То се можда најбоље види на примеру тумачења уздржавања од праксе као једном од начина за настанак међународних обичајних норми. Despite having some imperfections, the theory of formal sources of International Law is the most certain guide for identification of international legal norms. In theory of International Law there is a consensus about international custom being one of the formal sources of International Law, but apart from that, everything that has to do with the custom in International Law is disputable: the way it is being created, its constituent elements, relation among these elements, as well as changing and extinction of international custom. The dissertation firstly presents the conclusion that perception of customary international norm is determined by author’s perception of legal nature of International Law. The subsequent part of dissertation is dedicated to the concept of the “source of law”. Firstly, this part contains presentation of the existing doctrines in reference to the concepts of “material” and “formal sources of law”. Afterwards, it elaborates on the concept of “customary international law”. It also provides a conclusion that there is a rather convincing justification for insisting on demarcation between material and formal sources of law, and that the very name of Customary International Law reveals that the customary international norms are not being created spontaneously, but as a result of intentional and rational decision of the actors having the capacity to make international law. Definition of international customary norm in the Statute of the International Court of Justice indicates existence of two elements of international customary norm: international practice and opinio juris. The dissertation critically reviews existing doctrines in reference to the nature and relation between these two elements in a process of creation of international customary norm. Employment of this research method demonstrated that it was possible to demarcate material and subjective element of international customary norm for the analytical purposes, but that they are actually inextricably bonded. Perhaps it is the most obviously visible in the example of interpretation of refraining from action as one of the ways of creation of international customary norm.

Европска унија (ЕУ) представља специфичну међународну организацију са правом да доноси одлуке које су обавезујуће, не само за државе чланице него и за правна и физичка лица на њеној територији. При том, Европска унија је овлашћена да доноси обавезујуће акте у великом броју области које су у прошлости биле регулисане искључиво националним правним актима држава. Ове карактеристике чине правни систем Европске уније врло специфичним и врло развијеним, а самим тим и сложеним. Због тога све државе које претендују да постану чланице Европске уније, морају ускладити своје законодавство са правним правилима која важе у поретку Европске уније, а што је услов за њихов пријем у чланство ове организације. Усклађивање законодавства државе која приступа једини је начин да та држава, након ступања у чланство ЕУ, буде способна да преузме у пуној мери права и обавезе које чланство у Европској унији доноси. Предмет дисертације је процес усклађивања законодавства једне државе у процесу приступања Европској унији, до момента ступања у чланство. Са друге стране, предмет дисертације није и процес усклађивања након приступања ЕУ, будући да тада процес усклађивања добија другачије карактеристике, динамику и методологију. Општа хипотеза коју дисертација потврђује јесте да држава која приступа Европској унији примењује правне тековине европских заједница, тј. acquis communautaire и пре момента званичног ступања у чланство. Другим речима, процес усклађивања заправо представља процес примене acquis communautaire и пре ступања у чланство ЕУ. Држава која приступа ЕУ мора показати да је способна да примењује acquis communautaire како би постала чланица ЕУ. То се мора доказати у току процеса приступања, дакле пре момента самог ступања у чланство. Говорећи de iure, до момента ступања у чланство Европске уније, држава примењује национално законодавство, док acquis communautaire за њу представља страно право, док de facto путем усклађивања са acquis communautaire држава примењује то право, али кроз форму националних прописа који су претходно усклађени са acquis communautaire. The European Union (EU) is a specific international organization with the power to adopt decisions that are binding not only to member states, but also to natural and legal persons on its territory. In addition, the EU is empowered to adopt binding acts in a vast number of areas that were exclusive domain of sovereign states in the near past. These characteristics make the legal system of the EU very specific, very developed and hence very complex. This is the reason why countries aspiring to be members of the EU must approximate their legal systems with the legal system of the EU, as a precondition that enables them to become member states. Approximation of legislation is the only way to enable the candidate country to take full advantage of all rights and honor all commitments that membership brings. The scope of this dissertation encompasses the process of approximation of the legal system of a country aspiring to become a member state of the EU, until the moment of accession. On the other hand, it does not cover the process of approximation after the accession to the EU, because then the process develops different characteristics, dynamics and methodology. General hypothesis of the dissertation that is being proven is that a country in the process of accession applies the law of the European Communities or acquis communautaire, before the moment of its official accession to the EU. In other words, the process of approximation is, in fact, the process of application of the acquis communautaire before joining the EU. Acceding country must prove its willingness and capability to implement acquis communautaire in order to become a member of the EU. That must be proven in the course of accession, before joining the EU. Speaking de iure, until accession, a country implements its own legislation and acquis communautaire as foreign law, but de facto, through approximation the country implements acquis communautaire disguised in the form of national legal acts. The dissertation aims to prove that proper implementation of the acquis communautaire in the legal order of the acceding country is a condition for membership and not a result of the accession.