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Evidence accumulation models are a series of computational models that provide an account for speeded decision-making. These models have been used extensively within the cognitive psychology literature to great success, allowing inferences to be drawn about the psychological processes that underlie cognition that are sometimes not available in a traditional analysis of accuracy or reaction time (RT). Despite this, there have been only a few applications of these models within the domain of social cognition. In this article, we explore several ways in which the study of human social information processing would benefit from application of evidence accumulation modelling. We begin first with a brief overview of the evidence accumulation modelling framework and their past success within the domain of cognitive psychology. We then highlight five ways in which social cognitive research would benefit from an evidence accumulation approach. This includes (1) greater specification of assumptions, (2) unambiguous comparisons across blocked task conditions, (3) quantifying and comparing the magnitude of effects in standardised measures, (4) a novel approach for studying individual differences, and (5) improved reproducibility and accessibility. These points are illustrated using examples from the domain of social attention. Finally, we outline several methodological and practical considerations, which should help researchers use evidence accumulation models productively. Ultimately, it will be seen that evidence accumulation modelling offers a well-developed, accessible, and commonly understood framework that can reveal inferences about cognition that may otherwise be out of reach in a traditional analysis of accuracy and RT. This approach, therefore, has the potential to substantially revise our understanding of social cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social cognition differs from general cognition in its focus on understanding, perceiving, and interpreting social information. However, we argue that the significance of domain‐general processes for controlling cognition has been historically undervalued in social cognition and social neuroscience research. We suggest much of social cognition can be characterized as specialized feature representations supported by domain‐general cognitive control systems. To test this proposal, we develop a comprehensive working model, based on an interactive activation and competition architecture and applied to the control of action. As such, we label the model "ICON" (interactive activation and competition model for the control of action). We used the ICON model to simulate human performance across various laboratory tasks. Our simulations emphasize that many laboratory‐based social tasks do not require socially specific control systems, such as those that are argued to rely on neural networks associated with theory‐of‐mind. Moreover, our model clarifies that perceived disruptions in social cognition, even in what appears to be disruption to the control of social cognition, can stem from deficits in social representation instead. We advocate for a "default stance" in social cognition, where control is usually general, but representation is specific. This study underscores the importance of integrating social cognition within the broader realm of domain‐general control processing, offering a unified perspective on task processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aesthetic judgements dominate much of daily life by guiding how we evaluate objects, people, and experiences in our environment. One key question that remains unanswered is the extent to which more specialised or largely general cognitive resources support aesthetic judgements. To investigate this question in the context of working memory, we examined the extent to which a working memory load produces similar or different response time interference on aesthetic compared with non-aesthetic judgements. Across three pre-registered experiments that used Bayesian multi-level modelling approaches (N > 100 per experiment), we found clear evidence that a working memory load produces similar response time interference on aesthetic judgements relative to non-aesthetic (motion) judgements. We also showed that this similarity in processing across aesthetic versus non-aesthetic judgements holds across variations in the form of art (people vs. landscape; Experiments 1–3), medium type (artwork vs. photographs; Experiment 2), and load content (art images vs. letters; Experiments 1–3). These findings suggest that across a range of experimental contexts, as well as different processing streams in working memory (e.g., visual vs. verbal), aesthetic and motion judgements commonly rely on a domain-general cognitive system, rather than a system that is more specifically tied to aesthetic judgements. In doing so, these findings shine new light on the working memory resources that support aesthetic judgements, as well as on how domain-general cognitive systems operate more generally in cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been suggested that representing an action through observation and imagery share neural processes with action execution. In support of this view, motor-priming research has shown that observing an action can influence action initiation. However, there is little motor-priming research showing that imagining an action can modulate action initiation. The current study examined whether action imagery could prime subsequent execution of a reach and grasp action. Across two motion analysis tracking experiments, 40 participants grasped an object following congruent or incongruent action imagery. In Experiment 1, movement initiation was faster following congruent compared to incongruent imagery, demonstrating that imagery can prime the initiation of grasping. In Experiment 2, incongruent imagery resulted in slower movement initiation compared to a no-imagery control. These data show that imagining a different action to that which is performed can interfere with action production. We propose that the most likely neural correlates of this interference effect are brain regions that code imagined and executed actions. Further, we outline a plausible mechanistic account of how priming in these brain regions through imagery could play a role in action cognition. (Contains 3 figures.)

This article reports the substance of an interview with Grady R. Hazel, Executive Director of the Society of Louisiana Certified Public Accountants (CPAs). Hazel has been director of the Society of Louisiana CPAs since 1995. The 6,500-member organization is headquartered in Kenner, a suburb of New Orleans. A native of Baton Rouge, Hazel has been involved in major change initiatives undertaken by the accounting profession and speaks frequently to a variety of professional and academic audiences about trends in accounting, most recently on challenges to the profession in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In this interview, Hazel talked about how Sarbanes-Oxley Act has affected corporate financial reporting, particularly the auditing process. Hazel also talked about the increased litigation in corporate auditing, and predicted the most significant challenges for corporate financial reporting. This interview confirmed what has been widely known in the accounting profession: The current demands of auditing and corporate financial reporting necessitate that accounting students learn to communicate ethically and efficiently.

Finds that student perceptions of readability and interest levels in two upper-level college composition texts varied from the Flesch and the Fry readability and human interest formulas. (SR)