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Many have argued that the development of evidence-based policing (EBP) depends on those in law enforcement agencies receiving appropriate training in research methodologies and data analysis. Despite this, there are few detailed accounts of such training and its delivery. This paper describes and evaluates the contribution of training workshops for police officers and staff in driving forward EBP. The workshops, developed based on a model used in healthcare, sought to provide attendees with the knowledge, skills, and confidence to engage with research evidence during their work, and sat within a wider plan for organisational change within one force in England. We outline the development and delivery of the workshops, which were undertaken using an action research approach, and assess their impact including subsequent changes to practice. Finally, we consider the role these workshops played within organisational change, and reflect on how EBP can be promoted within academic-police collaborations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Coercive measures such as involuntary psychiatric admission are considered a last resort in the treatment of people with psychiatric disorders. So far, numerous factors have been identified that influence their use. However, the link between a pandemic - in particular, restrictions such as lockdowns - and the use of involuntary psychiatric admission is unclear., Aim: To examine the association between COVID-19 lockdowns and involuntary psychiatric admissions in Austria., Method: This retrospective exploratory study assessed all involuntary psychiatric admissions and use of mechanical restraint in Austria, except for the federal state of Vorarlberg, between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2020. Descriptive statistics and regression models were used., Results: During the 3-year study period, 40 012 individuals (45.9% females, mean age 51.3 years) had 66 124 involuntary psychiatric admissions for an average of 10.9 days. Mechanical restraint was used during 33.9% of these admissions. In weeks of nationwide COVID-19 lockdowns (2020 v. 2018/2019), involuntary psychiatric admissions were significantly fewer (odds ratio = 0.93, P = 0.0001) but longer (11.6 (s.d.: 16) v. 10.9 (s.d.: 15.8) days). The likelihood of involuntary admission during lockdowns was associated with year (2020 v. 2018-2019; adjusted odds ratio = 0.92; P = 0.0002) but not with sex ( P = 0.814), age ( P = 0.310), use of mechanical restraint ( P = 0.653) or type of ward ( P = 0.843)., Conclusions: Restrictions such as lockdowns affect coercive measures and resulted in fewer but longer involuntary psychiatric admissions during weeks of lockdown in Austria. These results strengthen previous findings that showed the dependence of coercive measures on external factors, highlighting the need to further clarify causality and desired prevention effects when using coercive measures.

This article examines the relation between counting, counts and accountability. It does so by comparing the responses of the British government to deaths associated with Covid-19 in 2020 to its responses to deaths associated with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Similarities and dissimilarities between the cases regarding what counted as data, what data were taken to count, what data counted for, and how data were counted provide the basis for considering how the bounds of democratic accountability are constituted. Based on these two cases, the article sets out the metaphors of leaks and cascades as ways of characterising the data practices whereby counts, counting and accountability get configured. By situating deaths associated with Covid-19 against previous experience with deaths from war, the article also proposes how claims to truth and ignorance might figure in any future official inquiry into the handling of the pandemic.

This article attends to the movement between disclosing and non-disclosing in accounts of expertise. While referencing discussions about tacit knowledge ('experts know more than they can say') and the politics of non-disclosure ('withholding can help as well as harm the credibility of experts'), in the main it considers how experts move between conveying and not conveying in order to make their proficiencies recognized and accessible to others. The article examines this movement through a form that partakes in it, thus drawing attention to conventions and tensions in how authors make themselves accountable, and their subject matter available, to audiences. It thereby proposes to explore the possibilities of careful, and generative, non-disclosure as part of expert writing practices.

Amid the renewed concern in the last several years about the potential for life science research to facilitate the spread of disease, a central plank of the policy response has been to enact processes for assessing the risks and benefits of "research of concern." The recent controversy regarding a proposed redaction of work on the modification of a H5N1 avian influenza virus is perhaps the most prominent such instance. And yet, a noteworthy feature of this case is its exceptionalness. In the last 10 years, life science publishers, funders, and labs have rarely identified any research as "of concern," let alone proposed censors. This article takes this experience with risk assessment as an invitation for reflection. Reasons for the low number of instances of concern are related to how the biosecurity dimensions of the life sciences are identified, how they are described, how the assessments of benefits and risks are undertaken, how value considerations do and do not enter into assessments, as well as the lack of information on the outcomes of reviews. This argument builds on such considerations to examine the limitations and implications of the risk-benefit experiment of concern framing, the politics of expertise as well as the prospects for alternative responses.

In recent years, states and non-governmental organizations have expressed concern about the humanitarian consequences of the category of technologies labelled 'explosive weapons', particularly in relation to their use in populated areas. This article seeks to outline the magnitude of these consequences as well as what can be done to reduce harms. In particular, it makes a case for how health approaches could help prevent the harms associated with this category of weapons. Attention is given to the types of evidence and argument that might be required to characterize explosive weapons. An overarching aim is to consider how alternative ways of understanding weapons and violence can create new opportunities for addressing harms from conflict., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Attempts to place limits on the conduct of conflict raise many practical and political concerns. This article asks how debates regarding precautionary approaches to risk might inform discussions about how limits are set for armed conflict. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) provides the starting point for this analysis. While the adoption of this convention represents a major achievement in multilateral humanitarian disarmament, its provisions are open to question about their meaning. As argued, the manner in which the CCM was agreed provides an opening for embedding precautionary thinking into its future interpretation. Experiences with precautionary approaches to risk are surveyed with a view to considering what lessons they hold for the central prohibition of cluster munitions in the CCM, its novel provisions for Victim Assistance, and its possible implications for the use of explosive force. The overall goal is to ask how debates about the precautionary principle might enhance the protection of civilian populations.

Codes of conduct have received a significant amount of attention in recent years as a policy option to address concerns about the relation between life science research and the deliberate spread of disease through biological weapons. While the term code of conduct has functioned as a generic umbrella phrase for an array of different types of codes, in general, such codes seek to set expectations regarding thinking and behavior for those associated with the life sciences. The purpose of this article is fourfold: (1) to survey recent developments, specifically with respect to "universal" and "scientific society" types of codes; (2) to propose criteria for assessing these initiatives; (3) to evaluate activities undertaken to date on the basis of these criteria; and (4) to propose key questions for the future. Overall, a mixed assessment is offered of the achievements of code-related activities to date. As argued, because of this overall situation, in the future careful attention should be given to what is sought out of this option and how it can be realized in practice.

In many government, police and military circles, attention is being given to so-called 'non-lethal' weapons as means of reducing many of the negative effects directly or indirectly associated with the use of force. Despite the purported ability of the adoption of such weaponry to lessen grounds for contention and concern, past experience suggests the need for scepticism regarding the purported benefits. Rather than relying on poorly substantiated claims, comprehensive procedures are needed to ensure the appropriateness of force options. This article outlines some of the institutional structures required for 'carefully evaluating' and 'carefully controlling' non-lethal weapons, with a discussion of the perennial tensions associated with ensuring the relative 'acceptability' of the use of force.

In response to threats from bioweapons, questions are being asked today in some countries about the implications and appropriateness of biological research. Many organizations and governments have suggested that bioscientists adopt what is generally referred to as a "code of conduct" to reduce the security concerns associated with their work. This article examines the potential contribution of such codes. By drawing on past lessons in other areas of professional life, it suggests some key questions, issues, and dilemmas for future consideration. As argued, attempts to establish codes must address demanding questions about their aims and audience--questions whose answers depend on potentially contentious issues regarding arms control, science, ethics, and politics.

Recent terrorist attacks in the United States have generated significant attention in many countries to the threats posed by biological weapons. In response to these events and the specter of future attacks, bioscientists and professional organizations have begun or intensified asking questions about the possible malign applications of their research. Part II of this two-part article examines the emerging responses initiated by biomedical organizations and spokespersons in the US and the UK. In doing so it considers how scientific and medical research communities are defining and policing notions of professionalism, responsibility and accountability in the responses made. Through an examination of these issues, suggested lines for future social analysis are offered.

Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have increased significantly. With this has come an expansion of those activities in civil society deemed as potential sites for applying security controls. This paper examines the assumptions and implications of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration can take place between security and openness in civilian biomedical research through devising professional codes of conduct for scientists. Future attempts to establish such codes must find a way of reconciling or at least addressing dilemmatic and tension-ridden issues about the appropriateness of research; a topic that raises fundamental questions about the position of science within society.

Recent years have seen the introduction of a wide range of weapons for police forces around the world intended to minimise injuries incurred in officer-public encounters. In 1996, police forces in England and Wales began trials of CS incapacitant sprays. This article reviews the claims and counterclaims surrounding the medical implications of the sprays with a view to asking how the uncertainties associated with them have been handled in the regulation process. This analysis casts considerable doubt on the robustness of the precautions taken and demonstrates a continuing failure for relevant government agencies to respond and learn from problems identified. Drawing on wider literature regarding the health implications of risky technologies, it further asks what policy lessons the case of the CS sprays holds for the regulation of weaponry at an international level.