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El presente artículo hace un balance de la respuesta de las organizaciones regionales latinoamericanas y caribeñas al covid-19. En especial, se pregunta si éstas han contribuido a hacer frente a la pandemia y se busca encontrar explicaciones para la considerable divergencia entre las respuestas de nueve organizaciones regionales. En ese orden de ideas, en primer lugar, se señala que el regionalismo latinoamericano ya se encontraba en crisis antes de la llegada del covid-19. Algunas de las características de esta crisis eran: una decreciente regionalización económica, una creciente polarización política regional, y la parálisis y la desintegración de algunas organizaciones regionales como la UNASUR. Es por eso que se argumenta que las expectativas con respecto al desempeño de las organizaciones regionales eran bastante bajas. Posteriormente, combinando fuentes académicas y primarias, se hace una valoración de las acciones desplegadas por cada organización frente a la pandemia del covid-19. Estas acciones se dividen en tres para su evaluación: el compartir información, la coordinación interestatal y la acción colectiva (interna y externa). En esa valoración se obtuvieron resultados mixtos: hubo algunas organizaciones que tuvieron un buen desempeño y otras que tuvieron un bajo rendimiento, en especial si se tienen en cuenta sus mandatos fundacionales y la totalidad de sus capacidades institucionales. En segundo lugar, con base en la literatura sobre organizaciones internacionales y regionales se propone que son cuatro las variables que tienen mayor poder explicativo para dar cuenta de la divergencia de esas respuestas de las instituciones regionales a la pandemia: la diferenciación funcional, la autonomía de las organizaciones, el liderazgo y el conocimiento (know-how) acumulado. En tercer lugar, el artículo deriva unas lecciones más generales para el regionalismo latinoamericano de estas respuestas regionales al covid-19 (y de la ausencia de éstas en algunos casos). Se defiende la idea de que un regionalismo más técnico, diferenciado funcionalmente y segmentado puede resistir mejor los embates de la polarización ideológica y los inevitables cambios de ciclo político en América Latina. Especialmente, si se compara con los riesgos de parálisis y crisis de organizaciones “sombrilla” que abarcan una gran multiplicidad de temas a través de numerosos consejos u otro tipo de subunidades.

Cette thèse a obtenu, en 2022, le prix de la thèse de doctorat de la Société française d’histoire urbaine (SFHU). Le XIXe siècle est un moment clé dans l'histoire d'Alger, dans la définition des orientations urbanistiques et architecturales sous domination coloniale et dans l’instauration d'un nouvel idéal esthétique. La capitulation du Dey Hussayn et la réquisition des biens du Beylik (le domaine de l’État) par les troupes françaises, constituent des épisodes fondateurs pour l’histoire urbai...

The coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic remains a global security threat, as the result of the emerging and exacerbated security challenges that have impacted on the national security policies of various regional economic communities (RECs). This study analyses SADC and ECOWAS’ responses to the Covid-19 pandemic under their respective existing peace and security structures and explores if both RECs, SADC and ECOWAS have been efficient. This article discusses the Southern African and West African security setting, how its security architecture emerged and whether it has been successful in overcoming the security ramification in the region under the Covid-19 pandemic. Coincidentally, both SADC and ECOWAS have been confronted with existing and emerging human security threats, such as increased poverty, inequality, and the spread of diseases, such as Covid-19. The Covid-19 pandemic, a non-traditional security threat, has exposed how RECs, such as SADC and ECOWAS, respond to non-traditional and emerging security threats, suggesting for the transcendence of their security architecture that caters equally for non-military and emerging human security threats, alike military threats. This article explores the regional security experiences, challenges, and responses of both the SADC and ECOWAS under the Covid-19 pandemic.

Recent research on territorial preferences focuses on explaining who supports or opposes independence. However, this research overlooks the relevance of an “intermediate” category of citizens who may oppose the territorial status quo of a sub-state territory but not support independence. We use evidence from the critical case of Catalonia to illustrate the relevance of individuals with such preferences for policies and outcomes highly relevant to secessionist conflicts. We present four sets of findings using two-wave panel data from December 2017 (just prior to the December regional elections when Catalan independence was the most salient and contentious issue) and September 2018. First, we find that a sizable plurality within Catalonia supports greater autonomy short of independence; conventional sociodemographic variables explaining support for independence do not strongly account for this preference. Second, such pro-autonomy individuals have considerably more intermediate attitudes regarding the key “on the ground” actions that the Spanish and Catalan governments pursued during the crucial independence drive in 2017. They were more opposed than pro-independence individuals to the unilateral independence efforts, and more opposed than pro-status quo individuals to the Spanish government’s actions to counter these efforts. Third, they expressed emotions around the secessionist conflict similar to pro-status quo individuals. Finally, using an embedded survey experiment, we find that pro-autonomy individuals are more trusting of both the central and regional governments regarding their abiding by an agreement to resolve the conflict, and are less easily “polarized” through priming. Overall, these findings indicate the importance of further analyzing individuals with intermediate territorial views in secessionist conflicts.

This paper explores the Estonian vision of Baltic identity. Estonia’s authorities have repeatedly articulated their scepticism towards the concept of a stand-alone ‘Baltic region’ and the inclusion of Estonia in it, preferring to position their state as a Nordic country. Yet, in numerous cases, they have clearly labelled Estonia as a Baltic State. To identify the contexts and meanings labelling the country as a Baltic State, this contribution provides a content analysis of official speeches given by Estonia’s political leadership. It is concluded that, despite the visibility of socioeconomic issues in the discourse, the most comprehensive image of Estonian ‘Balticness’ is constructed by interconnected narratives built around the Soviet past and the ‘security threats’ associated with Russia. The theoretical framework of regionalism, which allows one to consider the Baltics as a social construct rather than a set of material factors, provides an additional explanatory model.

Today Russia has difficulty doing business-as-usual with EU states. It seems that the countries of the Visegrad Group (V4) and the Baltic Assembly/Baltic Council of Ministers (BA/BСM) have contributed substantially to this state of affairs. Overall, the tensions between Russia and the EU are building up — another tendency that did not arise on the Russian initiative. This article aims to address the question of whether Russia should establish direct relations with the V4 and the BA/BCM as tools to overcome the mentioned difficulties. On the one hand, these associations date back to before the countries acceded to the Union. On the other, they are products of regionalisation in the EU. In answering this question, we achieve three objectives. Firstly, we look for an appropriate theoretical and methodological framework for the study. Secondly, we produce a comparative description of the V4 and the BA/BCM. Thirdly, we examine the capacity of these associations to pursue an independent foreign and domestic policy. This study uses a comparison method to analyse the activities of the two organisations and identify their significance for the EU.

Thirty years after the downfall of the Soviet-led communist bloc, the United States-led liberal international order is seen as coming to an end. Policymakers have converged on the need to safeguard the "rules-based order" across the newly coined "Indo-Pacific" region. However, policy and scholarly debates lack clarity about what exactly is to be preserved, and why the terms of the "rules-based order" and the "Indo-Pacific" have rapidly found their way into policy debates despite their contested meaning. Analyzing developments in regional multilateralism, we find that mainstream discourses purport static conceptions of order, which are often conflated with United States-centered trans-Pacific alliance relationships. The ensuing problem of order stems in large part from the fact that multilateral projects for building alternate orders, undertaken since the early 1990s, have remained far below their potential. We conclude that emerging forms of multilateral cooperation across the enlarged "Indo-Pacific" region have partially filled this void.

While during ‘old’ or ‘closed’ regionalism, lasting approximately from 1950 to 1980, several regional integration projects practised a common industrial policy, in the period of ‘new’ or ‘open’ regionalism, starting in the late 1980s, market failure correcting horizontal industrial policy started to largely replace selective industrial policy, and many regional integration projects did not officially practise industrial policy at all. Only in the 21st century did industrial policy debates broaden again, and different actors brought industrial policy back on the agenda in Latin American, Eurasian and European regionalism. My PhD project contributes to the research field of comparative regionalism, by analysing the industrial policy of four contemporary regional integration projects – the ‘Common Market of the South’ (MERCOSUR), the ‘Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' Trade Treaty’ (ALBA-TCP), the ‘Eurasian Economic Union’ (EAEU) and the ‘European Union’ (EU) – in their specific historical and politico-economic contexts and by subsequently comparing (i) the programmes, (ii) the implementation results, (iii) the driving actors and institutional arrangements, (iv) the variegated effects caused within the respective integration projects, and (v) by outlining the specific challenges of (semi-)peripheral integration projects. The main body of the introduction concludes with a theoretical and methodological reflection. The four papers comprising the paper-based dissertation draw on and partly combine different theoretical perspectives – regional (economic) integration theories, regulation school, neo-Gramscian and materialist state theory, and theories on uneven development and dependency – to shed light on how (intergovernmental or supranational) industrial policy sought to influence the complex dynamics of uneven and dependent development and who were the supporting and inhibiting actors in these processes. In the conclusion to the introduction, I discuss whether the presented evidence indicates that we have witnessed a shift from trade-centred to development-centred regionalism, formulate some general and region-specific recommendations for joint industrial policy design and implementation, and identify persisting gaps for a future research agenda. Während des “alten” oder “geschlossenen” Regionalismus von ca. 1950 bis 1980 setzten mehrere regionale Integrationsprojekte gemeinsame Industriepolitik um. In der Periode des “neuen” oder “offenen” Regionalismus, die in den späten 1980er-Jahren startete, wurde selektive Industriepolitik zum Großteil durch horizontale Industriepolitik zur Korrektur von Marktversagen ersetzt und viele Integrationsprojekte praktizierten offiziell gar keine Industriepolitik. Erst im 21. Jahrhundert verbreiterten sich die Industriepolitik-Debatten abermals und verschiedene Akteur*innen sorgten für die Rückkehr von Industriepolitik im lateinamerikanischen, eurasischen und europäischen Regionalismus. Meine kumulative Doktorarbeit leistet einen Beitrag zum Forschungsfeld des vergleichenden Regionalismus, indem die Industriepolitik von vier zeitgenössischen regionalen Integrationsprojekten – dem ‚Gemeinsamen Markt des Südens’ (MERCOSUR), der ‚Bolivarischen Allianz für die Völker Unseres Amerikas – Handelsvertrag der Völker’ (ALBA-TCP), der ‚Eurasischen Wirtschaftsunion‘ (EAEU) und der ‚Europäischen Union‘ (EU) – in ihren spezifischen geschichtlichen und politökonomischen Kontexten untersucht werden und indem anschließend (i) die Programme, (ii) die Umsetzungsergebnisse, (iii) die treibenden Akteur*innen und die bestehenden institutionellen Strukturen, (iv) die uneinheitlichen Entwicklungseffekte innerhalb der jeweiligen Integrationsprojekte verglichen und (v) spezielle Herausforderungen für (semi-)periphere Integrationsprojekte skizziert werden. Der Hauptteil des Rahmenpapiers endet mit einer Reflexion der eingesetzten Theorien und Methodologie. Die vier wissenschaftlichen Artikel dieser kumulativen Dissertation bezogen sich auf unterschiedliche theoretische Perspektiven – Theorien zu regionaler (ökonomischer) Integration, die Regulationstheorie, Neogramscianismus und materialistische Staatstheorie, sowie theoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung von ungleicher Entwicklung und Abhängigkeit – und kombinierten diese teilweise, um zu beleuchten, wie (gemeinsame) Industriepolitik versuchte die komplexe Dynamik von ungleicher und abhängiger Entwicklung zu beeinflussen und wer die antreibenden und blockierenden Akteur*innen dieser Prozesse waren. In der Conclusio des Rahmenpapiers diskutiere ich, ob die präsentierten Belege darauf hinweisen, dass ein Übergang vom handelszentrierten zum entwicklungszentrierten Regionalismus stattgefunden hat, formuliere einige allgemeine sowie einige regionalspezifische Empfehlungen für die Entwicklung und Umsetzung gemeinsamer Industriepolitik und identifiziere bestehende Forschungslücken. submitted by Mag. Mag. phil. Julia Eder Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers Dissertation Universität Linz 2022

Článek popisuje formování osobní identity hrdinů románů Vladimira Sorokina Den opričníka, Telurie a Manaraga buď jako kosmopolitní, nebo jako regionální coby strategie přežití v měnících se podmínkách současného světa. Komparace vývoje postav ukazuje na posuny v aktuálních (anti)globalizačních procesech obecně. Výklad zahrnuje přidružená témata, jako je koncová identita, nomádství, nacionalismus a postnacionalismus. Při analýze textů byly využity i kvantitativní metody zkoumání a výsledky bádání jsou prezentovány mimo jiné prostřednictvím různých nástrojů vizualizace informací. V tomto směru si článek klade za cíl otevřít diskusi, zda jsou tyto metody pro soudobou literární vědu akceptovatelné a přínosné. The article describes the formation of the personal identity of the heroes of Vladimir Sorokin‘s novels Day of the Oprichnik, Teluria and Manaraga, either as cosmopolitan or as a regional strategy for survival in the changing conditions of today‘s world. A comparison of character development points to shifts in current (anti)globalization processes in general. The interpretation covers associated topics such as finite identity, nomadism, nationalism, and post-nationalism. Quantitative research methods were also used in the analysis of the texts, and the research results are presented, among other things, through various information visualization tools. In this regard, the article aims to open a discussion on whether these methods are acceptable and beneficial for contemporary literary science.

Objective/context: In 2008-09, nascent Union of South American Nations, UNASUR, agreed and formalized the creation of one of its most ambitious bodies, its Defense Council. The origin of this council was surprising as some rival states, as well as others whose security and defense interests were distant from each other, participated in it. Its performance was marked by this contradictory origin, which resulted in its failure a decade later, in 2018, with the division of UNASUR. This article proposes elements for a complementary explanation of the trajectory of the UNASUR Defense Council, pointing out geopolitical links. Methodology: This is an empirical case study that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of both national capacities and contemporary geopolitical trends. It also includes the review of official documents and the presentation of processed results of semi-structured interviews with South American diplomats and military officers. Conclusions: The main contribution of this article is that it shows how global (de)concentration, the geostrategic (re)orientation of the United States and the contemporary geopolitical dynamics of the regional institutions, form an adequate set of causes for a structural explanation on the origin, performance and decline of the South American Defense Council. Originality: Unlike most of the giving explanations about the fate of the South American Defense Council, and UNASUR in general, focused mainly on domestic causes, this article presents a systemic and structural explanation that links institutional and institutional dynamics. South American security with global processes of greater scope. In addition, it reaches potentially replicable conclusions in other regions and periods from a combination of quantitative and qualitative research tools. RESUMEN. Objetivo/contexto: En 2008-09, la naciente Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, Unasur, acordó y formalizó la creación de uno de sus órganos más ambiciosos, el Consejo de Defensa de América del Sur. El origen de este consejo fue sorprendente ya que algunos estados rivales, así como otros cuyos intereses de seguridad y defensa estaban distantes entre sí, participaron en él. Su desempeño estuvo marcado por este origen contradictorio, que resultó en su fracaso una década más tarde, en 2018, con la división de Unasur. Este artículo propone elementos para una explicación complementaria de la trayectoria del Consejo de Defensa de Unasur, señalando vínculos geopolíticos. Metodología: Este estudio de caso empírico que combina análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo, tanto de capacidades nacionales como de tendencias geopolíticas contemporáneas. Además, incluye la revisión de documentos oficiales y la exposición de resultados procesados de entrevistas semi-estructuradas a diplomáticos y oficiales militares suramericanos. Conclusiones: La principal contribución de este artículo es que muestra cómo la (des)concentración económica global, la (re)orientación geoestratégica de los Estados Unidos y la dinámica geopolítica contemporánea de las instituciones regionales, conforman un conjunto adecuado de causas para una explicación estructural sobre el origen, desempeño y declive del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano. Originalidad: A diferencia de la mayor parte de las explicaciones que han venido dando sobre el destino del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, y de la Unasur en general, centradas fundamentalmente en causas domésticas, este artículo presenta una explicación sistémica y estructural que vincula las dinámicas institucionales y de seguridad de Suramérica con procesos globales de mayor alcance. Además, llega a conclusiones potencialmente replicables en otras regiones y periodos desde una combinación de herramientas de investigación cuantitativas y cualitativas. RESUMO. Objetivo/contexto: Em 2008-09, a nascente União das Nações Sul-Americanas, UNASUL, concordou e formalizou a criação de um de seus órgãos mais ambiciosos, o Conselho de Defesa da América do Sul. A origem desse conselho foi surpreendente, pois alguns estados rivais, bem como outros cujos interesses de segurança e defesa estavam distantes entre si, participaram. Seu desempenho foi marcado por essa origem contraditória, que resultou em seu fracasso, uma década depois, em 2018, com a divisão da UNASUL. Este artigo propõe elementos para uma explicação complementar da trajetória do Conselho de Defesa da UNASUL, apontando os vínculos geopolíticos. Metodologia: Este estudo de caso empírico que combina análise quantitativa e qualitativa das capacidades nacionais e das tendências geopolíticas contemporâneas. Também inclui a revisão de documentos oficiais e a apresentação de resultados processados de entrevistas semiestruturadas com diplomatas e oficiais militares sul-americanos. Conclusões: A principal contribuição deste artigo é que mostra como a (des)concentração econômica global, a (re)orientação geoestratégica dos Estados Unidos e a dinâmica geopolítica contemporânea das instituições regionais formam um conjunto adequado de causas para uma explicação estrutural sobre a origem, desempenho e declínio do Conselho de Defesa da América do Sul. Originalidade: Diferentemente da maioria das explicações que vêm dando sobre o destino do Conselho de Defesa da América do Sul e da UNASUL em geral, focado principalmente em causas domésticas, este artigo apresenta uma explicação sistêmica e estrutural que liga a dinâmica institucional e institucional. Segurança sul-americana com processos globais de maior alcance. Além disso, chega a conclusões potencialmente replicáveis em outras regiões e períodos a partir de uma combinação de ferramentas de pesquisa quantitativa e qualitativa.

The paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for studying actorness of regional organizations created by authoritarian countries. It serves as a conceptual foundation for a DFG project co-led by the authors in 2021-2023 and focusing on studying the behavior and the functioning of Eurasian regional organizations. While the literature traditionally assumes that authoritarianism and actorness of regional organizations are incompatible, we take a more nuanced perspective on this question. The paper discusses possible determinants for the emergence of actorness, in particular in the post-Soviet Eurasia. It also introduces the concept of back-door actorness, which could be particularly relevant in the authoritarian context.

This article advances understandings of secessionist strategies by examining how and why secessionist movements make the case for creating a new sovereign state. It draws on new empirical data to examine the ways in which pro-independence parties in Catalonia have justified their calls for the creation of an independent Catalan Republic between 2008 and 2018. The findings challenge the widespread scholarly assumption that secessionist mobilisation is underpinned by grievances—cultural, economic, and political—against the state. We find that arguments for an independent Catalonia rarely include cultural claims. Instead, independence is advocated as a way of resolving political and economic grievances and of creating a better, more democratic, and just Catalan society. Such justifications are highly influenced by the political context in which pro-independence parties try to advance towards secession. These insights advance on extant explanations of secessionist mobilisation by highlighting the distinctive nature of, and the motives for, secessionist claims.

In this thematic issue we discuss what we really know about the explanations for secessionism. Over the last few decades, an increasing number of new analyses on secessionism have appeared, regarding both its normative and its empirical dimensions. We can distinguish at least three types of research questions that categorise the current analyses of secessionism: normative, explanatory, and pragmatic. Political theorists work mainly on the moral and political right to unilaterally secede, answering questions such as “under what conditions” this right is legitimate and “who” has this moral right (Requejo & Sanjaume-Calvet, 2015; Sanjaume‐Calvet, 2020). Despite the importance of normative theories, these approaches do not provide explanations for secessionism, although most of them are built on implicit explanations of these phenomena. The field of explanatory theories of secession focuses mainly on the individual and/or aggregate preconditions and variables that correlate (or not) with the presence (or absence) of secessionist movements in specific territories. Through our general guiding question—”what do we really know about the explanations for secessionism?”—we try to disentangle the current explanations of secessionism by using empirical analyses, combining comparative politics and case studies. We bring together several different analytical perspectives, from political economy, nationalism, electoral behaviour, and institutional studies. Beyond these empirical perspectives, the issue puts forward some normative implications based on what we know and what we do not know about the existence of secessionist claims.

The politics of godfatherism and regionalism has become a phenomenon in the political development of many nations Nigeria inclusive. The paper examined the determinants and impacts of the politics of godson and regionalism in Yobe state. Indeed, the politics of godson or the elites have entered every hook and crannies of the state and have affected the political arrangement of the political system. The paper is qualitative in nature, data were generated from secondary sources where several related articles, newspapers, magazines, books were consulted, etc. In explaining the topic under study, the researcher adopted the Elite theory. This theory was propounded by Vilfredo Pareto in 1935, the postulation of the theory is that elites could only be replaced by another set of elites, meaning that the majority are unavoidably governed by the minority. The study found that the politics of godfatherism courses and affect the political development of the Yobe state by restricting power in the hands of the few, in a specific geopolitical zone of the state. This has led to inter-party and intra-party defections, decamping, and conflicts among the party members. Therefore, the study recommends the adoption of the direct primary election in the chosen candidates in all levels of governance. INEC should also make a law that will discourage money politics and punish the culprit involved in such an illegal act. To minimize the politics of Godfatherism, there is a need for political awareness campaigns on the effects of political godson on the political development of the state.