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This chapter investigates the cognitive effects of different populist messages on blame attributions and stereotyping in the 15 countries participating in the study. It first gives an overview about whether respondents blamed politicians, the wealthy, immigrants, or ordinary people for the future economic decline described in the experimental stimulus. In addition, general stereotypical perceptions of those groups among respondents are presented. With respect to populist message effects, the analyses show that these were generally rather weak. But the analyses were also able to show that left-wing anti-out-group cues blaming ‘the rich’ and economic elites were most influential in this experiment. In contrast, the effects of anti-immigrant cues were much weaker, and neither anti-politics nor people-centrism cues made much of a difference for blame attributions and stereotypes. The chapter discusses the complex reasons for these differential effects. With respect to the impact of contextual factors, the analyses support the notion that the exact workings of populist communication seem to be rather country-specific. This supports findings from the interviews with journalists and politicians, as well as results of the content analysis presented in Parts I and II of this volume.

European media systems have been affected by major changes in the last few decades that have facilitated the dissemination of populist messages, including increased media ownership concentration, increased commercialization, and a stronger orientation towards news values (Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017). At the same time, Europe has faced several political crises, such as the European sovereign debt crisis, the refugee crisis, and ‘Brexit’. Against this background, we analyze populist communication in immigration news coverage as well as in opinion pieces within two time periods (2016 & 2017) across twelve European countries. We define populism as a ‘thin’ ideology (Mudde, 2004) and derive four dimensions of populist communication: people-centrism, anti-elitism, the exclusion of specific out-groups, and restoring sovereignty (Mény & Surel, 2002; Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017). This chapter provides a theoretical introduction to populist communication in the media, and a detailed description of the methodological approach, as well as first descriptive results of the study.

This chapter provides the theoretical background and context for the chapters in the book. It explains the framework behind the research, the countries involved, how the research was funded, and how work was organized. The studies in the book were conducted in the context of a research network that was funded by the European Union framework program ‘Cooperation in Science and Technology’ (COST). The structure and purpose of the COST scheme and network had an impact upon which countries could be involved. The projects had to rely on the voluntary participation of country experts present in the network. A total of 31 European countries joined the network with 22 participating in this book.

Against the background of the variation in populism between countries exposed in the previous chapter by Blassnig et al., this chapter will focus on article, newspaper, and country-level explanatory factors for this variation. Evidence for between-newspaper variation with respect to populist communication has already been presented elsewhere (Manucci & Weber, 2017; Rooduijn, 2014; Wettstein et al., 2018). The role of the press in a political climate of intensifying conflict among European democracies, especially in relation to financial bailouts for EU member states and the EU’s response to migration pressure, to name a few, has been criticized (Sarikakis, 2012). For instance, Tomov and Raycheva (2018) assert that for Bulgaria, populist messages are widely disseminated in the media, especially during the migrant Crisis and periods of instability. They conclude that the media disseminate populist messages without the necessary criticism, not seeking different points of view on the subject. Due to the emergence and establishment of populist parties in the political field of virtually all European democracies, political communicators might cultivate a populist discourse in the public sphere which would then also be reflected in the degree of populism in newspapers. Furthermore, existing theoretical accounts of populism and the media have suggested that we must distinguish between two forms of populist discourse in media coverage: First, populist messages stemming from political actors who communicate through the media thereby using the media as a communication channel for their ideas, and, second, populism voiced by 3 media actors themselves. For the former, Esser, Stepinska and Hopmann (2017) have coined the term “populism through the media”, and for the latter, “populism by the media”. Mazzoleni (2008) has argued that we can speak of “media populism” when journalists create Populist messages themselves – and thus become much more proactive than merely transmitting th

This chapter focuses on trends in reporting over time. It examines the presence of populist key messages in “news coverage of immigration” and “commentaries on current political events” in European newspapers at two points in time, namely spring 2016 and spring 2017. The chapter has a twofold aim. First, it will explore similarities and differences in the populist content of European newspapers between the two periods. Second, it identifies a set of extra-media and intra-media explanatory factors contributing to the understanding of the emerging differences in a year-to-year comparison. The chapter by Blassnig et al. in this volume provides more detailed information about the newspaper stories we content-analyzed. Two types of stories are analyzed: ‘news articles on immigration’, and ‘editorials commenting on current political events’ irrespective of the topic. While the chapter by Blassnig et al. pooled and jointly investigated the data from 2016 and 2017, and the chapter by Maurer et al. in this volume, used only content data from 2017, this chapter will evaluate and compare the data from 2016 and 2017. These two periods are seen as two phases of a news and policy cycle that responds to real world cues. The two phases are understood as stages of a crisis, which offer more or less favorable opportunity structures for populist discourse (Moffitt, 2015). As stated in the introduction to this volume, a whole range of contextual factors influence the populist worldview of crises and, subsequently, the use of populist communication in news reports and commentaries about theses crises.

This book started from several assumptions, the key one being that although the rise of populism can be regarded as an international trend, it may take different forms when investigated in an internationally comparative manner. This book set out to look systematically for both similarities and differences in populist political communication processes in a variety of European nations. The previous chapters presented findings from several large-scale and comparative studies of populist communication. They examined how politicians and journalists perceive populism and the role of the media and communication (Part I); populist elements in media coverage and the factors explaining their prevalenc (Part II); and cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral effects of populist communication, using cross-national survey embedded experiments (Part III). The purpose of this concluding chapter is two-fold. On the one hand, we want to tease out and summarize the key findings of the different chapters. What do these studies tell us, collectively? On the other hand, we want to extrapolate from these findings and the current literature to offer concrete stakeholder advice to politicians, journalists, and citizens who are all confronted with the challenge of populist politics and populist messages. For discussions of the limitations of this research and future research directions, we refer the reader back to the conclusions of the individual chapters where these are discussed in detail.

This book started from several assumptions, the key one being that although the rise of populism can be regarded as an international trend, it may take different forms when investigated in an internationally comparative manner. This book set out to look systematically for both similarities and differences in populist political communication processes in a variety of European nations. The previous chapters presented findings from several large-scale and comparative studies of populist communication. They examined how politicians and journalists perceive populism and the role of the media and communication (Part I); populist elements in media coverage and the factors explaining their prevalenc (Part II); and cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral effects of populist communication, using cross-national survey embedded experiments (Part III). The purpose of this concluding chapter is two-fold. On the one hand, we want to tease out and summarize the key findings of the different chapters. What do these studies tell us, collectively? On the other hand, we want to extrapolate from these findings and the current literature to offer concrete stakeholder advice to politicians, journalists, and citizens who are all confronted with the challenge of populist politics and populist messages. For discussions of the limitations of this research and future research directions, we refer the reader back to the conclusions of the individual chapters where these are discussed in detail.

This chapter provides the theoretical background and context for the chapters in the book. It explains the framework behind the research, the countries involved, how the research was funded, and how work was organized. The studies in the book were conducted in the context of a research network that was funded by the European Union framework program ‘Cooperation in Science and Technology’ (COST). The structure and purpose of the COST scheme and network had an impact upon which countries could be involved. The projects had to rely on the voluntary participation of country experts present in the network. A total of 31 European countries joined the network with 22 participating in this book.

Against the background of the variation in populism between countries exposed in the previous chapter by Blassnig et al., this chapter will focus on article, newspaper, and country-level explanatory factors for this variation. Evidence for between-newspaper variation with respect to populist communication has already been presented elsewhere (Manucci & Weber, 2017; Rooduijn, 2014; Wettstein et al., 2018). The role of the press in a political climate of intensifying conflict among European democracies, especially in relation to financial bailouts for EU member states and the EU’s response to migration pressure, to name a few, has been criticized (Sarikakis, 2012). For instance, Tomov and Raycheva (2018) assert that for Bulgaria, populist messages are widely disseminated in the media, especially during the migrant Crisis and periods of instability. They conclude that the media disseminate populist messages without the necessary criticism, not seeking different points of view on the subject. Due to the emergence and establishment of populist parties in the political field of virtually all European democracies, political communicators might cultivate a populist discourse in the public sphere which would then also be reflected in the degree of populism in newspapers. Furthermore, existing theoretical accounts of populism and the media have suggested that we must distinguish between two forms of populist discourse in media coverage: First, populist messages stemming from political actors who communicate through the media thereby using the media as a communication channel for their ideas, and, second, populism voiced by 3 media actors themselves. For the former, Esser, Stepinska and Hopmann (2017) have coined the term “populism through the media”, and for the latter, “populism by the media”. Mazzoleni (2008) has argued that we can speak of “media populism” when journalists create Populist messages themselves – and thus become much more proactive than merely transmitting th

This chapter focuses on trends in reporting over time. It examines the presence of populist key messages in “news coverage of immigration” and “commentaries on current political events” in European newspapers at two points in time, namely spring 2016 and spring 2017. The chapter has a twofold aim. First, it will explore similarities and differences in the populist content of European newspapers between the two periods. Second, it identifies a set of extra-media and intra-media explanatory factors contributing to the understanding of the emerging differences in a year-to-year comparison. The chapter by Blassnig et al. in this volume provides more detailed information about the newspaper stories we content-analyzed. Two types of stories are analyzed: ‘news articles on immigration’, and ‘editorials commenting on current political events’ irrespective of the topic. While the chapter by Blassnig et al. pooled and jointly investigated the data from 2016 and 2017, and the chapter by Maurer et al. in this volume, used only content data from 2017, this chapter will evaluate and compare the data from 2016 and 2017. These two periods are seen as two phases of a news and policy cycle that responds to real world cues. The two phases are understood as stages of a crisis, which offer more or less favorable opportunity structures for populist discourse (Moffitt, 2015). As stated in the introduction to this volume, a whole range of contextual factors influence the populist worldview of crises and, subsequently, the use of populist communication in news reports and commentaries about theses crises.

European media systems have been affected by major changes in the last few decades that have facilitated the dissemination of populist messages, including increased media ownership concentration, increased commercialization, and a stronger orientation towards news values (Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017). At the same time, Europe has faced several political crises, such as the European sovereign debt crisis, the refugee crisis, and ‘Brexit’. Against this background, we analyze populist communication in immigration news coverage as well as in opinion pieces within two time periods (2016 & 2017) across twelve European countries. We define populism as a ‘thin’ ideology (Mudde, 2004) and derive four dimensions of populist communication: people-centrism, anti-elitism, the exclusion of specific out-groups, and restoring sovereignty (Mény & Surel, 2002; Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017). This chapter provides a theoretical introduction to populist communication in the media, and a detailed description of the methodological approach, as well as first descriptive results of the study.

The studies in this volume conceptualize populism as a type of political communication and investigate it comparatively, focusing on (a) politicians’ and journalists’ perceptions, (b) media coverage, and (c) effects on citizens. This book presents findings from several large-scale internationally comparative empirical studies, funded by the European Cooperation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research (COST), focusing on communication and the media within the context of populism and populist political communication in Europe. The studies are based on comparative interview studies with journalists and politicians, a large-scale comparative content analysis, and a comparative cross-country experiment using nationally representative online-surveys over 15 countries. The book also includes advice for stakeholders like politicians, the media, and citizens about how to deal with the challenge of populist political communication. This enlightening volume is ‘populist’ in the best sense and will be an essential text for any scholar in political science, communication science, media studies, sociology and philosophy with an interest in populism and political communication. It does not assume specialist knowledge and will remain accessible and engaging to students, practitioners and policymakers

European media systems have gone through major changes in the last few decades, and these changes have included increased opportunity structures for the dissemination of populist messages. Chapter 12 (‘Switzerland’) rightly states that the disappearance of the traditional party press, increased media ownership concentration, dependence on advertising, and a stronger orientation toward news values have worked in favor of a growing populist discourse. The newly established online media are seen as having a high afnity to populism’s rhetorical persuasion because both aim for the “quick kick/click” with a broad audience. As was stated in Chapter 1 in this volume, the role that the media play in the dissemination of populism is largely under-explored. In the classical research literature dealing with populism (see, e.g., Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000), communication and media are not addressed at all. When political scientists make the media their subject, they see the media mostly only as a neutral platform for populist leaders’ appearances and messages. One exception is Mudde (2007), who dedicates at least a few pages to this topic in his book Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (pp. 248-253). He elaborates in particular on the assumption that tabloids and commercial television share a close relationship with populist communication.

In this chapter the state of the art in comparative political communication research is reviewed. First, the chapter reflects upon the development of comparative research that today aspires to knowledge about social prerequisites and political consequences of communication that go beyond a single country, region or field of communication. Second, the authors discuss key approaches to theorize and measure political communication beyond the nation state and national publics.They propose more meaningful frameworks for comparative research than the seemingly outdated country category (e.g., media systems, political communication cultures, political information environments). Finally, the substantial progress made by applying new concepts, complex designs and sophisticated measures is discussed. Applications and examples include election campaigning, the interaction between media actors and political actors, and the impact of the Internet on democracy. The chapter closes with a summary of core advances and promising areas of future scholarship.