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While anecdotal evidence suggests that transnational private rule-making organizations (TPROs)—such as eco-certification organizations—lobby public policy makers, we know little about the extent of this phenomenon or the characteristics of TPROs that lobby. TPRO lobbying is relevant given that their rule-making activities directly intersect with public policy. We use the interest group and private governance literatures to examine TPRO features that distinguish TPROs that lobby from those that do not. We developed an original data set of 147 environmental TPROs and assessed TPRO lobbying by their registration in the European Union's Transparency Register (TR). We find that a quarter of the TPROs in our data set are registered in the TR, and that capacity and expertise matter. Contrary to expectations, however, we do not find that certain key features of TPROs—such as business origins or credibility—are correlated with being registered, which implies that these features do not create inequalities in the TPRO population in terms of lobbying likelihood. By assessing environmental TPROs as interest organizations that engage in lobbying, we contribute to research on public–private governance interactions and identify TPROs as an interest group population in its own right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While scholars have researched transnational private governance for over two decades, we still know little about some of the specific political activities in which private rulemaking schemes engage. This article addresses this topic by bringing together hitherto separate literatures on private governance and interest groups. I argue that examining private governance's instrumental power, and interest representation and lobbying specifically, complements the literature's dominant focus on the structural and discursive power of private governance. The article makes three contributions. First, it conceptualizes private governance schemes as interest organizations by analyzing similarities and differences with traditional interest groups. Second, the article examines instrumental power empirically by assessing the participation of 48 transnational private governance schemes in the European Union's lobby register and variation among private governance schemes in this respect. Finally, the article contributes to developing a new research agenda to continue bridging the gap between the private governance and interest group literatures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electronic waste has recently emerged as an environmental issue of growing concern. This is due to the increasing consumption of electronic devices and a heightened awareness for the potentially detrimental environmental impact of a non-sustainable management of these devices in their end-of-life stage. In this article e-waste governance in the USA will be explored. More specifically, the voluntary collaborative initiatives that are taken at the federal level, in a context where a general regulatory framework is largely absent, will be examined. Such voluntarism is linked to a larger trend towards voluntary action in US environmental governance and to a particular framing of the e-waste problem as a materials management, instead of a waste management, challenge with shared responsibilities for all stakeholders. A critical exploration of the various initiatives will show that the voluntary public–private partnerships on e-waste have only produced limited results so far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We assess 98 private sustainability certification programs' changes to audit policies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. • We ask whether and how these changes exacerbate existing barriers to program participation by Global South operators. • Conditions on the use of remote audits and increased costs of such audits create barriers for Global South operators. • Limited flexibility of substantive certification standards and prioritizing existing over new entrants exacerbate barriers. • We reflect on implications for private governance of the broader global political-economic changes post-COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted global economic relations. Transnational private regulatory programs, such as sustainability certification and eco-labeling schemes that set standards for responsible production practices in global markets, have had to react. Private regulation's market credibility is partially built on audits, which include field visits used to assess whether participating operators conform with a program's standard. But COVID-19-related health and business restrictions have forced adjustments to field-audit policies. Literature on private governance has identified several barriers to participation of Global South operators, including the costs of certification, the availability of qualified auditors, and uncertain socio-economic benefits. Are audit policy changes made because of the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating these barriers? We examine this question through a dataset constructed between April and November 2020 that contains information on COVID-19-related audit policy responses of 98 transnational private sustainability regulators. We describe the mixed transparency of these adjustments to date and five ways in which the adjustments create explicit and implicit barriers to operators from Global South countries. The changes create barriers through (1) the conditions set on when and how adjustments to audits are permitted, (2) the limited flexibility of substantive standards, (3) the potential costs of shifting to remote audits, (4) the focus on accommodating existing participants over new applicants, and (5) the potential challenges of accessing auditors to conduct assessments. We conclude with implications for research on private regulation post-COVID-19. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transnational private governance schemes, like other global rule-making arenas, are confronted with the challenges of North-South imbalances. Through their standards and certification processes, private governance schemes aim to control access to the market for sustainably certified products and may consequently generate or perpetuate global inequalities. Are these imbalances inevitable and likely to persist? This article explores North-South imbalances in the operations of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), a leading standard-setting and certification scheme for capture fisheries. We examine whether the scheme's Northern-dominated origins reflect pre-existing structural imbalances, persist through path-dependent processes, or can be addressed by scheme adaptations. Our analysis uses data on the 312 fisheries that have engaged with the MSC from 1999 to 2015. We find evidence that imbalances in the MSC reflect corporate power and structures of power in the global fisheries sector, but that path dependence has also elevated the power of unexpected countries. Adaptations to date have been less successful as a means to lessen Northern dominance. • Structure affects rule making and auditing in MSC through corporate power • Dominant fisheries countries influence but do not predetermine imbalances • MSC sustainability rules and governance bodies are subject to path dependence • MSC adaptations have focused on changing assessment procedures for data-poor fisheries • Fisheries uptake likely more influenced by market demand than MSC adaptations [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article present case studies of a variety of different environmental challenges as part of a multinational research project identifying some of the best and worst practices in international and transnational environmental cooperation. Topics include hypotheses of best and worst practices, the case studies used in the agenda setting component of the project's hypotheses, and a table of all the cases covered in the project.