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TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 567 TABLE OF CONTENTS 569 I. TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: CONFERENCE REALIGNMENT AND STUDENT-ATHLETE BENEFITS 570 II. ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE: CONSOLIDATING CONTROL AND STUDENT-ATHLETE [...], This paper explores a future in which two "super conferences" dominate college football. Considering the erosion of the PAC 12 Conference and the looming threats to the Atlantic Coast Conference against the skyrocketing media rights revenues of the Big Ten Conference and the Southeastern Conference ("Power Two"), thought leaders across college athletics anticipate that future industry changes will be characterized by a continued consolidation of valuable college football brands into fewer high major conferences than we see today. At the same time, the frequency and public sentiment toward legal attacks on student-athlete compensation restrictions are now such that major college football student-athletes are soon likely to gain access to greater compensation, through employment, collective bargaining, revenue-sharing, or otherwise. As college football becomes captured by the Power Two, there will be a greater incentive for the two rival conferences to work together to maximize the revenues associated with their media rights agreements and minimize the expenses associated with student-athlete compensation. This article argues that antitrust concerns related to media rights agreements are more salient than those related to student-athlete compensation, because courts will be more likely to find that the Power Two controls the relevant product market with respect to high major college football broadcasts than with respect to elite football student-athlete talent. The distinction is grounded in the presence or absence of a reasonable substitute for Power Two products in the context of different consumer groups. Regardless of the legal viability, this article also argues that public perception is such that conferences should avoid using their authority to cap student-athlete benefits. Instead, each institution should decide to compensate its student-athletes at fair, but fiscally responsible, levels that will sustain the college athletics framework.

INTRODUCTION No competition law subject has more preoccupied the Supreme Court than tying. Since its origins in patent law, tying has come to the Court on at least twenty-two occasions, [...], Tying arrangements, a central concern of antitrust policy since the early days of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, have come into renewed focus with respect to the practices of dominant technology companies. Unfortunately, tying law's doctrinal structure is a self-contradictory and incoherent wreck. A conventional view holds that this mess is due to errant Supreme Court precedents, never fully corrected, that expressed hostility to tying based on faulty economic understanding. That is only part of the story. Examination of tying law's origins and development shows that tying doctrine was built on a now-dated paradigm of what constitutes a tying arrangement. In its origins during the industrial age, tying meant the leverage of patent rights over one good to impose requirements contracts forcing the purchase of a second, unpatented good. That paradigm no longer describes the vast majority of tying arrangements challenged under the antitrust laws. Instead, digital-age tying claims tend to involve product design decisions, the integration of technologies, the bundling of components, considerations of product functionality and performance, and the economic terms on which companies can obtain a return on their research and development investments. Correcting the mess in tying law requires not only updating economic learning, but also appreciating the patterns of behavior to which tying standards are applied.

INTRODUCTION 235 I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF MODERN FREQUENT FLYER PROGRAMS 237 A. The Rise and Fall of U.S. Airline Regulation 237 B. The Emergence and Evolution of Frequent Flyer [...], Airlines' frequent flyer programs operate more like a monetary system, with points as a form of currency, than a typical discount or rewards plan. In fact, airlines' power over points is even more extensive than that of a central bank over currency--beyond simply determining how many points are in circulation, airlines also control the value of points at redemption, how many points consumers can accumulate, and when points expire. This financialized form of frequent flyer programs has proven to be lucrative. For the Big Four airlines, frequent flyer programs are worth markedly more than the business of providing air travel itself. Much of this profit stems from selling points to third parties, like banks, which use the promise of points to incentivize consumers' credit card spending. The very structure of frequent flyer programs presents a problem for consumer protection. The value of these programs relies on consumers' belief in the value of points. At the same time, the value of these programs also depends on preventing consumers from efficiently redeeming their outstanding points, which would present an unsustainable cost for the airlines. In other words, the value of these programs stems from ensuring consumers believe that points are highly valuable, while limiting the points' actual value. This market structure relies on keeping consumers in the dark. Because the structure of frequent flyer programs depends on consumer deception, regulatory action is necessary. To that end, this Note analyzes the sometimes-overlapping regulatory mandates of the Federal Trade Commission, Department of Transportation, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. It then proposes that the agencies act to provide much-needed transparency in the market for frequent flyer points. These proposals aim to prevent the airline industry from subsidizing the provision of air travel with profit driven by consumer mistake and misrepresentation.

INTRODUCTION 330 I. THE SUPREME COURT'S PREDATORY PRICING JURISPRUDENCE 335 A. The Pre-Chicago Era 335 B. The Ascendancy of Theory 338 1. Matsushita 338 2. Cargill 342 3. Brooke Group [...]