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Renewable energy installations are rapidly gaining market share due to falling technology costs and supportive policies. Meanwhile, the energy price crisis resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian war has shifted the energy policy debate toward the question of how consumers can benefit more from the low and stable generation costs of renewable electricity. Here we suggest a Renewable Pool ('RE-Pool') under which the government passes the conditions of Contracts-for-Difference on to consumers who thereby benefit from reliably low-cost electricity supply. We assess the effect on financing costs, scale, and system friendliness of wind investments, as well risk hedging for consumers' volume risks and hedging incentives.

Contracts for difference are an instrument to provide security in case of volatile or unsure price evolvement. They have been successfully used in the context of market opening for renewable energies. The contract guarantees the agreed contract price and thereby basically funds a price gap between market prices for a good and its actual costs for the project developer. Project-based Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfD) are now being discussed as a means to advance the adaptation of breakthrough technologies, i.e., to incentivise emission intensive basic industries to shift to low-emission production processes. In Germany, the federal government committed itself to deploy a project-based pilot funding program for such CCfDs, for the steel, ammonia, cement, and lime sectors. The basic idea is simple: to cover incremental costs between a novel climate-friendly technology and its conventional baseline, while considering existing and evolving CO2 prices and other relevant risks. The implementation as a CCfD might also encompass paybacks in case CO2 market prices (in the EU ETS) exceed the contract price, depending on the design of the instrument. The detailed design of this policy instrument, contrariwise to the basic idea, can be rather complex. Important questions are: how to set a suitable reference for the project to be contracted in terms of costs and emissions, which kinds of costs and revenues to consider, how to allocate funding and determine which projects are awarded, and how to consider the interaction with the ETS - and many more. The paper presents preliminary findings from a research grant from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK), considering the aforementioned questions of policy design in the context of the expected German pilot program, and discusses their respective trade-offs. It outlines explicitly how a CCfD payment can be derived considering the difference costs between a climate friendly and a respective reference production as well as the effective CO2 price based on market price and free allocation. In a broader perspective, it addresses how CCfDs are embedded in the existing and anticipated policy framework for carbon intensive industries in Germany and in the EU such as, e.g., CBAM.

Die steile Entwicklung der Gaspreise hat die Strompreise im vergangenen Jahr in bislang ungeahnte Höhen klettern lassen. Satte Zusatzgewinne gemacht haben die Betreiber von Anlagen für erneuerbare Energien - und zwar indirekt auf Kosten der VerbraucherInnen, die kräftig draufzahlen mussten. Grund dafür ist die geltende Politik der gleitenden Marktprämie, mit der den Betreibern fast aller geförderter Windanlagen und von rund einem Drittel der Solaranlagen eine Mindestvergütung für den verkauften Strom zusteht. In Zeiten von niedrigen Strompreisen werden die Erneuerbare-Energien-Anlagen zusätzlich gefördert: Im Falle von hohen Strompreisen wie jetzt winken zugleich unverhoffte Gewinne, die die Betreiber einstreichen dürfen. Die KonsumentInnen haben das Nachsehen: Obwohl sie bei niedrigen Strompreisen regenerative Energien über die EEG-Umlage über Jahre hinweg gefördert haben, sind sie im Gegenzug nicht gegen hohe Strompreise abgesichert. Hätte die Bundesregierung in der Vergangenheit bereits auf Differenzverträge (Contracts-for-Difference, CfDs) statt auf die gleitende Marktprämie für Wind an Land und Photovoltaik gesetzt, hätten auch die StromkundInnen davon profitiert: Berechnungen des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) zeigen, dass die Stromkosten im vergangenen Jahr knapp 1,7 Milliarden Euro geringer gewesen wären. Allein im Dezember hätte die Ersparnis bei etwa 750 Millionen Euro gelegen.

Designing auctions that favor low resource quality installations allows countries to geographically diversify their renewable energy production, while lowering payments to low-cost producers. In this paper, we develop a stylized model showing that a discriminatory auction design favoring low-wind-yield locations leads to a tradeoff between production costs and producer rent and that the scheme can lower consumer costs even without considering the positive externalities of distributed generation. We explore the influence of the heterogeneity of production costs, the strength of the adjustment, and the regulator's knowledge about cost structures. Through a numerical analysis of the German reference yield model, we estimate that at current auction levels intra-technology discrimination through the reference yield model leads to a reduction of consumer costs of around 24.8 billion Euro or 13% between 2023 and 2030.

Climate change and ambitious emission-reduction targets call for an extensive decarbonization of electricity systems, with increasing levels of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and demand flexibility to balance the variable and intermittent electricity supply. A successful energy transition will lead to an economically and ecologically sustainable future with an affordable, reliable, and carbon-neutral supply of electricity. In order to achieve these objectives, a consistent and enabling market design is required. The Kopernikus Project SynErgie investigates how demand flexibility of the German industry can be leveraged and how a future-proof electricity market design should be organized, with more than 80 project partners from academia, industry, governmental and non-governmental organizations, energy suppliers, and network operators. In our SynErgie Whitepaper Electricity Spot Market Design 2030-2050 [1], we argued for a transition towards Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) (aka. nodal prices) in Germany in a single step as a core element of a sustainable German energy policy. We motivated a well-designed transition towards LMPs, discussed various challenges, and provided a new perspective on electricity market design in terms of technological opportunities, bid languages, and strategic implications. This second SynErgie Whitepaper Electricity Market Design 2030-2050: Moving Towards Implementation aims at further concretizing the future German market design and provides first guidelines for an implementation of LMPs in Germany. Numerical studies –while not being free of abstractions –give evidence that LMPs generate efficient locational price signals and contribute to manage the complex coordination challenge in (long-term) electricity markets, ultimately reducing price differences between nodes. Spot and derivatives markets require adjustments in order to enable an efficient dispatch and price discovery, while maintaining high liquidity and low transaction costs. Moreover, a successful LMP implementation requires an integration into European market coupling and appropriate interfaces for distribution grids as well as sector coupling. Strategic implications with regard to long-term investments need to be considered, along with mechanisms to support RES investments. As a facilitator for an LMP system, digital technologies should be considered jointly with the market design transition under an enabling regulatory framework. Additional policies can address distributional effects of an LMP system and further prevent market power abuse. Overall, we argue for a well-designed electricity spot market with LMPs, composed of various auctions at different time frames, delivering an efficient market clearing, considering grid constraints, co-optimizing ancillary services, and providing locational prices according to a carefully designed pricing scheme. The spot market is tightly integrated with liquid and accessible derivatives markets, embedded into European market coupling mechanisms, and allows for functional interfaces to distribution systems and other energy sectors. Long-term resource adequacy is ensured and existing RES policies transition properly to the new market design. Mechanisms to mitigate market power and distributional effects are in place and the market design leverages the potential of modern information technologies. Arapid expansion of wind andsolar capacity will be needed to decarbonize the integrated energy system but will most likely also increase the scarcity of the infrastructure. Therefore, an efficient use of the resource "grid" will be a key factor of a successful energy transition. The implementation of an LMPs system of prices with finer space and time granularity promises many upsides and can be a cornerstone for a futureproof electricity system, economic competitiveness, and a decarbonized economy and society. Among the upsides, demand response (and other market participants with opportunity costs) can be efficiently and coherently incentivized to address network constraints, a task zonal systems with redispatch fail at. The transition to LMPs requires a thorough consideration of all the details and specifications involved in the new market design. With this whitepaper, we provide relevant perspectives and first practical guidelines for this crucial milestone of the energy transition.

Speeding up the energy transition in the European Union (EU) is a major task to quickly reduce harmful greenhouse gas emissions. Market design plays a crucial role in the decarbonization of the European energy system, driving the expansion of both Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and accompanying flexibility sources. In particular, demand flexibility by energy-intensive industrial companies can play a key role. By flexibilizing their production processes, industrial companies can contribute to an increased use of variable RES (in the following referred to as Variable Renewable Energy (VRE)) to lower the CO2 footprint of their products with positive effects on economic competitiveness. Together with other flexibility sources like electric vehicles, the EU can transition to a just, low-carbon society and economy with benefits for all. However, to actually realize these benefits, market design must account for the changing production and consumption characteristics, e.g., the intermittency of VRE. Starting with current challenges of the energy transition that need to be solved with a future market designin the EU, the whitepaper takes alternative market design options and recent technological developments into account, which are highly intertwined. The whitepaper elaborates on the role of, for instance, flexibility, digital technologies, market design with locational incentives, and possible transition pathways in a European context. The “Clean energy for all Europeans” package offers a new opportunity to deepen the integration of different national electricity systems, whereby Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are required to reserve at least 70% of transmission capacities for cross-border trades from 2025 onwards. The corresponding scarcity of transmission capacities on the national level, however, may aggravate congestion to a critical extent, calling for transformational changes in market design involving, e.g., a redefinition of bidding zones close to the network-node level. The present whitepaper can be seen as part of a series of whitepapers on electricity market design 2030 - 2050 [14, 15] and continues the analysis of regionally differentiated prices or Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) as a means to address congestion problems in future VRE-based electricity systems. Thereby, the whitepaper extends the findings of the previous two whitepapers (where in the latter whitepapers, e.g., a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of LMP can be found) and elaborates on the question how LMP could be implemented in one or several European countries and how possible implementation pathways may look like in a coupled European system. Moreover, the whitepaper describes preparatory steps that are necessary for the introduction of LMP, and – at the same time – create advantages for countries under both, a nodal and zonal market design. All in all, the results and outcomes of the whitepaper shall support the market design transition in Europe and, thus, the integration and activation of flexibility potentials to foster a fast reduction of CO2 emissions through a better use of VRE. Therefore, the whitepaper contributes with concrete policy measures to the overarching vision of a future European electricity market design that bases on low-carbon technologies and enhances welfare and fairness, while ensuring economic competitiveness of Europe. We would like to thank all the partners and are grateful for the financial support from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research as well as the Project Management Jülich. Martin Bichler, Hans Ulrich Buhl, and Martin Weibelzahl (SynErgie) Antonello Monti (OneNet)

Driven by the climate conference in Paris in December 2015 countries worldwide are confronted with the question of how to shape their power system and how to establish alternative technologies to reduce harmful CO2 emissions. The German government plans that even before the year 2050, all electricity generated and consumed in Germany should be greenhouse gas neutral [1]. To successfully integrate renewable energies, a future energy system must be able to handle the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. One important means to address such electricity production variability is demand-side flexibility. Here, industry plays a major role in responding to variable electricity supply with adequate flexibility. This is where the Kopernikus project SynErgie comes in with more than 80 project partners from academia, industry, governmental, and non-governmental organizations as well as energy suppliers and network operators. The Kopernikus project SynErgie investigates how to best leverage demand-side flexibility in the German industry. The current electricity market design in Germany is not well suited to deal with increasing levels of re- newable energy, and it does not embrace demand-side flexibility. Almost 6 GW of curtailed power in 2019 provide evidence that changes are needed with respect to the rules governing electricity markets. These rules were designed at a time when electricity generation was concentrated on a few large and dispatchable conventional power plants and demand was considered inelastic. The SynErgie Cluster IV investigates how a future-proof electricity market design should be organized. The corresponding Work Package IV.3.1 more specifically deals with analyzing and designing allocation and pricing rules on electricity spot markets. The resulting design must be well suited to accommodate demand-side flexibility and address the intermittent nature of important renewable energy sources. This whitepaper is the result of a fruitful collaboration among the partners involved in SynErgie Cluster IV which include Germany’s leading research organizations and practitioners in the field. The collaboration led to an expert workshop in October 2020 with participation from a number of international energy market experts such as Mette Bjørndal (NHH), Endre Bjørndal (NHH), Peter Cramton (University of Maryland and University of Cologne), and Raphael Heffron (University of Dundee). The whitepaper details the key recommendations from this workshop. In particular, the whitepaper recommends a move to a locational, marginal price-based system together with new bidding formats allowing to better express flexibility. We argue in favor of a one-step introduction of locational, marginal prices instead of repeatedly splitting existing zones. Frequent zone splitting involves recurring political debates as well as short- and long-run instabilities affecting the basis for financial con- tracts, for example. Importantly, the definition of stable prize zones is very challenging with increasing levels of distributed and renewable energy sources. The recommendation is the outcome of an intense debate about advantages and downsides of different policy alternatives. However, such a transition to locational, marginal prices is not without challenges, and it is a call to arms for the research community, policymak- ers, and practitioners to develop concepts on how to best facilitate the transition and ensure a reliable and efficient electricity market of the future. We’d like to thank all the project partners and are grateful for the financial support from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research as well as the Project Management Jülich. Hans Ulrich Buhl (Cluster Lead) Martin Bichler (Work Package Lead)

This report supports the European Commission’s revision of the EEAG and section 7 of the GBER. It consists of 3 study items that address distinct questions: Study Item 1: The measurement of cost-effectiveness (EUR per tonne of CO2 avoided) allows for the assessment of relative decarbonisation benefits of policies, but may not always capture their overall environmental impact. Wind, solar and energy efficiency have similar cost-effectiveness, while cogeneration of heat and power is less cost-effective. Fo cusing on decarbonisation objectives only, multi-technology auctions improve cost-effec tiveness by prioritising less costly technologies. If potential inframarginal rents and dy namic effects are also considered, then technology-specific auctions may exhibit lower carbon mitigation costs in some cases. Study Item 2: Research on operating and investment aid is reviewed, with the finding that for environmentally friendly energy aid, some distortions have arisen from the nature of aid, but that both investment and especially operating aid can yield positive outcomes. Analysis of four actual schemes with operating or investment aid suggests that precise scheme design matters for success and often evolves with time. Three aid schemes are examined for industrial decarbonisation. Aid levels of 40% for fixed aid intensity are deemed unlikely, if the maximum aid intensities remain unchanged, to provide sufficient support for several industrial decarbonisation routes. Study Item 3: Empirical studies support the relevance of electro-intensity and trade in tensity for eligibility of energy-intensive users for levy exemptions in the EEAG. The anal ysis of levies from 2011 to 2018 highlights their large heterogeneity across sectors, coun tries and over time. Scenarios harmonising levies to the highest levy and abolishing ex emptions lead to a substantial decrease in profits. A limited profit decrease is predicted when levies change by a percentage value, an absolute level or are partially harmonised to a threshold. ispartof: Catalogue number: KD-05-21-173-EN-N pages:1-308 nrpages: 308 status: published

Die Europäische Kommission steht vor der Herausforderung und Chance, den Green Deal umzusetzen und dabei gleichzeitig die Erholung der Wirtschaft infolge der Corona-Krise einzuleiten. Investitionen in die Transformation zur Klimaneutralität der Grundstoffindustrie spielen dabei eine zentrale Rolle, da der Sektor für 16 Prozent des CO2-Ausstoßes der EU verantwortlich und zentral für nachgelagerte Wertschöpfungsketten ist. Während oftmals über die Förderung der Investitionsmöglichkeiten diskutiert wird, sind für die Transformation aber vor allem klare Rahmenbedingungen notwendig, mit denen Investitionen in klimafreundliche Technologien erst wirtschaftlich werden und die sicherstellen, dass Unternehmen die Investitionen in die Transformation auch umsetzen. Dafür müssen dann auch die notwendige Infrastruktur und Institutionen bereitgestellt werden. Damit diese Maßnahmen rechtzeitig und koordiniert umgesetzt werden, ist es wichtig, auf nationaler und europäischer Ebene Ziele für den Anteil an CO2-neutraler Produktion zu setzen und diese im Klimaschutzgesetz und der EU-Governancestruktur zu verankern., DIW Wochenbericht

Incentives for industrial loads to provide demand response on day-ahead and reserve markets are affected both by network tariffs, as well as regulations on the provision of flexibility in different markets. This paper uses a numerical model of the chlor-alkali process with a storable intermediate good to investigate how these factors affect the provision of demand response in these markets. We also model the effect of network tariffs and regulation on endogenous investment into process excess capacities, which are needed to provide load shifting. We find that fixed network tariffs based on peak-demand (demand charges) can be detrimental to the provision of demand response, especially to new investments in process capacity. For existing excess capacities, only high network tariffs inhibit demand response by limiting the optimal peak load below its physical limit. Marketing flexibility on the day-ahead market and in the reserves are substitutes for each other. The choice where to market flexibility is affected both by fixed peak-demand network tariffs and existing excess capacities. For endogenous investments, there are synergies between primary reserve participation and day-ahead flexibility provision, with the combination leading to increased capacity investments. In contrast, so-called interruptible load reserves, regular payments to industrial loads to be able to reduce electricity consumption at any point in time, incentivize a flat demand level. Consequently, such reserve markets reduce investments into additional flexibility capacities and often crowd out active participation in other markets.

[Motivation der Kurzexpertise] Im Zuge der Einführung eines nationalen Brennstoffemissionshandelssystems (nBEHS) vor allem im Wärme- und Verkehrssektor spielt der Erhalt der internationalen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und die Vermeidung von potentiell möglichen Carbon Leakage Risiken eine wichtige Rolle. Steigen die Kosten für einzelne Sektoren durch den nationalen CO2-Preis stark an, könnte einheimische Produktion durch Importe aus dem Ausland ersetzt und Produktion ins Ausland verlagert werden, was weder im Sinne des Wirtschaftsstandortes Deutschland, noch des Klimas, wäre. Entsprechend internationaler Ansätze zur CO2-Bepreisung und der Regelungen im europäischen Emissionshandel (EU ETS) wird in diesem Gutachten diskutiert, welche Sektoren unter besonderen Wettbewerbsdruck geraten können und wie dieses verhindert werden kann. In der regulatorischen Praxis des EU ETS werden Carbon Leakage Gefahren durch sektorale Bewertungen identifiziert, die sich an den erwarteten Mehrkosten und der internationalen Wettbewerbsintensität orientieren (Europäische Union, 2009 und 2018). Daraus ergibt sich die Fragestellung, wie ähnliche Bewertungsansätze für den deutschen Brennstoffemissionshandel ausgestaltet werden können und welchen Beitrag sie zur Vermeidung von Carbon Leakage leisten können. In dieser Studie werden dazu die in der Literatur verfügbaren Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem EU ETS und weiteren internationalen Politikmaßnahmen erläutert und Schlussfolgerungen bezüglich der Implikationen auf das nBEHS dargestellt. Hieraus ergibt sich die Frage, wie die identifizierten oder weitere Kriterien bei der nationalen Umsetzung so ausgestaltet werden können, dass Carbon Leakage Risiken durch höhere Kosten vor allem im Wärmeund Verkehrssektor zielgenau erfasst werden können. Dafür müssen die genutzten Kriterien eines solchen Carbon Leakage Assessments auf Ebene disaggregierter (Teil-)Sektoren anwendbar sein, um Aussagen über die tatsächliche Betroffenheit für einzelne Branchen treffen zu können. Für das gewählte Vorgehen werden also entsprechend fein aufgelöste Daten benötigt. Dies stellt langfristige Praktikabilität und Nachvollziehbarkeit der Analysen sicher. Daher wird eine anschließende Bewertung der Datenquellen bezüglich ihres Nutzens für die Identifikation betroffener Sektoren durchgeführt. Dabei ist die erste Anforderung, die energetisch bedingten Emissionen der Sektoren zu kennen. Im zweiten Schritt ist es notwendig, den Energiebezug, der bereits dem EU ETS unterliegt, von dem Energiebezug zu trennen, der zukünftig unter das nBEHS fällt. Darauf basierend können außerdem diejenigen Sektoren identifiziert werden, die bereits vollständig dem EU ETS unterliegen und somit keine Kosten durch den nationalen Brennstoffemissionshandel haben. Die Ausgestaltung des Carbon Leakage Schutzes ist bereits im Brennstoffemissionshandelsgesetz enthalten, doch noch nicht genauer spezifiziert. Dieser Schutz soll vorrangig durch finanzielle Unterstützung für klimafreundliche Investitionen geschehen. Diese Studie legt dar, wie groß die CO2-Kosten verglichen mit den Investitionssummen sind und skizziert Möglichkeiten für die Ausgestaltung und Umsetzung solcher Fördermaßnahmen. Forschungsprojekt im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen.

Die Klimaziele können nur mit einem Wechsel hin zu neuen Technologien und Praktiken für die Produktion und Nutzung von Grundstoffen, wie Zement, Stahl und Chemikalien, erreicht werden. Die Produktion solcher Grundstoffe macht nämlich rund 16 Prozent der europäischen und 25 Prozent der weltweiten Treibhausgasemissionen aus. Der moderate CO2-Preis im europäischen Emissionshandel (EU-ETS) und die unsichere Preisentwicklung bieten jedoch nicht genügend Anreize für Investitionen in und den Einsatz von innovativen klimafreundlichen Optionen. Hierfür sind neue Politikinstrumente notwendig. Projekt-basierte CO2-Differenzverträge sind, in Kombination mit einem Klimapfand, besonders geeignet: Sie senken die Finanzierungskosten von klimafreundlichen Investitionen, setzen die richtigen Anreize für Emissionsminderungen und wären ein klares Signal des Engagements der Regierungen für langfristige politische Ziele.

Short-term electricity markets are key to an efficient production by generation units. We develop a two-period model to assess different bidding formats to determine for each bidding format the optimal bidding strategy of competitive generators facing price-uncertainty. We compare the results for simple bidding, block bidding and multi-part bidding and find that even under optimal simple and block bidding generators face the risk of ex-post suboptimal solutions, whereas in multi-part bidding these do not occur. This points to efficiency gains of multi-part bidding in the presence of uncertainty in electricity markets.

Cost of renewable energies have dropped, approaching wholesale power price levels. As a result, the role of renewable energy policy design is shifting - from covering incremental costs towards facilitating risk-hedging. An analytical model of the financing structure of renewable investment projects is developed to assess this effect und used to compare different policy design choices: contracts for differences, sliding premia, fixed premia and a setting without dedicated remuneration mechanism. The expected benefit for electricity consumers from reduced risk and financing costs is approximated at the example of a 2030 scenario for Germany. Policies like sliding premia, previously evaluated as providing low-risk investment environments, provide for less risks hedging, when technology costs approach wholesale power prices. Contracts for differences provide in all scenarios the most effective hedge for investors against power prices uncertainty, enabling low-cost financing and reducing costs for consumers, while also hedging electricity consumers against high power prices.

Low and uncertain carbon prices are often stated as a major obstacle for industrial sector investments in technologies to deliver deep emissions reductions. Project-based carbon contracts underwritten by national governments could addressregulatory risk, lower financing costs and strengthen incentives for emission reductions at investment and operation stage. In this paper design options for project-based carbon contracts are assessed using an analytical model capturing risk aversion of investors with a meanvariance utility function. The model is also used to assess how a combination with grant support for innovative projects can minimize overall costs of innovation policy. Savings in financing costs are quantified using a stylized project finance cash flow analysis.

The recent low CO2 prices in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) have triggered a discussion whether the EU ETS needs to be adjusted. We study the effects of CO2 price floors and a price ceiling on the dynamic investment pathway of two interlinked electricity markets (loosely based on Great Britain, which already has introduced a price floor, and on Central Western Europe). Using an agent-based electricity market simulation with endogenous investment and a CO2 market (including banking), we analyse the cross-border effects of national policies as well as system-wide policy options.A common, moderate CO2 auction reserve price results in a more continuous decarbonisation pathway. This reduces CO2 price volatility and the occurrence of carbon shortage price periods, as well as the average cost to consumers. A price ceiling can shield consumers from extreme price shocks. These price restrictions do not cause a large risk of an overall emissions overshoot in the long run. A national price floor lowers the cost to consumers in the other zone; the larger the zone with the price floor, the stronger the effect. Price floors that are too high lead to inefficiencies in investment choices and to higher consumer costs.

The global energy system is undergoing a major transition, and in energy planning and decision-making across governments, industry and academia, models play a crucial role. Because of their policy relevance and contested nature, the transparency and open availability of energy models and data are of particular importance. Here we provide a practical how-to guide based on the collective experience of members of the Open Energy Modelling Initiative (Openmod). We discuss key steps to consider when opening code and data, including determining intellectual property ownership, choosing a licence and appropriate modelling languages, distributing code and data, and providing support and building communities. After illustrating these decisions with examples and lessons learned from the community, we conclude that even though individual researchers' choices are important, institutional changes are still also necessary for more openness and transparency in energy research., Energy Strategy Reviews, 19