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BORIS NEMTSOV: A TRUE RUSSIAN PATRIOT DAVID J. KRAMER It is hard to believe that a year has gone by since Boris Nemtsov was shot and killed just yards from [...]

This article describes a simulation that fulfills many of the goals of a scholar/apprentice model--one that requires a sustained period of time during which an apprentice practices a set of discipline-specific skills under the guidance of his or her mentor. Such an extended simulation differs from shorter exercises in several ways, such as the necessity of including numerous checkpoints for monitoring student progress and of utilizing objective and systematic assessment tools. In particular, students must know that they will be assessed on the basis of both group results and their individual contributions. The simulation discussed in this article pays explicit attention to these two issues--the importance of "deliverables" and the need for dual-pronged, objective assessment instruments--as well as to the desirability of coordinated college-wide instructional support. (Contains 1 figure, 2 tables, and 19 notes.)

Since Vladimir Putin took over the presidency, analysts have highlighted the large numbers of siloviki--those with experience in the military and security agencies--who have been recruited into government service. Two political scientists investigate this trend by reexamining previously published findings and using an original data set. Claims of the 'FSB-ization of power' under Putin and an underappreciated trend in elite formation under Putin--the increasing presence of business representatives in the government and society at large--are considered. The article examines the implications of its findings for Russia's future political development, particularly in terms of stability and democracy.

Globalization has sparked renewed interest in the diffusion of ideas and norms across boundaries. Although much work has focused on diffusion at the macro-level and on the groups that transmit ideas, few researchers have studied the cognitive processes of political elites as they weigh the merits of various foreign-inspired models. Drawing on a series of original, in-depth interviews with Russian parliamentarians and high-ranking bureaucrats conducted in 1996, this paper makes two contributions to the study of individual-level borrowing in the Russian context. First, the openness of Russian elites to foreign borrowing is investigated; despite the public rhetoric about Russia's uniqueness, a substantial number of Russian elites are willing to borrow from foreign experience--particularly from models of European welfare capitalism. Second, three explanations of why policy-makers prefer to emulate some countries rather than others are tested--because they are similar to their own country either geographically, historically or culturally (comparability); because they have geostrategic prominence (prestige); or because they excel economically and/or politically (performance). Comparability and prestige are found to be of lesser importance than performance to Russian elites when considering the merits of various foreign models. Given that Russia closely approximates a most-likely case for validating explanations stressing comparability, this suggests that the array of foreign ideas that could become part and parcel of Russia's transition process is probably wider than is usually assumed. It also implies that, in general, the regional dimension of diffusion plays a smaller role than previously theorized.

Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia. London and Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999, xii + 295 pp., $64.95 h/b, $24.95 p/b. THE FIRST IN A SERIES devoted to understanding the [...]

This article reviews the vast literature on Russia’s transformation into a “militocracy”—a state in which individuals with career experience in Russia’s various force structures occupy important positions throughout the polity and economy—during the reign of former KGB lieutenant colonel Vladimir Putin. We show that (1) elite militarization has been extensively utilized both to describe and explain core features of Russian foreign and domestic policy; and (2) notwithstanding its widespread usage, the militocracy framework rests on a rather thin, and in some cases flawed, body of empirical research. We close by discussing the remaining research agenda on this subject and listing several alternative theoretical frameworks to which journalists and policymakers arguably should pay equal or greater attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dominant paradigm for understanding contemporary Russia holds that Vladimir Putin's tenure in office has been accompanied by a massive influx of former KGB and military personnel - so-called "siloviki" - into positions of power and authority throughout the polity and economy. Claims of extensive elite militarization, however, are largely based on the analyses of only one research program and, moreover, the validity of the estimates produced by that research program is open to question on numerous grounds. In this article, we review existing research on elite militarization in Russia; discuss a series of conceptual and empirical issues that need to be resolved if valid and meaningful estimation of military-security representation is to be achieved; introduce new findings; and evaluate the totality of existing evidence regarding whether the Russian state under Putin deserves to be labeled a militocracy. We find that the most straightforward reading of existing data indicates that the percentage of siloviki in the political elite during Putin's first two terms as president was approximately half of that which has been widely reported in both scholarship and the media, and also declined during the Medvedev presidency. In addition, our analysis of a broader cross section of the elite estimates military-security representation during the Putin presidency to have been lower still. Overall, existing data paint a less alarming picture of the depths to which siloviki have penetrated the corridors of power since 2000 than has been commonly portrayed and thereby cast doubt on Russia's status as an "FSB state." On the other hand, past trends also provide some basis for expecting that the numbers of siloviki will once again rise during Putin's current presidential term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]