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Since its introduction, self-concept clarity has been viewed as a construct related to the structure and organization of a person's self-concept. We argue, however, that self-concept clarity may best be understood as a combination of subjective, metacognitive beliefs about the self-concept and objective structure and organization. We consider the unique influences of both objective and subjective clarity and offer some suggestions and novel hypotheses for investigating this proposed distinction.

Grandiose and vulnerable narcissism share some core features (e.g., entitlement, self-absorption) but differ in other important ways (e.g., self-esteem). To reconcile these differing characteristics, we predicted that differences in perceived agency mediate the association between narcissistic subtypes and differences in self-esteem. One hundred college students completed self-report measures of grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, explicit global self-esteem, and perceived agency. As predicted, grandiose narcissism was positively associated with agency and self-esteem, whereas vulnerable narcissism was negatively associated with agency and self-esteem. Perceived agency also mediated the associations between each narcissistic subtype and self-esteem. Furthermore, a partial correlation showed that when controlling for agency, the previously null correlation between measures of grandiose and vulnerable narcissism became significantly positive. These findings indicate that agency serves as a primary differentiator between the narcissistic subtypes.

The purpose of this research is to better illuminate a vulnerable narcissist's daily emotional life, targeting the experiences of shame, anger, and emotion regulation. Participants completed self-report questionnaires before writing an essay on their adjustment to college. After being randomly assigned to receive either satisfactory or unsatisfactory feedback, participants rated the quality of their own essay performance, reported their current emotions, and completed extra process measures to assess what they were thinking during the study. Feedback which disconfirmed vulnerable narcissists' self-reported performance ratings led to greater emotionality. Furthermore, vulnerable narcissists' intention to regulate their emotions, specifically their attempts to disqualify the importance of interpersonal feedback, ultimately led to greater shame. Conceptual and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

This research investigated the hypothesis that intellectual competence is chronically accessible to individuals who question their own intellectual competence, despite their own uncertainty on this dimension, and that they rely on intellectual competence in forming impressions of and thinking about others. In two studies, we show that doubtful individuals are more likely to use traits related to intellectual competence to describe others and these traits more strongly affect their overall impressions of others. These findings support recent approaches to accessibility by showing that a self-relevant trait may be chronically accessible to an individual even in the face of uncertainty regarding one's standing on the trait. The findings also contribute to the understanding of the phenomenology of self-doubt.

The present research examines how self-concept clarity moderates the impact of feedback about one's self-knowledge. A preliminary study shows that individuals with higher clarity expect the process of defining who they are to be easier than those with lower clarity. Two experiments then test the effect of self-concept clarity on the experience of self-elaboration under conditions of either doubt or confidence. The results suggest that people with higher self-concept clarity show greater differences in self-evaluations based on whether their experience of describing the self is nested within ease and confidence or difficulty and doubt. We suggest that this effect may be a result of the different expectations high- and low-clarity individuals have for the task of describing the self.

The prevalence of entertainment media in everyday life might offer unexpected social opportunities. The present paper examined whether cognitive overlap with the character and self-expansion occur as a result of exposure to fictional characters. Results of two studies indicated that transportation into a narrative leads to greater cognitive overlap with the character and perceived self-expansion. Providing a distinction between these two concepts, we found that cognitive overlap with the character increases to the extent the character represents one's actual self-guide; perceived self-expansion increases to the extent the character represents one's ideal self-guide. Together, these findings illustrate the nature of parasocial relationships and impact of entertainment media on the self.

People often look to others for guidance when selecting narrative entertainment. Previous work has demonstrated that this social guidance forms the basis of people’s expectations and subsequently affects people’s experience. The current work extends previous research by exploring the influence of peer evaluations of a story, on enjoyment of and psychological transportation in the written narrative. In two experiments, participants read peer evaluations prior to reading the story. Results of Experiment 1 revealed that social influence guides readers’ expectations, attention to elements in the narrative, reported enjoyment, and feelings of transportation in the narrative. This influence was particularly apparent when readers were given unfavorable reviews of the stimulus. In the second experiment, readers were given peer evaluations that were either confirmed or disconfirmed by other readers. Results indicated that valence of peer evaluations influenced both transportation and enjoyment. Additionally, inconsistent evaluations increased feelings of transportation, but consistency alone had no effect on reported enjoyment. Implications for social media experiences and future directions in research on entertainment media are discussed.

Three studies tested whether self-doubt stems more from the absence of a strong desired self or the presence of a strong undesired self. Across studies, participants completed individual difference measures and then imagined a desired, neutral, or undesired possible self and completed strength measures for the imagined possible self. As predicted, compared to low self-doubt participants, high self-doubt participants reported less confidence in imagined desired selves and were slower to respond to desired self-consistent terms; however, they did not differ on explicit (confidence) or implicit (response speed) strength measures for imagined neutral or undesired selves. Moreover, the weaker desired selves imagined by high self-doubt participants predicted lower performance (compared to low self-doubt participants) on a final achievement test. Finally, the interactive effect of self-doubt and imagery on performance held after controlling for self-esteem and self-concept clarity but, consistent with predictions, was mediated by strength of the possible self.

Typically, people rate enhancement needs as more important than security needs to their well-being. Two studies tested whether event valence and prior trauma moderate relative need importance. Traumatized (hurricane survivors) and non-traumatized (control) participants recalled the most “distressing” (security-relevant) or “satisfying” (enhancement-relevant) event they had recently experienced and rated the importance of 10 needs in defining the event. In both studies, event valence moderated relative need importance on explicit (salience) and implicit (affect) measures as enhancement needs were more important for enhancement-relevant (satisfying) events whereas security needs were more important for security-relevant (distressing) events. However, results also suggest that differences in traumatic experience across samples moderated the effect of event valence on relative need importance. Unlike non-traumatized (control) participants, traumatized (hurricane survivors) participants did not reassign greater importance to enhancement over security needs when event valence shifted to enhancement-relevant (satisfying) memories. We close by discussing implications for human motivation.

Two studies explored how and when people abandon commitment to threatened possible selves. First, we predicted that self-doubt, anxiety, and expectancy changes will mediate the effect of threats on possible selves. Specifically, the rising anxiety evoked by threats transforms initial doubt into the ultimate fall of expectancies supporting commitment to possible selves. Second, we predicted that this general process of downward self-revision would be more likely to occur when threats fully specify the meaning, or implications, of an undesired discrepancy (i.e., into the vivid prospect of an alternative undesired self as more likely than the desired self if the person continues to pursue the desired self). Results across both studies support the hypotheses. We close by discussing the conceptual and practical implications of the findings.

Lack of effort is a common index of self-handicapping. Yet, withholding effort is subject to a number of other interpretations. In two studies, we tested whether men would engage in effortful self-handicapping (practice more) and how this compares to effort withdrawal. When men believed that practice could be harmful to future performance, those high in trait self-handicapping were expected to behaviorally self-handicap by exerting effort. This prediction was confirmed in both a novel non-contingent-success setting (Study 1) and a more realistic contingent-success setting (Study 2). We suggest that to achieve a strong and clear indication of behavioral self-handicapping, researchers consider effort expenditure, as it is less susceptible to alternative explanations than effort withdrawal. Implications for refinements to self-handicapping theory are discussed.

Regulatory focus theory [Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 1–46). New York: Academic Press.] argues that concerns with growth and nurturance (i.e., a promotion focus) and concerns with safety and security (i.e., a prevention focus) produce different motives and perception. The current studies test whether regulatory focus also affects individuals’ strivings for self-evaluation. Specifically, we argue that a promotion or a prevention focus directs the self-evaluation process to self-esteem or self-certainty, respectively. Two studies supported this prediction by demonstrating that regulatory focus affects the strength of self-evaluation goals and individuals’ reactions to goal failure. In Study 1, we found that a promotion focus led to a stronger self-esteem goal (as measured by greater accessibility of esteem-related words), whereas a prevention focus led to a stronger self-certainty goal (as measured by greater accessibility of certainty-related words). In Study 2, a promotion failure led to lower self-esteem than a prevention failure, but a prevention failure led to lower self-certainty than a promotion failure. This research suggests an unrecognized role of nurturance and safety concerns in understanding the self-evaluation process.

Introduction and Overview. Part 1. Personal Security in Individual Contexts. Security and Uncertainty in Contemporary Delayed-Return Cultures: Coping with the Blockage of Personal Goals, K. van den Bos, I. McGregor, L. Martin. Being Threatened and Being a Threat Can Increase Reliance On Thoughts: A Self-Validation Approach, P. Brinol, K. G. DeMarree, R. E. Petty. Psychological Insecurity and Leadership Styles, C. Schoel, D. Stahlberg, C. Sedikides. The Psychology of Defensiveness: An Integrative Security System Model of Attachment, Self-esteem, and Worldviews, J. Hart. Part I Commentary, C. Holbrook, D. Fessler. Part 2. Personal Security in Interpersonal Contexts. Narcissism and Protection Against Social Threat, S.D. Freis, A.A. Brown, R.M. Arkin. Regulating Relationship Security of Chronically Insecure Partners, E. Lemay. An Attachment Perspective on Personal Security, M. Milkulincer, P.R. Shaver. Attachment Security and Prosociality: Dynamics, Underlying Mechanisms, and Implications, O. Gillath, G. Karantzas. A Goal Circumplex Model of Security Strivings in Social and Cultural Context, K. Tomczyk, B. Yu, X. Zhou. Ostracism Threatens Personal Security: A Temporal Need Threat Framework, E. D. Wesselmann, A. Hales, D. Ren, K. D. Williams. Part II Commentary, M. Clark, K. Von Culin, J. Hirsch. Part 3. Personal Security in Cultural and Health Contexts. Security Seeking in a Regulatory Focus Whodunit: The Case of the Relative Orientation in Behavioral Economics, G. Leonardelli, V. Bohns, J. Gu. Achieving Existential Security through Symbolically Fusing Secular and Religious Sources of Control and Order, A. Kay, S. Shepherd, R. Eibach. Responding to Psychological Threats with Deliberate Ignorance: Causes and Remedies, J. Shepperd, J. Howell. Uncertainty in Healthcare: A Multi-Level Approach, S. Andrews, K. Sweeny. Part III Commentary, A.J. Rothman, A. K. Farrell, L. Auster-Gussman. Part 4. Interdisciplinary Analyses of Personal Security. "Fear Appeals" and Security in American Foreign Relations, C. Fettweis. Terrorism, Personal Security, and Responsible Policy Making, J. Mueller, M.G. Stewart. Secure in Their Beliefs: Personal Security, the Quest for Personal Significance, and the Psychology of Extremism, A. Kruglanski, N. Schori-Eyal. Ecology and Evolution of Personal Security: Adaptive Interdependence of the Individual and the Collective, R. Sagarin. Part IV Commentary, T. Kolditz, J. Lovelace.

Four studies explored whether perceived implicit theories (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995) of others have the potential to engender self-doubt and influence one's self-attributions. Study 1 showed that people are aware of the attributional implications of evaluators' implicit theories. Study 2 showed that people can use social cues to detect evaluators' implicit theories. In Study 3, participants who believed that significant others endorsed an entity theory of intelligence exhibited greater self-doubt and made attributions for their own outcomes that were more stable (for negative events) and global (for negative and positive events). Finally, in Study 4, a manipulation of evaluators' implicit theories interacted with performance expectations to predict self-doubt about an upcoming evaluative situation. Compared to their counterparts with incremental evaluators, participants with entity evaluators reported greater self-doubt when they expected to do poorly and less self-doubt when they expected to do well. Di...

Research on American students has indicated that a subjective overachiever strives to attain outstanding performance but is also chronically plagued by self-doubt. The present investigation compared Chinese college students in Hong Kong and Singapore to their Caucasian American counterparts in an attempt to examine the similarities and differences in subjective overachievement across cultures. Results supported the relevance of the subjective achievement experience in different cultures but also revealed important differences. Compared to American participants, Chinese participants showed more ambivalence about the benefits of failure, and they manifested higher levels of self-doubt as well as the tendency to discount ability under conditions of effort exertion. These cross-cultural differences persisted after controlling for individual differences in self-construals.

Self-report distributions of self-evaluations are proposed to convey information beyond unidimensional (e.g., Likert-type) measures. Two studies tested the hypothesis that the shape of a distribution-type measure of self-evaluation of intellectual ability, as well as the central tendency and variability, is a meaningful indicator of individual differences. Specifically, one correlational study showed that measures of central tendency, variability, and skew were uniquely associated with self-ratings of ability level, self-certainty, and implicit theories of intelligence, respectively. An experiment explored the finding that incremental theorists (Dweck, 1999) reported more negatively skewed distributions than entity theorists. Only incremental theorists who wrote essays about recent intellectual growth created negatively skewed distributions; entity theorists did not. Evidence supports the hypotheses that self-report distributions are multiply informative and idiographic measures of self-evaluation, that negative skew on intellectual ability distributions can represent perceptions of growth, and that incremental theorists typically take this perspective when evaluating their own intellectual ability.

Three studies tested the hypothesis that people may turn to materialism when they face uncertainties in modern life. Study 1 showed that anomie and self-doubt are significant predictors of materialistic orientations; other plausible antecedents have less predictive value. In Study 2, participants experiencing chronic self-doubt showed a higher level of materialism if they were primed to experience doubt and insecurity. In Study 3, participants with chronic perceptions of anomie showed a higher level of materialism if they were primed with the concept of normlessness. Together, these three studies show that some people turn to materialism when they experience uncertainty within the self (self-doubt) or perceive uncertainty relating to society (anomie). © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The impact on self-esteem of activating self-doubt was investigated in three studies. Individuals with enduring high self-doubt were expected to be more threatened by an experimental induction of self-doubt (modeled on the ease of retrieval paradigm) than individuals low in enduring self-doubt, and their self-esteem was predicted to decline. The predictions were supported when self-esteem was measured postexperimentally (Experiment 1) and when it was measured both pre- and postexperimentally (Experiment 2). There was no comparable loss in self-esteem for individuals low in self-doubt. A third experiment explored the phenomenology of low-self-doubt individuals and replicated the finding that their level of self-esteem was unaffected by the induction designed to produce doubt.

Despite keen interest in the construct of narcissism, the field of personality and social psychology has lacked a comprehensive framework under which to fit together the relevant empirical bits and pieces. Morf and Rhodewalt's target article takes an admirable first step toward remedying this deficiency. Morf and Rhodewalt's (this issue) conceptualization of narcissism brings the construct to life. These authors have moved the empirical focus beyond the psychometric, trait-like properties of the construct and into its dynamic, regulatory utility. How do narcissists navigate the troubled waters of everyday life? How do narcissists regulate their psychological functioning at both the intrapersonal and interpersonal level? In the spirit of Morf and Rhodewalt's thinking, we approach the narcissistic self from a motivational perspective. We wonder about the motives that guide the evaluation of the narcissistic self. What do narcissists want to know about themselves, and what do they make of this knowledge? To what extent do they accept or reject feedback about themselves? If they reject feedback, why do they do so and at what cost? We argue that narcissists, compared to nonnarcissists, have both motivational surfeits and motivational deficits. Four motives have been identified and documented in the self-evaluation literature (Sedikides, 1993; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). These are self-enhancement (the motive to protect and elevate the positivity of the self), self-verification (the motive to validate cherished self-views), self-assessment (the motive to gain accurate knowledge about the self), and self-improvement (the motive to better aspects of the self). For the purposes of this commentary, we draw attention to how two of the above-mentioned motives bifurcate. First, the self-enhancement motive divides into an enhancement motive (striving to increase the positivity of the self-concept-an approach orientation) and a protection motive (striving to decrease the negativity of the self-concept-an avoidance orientation). Enhancement and protection may have distinct correlates and consequences, as recent research on self-esteem (Rhodewalt, Morf, Hazlett, & Fairfield, 1991; Tice, 1991) and achievement motivation (Elliot & Church, 1997) suggests. Second, self-verification divides into positive verification (confirming positive self-views) and negative verification (confirming negative self-views; Pemberton & Sedikides, 2001). Given that the enhancement motive is difficult to distinguish empirically from the positive-verification motive (what Morf and Rhodewalt call "self-affirmation"), we refer to them jointly as enhancement-positive verification. As Morf and Rhodewalt amply document (see also Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, in press), narcissists have a seemingly unlimited supply of the enhancement-positive verification motive. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to state that this motive must subjectively feel like an internal geyser to the narcissist, welling up within them, to be released in practically all forms of intraand interpersonal regulation. Narcissists make no apologies for their claims of superiority. They adore their self-image, are hopelessly self-centered in their craving for attention and admiration, and feel deserving of unlimited praise. They regard themselves as preeminent persons, brilliant supernovas in a dark social universe populated by inferior peers. Others simply cannot match their celestial brilliance. A surfeit of the enhancement-positive verification motive is one way in which the motivational system of narcissists differs from that of nonnarcissists. Unfortunately for them, narcissists must also live in the real social world, a world that provides them with feedback that is not uniformly positive. Indeed, the feedback that narcissists receive follows a pattern of progressive disenchantment. In the initial interaction encounters, narcissists receive favorable feedback: They give off the impression of being confident, engaging, clever, and full of life. Alas, this impression evaporates rapidly. Before long (indeed, by the seventh weekly interaction; Paulhus, 1998), narcissists are perceived as shameless braggarts, conceited, uninteresting, and hostile. Such attributes do not boost anyone's bid for public office (Leary, Bednarski, Hammon, & Duncan, 1997). Perceivers smarten up, see through narcissists, and realize that narcissists are full of themselves rather than full of life. Initial attraction gives way to eventual repulsion. Narcissists start to reap the dire consequences of their own behavior: They receive increasingly unfavorable feedback. Perceivers are likely to express their dislike for narcissists in both indirect and direct ways. They cease to pay attention to them, become frugal with their expressions of admiration, start to avoid and distance themselves from narcissists (e.g., gaze aversion at professional meetings, noninclusion at social gatherings), spread unflattering gossip about them, and (if push comes to shove) openly tell the narcissists what they think of them. Inevitably, the narcissists must come face-to-face with recalcitrant real

A. E. Kelly's (2000) thesis that psychotherapy clients benefit from withholding negative information is considered in light of current social-psychological theory and research. Positive illusions about oneself are associated with indexes of mental health; this is consistent with treating therapy as positive identity development. Self-presentation can shape self-concept, even apart from the feedback that an audience might provide; the social construction of identity is a powerful process, suggesting that withholding negative and presenting only positive information is adaptive. However, evidence concerning the level of identification of one's actions suggests complexities in understanding ways clients might deal with disclosing negative information; the authors argue that the impact on self-concept is probably more complex than A. E. Kelly's characterization and that the implications are of a broader scope than indicated so far.

This Handbook explores the cognitive, motivational, interpersonal, clinical, and applied aspects of personal uncertainty. It showcases both the diversity and the unity that defines contemporary perspectives on uncertainty in self within social and personality psychology. The contributions to the volume are all written by distinguished scholars in personality, social psychology, and clinical psychology united by their common focus on the causes and consequences of self-uncertainty. Chapters explore the similarities and differences between personal uncertainty and other psychological experiences in terms of their nature and relationship with human thought, emotion, motivation, and behavior. Specific challenges posed by personal uncertainty and the coping strategies people develop in their daily life are identified. There is an assessment of the potential negative and positive repercussions of coping with the specific experience of self-uncertainty, including academic, health, and relationship outcomes. Throughout, strategies specifically designed to assist others in confronting the unique challenges posed by self-uncertainty in ways that emphasize healthy psychological functioning and growth are promoted. In addition, the contributions to the Handbook touch on the psychological, social, and cultural context of the new millennium, including concepts such as Friedman’s "flat world," confidence, the absence of doubt in world leaders, the threat of terrorism since 9/11, the arts, doubt and religious belief, and views of doubt as the universal condition of humankind. The Handbook is an invaluable resource for researchers, practitioners, and senior undergraduate and graduate students in social and personality psychology, clinical and counseling psychology, educational psychology, and developmental psychology.

Although prior research has documented a pervasive egocentric bias in the self-perceptions, self-ascriptions, and behaviors of most people, shy individuals seem not to share this bias. This study examined whether the apparent absence of an egocentric bias among shy individuals is reflected in their excuse making following poor performance. It also examined whether anticipating a challenge to one's excuses would dissuade even nonshy individuals from making excuses. Shy and nonshy subjects received either success or failure feedback on an intelligence test and then were or were not told that they would be retested. Consistent with predictions, shy individuals refrained from making consistency-lowering excuses regardless of performance feedback and retest instructions. By contrast, nonshy subjects made consistency-lowering excuses after failure feedback, but only when they expected that their excuses would go unchallenged by a retest.

A strategy related to self-handicapping in which individuals supply a comparison other with a performance advantage rather than handicap their own performance was investigated in two experiments. In Experiment 1 greater other-enhancement was found among men than among women. In addition, men engaged in the most other-enhancement when expecting that their performance would be compared with that of a coparticipant. In Experiment 2 the hypothesis that subjects would facilitate their coparticipant's performance primarily under conditions of uncertainty and competition was supported. A defining feature of contemporary Western society is the extraordinary emphasis placed on achievement and success. Striving for success seems to pervade every aspect of human interaction from the classroom, to the playing field, to the corporate boardroom. This emphasis on achievement and success suggests that people might make every effort to ensure possession of the necessary resources to maximize performance. Individuals would be expected to reach for any and every advantage to facilitate performance, including eliminating obstacles or disabilities that might interfere with success. Nevertheless, recent research shows that individuals are sometimes willing to create impediments to performance, making failure more likely. Berglas and Jones (1978) labeled this intriguing finding "self-handicapping."

Research across various disciplines has demonstrated that social exclusion has devastating psychological, emotional, and behavioral consequences. Excluded individuals are therefore motivated to affiliate with others, even though they may not have the resources, cognitive or otherwise, to do so. The current research explored whether nonconscious mimicry of other individuals—a low-cost, low-risk, automatic behavior—might help excluded individuals address threatened belongingness needs. Experiment 1 demonstrated that excluded people mimic a subsequent interaction partner more than included people do. Experiment 2 showed that individuals excluded by an in-group selectively (and nonconsciously) mimic a confederate who is an in-group member more than a confederate who is an out-group member. The relationship between exclusion and mimicry suggests that there are automatic behaviors people can use to recover from the experience of being excluded. In addition, this research demonstrates that nonconscious mimicry is selective and sensitive to context.

The regulation of affiliation patterns in everyday life has important implications for subjective well-being. For instance, Cheek & Buss (1981) distinguished approach (sociability) motivation from avoidance tendencies (shyness) and found that individuals high in both traits experienced the most stilted and uncomfortable interaction in comparison to any other trait combination among dyad members. In the present field study, participants were free to self-regulate their social interaction in any way. Meaningful patterns of initiation of encounters, perceptions of the encounter and objective features of the encounter emerged. The pattern of findings suggests that further research on the self-regulation of affective life, through affiliation patterns, would be productive.

We discuss the construct of doubt about one's competence and suggest that doubt can have myriad consequences (e.g., self-handicapping, defensive pessimism). We focus on the effect of self-doubt when it is combined with a concern with performance and assert that this combination leads to the phenomenon of subjective overachievement. In two studies, we present a new 17-item Subjective Overachievement Scale (SOS), which includes two independent subscales measuring individual differences in self-doubt and concern with performance. The first study, consisting of two large samples (Ns = 2,311 and 1,703), provides evidence that the scale has high internal consistency and a clear two-factor structure. Additionally, the subscales have adequate test-retest reliability (Ns = 67 and 115). A second study reveals that the SOS has good convergent and discriminant validity. Both subscales are unrelated to social desirability but exhibit the predicted patterns of associations with other related constructs. The Concern with Performance Subscale is correlated with achievement motivation, whereas the Self-Doubt Subscale is correlated with scales assessing negative affectivity (e.g., self-esteem, social anxiety) and other self-related strategies associated with concerns about one's competence (e.g., self-handicapping, defensive pessimism, impostor phenomenon). The SOS, which combines the two subscales, appears to tap a unique strategy that individuals may use to deal with doubts about their own competence.

(2006). Security in the Aftermath of 9/11. Basic and Applied Social Psychology: Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 289-290.