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In recent non-international armed conflicts in countries such as the Central African Republic, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, various non-State armed groups (NSAGs) have exercised control over territory and people living therein. In many cases, and for a variety of reasons, NSAGs perform some form of governance in these territories, which can include the maintenance of order or the provision of justice, health care, or social services. The significance of such measures became particularly apparent when in 2020 not only governments but also armed groups took steps to halt the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This article examines key legal issues that arise in these contexts. First, it analyzes the extent to which international humanitarian law protects the life and dignity of persons living under the control of NSAGs, rebutting doubts as to whether this field of international law has a role in regulating what is sometimes called "rebel governance". Second, it provides a brief overview of aspects of the lives of people in armed group-controlled territory that are addressed by international humanitarian law and aspects that instead fall into the realm of human rights law. Third, the article discusses whether and to what extent human rights law can be said to bind NSAGs as a matter of law and flags issues that need further attention in current and future debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of cyber operations during armed conflicts and the question of how international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to such operations have developed significantly over the past two decades. In their different roles in the Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the authors of this article have followed these developments closely and have engaged in governmental and non-governmental expert discussions on the subject. In this article, we analyze pertinent humanitarian, legal and policy questions. We first show that the use of cyber operations during armed conflict has become a reality of armed conflicts and is likely to be more prominent in the future. This development raises a number of concerns in today's increasingly cyber-reliant societies, in which malicious cyber operations risk causing significant disruption and harm to humans. Secondly, we present a brief overview of multilateral discussions on the legal and normative framework regulating cyber operations during armed conflicts, looking in particular at various arguments around the applicability of IHL to cyber operations during armed conflict and the relationship between IHL and the UN Charter. We emphasize that in our view, there is no question that cyber operations during armed conflicts, or cyber warfare, are regulated by IHL – just as is any weapon, means or methods of warfare used by a belligerent in a conflict, whether new or old. Thirdly, we focus the main part of this article on how IHL applies to cyber operations. Analyzing the most recent legal positions of States and experts, we revisit some of the most salient debates of the past decade, such as which cyber operations amount to an "attack" as defined in IHL and whether civilian data enjoys similar protection to "civilian objects". We also explore the IHL rules applicable to cyber operations other than attacks and the special protection regimes for certain actors and infrastructure, such as medical facilities and humanitarian organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Answering the question of whether international law prohibits sexual violence by armed groups against child soldiers in their own ranks should be straightforward: it is prohibited. However, as seen in recent cases before the International Criminal Court (ICC), this is not necessarily the case. The present article critically discusses two approaches suggested in ICC jurisprudence, namely prosecuting sexual violence against children as constitutive of the war crime of 'using [children] to participate actively in hostilities' (Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the ICC Statute), or directly as the war crime of 'committing rape [or] sexual slavery' (Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the ICC Statute). First, it is shown that prosecuting sexual violence under the crime of using children to participate actively in hostilities is unconvincing. Abusing children for sexual purposes does not fall under the scope of active participation in hostilities. If it did, this could have the unintended consequence of depriving children of their civilian status and protection under other provisions of the ICC Statute and international humanitarian law (IHL). Second, it is argued that in the Ntaganda case the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) circumvented the question of whether and to what extent children may generally lose their civilian status and protection under IHL if they become member of a party's armed forces. If children join armed groups or armed forces, the questions arise whether IHL addresses intra-party violence, and under what conditions such violence can be prosecuted as a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In February zoia, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic found that opposition groups fighting against the Assad regime are bound by human rights obligations constituting peremptoly norms of international law. This finding is innovative for two reasons. First, human rights obligations apply generally to the vertical relation between States and their subjects. Second, whereas is seems accepted that non-state armed groups can have human rights obligations when they control territoly, the Commission of Inquiry was unable to confirm that Syrian opposition forces exercised such control over territory. This article examines whether the finding that non-state armed groups are bound by peremptory human rights norms is supported by contemporary international law. Moreover, recent trends in the practice of the United Nations with regard to human rights obligations of non-state actors will be analysed. Even though this article argues that non-state armed groups can have human rights obligations in other situations of violence, it points out particular challenges to their practical application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]