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We investigate in-service teachers' reasons for trust and distrust in educational research compared to research in general. Building on previous research on a so-called "smart but evil" stereotype regarding educational researchers, three sets of confirmatory hypotheses were preregistered. First, we expected that teachers would emphasize expertise--as compared with benevolence and integrity--as a stronger reason for trust in educational researchers. Moreover, we expected that this pattern would not only apply to educational researchers, but that it would generalize to researchers in general. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the pattern could also be found in the general population. Following a pilot study aiming to establish the validity of our measures (German general population sample; N = 504), hypotheses were tested in an online study with N = 414 randomly sampled German in-service teachers. Using the Bayesian informative hypothesis evaluation framework, we found empirical support for five of our six preregistered hypotheses.

Fostering students' epistemic beliefs is key for achieving a more nuanced approach to psychological knowledge. The Bendixen-Rule model on epistemic change posits epistemic doubt (questioning one's prior epistemic beliefs), epistemic volition (the will to change one's beliefs) and resolution strategies (strategies to overcome epistemic doubt by epistemic change) as three interrelated process components that lead to the development of more advanced epistemic beliefs. However, while the model has risen to relative prominence over the last years, the postulated mechanisms of change still lack empirical backing. In this article, we report on an experimental study with N = 153 psychology students that aimed at testing the effects of two specific resolution strategies--reflection and social interaction. This was realized by developing intervention components that target the two strategies, and by analyzing these components' incremental effects on epistemic change. Results showed that reflection and social interaction might be promising strategies to address epistemic doubt. Psychology lecturers should thus give students room for reflecting on and discussing their beliefs once doubt has arisen.

In-service and preservice teachers are increasingly required to integrate research results into their classroom practice. However, due to their limited methodological background knowledge, they often cannot evaluate scientific evidence firsthand and instead must trust the sources on which they rely. In two experimental studies, we investigated the amount of this so-called epistemic trustworthiness (dimensions expertise, integrity, and benevolence) that student-teachers ascribe to the authors of texts who present classical research findings (e.g., learning with worked-out examples) that allegedly were written by a practitioner, an expert, or a scientist. Results from the first exploratory study suggest that student-teachers view scientists as "smart but evil," since they rate them as having substantially more expertise than practitioners, while also being less benevolent and lacking in integrity. Moreover, results from the exploratory study suggest that evaluativistic epistemic beliefs (beliefs about the nature of knowledge) predict epistemic trustworthiness. A preregistered conceptual replication study (Study 2) provided more evidence for the "smart but evil" stereotype. Further directions of research as well as implications for practice are discussed.

Background: Many interventions on epistemic beliefs (i.e., individual beliefs about knowledge and knowing) are based on Bendixen and Rule's "Integrative Model for Personal Epistemology Development." Empirically, however, the model is still insufficiently validated. This is especially true for its epistemic volition component -- a will or desire to actively change one's beliefs. Aims: To experimentally scrutinize the role of epistemic volition, we investigated (incremental) effects on epistemic change of an epistemic volition intervention.Sample412 psychology students enrolled at German universities completed the study. Methods: We employed a randomized pre-post design with three experimental groups that differed in the administered epistemic volition and resolvable controversies interventions. The purpose of the latter was to initiate an epistemic change process, thereby laying the foundation for the epistemic volition intervention. Both data collection and interventions were conducted online. In addition to self-report measures, we applied a complementary source evaluation task to analyse epistemic change. Results: Even though we found small- to medium-sized changes in epistemic beliefs, these changes did not differ between experimental conditions. Exploratory analyses suggested, however, that source evaluation task performance might have been promoted by the epistemic volition intervention and that -- across experimental groups -- manipulation check measures on both interventions interacted positively. Conclusion: Ultimately, we failed to separate the effects that our epistemic volition intervention had on epistemic change from these of the resolvable controversies intervention. Nonetheless, our study makes some strong contributions to -- and interconnects -- the growing bodies of research on epistemic change and multiple source use.

Perceived fit of students is one of the most prominent predictors of study success in higher education, but when assessed directly, it provides lots of room for interpretation for the respondents. This is also true for perceived demands-abilities fit (e.g. how do one's abilities fit with study demands), which has particularly high associations with study success. We, therefore, investigated (1) how students combine demands and abilities when asked about their perceived demands-abilities fit and (2) which demands and abilities they have in mind when asked about their perceptions of fit in an unspecific manner. We obtained data on the perceived fit of N = 595 university students from four German-speaking countries and analyzed them using response surface analysis. The results indicate that (1) perceived demands-abilities fit does not correspond to the congruence of perceived demands and perceived abilities when the latter two are measured separately, but rather reflects a strong linear effect of the abilities. Furthermore, they show that (2) the specific demands and abilities do not influence the way how demands and abilities are combined to a fit score, but that there are differences in the amount of explained variance between the specific demands and abilities. The results speak for a new interpretation of prior findings and challenge the contemporary understanding of perceived fit. For example, perceived fit and self-efficacy might be more closely associated than previously assumed. When striving to enhance perceived fit, practitioners should thus focus on fostering individual abilities and their perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When dealing with a health threat, health information seeking (HIS) is a prominent way of engagement coping. Yet, there is only limited research as to its motivational and emotion regulatory antecedents. We present a theoretical model integrating approach and avoidance motivation, emotion regulation, HIS self-efficacy, and problem and emotion coping focus as predictors of HIS. We propose that, in the context of HIS, (1) approach and avoidance motivation have a direct effect on emotion regulation ability (positive and negative, respectively), (2) approach and avoidance motivation have indirect effects on intended comprehensiveness of search via emotion regulation, HIS self-efficacy and problem coping focus, (3) avoidance motivation has a direct effect on emotion coping focus. Our model was tested by means of structural equation modeling in a sample of university students (N = 283). Model fit was good, and all three hypotheses were supported. We show that emotion regulation ability is essential to explain the effects of approach and avoidance motivation on HIS as it fosters self-efficacy and a problem coping focus. The direct effect of avoidance motivation on emotion focus may represent an alternative way of coping with a health threat for those individuals who are highly sensitive to threat-related emotions., Author(s): Anita Chasiotis [sup.1] , Oliver Wedderhoff [sup.1] , Tom Rosman [sup.1] , Anne-Kathrin Mayer [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.470177.2, 0000 0000 9054 7552, Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information, , [...]

The transition to higher education is a topic of concern for educators around the world. In fact, the shift to a more competitive educational environment can negatively impact students' academic self-concept, which, in turn, might lead to lower persistence and less adaptive educational decisions. To examine how psychology students adapt to the transition to such an environment, the present article examines changes in psychology entrants' academic self-concepts. A four-wave longitudinal study covering students' first three semesters was conducted. Since the transition to higher education implies that students compare themselves to a stronger reference group, we expected academic self-concept to decrease over time (i.e. a big fish little pond effect). Moreover, we expected secondary school grades, study grades and gender to moderate self-concept development. While we found no evidence for a big fish little pond effect, we found that study grades and gender indeed moderate self-concept development: while self-concept scores of students with better grades increased with time, the contrary occurred for students with lower grades. Moreover, females' self-concepts remained largely constant whereas those of men increased considerably over time. We conclude that, in terms of self-concept changes, psychology undergraduates seem to adapt rather well to the transition to higher education. Future research should investigate whether or not these findings are generalisable to other academic fields, especially to disciplines that attract students with a broader range of achievements.

Introduction: The present paper argues that adequate self-perceptions of academic ability are essential for students' realization of their intellectual potential, thereby fostering learning of complex skills, e.g., information-seeking skills. Thus, academic self-concept should moderate the relationship between intelligence and information literacy: a positive relationship between intelligence and information literacy is only expected for students with a high academic self-concept. It is expected that this moderator effect is mediated by students' effort: Whenever students recognise their actual deficits or strengths, they will invest more effort than if they are over- or under-confident. Method: Data were gathered in a quantitative field study with 137 psychology freshmen from the University of Trier, Germany. Measures included a standardised information literacy test, Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices test for fluid intelligence as well as standardised measures for students' academic self-concept and work avoidance tendencies. Analysis: Data was analysed through multiple regression analysis and tests for mediated moderation. Results. With regard to the hypothesised interaction effect, it was confirmed that a positive relation between intelligence and information literacy solely exists for students with a high academic self-concept. A high academic self-concept may even be detrimental for information literacy when paired with a low intelligence. These effects were partially mediated by students' tendency for work avoidance. Conclusions: Our findings corroborate that adequate self-perceptions of academic abilities are a basic requirement for information-seeking skills. Hence, we emphasise a need for ability-tailored information literacy training paired with performance feedback to foster realistic self-perceptions. [This paper was published in: "Proceedings of ISIC: The Behaviour Conference" (Leeds, England, Sep 2-5, 2014), Part 2, Paper isic34.]

In one exploratory study (N = 985) and one preregistered study (N = 1100), we investigated whether trust in science influences belief change on a medico-scientific issue when laypersons are confronted with scientific evidence. Moreover, we tested whether individuals with high trust in science trust science "blindly," meaning that their trust in a scientific claim's source prevents them from adequately evaluating the claim itself. Participants read eight fictitious studies on the efficacy of acupuncture, which were experimentally manipulated regarding direction (evidence favoring acupuncture vs diverging evidence) and quality (high vs low; only Study 2). Acupuncture-related beliefs were measured before and after reading. Moderator and mediator analyses showed that the magnitude of belief change indeed depends on trust in science. Furthermore, we found that people with high trust in science are better able to evaluate the quality of scientific studies, which, in turn, protects them from being influenced by low-quality evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The "cognitive incongruity model of epistemic beliefs and emotions" states that if students' beliefs about the nature of knowledge (e.g., knowledge as simple and absolute) are incompatible with the epistemic nature of learning materials (e.g., complex and contradictory), cognitive incongruity arises. This, in turn, entails negative emotional consequences. Aims: The epistemic nature of contradictory learning materials might be perceived differently depending on whether individuals resolve the contradictions or not. Therefore, extending the cognitive incongruity model, the present paper argues that cognitive (in)congruity also depends on how individuals act on the learning materials. We expect that only if students resolve contradictory scientific claims (e.g., by identifying moderators), more advanced epistemic beliefs (e.g., evaluativism) have positive emotional effects and vice versa. Sample: A field-experimental study with N = 86 undergraduate psychology students was conducted. Method: Using a multiple-texts approach, participants were first presented controversial evidence on gender stereotyping from 18 different (fictional) studies. In contrast to similar multiple-texts approaches, all contradictions could be resolved by identifying the contextual factors that a certain type of stereotype discrimination occurs in ('resolvable controversies'). After reading, the experimental group was asked to resolve the contradictions, whereas two control groups read the same texts, but were not required to resolve the controversies. Results: Results revealed that absolute beliefs positively and evaluativistic beliefs negatively predict negative emotions, but only if students were instructed to resolve the contradictions. Conclusions: Our results suggest that extending the cognitive incongruity model by how students deal with controversial learning materials might be worthwhile.

In this study, we draw on person-environment fit theory to analyze whether academic success is best explained by individual abilities subjectively "exceeding" situational demands or by abilities "matching" the demands. Moreover, we disentangled effects of perceived abilities and subjective person-environment (P-E) fit on academic success. All in all, 693 teacher education students participated in an online questionnaire. Students were asked to rate general requirements of their academic programs (e.g., self-discipline) on a 5-point scale in terms of (1) their own abilities and (2) the perceived relevance for their studies. P-E fit was determined by difference scores between abilities and relevance ratings. Academic success was assessed by grades, perceived performance, and study satisfaction. Data were analyzed through structural equation modeling and suggest that academic success is best explained by a match between abilities and demands. Moreover, all three criteria for academic success were more strongly related to subjective fit than to subjective abilities.

The present article investigates the effects of epistemic beliefs (i.e. beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing) on the effectiveness of information literacy instruction (i.e. instruction on how to search for scholarly information in academic settings). We expected psychology students with less sophisticated beliefs (especially multiplicistic students viewing psychological knowledge as inherently subjective) not to recognize the value of differentiated information searches and of the respective instructional courses. In a first intervention study with 67 psychology students, multiplicism was shown to reduce information-seeking skills students gain throughout the intervention. In a second intervention study with 64 psychology students, students with higher multiplicistic beliefs subjectively benefited less from the information searches carried out during instruction (in terms of reduced increases in subjective topic-specific knowledge). In conclusion, we recommend including elements from epistemic belief instruction into information literacy instruction.

Lay readers' trust in scientific texts can be shaped by perceived text easiness and scientificness. The two effects seem vital in a time of rapid science information sharing, yet have so far only been examined separately. A preregistered online study was conducted to assess them jointly, to probe for author and text trustworthiness overlap, and to investigate interindividual influences on the effects. N = 1467 lay readers read four short research summaries, with easiness and scientificness (high vs low) being experimentally varied. A more scientific writing style led to higher perceived author and text trustworthiness. Higher personal justification belief, lower justification by multiple-sources belief, and lower need for cognitive closure attenuated the influence of scientificness on trustworthiness. However, text easiness showed no influence on trustworthiness and no interaction with text scientificness. Implications for future studies and suggestions for enhancing the perceived trustworthiness of research summaries are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Particularly in higher education, not only a view of science as a means of finding absolute truths (absolutism), but also a view of science as generally tentative (multiplicism) can be unsophisticated and obstructive for learning. Most quantitative epistemic belief inventories neglect this and understand epistemic sophistication as disagreement with absolute statements. Aims: This article suggests considering absolutism and multiplicism as separate dimensions. Following our understanding of epistemic sophistication as a cautious and reluctant endorsement of both positions, we assume evaluativism (a contextually adaptive view of knowledge as personally constructed and evidence-based) to be reflected by low agreement with both generalized absolute and generalized multiplicistic statements. Samples: Three studies with a total sample size of N = 416 psychology students were conducted. Methods: A domain-specific inventory containing both absolute and multiplicistic statements was developed. Expectations were tested by exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and correlational analyses. Results: Results revealed a two-factor solution with an absolute and a multiplicistic factor. Criterion validity of both factors was confirmed. Cross-sectional analyses revealed that agreement to generalized multiplicistic statements decreases with study progress. Moreover, consistent with our understanding of epistemic sophistication as a reluctant attitude towards generalized epistemic statements, evidence for a negative relationship between epistemic sophistication and need for cognitive closure was found. Conclusions: We recommend including multiplicistic statements into epistemic belief questionnaires and considering them as a separate dimension, especially when investigating individuals in later stages of epistemic development (i.e., in higher education).

This article examines the significance of information literacy self-assessments in higher education with a special focus on situational conditions increasing their explanatory power. First, it was hypothesised that self-assessments of information literacy correlate higher with factual information literacy if measured after the administration of information search tasks (and tests) due to the intrinsic feedback associated with their completion. Furthermore, it was assumed that self-assessments measured after the administration of information search tasks explain incremental variance over standardised information literacy tests in information search performance. A study with N = 82 German psychology students was carried out to verify these assumptions. Information literacy self-efficacy (as one form of self-assessment), as well as the PIKE-P information literacy test and several standardised information search tasks, was included in the test battery. As both assumptions were largely supported, we recommend that researchers complement their test batteries by self-assessments but warn them against relying primarily on this method. We further recommend that self-assessments should take place at the end of testing.