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The aim of this study was to investigate whether 2018 FIFA World Cup (FWC) consumers would engage in political consumerism to reduce a perceived dissonance between host country (Russia) brand image and FWC brand attributes. Literature has associated Russia-hosted sport mega-events (SME) with violations of human rights. Drawing on cognitive dissonance theory, we investigate UK consumers (n = 417) on their perceptions about Russia's brand image (cognitive and affective attributes) and FWC brand attributes before and after the event. Online questionnaires were used to collect data, which were analyzed via covariance-based structural equation modeling. Findings showed that intentions did not differ from behaviors of political consumerism toward 2018 FWC products. Lower evaluations of affective host image attributes led to more political consumerism. Higher perceptions of the FWC attributes led to less political consumerism. Results inform FIFA (and possibly other SME owners) on how poor human rights practices (affective attributes) may affect the consumption of their products. Results also inform hosts about ineffectiveness of associating themselves with brands like FWC without showing concerns about human rights. Keywords: human rights, co-branding, sport mega-events, consumption boycott, The interaction between a sport mega-event (SME) brand and the host country's brand image can affect attitudes toward consumption of products related to the event. Recent research has analyzed the [...]

Consider the following claim: 'Though present-day Russia poses no threat to it whatsoever, NATO is methodically and persistently expanding its military apparatus in the east of Europe and is implementing [...]

The existence of elections at the subnational level is a distinctive feature of federal states. (1) In September 2004, President Putin proposed abolishing direct gubernatorial elections in Russia. (2) After [...]

Using leaked emails attributed to covert political actors, this study explores the Kremlin's comprehensive influence operations (active measures) to thwart Ukraine's aspirations to join the European Union. These efforts were launched by Putin as early as the beginning of 2013 to avoid losing Ukraine as part of his Eurasian integration project. In Ukraine, however, pro-Russian political forces were weak, clandestinely suppressed by President Viktor Yanukovych and his party. Moscow's major efforts, including the Rus Baptism anniversary, trade sanctions, and 'Medvedchuk project' failed to turn the tide; some even backfired, consolidating support for the European project among the Ukrainian elite and public. Although Putin interrupted the signing of the EU Association Agreement by taking advantage of Yanukovych's personal weakness, he became increasingly frustrated with the Ukrainian president, who 'sacrifices Russia's strategic interests' and sought to become an 'all-Ukrainian national leader' resistant to Russian pressures. Russian policy was at an impasse, without any viable instruments to restrict the westward drift of Ukraine, making the situation totally different from that of 2004. These observations allow us to construct a nuanced interpretation of Russian behaviors in late 2013 and early 2014, which suggest a possible review of and change to their Ukraine policy. The Crimea operation comes to be seen as a well-considered and proactive move to compensate for the failed influence operations and achieve a strategic goal: keeping Ukraine in Russia's orbit., Leaked Emails: What Do They Tell Us? What drove Russia to make the fateful decision of annexing part of the territory of its 'brotherly' neighbor in 2014? To address this [...]

Based on a set of articles about the assassination of Russian politician Boris Nemtsov from nine different editions of the encyclopaedia, the article examines the place of translation in Wikipedia [...]

As Putin's Russia tries to change its image in international politics, Russia also attempts to re-establish the country's importance and exceptionality. The second component involves communication efforts that are based on certain ideological narratives. This article offers a discourse analysis approach to those ideological novelties and an understanding of underlying perceptions, which it connects with historical and literary contexts. Effective communication with Russian leadership and Russia's public sphere may not be achieved unless those narratives are addressed through political communication, even though this idea may sound irrational. These phenomena replicate, in obscure ways, traditional beliefs that are rooted in Russian culture, literature and philosophy and, though Putin did 'renovate' them, such constructs will overshadow East-West relations regardless of which political regime is in power in Russia., Author(s): Vasily V. Gatov[sup.1] Author Affiliations: Vasily V. Gatov is a Russian media researcher and critic is a visiting fellow at University of Southern California Annenberg School of Communications and [...]