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Poland was the first country in Central Europe to start dismantling the political system of ‘real socialism’ in 1989 and has become a pioneer of democratic and market reforms. After 10 years it was admitted to NATO and after 15 years to the European Union. Then, gradually, populism, nationalism and Euro-skepticism began to grow in Poland, which was evident in the years 2005-2007, during the first edition of rules of the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party. After the next eight years of the pragmatic approach of the Polish governments towards European integration, the PiS assumed full power in the country in 2015. The new president and the PiS government began systematic changes in domestic and foreign policy. Populism, illiberalism and authoritarianism began dominating in Polish internal politics, and nationalism and Euro-skepticism in foreign policy. The most important new phenomena in the foreign policy of the PiS government are: (a) the bi-lateralization and militarization of security policy based on the strategic partnership with the US; (b) Euroskepticism: anti-Brussels posturing and disputes with Germany and France; (c) Poland’s nationalistic and great-power approach to Russia; and (d) Three Seas Initiative as a dream of Poland’s greatness. The consequences of this Poland’s politics are detrimental to itself and to the international environment. It has reduced the importance of Poland as a state in Europe and the world. The world’s perception of Poland is increasingly unfavorable among democratic countries, and more favorable among other illiberal countries. But it is not favorable with all illiberal countries, because the nationalism that accompanies Polish illiberalism makes it impossible to improve relations with other not fully democratic or downright undemocratic countries, especially Poland’s eastern neighbors. Poland’s foreign policy is facing serious challenges, some of which Poland created on its own and is unable to address effectively. This means that there is a growing problem of incompatibility between Poland’s policies and the changing international order.

After the end of the Cold War, France issued the first document defining its national security strategy only in 1994. In the following years, despite its involvement in NATO and European Union enlargement, France did not publish any documents defining its security strategy. Only when Europe and the world found themselves in the process of reconfiguration of the international order at the end of the first decade of the 21st century did France begin to issue extensive documents defining its defense and national security strategy. As international terrorism became the greatest threat to France, the first document published in 2006 dealt with its position regarding this global phenomenon. Subsequently, White Papers on Defense and National Security were published in 2008 and 2013, followed by the Strategic Review of Defense and National Security in 2017. These documents define threats and challenges to the security of France, as well as its goals, and means and methods for strengthening it. They make up a broad understanding of the security of the state, society and the individuals, and international security. They show the programming of France as a European and world power. The author draws attention to some similarities and differences with the national security strategy of the Russian Federation. The analysis is conducted using the neorealist approach.

France and Poland have had dynamic security relations for over 100 years. Initially, the bonding element was the sense of threat posed by Germany. Therefore, in the interwar period, France and Poland were bound by the allied treaty of 1921. However, both countries lost their independence during WWII, and the alliance was not renewed after the war. During the Cold War division, convergence and divergence of security interests were evident. After the breakthrough of 1989, Poland joined NATO and the EU and, together with France, found itself in the Western security community. At that time, France represents a Eurocentric vision of security with elements of mondialisme, and Poland prefers an Atlantic option. These convergences and differences in understanding their own security interests mean that relations between France and Poland are meandering, changeable and even complicated, which can be seen in their changing dynamics throughout the post-Cold War period.

Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Princeton University Press, Princeton–Oxford 2010, ss. XIII + 442.

Contemporary Polish-Russian relations are examined, taking into consideration the broad internal conditions in Poland and in Russia. Negative mutual stereotypes prevail in both countries, shaped in the course of a complicated history of mutual relations, while the concepts of international policies in both states are underdeveloped and divergent. Polish-Russian relations are increasingly more influenced by external conditions, such as the profound change Europe is going through and the evolution of the entire international order. The most important modern issues in Polish-Russian relations concern the persistent differences in the perception of the history of mutual relations, dissimilar concepts of the European security system, and energy security. The conditions of relations between Poland and Russia affect Poland’s ability to pursue its international interests in many areas: in relations with Russia and the CIS, in the forum of international organizations (NATO, EU, Council of Europe, OSCE and the UN), in relations with Poland’s closest allies and partners (Germany, France, U.S. and Ukraine). Finally, Polish-Russian relations influence the position and international role of Poland, limiting it when these relations are bad or augmenting it when they are good. Since late 2007 Poland has been trying to conduct a pragmatic policy and normalize its relations with Russia. In general, Polish-Russian reconciliation seems feasible.

The author claims that contemporary Polish foreign and security policy is under the overwhelming influence of historical events in relations with Russia. Poland’s focus on its negative experiences in relations with Russia and disputes over interpretations of history greatly hinder the evolution of those relations in a positive direction. Different visions of European security and Poland’s fears about energy security are also important problems. The author’s analysis leads him to advance the idea that the generally poor state of Poland’s relations with Russia has a negative impact on Poland’s ability to pursue its interests successfully on the international stage, both in its immediate vicinity and in the European Union. Poland’s fears of Russia have persisted throughout the period since Poland regained its sovereignty in 1989 and have led successive Polish governments to adopt a pro-American stance.

In this chapter, the author presents Poland’s engagement for collective security, by discussing its activeness at the UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He refers to Poland’s activeness during the years of Cold War. During that period, Poland proposed well-known initiatives seeking to limit arms in Central Europe and in general, to develop the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, and to strengthen peace and universal disarmament. The author considers that for several years after 1989 sovereign Poland continued to be engaged at the UN and CSCE/OSCE. However, when the opportunity to join NATO emerged, the importance of those structures diminished in Polish foreign and security policy. Poland opted for hard, group security (defense) guarantees within NATO at the expense of its involvement for collective security within the UN and OSCE. This trend has been significantly stronger in the policies of the Law and Justice government since 2015.

This chapter shows the importance of the USA for Poland’s security and Warsaw’s attempts to establish the closest possible bilateral relations with Washington. Since 1989, these efforts were meant to bring about a strategic partnership, but in practice, they have led to Poland’s asymmetric dependence on its powerful transatlantic partner. This was the result of Poland’s efforts to join NATO, and after this aim was achieved in 1999 with Washington’s support, the country proceeded to turn itself into a vassal of the USA. In the years 2007–2015, the Polish government attempted to rationalize Polish–American relations, above all by actively working for EU integration. After the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in Poland in 2015, the country openly adopted a policy of clientelism in regard to the USA. The chapter analyses specific traits of Polish–American relations in the years 1989–2019.

In this chapter, the author presents the conclusions from his analysis of Polish foreign and security policy in the context of the changing international order. In accord with the theory of international roles, he distinguishes three types of roles connected with Poland: (1) those expected from Poland by participants in the Euro-Atlantic system; (2) the roles declared by Poland; and (3) the roles that Poland actually performs. The latter group contains the following: Poland is (1) a model for successful systemic transformation; (b) a party weakening Russia’s imperial ambitions; (c) a satellite and client of the USA; (d) a brake on European integration; (e) a pragmatic and engaged participant in European integration; and (f) a force breaking up the EU. In his final comments, the author discusses the nature and effectiveness of Poland’s international roles.

In this chapter, the author presents Poland’s behavior within the EU. He discusses Warsaw’s position on EU institutional reform in the years 2002–2004. Poland favored strengthening the intergovernmental nature of this organization and after 2005 refused to ratify the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, which it had signed. Subsequently, the Civic Platform and Polish People’s Party (PO-PSL) governments played a constructive role in efforts to overcome the financial crisis in the euro area. Poland adopted changing positions in regard to EU defense policy. It initially criticized the EU’s initiatives, but later it cautiously joined in. Beginning in 2009 it made attempts, jointly with Germany and France, to reinforce the CSDP; later, it advocated unrealistic ideas about creating a European army and it was not, particularly after 2015, interested in overcoming the stagnation of the CSDP. During the immigration crisis, the PO-PSL government showed solidarity with the majority of EU member states, but the succeeding PiS government adopted the opposite stance and rejected the mandatory relocation of illegal immigrants and refugees. The PiS government’s view of the future of the EU also differs from that of the majority of EU countries.

The author claims that Poland is seeking to bring about an active NATO and EU policy in the east of Europe. He shows how Poland participates, by close cooperation with the USA and EU, in the West’s promotion of democracy in the East. The consequences of this have included the inducement of “color revolutions” in post-Soviet countries and rivalry with Russia. The author demonstrates how this policy led to the crisis in Ukraine in the autumn of 2013. He details Poland’s participation in NATO’s “open door” policy of expansion, including to post-Soviet states. He also analyzes Poland’s efforts to have NATO’s eastern flank reinforced, with the consequence that European security has become militarized.

Central Europe is a recurring theme in Polish foreign and security policy. Its newest manifestation is the Three Seas Initiative (3SI, Trimarium), which Poland has been pushing for since 2015. This initiative harks back to earlier attempts to organize cooperation under Poland’s leadership between Central and Eastern European countries and is an expression of Poland’s desire to attain the great power position it once held in distant history. The 3SI is limited to close cooperation between twelve countries lying on the eastern fringes of the EU and NATO but does not involve Ukraine or Belarus, which are traditionally included in Poland’s initiatives. The author discusses the essence of the 3SI, its potential, and the obstacles involved in its implementation.

In the ninth chapter, the author demonstrates how the Euro-Atlantic security system’s shift from cooperation to rivalry for spheres of influence reached its apogee in the Ukraine crisis. In the spring of 2014, following the arrival in power in Kyiv of nationalist and pro-Western politicians the crisis turned into an international crisis and to Russian intervention. Like the leading neorealists, the author holds the view that Ukraine was the scene of a clash between the West and Russia. The West attempted to draw Ukraine into its sphere of interests, and Russia countered this by annexing Crimea and by supporting militarily the secession of Ukraine’s eastern provinces (the Donbas). This crisis had a very negative impact on the Euro-Atlantic security system. It led to geopolitical rivalry, to military confrontation and to the weakening of Ukraine. The author also analyzes the chances for overcoming the crisis, by pointing to the need for a compromise with the participation of the three interested parties—Ukraine, the West and Russia.

The fourth chapter focuses on how program documents concerning the security concepts (strategies and doctrines) of the principal participants of the Euro-Atlantic system identify threats and challenges to security, and how they present the aims, means and methods of security policy. The author analyses the security concepts of the US, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland as a middle power, NATO, the EU, Russia, and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. He notes that terrorism is identified as the main threat by almost all those entities and shows the evolution of their perception of other challenges and threats. In the final section, the author points to similarities and differences between security concepts in light of the theory of international relations. He concludes that the rise of divergent interests among the participants of the Euro-Atlantic security system is accompanied by a return to the traditional, militarized understanding of security, in keeping with the premises of the realist paradigm.

This chapter gives a description and the background for the Euro-Atlantic security system as it emerged after the Cold War and its functioning for about a decade. It shows the genesis of the system; and how it came to include the new Central European democracies, which were admitted to NATO and the European Union; and the cooperation of all the system’s members based on the concept of cooperative security. The evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the nineties produced an asymmetry of security—greater in its western part and weaker in its eastern one. Russia was the weaker partner and agreed to cooperate with the West, but raised reservations about the expansion of its multilateral structures, especially NATO, in which it saw a potentially threatening political and military bloc with a Cold War pedigree.

The seventh chapter is concerned with analyzing the crisis of the EU and its negative impact on the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system. The symptoms of the crisis came to the fore during work on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2002–2004, which ended in failure. With the Lisbon Treaty, which strengthened the inter-governmental character of the EU, the CSDP fall into stagnation. The EU also couldn’t function as an effective security policy actor on account of the financial and economic crisis 2008–2011. The EU then had to deal with the migration crisis that began in 2014. For many years, nationalistic and centrifugal tendencies threatening the EU’s survival as an integration project also had been on the rise. In 2016, the British decided to take their country out of the EU. The EU’s power to act weakened and the EU did not play a positive role in the Ukraine crisis. Nevertheless, the EU made successive attempts to revitalize the CSDP, drew up a new global foreign and security policy strategy in 2016, discussed how to build an European army, and established Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

The tenth and final chapter presents the author’s conclusions from the analyses of the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century. The author confirms his hypothesis, according to which this system found itself in a state of crisis consisting of a return to rivalry for spheres of influence and the suspension of cooperation. By observing the redistribution of capabilities in the global international order, the author notes the gradual weakening of the West and the simultaneous increase of Russia’s international position and the worsening sense of security in Central European countries, which feel threatened by Russia. Drawing inspiration from the theses of the neorealists and from Charles Kupchan, the author predicts a further weakening of the importance of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the global international order and the growing anarchy of world security. In conclusion, he points to the need to introduce new institutional arrangements to halt these negative trends.

The third chapter contains a presentation of the evolving challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic zone. The author shows the reconfiguration of the global international order, which resulted in the West’s position weakening while that of the new emerging powers rose. The latter included Russia which, strengthened under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, shifted to a policy of balancing the influence of the West and began to claim the right to co-decide in regional and global security. The author then points to the growing significance of terrorism as a major international threat in the 21st century, to the ongoing military threats connected with the nuclear stockpiles in the possession of great powers, and to the danger of proliferation of WMD. He also presents military threats created by the conventional arms race in Europe; cyber, economic, and environmental threats; and the serious challenges represented by uncontrolled migration to Europe.

The fifth chapter analyzes the fight against terrorism. As the principal participants of the Euro-Atlantic security system view terrorism as the main threat, they took action unilaterally and undertook multilateral cooperation to combat this trans-border danger. The author shows the War on Terror, proclaimed in 2001 by the USA, as mostly unsuccessful. He views the EU’s actions in this respect similarly. NATO-Russian collaboration in fighting terrorism was relatively successfully but did not produce large scale effects. In contrast, the fast-growing and intensive cooperation in fighting terrorism between Russia and CIS countries brought noticeable results. Generally, the author concludes that participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system are not coping with this dangerous phenomenon.

The author claims that the greatest problems in the Euro-Atlantic security system arose with the West’s continued policy of dominance and expansion eastwards. The first tensions and diverting interests in relations with Russia were due to the West’s promotion of democracy in the Western Balkans and in the post-Soviet space, including the so-called ‘color revolutions’. Russia viewed this policy as a cover for the strategic interests of the USA, NATO and the EU and as interference in East-European countries’ internal affairs. Russia had been opposed to NATO expansion to the east since the previous decade, but had no means to prevent it during the first two post-Cold War rounds of NATO enlargement in 1999 and 2004. When, in 2008, NATO announced plans to include Ukraine and Georgia in the alliance, however, Russia was strong enough to oppose it and demonstrated its military power during the Georgian-Russian War of 2008, and then by intervening in Ukraine in 2014. As NATO reacted to this by reinforcing its eastern flank, Europe became the scene of a dangerous confrontation reminiscent of Cold War days.

Państwa zachodnie i ich instytucje międzynarodowe (Unia Europejska i NATO), kierując się liberalną ideologią kontynuowały w XXI wieku politykę promowania demokracji, rządów prawa, praw człowieka i gospodarki rynkowej wobec byłych państw socjalistycznych na terenie Bałkanów Zachodnich oraz byłego ZSRR. Największe przeszkody stawia ich polityce Rosja, która uważa, że państwa zachodnie w rzeczywistości realizują cele poszerzania strefy swoich wpływów i narażają na uszczerbek jej interesy bezpieczeństwa. Do największej konfrontacji między Zachodem a Rosją doszło w 2014 roku na Ukrainie, kiedy UE i USA wsparły prozachodnie aspiracje nowych władz tego państwa, wyłonione w wyniku kilkumiesięcznych demonstracji ulicznych w Kijowie. Kryzys ukraiński spowodował trudności we współpracy międzynarodowej i pogarszanie się stanu bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w strefie euro atlantyckiej. The Western states and their international institutions (the European Union and NATO) followed the liberal ideology in the 21st century to continue the policy of promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and market economy towards the former communist states in the Western Balkans and the former USSR. The biggest impediment to their policy is Russia, which believes that Western states are actually pursuing the goals of extending their sphere of influence and compromising its security interests. The biggest confrontation between the West and Russia took place in 2014 in Ukraine, when the EU and the USA supported the pro-Western aspirations of the new authorities of the country, which emerged as a result of several months of street demonstrations in Kyiv. The Ukraine crisis has caused difficulties in international cooperation and deterioration of international security in the Euro-Atlantic zone.

Bliskie stosunki polsko-amerykańskie mają wpływ na określanie celów polskiej polityki zagranicznej, a także na dobór środków i metod tej polityki. Stosunki Polski z USA sprowadzają się głównie do kwestii bezpieczeństwa. W latach 90. widoczny był prymat środków polityczno-dyplomatycznych, a Polska stopniowo stosowała strategię bandwagoning w stosunkach z USA. Z biegiem czasu ta strategia prowadziła do utożsamiania naszych interesów narodowych z interesami Stanów Zjednoczonych. To skłoniło Polskę do bezwarunkowego wsparcia interwencji wojskowej USA w Iraku oraz do udziału w wojnie w Afganistanie. Coraz wyraźniej Polska zaczęła reprezentować oparte na realistycznym paradygmacie rozumienie bezpieczeństwa i preferowanie zasobów i instrumentów wojskowych, własnych, koalicyjnych (natowskich) i amerykańskich. Stosunki polsko-amerykańskie mają zasadniczy wpływ także na pozycję i role międzynarodowe Polski, wśród których wyróżnia się rola satelity USA. Close Polish-American relations have an impact on shaping the objectives of Poland’s foreign policy, as well as the choice of methods and measures used in this policy. Polish relations with the United States boil down mainly to security issues. The 1990s witnessed the visible primacy of political and diplomatic measures, and Poland gradually applied a bandwagoning strategy in relations with the United States. Over time, this strategy has led to the identification of our national interests with the interests of the United States. This prompted Poland to unconditionally support the US military intervention in Iraq, and to participate in the war in Afghanistan. More and more clearly, Poland began to present – based on a realistic paradigm – an understanding of security and a preference for military resources and instruments, whether its own, the coalition’s (NATO) or the US’s. Polish-American relations have a major impact also on the position and international roles of Poland, with the role as a US satellite standing out.

The European Union plays a few kind of international roles: economic, political and security, and civilisational ones. The economic roles are the following: the world leader of sustainable development and the pattern of successful and complex integration, the biggest shareholder of world trade, the supplier of biggest development aid, the donator of biggest humanitarian aid. The political and security roles are such as: the role of active diplomatic actor and the role of stabiliser of peace and international security. Moreover the EU plays the role of an attractive civilisational centre and promoter of European culture values. Above roles confirm the EU has growing significance and ambitions to became a complex and global international actor. To materialise them the EU must to overcome the financial crisis and to save the threatened Euro zone, what is the sine qua non condition to survive the EU as a subject.

Podpisany w Helsinkach w 1975 roku Akt Końcowy KBWE otworzył nowy rozdział w poszukiwaniu optymalnego systemu bezpieczeństwa w strefie euroatlantyckiej, obejmującej obszar od Vancouver do Władywostoku. Ustanowił kooperatywny system bezpieczeństwa wprowadzający ponad blokowy mechanizm uzgadniania współpracy politycznej, gospodarczej i w dziedzinach humanitarnych, takich jak kultura, oświata, wymiana informacji i kontakty międzyludzkie. Po zimnej wojnie stworzono organy KBWE, wyposażono ją w nowe kompetencje w zakresie dyplomacji prewencyjnej i rozwiązywania konfliktów, ale ewolucja ładu międzynarodowego w Europie sprawiła, że wbrew początkowym zamierzeniem KBWE, przemianowana z początkiem 1995 roku na OBWE, nie stała się centralną instytucją bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. W wyniku rozszerzenia NATO i Unii Europejskiej na Wschód dokonało się odejście od zasady równego bezpieczeństwa dla wszystkich państw uczestniczących. OBWE pozostała drugorzędną instytucją wyspecjalizowaną w tzw. miękkich aspektach bezpieczeństwa. Kryzys ukraiński, wybuchły jesienią 2013 r., jak inne wyzwania i zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa pochodzące z innych regionów ukazały potrzebę rewitalizacji OBWE i stworzenia euroatlantyckiej i euroazjatyckiej wspólnoty bezpieczeństwa. The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.