Search

Hedging is typically understood as a middle path straddling balancing/bandwagoning, the military/economic, and United States/China. This conventional understanding of hedging confuses risk and threat. It also makes the hedging concept non-falsifiable and thus analytically dubious, while further reinforcing a false dialectic of other states in the Asia-Pacific as caught between the United States and China. This article proposes to restore the centrality of risk and autonomy back to the concept of hedging. It contends that hedging is a risk management strategy that emphasizes autonomy—to retain control, reduce uncertainty, and remain secure—preventing the costs of alignment by signaling ambiguity in the military, political, and economic sectors. This hedging concept is subsequently applied to a case study of Singapore, demonstrating that the island state is the quintessential hedger. In so doing, this article develops a falsifiable concept of hedging that enables such a strategy to be explicitly identified, and importantly, returns agency back to the other states amid intensifying Sino-US competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can individuals with contrasting interests in a declining industry, at odds with the country's identity, and facing an illiberal and sceptical government, band together to promote collective goals? This article addresses this question by examining Singapore's Kranji Countryside Association, one of Singapore's few civil society organisations to focus on community organising. To Association members, the material and time costs of organising were high, the odds of success were low and the material rewards of success were modest. The article evaluates two views that purport to explain collective action: the rational choice approach that focuses on selective incentives and the social-psychological approach that emphasises non-excludable collective incentives and collective identity. It is concluded that while selective incentives were necessary for attracting several non-active members to fill out the ranks of the organisation, the rational choice approach cannot explain the group's initial establishment or why some members have been especially active. For this, social-psychological factors were vital to both building and sustaining the organisation. The results illuminate collective action in Singapore's illiberal context and enhance our understanding of the state's dilemmas in managing civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Administrative capacity depends on the nature of the state of which the administrative system is an integral part. In recent years, there has been a revival of debates on the role of public administration under developmental states in Southeast Asia and Latin America. A major analytical component of developmental states has been their administrative capacity and how to build it. There are significant variations in administrative capacity among developmental states caused by divergences in their historical, economic, political, and cultural contexts. This article compares two cross-continental cases (Singapore and Chile) with regard to the formations of developmental states shaping their administrative systems and capacity-building initiatives. It examines the divergences in their state formations and the contextual factors affecting their administrative capacity. The article concludes by making some generalizations, offering an analytical framework for further research, and suggesting policies needed for building effective administrative capacity. Points for practitioners: This article highlights the significance of administrative capacity-building for development. It explores how this capacity is shaped by the formation of the state under which public administration functions. In explaining this relationship between state formation and public administration, the article specifically focuses on the "developmental" state, compares two cross-continental cases (Singapore and Chile) as regards how these two developmental states differ and cause variations in their administrative systems, and explains the major contextual factors leading to such variations. This understanding is crucial to designing effective policies for building administrative capacity in any country depending on its state formation and context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In both the Philippines and Singapore, rapid capitalist development over the last decade combined with intensified inequalities in wealth and income. The conflict this generated resulted in significant – but very different – political responses by elites and popular forces in these countries. In the Philippines, public disenchantment with established elites and institutions fuelled support for populist representation through the authoritarian Rodrigo Duterte. In Singapore, populist sentiments were evident also, but ruling elites were more effective in containing conflict to reinforce prevailing institutions of representation. The explanation for these different outcomes resides not in the intrinsic quality of established institutions, but in the contrasting social foundations on which they rest: technocratic state capitalism in Singapore and private oligarchic capitalism in the Philippines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While neoliberal ethos has seen a consistent spread and reterritorialization beyond its Anglo‐American roots, the specific inflections of neoliberalism and its discourse have had to be recontextualized to fit with context‐specific values and structures of government/governance. Adopting a critical discourse‐analytic approach, this paper looks at the case of Singapore to probe the discursive moves and tropes deployed to communicate and legitimate a neoliberal‐oriented, authoritarian governance in a wealthy society marked by a high level of inequality. It shows how Singapore's 'Asian' sociopolitical context and its post‐Confucian heritage are amenable to a strategic discursive melding of a more conventional self‐interested, neoliberal individualism with a more locally‐situated traditionalist collective/communitarian ethos, with the latter functioning as a discursive‐moralizing trope to encourage acquiescence to a market‐fundamentalist agenda for 'the greater/common good'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consistent developments since 2016 demonstrate that China is determined to depart from its traditional practice – rejecting reciprocity-based judgment recognition and enforcement. This is strongly endorsed by China's 'One Belt, One Road' (OBOR) Initiative. To develop the Chinese system of reciprocity-based judgement recognition and enforcement (JRE), China will make two efforts. First, it is likely to propose unbinding memos, like the China-Singapore Memo, to the supreme courts in countries alongside the OBOR. Second, Chinese Supreme People's Court will issue a judicial interpretation to clarify the scope, requirements of, and defences against reciprocity-based JRE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, much has been written about the potential of smart urbanism to bring about various and lasting forms of betterment. The embedding of digital technologies within urban infrastructures has been well documented, and the efficiencies of smart models of urban governance and management have been lauded. More recently, however, the discourse has been labelled ‘hegemonic’, and accused of developing a view of smart technology that is blinkered by its failure to critique its socio-political effects. By focusing on the case of Singapore’s ‘Smart Nation’ initiative, this paper embraces the paradoxes at the heart of smart urbanism and, in doing so, interrogates the tension between ideology and praxis, efficiency and control, access and choice, and smart governance and smart citizenship. It also demonstrates how such tensions are (re)produced through ‘fourthspace’ – the digitally enabled spaces of urbanism that are co-created, and that contribute to an expansion and diffusion of social and political responsibility. It ends by suggesting how such spaces have the potential to radically transform not just the urban environment, but also the role of government and citizens in designing urban futures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the political and economic condition of Singapore under leadership of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. Topics discussed include the amendment of the Presidential Elections Act (PEA), lawsuits filed against Workers' Party (WP) chief Low Thia Khiang, assistant secretary-general Pritam Singh, and chairman Sylvia Lim, and foreign policy and diplomacy.

The city-state of Singapore is proactive in harnessing policy experimentation to incubate innovations, transfer knowledge and facilitate collaborations across different public sectors. Given the country’s strong knack for pragmatism, international practices and lessons are usually first tested and adapted in policy experiments before scaling up to nationwide policies. Singapore’s practice of policy experimentation, however, has also demonstrated evolution over time. This article reviews the evolving role of experimentation in Singapore’s policy decision-making and implementation, and analyses pilot programmes in public housing to elicit the key attributes and commonalities of its policy experiments. It finds that policy experiments have been increasingly used after the 2011 general election, which witnessed a radical political rebalancing in Singapore’s governance history. Pilot projects have thus transformed from a utilitarian to citizen-centric, design-thinking approach after 2011. Pilot programmes are used for multiple purposes in policy innovations, among which civil service mentoring, knowledge transfer and cross-boundary collaboration are the values primarily pursued. The article discusses the contributions of the findings to the literature and policy implications for practitioners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Action Party's unexpectedly strong win in Singapore's September 2015 general election illuminates the dynamics of opposition under electoral authoritarianism. The conduct and outcome of the election raise questions not just of why the much-hyped opposition efforts fizzled, but also of the implications for Singapore politics, moving forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Singapore, the percentage of elected female politicians rose from 3.8 percent in 1984 to 22.5 percent after the 2015 general election. After years of exclusion, why were gender reforms adopted and how did they lead to more women in political office? Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, this paper shows that in Singapore party pragmatism rather than international diffusion of gender equality norms, feminist lobbying, or rival party pressures drove gender reforms. It is argued that the ruling People's Action Party's (PAP) strategic and electoral calculations to maintain hegemonic rule drove its policy u-turn to nominate an average of about 17.6 percent female candidates in the last three elections. Similar to the PAP's bid to capture women voters in the 1959 elections, it had to alter its patriarchal, conservative image to appeal to the younger, progressive electorate in the 2000s. Additionally, Singapore's electoral system that includes multi-member constituencies based on plurality party bloc vote rule also makes it easier to include women and diversify the party slate. But despite the strategic and electoral incentives, a gender gap remains. Drawing from a range of public opinion data, this paper explains why traditional gender stereotypes, biased social norms, and unequal family responsibilities may hold women back from full political participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, more than 118 countries and political parties around the world have introduced gender quotas to guarantee women's political representation. While the study of gender quotas and electoral systems is an exciting field, few studies have focused on East Asia. Why do traditionally male-dominated parties engage in gender reforms? Have gender reforms improved women's political representation and participation? To address these questions, this introductory article offers an overview of the electoral rules, gender quotas, and candidate selection methods adopted in three broadly similar cases with different outcomes in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Taiwan and South Korea introduced mixed electoral systems and legislated candidate quotas to improve women's legislative representation at the local and national levels. Singapore resisted legislating gender quotas while the ruling party voluntarily introduced a party quota in 2009. These gender equality strategies have brought slow and uneven results. Based on qualitative and quantitative methods as well as survey and electoral data, this paper offers new evidence showing why the effects of electoral systems and quota strategies are not automatic or mechanical, but dependent on the degree of party system institutionalization, electoral competitiveness, legal enforcement, and social-cultural attitudes toward women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The passing of a national political leader, widely regarded as a world figure, marked the beginning of the year 2015. The long standing Senior Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew left an undeniably significant mark upon the political leadership sphere. In order to assess his intriguing leadership style I will be using three theoretical models namely; Kouzes and Posner Model (1995), Blondel Model (1987) and Simonton Model (1988). The paper will mainly focus on Lee Kuan Yew's attempts at building a new Singaporean Identity from a multiethnic pluralistic society. By this exercise I try to answer the question of whether another leader can adopt Lee Kuan Yew's leadership style as a guiding principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past few years, a number of civil society coalitions have emerged in the illiberal city-state of Singapore. They are the unintended result of a controlled process of liberalization which was initiated by the government in the 1990s in response to growing demands for participation. In particular, the internet has contributed to a more assertive, independent and better organized civil society, which can be seen as a significant step in the process of political change in the city-state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using Singapore as an extended case study, this Article examines the idea of authoritarian constitutionalism, which it identifies as a system of government that combines reasonably free and fair elections with a moderate degree of repressive control of expression and limits on personal freedom. After describing other versions of non-liberal constitutionalism, including "mere" rule-of-law constitutionalism, the Article offers an extended analysis and critique of accounts of constitutionalism and courts in authoritarian countries. Such accounts are largely strategic and instrumental, and, I argue, cannot fully explain the role of constitutions even in those countries. Rather, I argue, where constitutionalism exists in authoritarian systems, it does so because the rules have a modest normative commitment to constitutionalism. The Article concludes by describing the characteristics of authoritarian constitutionalism and offering a modest defense of its normative appeal in nations with specific social and political problems, such as a high degree of persistent ethnic conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the harmonization of financial regulatory regimes possible in East Asia? Focusing on corporate governance, which many see as a critical part of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and which is also seen as unresponsive to calls for change, this paper argues that such harmonization is possible, but that it will not be according to the standards advocated by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and other international organizations. At present, actors generally feign compliance with these international rules and standards. The pattern of noncompliance is reflective of two types of regulatory models at work in East Asia, which correspond to democratic and nondemocratic regimes. The manner by which these political institutions mediate the influence of key actors determines corporate governance outcomes. Three cases illustrate the key dynamics: Singapore (nondemocracy), South Korea (democracy), and pre- and post-World War II Japan (change from nondemocracy to democracy). By identifying the key actors that determine regulatory outcomes, this paper points to a more realistic regulatory framework. This alternative framework is a compromise between the standards advocated by international organizations and the domestic political realities of East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Tarsadalomkutatas is the property of Akademiai Kiado and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Trade unions may exact a heavy cost on an economy, but there is one mode of trade unionism that will enable the trade union to play a positive role in economic development. This mode of unionism, which may be characterized as macro-focused, requires the trade union to work closely with the ruling party in order to contribute to economic development. The required symbiosis between such a trade union and the ruling party may not be sustainable when there is a change in government. This paper argues that a union can remain macro-focused as long as it is not part of any political party and therefore can work with any government regardless of which political party is in power. The paper will examine the various conditions, both economic and non-economic, under which such an outcome can exist and be sustainable. The paper will also analyze how a macro-focused union induces workers to join the union based on the results of a field survey of 690 respondents in Singapore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a quantitative content analysis of 10,473 comments from two opposing online petitions related to the legal status of a section of the penal code in Singapore used to ban sex between men. Results indicate numerous significant differences in how the two sides discussed the law and its significance. In particular, they used different types of arguments to support their views and expressed different kinds of concerns over the potential impact of changing or maintaining the law. The patterns of language use seem to reflect distinctly different approaches to the debate and suggest the difficulty of finding common ground amid this contentious social issue, but they also reveal similarities to how Western cultures have framed the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For the first time in Singapore's history, two elections were held in a year. In 2011, Singaporeans voted in a general election on 7 May and in another competitive presidential election on 27 August. Faced with a stronger opposition force and an emboldened electorate, the ruling People's Action Party won the elections but achieved the worst results since the country's independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Singapore government has traditionally invested heavily in, and focused on, the development of the hard sciences since gaining independence in 1965. This bode well for the fate of sustainability studies as the state, in the initial decades, focused heavily on performance legitimacy, emphasising issues of survivability and economic progress. With the country now at the top of global charts on many rankings on economic prosperity, the city-state has steadily begun to examine issues of nation-building rather than state-building. This can be attributed, in part, to the paradox of soft authoritarian regimes that invest heavily in human capital, because in the long run, an educated electorate will want, as active and informed citizens, to participate effectively in politics. The social sciences are slowly evolving to look at the Singapore model from a comparative perspective, moving away from the dominant narrative of 'Singaporean exceptionalism', which overstates the uniqueness of the city-state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]