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In information environments characterized by institutional distrust, fragmentation and the widespread dissemination of conspiracies and disinformation, citizens perceive misinformation as a salient and threatening issue. Especially amidst disruptive events and crises, news users are likely to believe that information is inaccurate or deceptive. Using an original 19‐country comparative survey study across diverse regions in the world (N = 19,037), we find that news users are likely to regard information on the Russian war in Ukraine as false. They are more likely to attribute false information to deliberative deception than to a lack of access to the war area or inaccurate expert knowledge. Russian sources are substantially more likely to be blamed for falsehoods than Ukrainian or Western sources – but these attribution biases depend on a country's position on the war. Our findings reveal that people mostly believe that falsehoods are intended to deceive them, and selectively associate misinformation with the opposed camp.

Conventional wisdom suggests that social media, especially when used by authoritarian powers with nefarious aims, leaves citizens of democratic countries vulnerable to psychological influence campaigns. But such concerns overlook predispositions among recipients of false claims to reject (or to endorse) conspiratorial narratives. Analyzing responses from a survey fielded in 19 countries, we find that it is a preexisting conspiracy outlook at the individual level, more so than media diets, which consistently predicts rating Russia’s pretenses for the invasion as more accurate. In all countries, individuals who view the world in general with a conspiratorial mindset are more likely to believe war-related disinformation. Receiving news via YouTube, Facebook, or TikTok is also associated with greater belief in Russian narratives justifying the invasion in several countries, but these relationships are weaker compared to those observed for conspiracy thinking. Without downplaying a potential positive role for media interventions, the findings highlight the importance of a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of conspiratorial thinking.

This paper examines journalistic role performance in coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic, based on a content analysis of newspaper, television, radio and online news in 37 countries. We test a set of hypotheses derived from two perspectives on the role of journalism in health crises. Mediatization theories assume that news media tend to sensationalize or to politicize health crises. A contrasting perspective holds that journalists shift toward more deferential and cooperative stances toward health and political authorities in a health crisis, attempting to mobilize the public to act according to the best science. Hypotheses derived from these perspectives are tested using the standard measures of journalistic roles developed by the Journalistic Role Performance Project. Results show that the deference/cooperation/consensus perspective is better supported, with media moving away from the Watchdog and Infotainment, and toward performance of the Service and Civic roles. We also explore differences in the pattern by country.

Studies suggest that, at the routine level, news beats function as unique “micro-cultures.” Exploring this “particularist” approach in news content, we compare how the interventionist, watchdog, loyal, service, infotainment, and civic roles materialize across 11 thematic news beats and analyze the moderating effect of platforms, ownership, and levels of political freedom on journalistic role performance in hard and soft news. Based on the second wave of the Journalistic Role Performance (JRP) project, this article reports the findings of a content analysis of 148,474 news items from 37 countries. Our results reveal the transversality of interventionism, the strong associations of some topics and roles, and the limited reach of news beat particularism in the face of moderating variables.

The shifting role of journalism in a digital age has affected long-standing journalistic norms across media platforms. This has reinvigorated discussion on how work in online newsrooms compares to other platforms that differ in media affordances and forms. Still, more studies are needed on whether those differences translate into distinct practices, especially when examining cross-national studies. Based on a content analysis of 148,474 stories produced by 365 media organizations from 37 countries, this article compares the performance of journalistic roles in online newsrooms to three other types of media—TV, radio, and print. The paper analyzes if journalistic roles present themselves differently across platforms, and if these differences are constant or they vary across countries. Results show that there are measurable differences in role performance in online journalism compared to other platforms. Platform had a significant impact, particularly in terms of service and infotainment orientation, while the implementation of roles oriented toward public service was more similar. Additionally, country differences in the relationship between role performance and platforms mainly emerged for roles that enable political influence on news coverage, with differences in the relationship between online vs. traditional platforms appearing to be distinct features of the specific political system. © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

In Poland, the presidential elections were primarily scheduled on May 10th, 2020. However, due to the COVID-19 circumstances, the elections were postponed and eventually took place in late June (first round) and mid-July (second round) 2020. The aim of the paper is to examine media coverage of the postponed presidential elections in Poland. In particular, the paper explores frames used by journalists in their coverage of the postponed elections. For the purpose of this study we conducted a quantitative content analysis of news items from three TV newscasts, four radio stations, and three online platforms. The material was collected on May 10th (a day of primarily scheduled the first round of elections), and June 30th (a day when the results of the first round of postponed elections were officially announced). The findings showed that both amount of the news coverage and the main frames used by the media across time differed. Although episodic frame prevailed in the media coverage on both days. thematic frame was used more often in the media coverage on the day when voting was supposed to take place, than on the day when results of the first round of presidential elections were announced. On contrary, conflict frame was used more often in the media coverage of results of the elections than on a day without election. The political orientation of the media outlets affected the way journalist employed responsibility and consequences frames., Wybory prezydenckie w Polsce zostały pierwotnie zaplanowane na 10 maja 2020 r. Niemniej, z uwagi na okoliczności, które powstały w związku z pandemią COVID-19, głosowanie zostało przełożone i odbyło się pod koniec czerwca (I tura) i w połowie lipca 2020 roku (II tura). Celem artykułu jest zbadanie sposobu, w jaki media relacjonowały przełożone wybory prezydenckie w Polsce. W szczególności celem badania jest rozpoznanie ram interpretacyjnych stosowanych przez dziennikarzy podczas relacjonowania wydarzeń związanych z tymi wyborami. Przeprowadzona została ilościowa analiza zawartości przekazów pochodzących z audycji informacyjnych trzech stacji telewizyjnych, czterech stacji radiowych i trzech platform online. Materiał badawczy został zebrany 10 maja (czyli w dniu, w którym pierwotnie głosowanie miało się odbyć) oraz 30 czerwca (czyli w dniu, w którym oficjalnie ogłoszono wyniki I tury wyborów). Wyniki analizy ukazały różnice w sposobie relacjonowania wyborów pomiędzy pierwszym i drugim dniem uwzględnionym w badaniu. Co prawda rama epizodyczna dominowała w medialnym przekazie w obu dniach, ale rama tematyczna była częściej wykorzystywana w dniu, gdy zaplanowane wcześniej wybory ostatecznie się nie odbyły, niż w dniu, w którym ogłoszono wyniki. Rama konfliktu była częściej wykorzystywana w materiałach dziennikarskich w dniu ogłoszenia wyników niż w dniu bez głosowania. Wyniki ukazały także wpływ orientacji politycznej organizacji medialnej na sposób wykorzystania ramy odpowiedzialności i ramy konsekwencji.

The transition from low- to high-choice media environments has had far-reaching implications for citizens’ media use and its relationship with political knowledge. However, there is still a lack of comparative research on how citizens combine the usage of different media and how that is related to political knowledge. To fill this void, we use a unique cross-national survey about the online and offline media use habits of more than 28,000 individuals in 17 European countries. Our aim is to (i) profile different types of news consumers and (ii) understand how each user profile is linked to political knowledge acquisition. Our results show that five user profiles – news minimalists, social media news users, traditionalists, online news seekers, and hyper news consumers – can be identified, although the prevalence of these profiles varies across countries. Findings further show that both traditional and online-based news diets are correlated with higher political knowledge. However, online-based news use is more widespread in Southern Europe, where it is associated with lower levels of political knowledge than in Northern Europe. By focusing on news audiences, this study provides a comprehensive and fine-grained analysis of how contemporary European political information environments perform and contribute to an informed citizenry.