Search

Traditional leaders can influence electoral outcomes. We designed an experiment to investigate why public endorsements by chiefs affect voters—and which types of voters they influence. Chiefs have incentives to prefer politicians who will promote local development, and can use endorsements to sway elections accordingly. We argue that voters often interpret chiefs' endorsements as a signal of candidate quality. To assess this argument, we exposed voters to real endorsements made by chiefs during Ghana's 2020 presidential election. We show that endorsements impact the vote choice of undecided voters. Consistent with a signaling mechanism, respondents exposed to chiefs' rationale for endorsing a candidate were no more likely to vote for the endorsed candidate than those who only heard chiefs' approval of a candidate. Further, treated respondents hold higher evaluations of the endorsed candidate on multiple dimensions of candidate quality. Our results suggest that chiefs influence voters through a non-coercive mechanism, which has positive implications for accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the relation between electoral politics and government small-business lending, employment, and business formation. We construct novel measures of electoral importance capturing swing and base voters using data from Facebook ad spending, independent political expenditures, the Cook Political Report, and campaign contributions. We find that businesses in electorally important states, districts, and sectors receive more loans following the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, controlling for funding demand and both health and economic conditions. Estimates from survey and observational data show that electoral politics and the allocation of government funds affect employment, small-business activity, and business applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory has long suggested that swing voting is a response to cross-pressures arising from a mix of individual attributes and contextual factors. Unfortunately, existing regression-based approaches are ill-suited to explore the complex combinations of demographic, policy, and political factors that produce swing voters in American elections. This gap between theory and practice motivates our use of an ensemble of supervised machine learning methods to predict swing voters in the 2012, 2016, and 2020 U.S. presidential elections. The results from the learning ensemble substantiate the existence of swing voters in contemporary American elections. Specifically, we demonstrate that the learning ensemble produces well-calibrated and externally valid predictions of swing voter propensity in later elections and for related behaviors such as split-ticket voting. Although interpreting black-box models is more challenging, they can nonetheless provide meaningful substantive insights meriting further exploration. Here, we use flexible model-agnostic tools to perturb the ensemble and demonstrate that cross-pressures (particularly those involving ideological and policy-related considerations) are essential to accurately predict swing voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do politicians target the benefits of social programs to party loyalists or to swing voters? Traditional tests of this question are clouded by an identification problem caused by the simultaneity of politician and voter choices to participate in the exchange of assistance for votes. I use the holding of an unanticipated repeat gubernatorial election in the Venezuelan state of Barinas in 2022 as a natural experiment to identify the effects of elections on the distribution of government assistance. I estimate that the holding of the election led to an increase in the probability of voters in Barinas receiving food packages in comparison with the control group of voters in the state of Apure. I also find that moderate opposition and third-party voters received larger increases in food benefits. These results are consistent with the predictions of the spatial model of distributive politics, according to which elections lead governments to direct more benefits to swing voters instead of core supporters. The findings illustrate why investigation of cross sectional correlations is insufficient to test the implications of theories of voting if it is not accompanied by a clear identification strategy to help isolate the source of the underlying shocks. • I use an unanticipated repeat vote in Venezuela as a natural political experiment. • The election led to an increase in the probability of voters receiving food packages. • Third-party voters received more benefits, consistent with spatial models. • Traditional tests using cross sectional correlations lack an identification strategy. • This is the first time a repeat election is used to test theories of politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study empirically whether the allocation of discretionary grants across Spanish regions is related to the number of swing voters and loyal voters of the ruling party. We estimate the number of swing and loyal voters from survey data. When estimating the number of swing voters, we account in a novel way for the two-dimensional ideological space and multiparty competition. We find that regions with more loyal voters of the ruling party received more grants per capita. Partisan alignment of regional governments also matters over a part of the studied period since the regions where the socialist party of the central government was a member of the regional government received more grants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the notion of a "bellwether" location in the electoral political context. Bellwethers are thought to have predictive power because they supposedly signal how the entire electorate will move on election day. We consider how the number of bellwether counties—defined in several ways—has fluctuated since the 1930s. We also explore the extent to which bellwethers successfully predict future elections. With the proliferation of geographic polarization, few counties can successively and successfully pick the winner of presidential elections. Other bellwether measures fare slightly better or worse, but as Tufte and Sun (1975) found nearly half a century ago, bellwethers today continue to be poor predictors of future performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper formulates a mathematical model that combines the dynamics of interest group formation with electoral politics, involving office-seeking and corrupt political candidates and voting population with well-defined policy as well as ideological preferences. The analysis provides several interesting insights into the factors affecting lobby membership, free-riding incentives of citizen-voters and aggregate monetary donations garnered by lobby groups. Besides this, the paper also explores the impact of the formation of distinct lobby groups, the presence of swing voters and the corrupt practices or financial embezzlement on the equilibrium policy choice of electoral contenders. The findings reveal that more honest spending of campaign donations by electoral contenders reduces both the size of the lobby (or membership) as well as aggregate campaign contributions in equilibrium. In contrast, a rise in the fixed cost of organization is found to augment lobby membership along with the total amount of campaign contributions. In addition, a reduction in the level of electoral uncertainty as well as a rise in the ideological or swing voter density is found to increase the effectiveness of campaign contributions in raising an electoral candidate's perceived popularity and, therefore, a smaller lobby group with lower aggregate donations is deemed as sufficient in influencing electoral outcomes. Moreover, the results indicate that a lower utility difference derived by the citizen-voters when comparing the two electoral candidate's policy choices translates into smaller dispersion of the voters' ideological bias, and consequently results in an increase in the size of lobby groups and their corresponding aggregate donations. As regards the choice of equilibrium policy, evidence of full policy convergence is not found in the case when citizen-voters of the two groups have separable preferences. In addition, policy equilibrium for a more realistic case in which the two policy platforms exhibit strategic interaction by reacting to each other has also been estimated with the help of simulations. Finally, this paper helps in categorically deciphering the influence of the median voter effect (or the centripetal force) and the distinct centrifugal forces in the form of lobbying effect, swing voter effect and the financial embezzlement effect on the equilibrium policy choice by employing different parametric specifications of the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the presence of geographically targeted spending in the allocation of infrastructure projects in Canada. Building on formal models of distributive politics, we expect government districts, core government districts and swing districts to be advantaged in terms of infrastructure projects. We also investigate whether characteristics of Members of Parliament (MPs), such as seniority or holding a cabinet position, influence the distribution of infrastructure projects. Empirically, we analyze the amount of funding allocated by Infrastructure Canada across non-urban federal electoral districts between 2006 and 2018. Our results indicate that non-urban governmental districts receive, on average, more money than opposition districts, and that this is even more the case for core government districts. In contrast, we found little evidence that cabinet ministers or senior MPs are able to attract more funding to their constituencies compared to other representatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, swing voters in courts and legislatures have made many of the United States' most important decisions of law and policy. It would be easy to conclude from the recent history of the Supreme Court and Congress that democracy or majority rule inevitably entails placing many of a society's most important decisions in the hands of swing voters. Far from being inevitable, however, swing voters result from a highly contingent set of circumstances, both ideological and institutional. This Article probes these contingencies, describing and evaluating swing voters and the power they hold. It first explains the conditions under which swing voters will exist and wield power, including an account of why swing voters hold greater power than other pivotal voters. Understanding swing voters requires understanding institutional design and internal procedures: some arrangements increase swing voter prevalence and power, while others have the opposite effect. The ways in which rules construct swing voters give institutional designers and reformers ample tools at their disposal to increase or decrease the prevalence of swing voters and the extent of their power. But nearly any judgment about swing voters and the power they exercise necessarily rests on thorny empirical and normative issues--including the relative importance of moderation and stability in different institutions, the performance of swing voters as compared to other voters, and how swing voter power interacts with principles of majority rule. Swing voters are therefore best understood not as ends unto themselves, but as windows into broader issues in democratic theory and institutional design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political parties use different methods—such as holding rallies, door-to-door canvassing, and distributing gifts—to mobilize voters during election campaigns across Africa. But how do parties choose which approach to use in each constituency? We propose that parties prefer to hold rallies in core constituencies, and to use targeted strategies—canvassing and handouts—in swing and opposition districts. However, opposition parties may not have sufficient resources to pursue such a strategy. Ruling parties have the dual advantage of being in a strong financial position, and having the ability to target core voters with state benefits between elections. Using post-election survey data from Ghana's 2012 election, we show that the ruling party canvassed the most in districts where they were electorally weak and concentrated rallies in their home constituencies. In contrast, the opposition party focused all of its efforts in its home districts. The results highlight how incumbency status shapes parties' campaign behaviour. They also suggest that ruling parties can combine core and swing voter targeting in different stages of the electoral cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research is mixed as to whether politicians target swing voters or core supporters with distributive spending and whether citizens' turnout affects this strategy. I use a novel data set and research design to examine this—a survey experiment on elected municipal officials. Respondents indicated which of two neighborhoods to target with a local project. I find that local officials, on average, target swing neighborhoods over core ones because they believe that swing voters are more likely than core voters to electorally punish politicians for targeting other groups. Yet, a large proportion still target core voters but not for reasons consistent with extant theory. Officials generally target high turnout neighborhoods over low turnout ones but under certain conditions are also willing to target lower turnout citizens. These findings point to the need for ongoing work to identify the conditions under which officials will target core or swing voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The swing voter's curse is useful for explaining patterns of voter participation, but arises because voters restrict attention to the rare event of a pivotal vote. Recent empirical evidence suggests that electoral margins influence policy outcomes, even away from the 50% threshold. If so, voters should also pay attention to the marginal impact of a vote. Adopting this assumption, we find that a marginal voter's curse gives voters a new reason to abstain: to avoid diluting the pool of information. The two curses have similar origins and exhibit similar patterns, but the marginal voter's curse is both stronger and more robust. In fact, the swing voter's curse turns out to be on a knife edge: in large elections, a model with both pivotal and marginal considerations and a model with marginal considerations alone generate identical equilibrium behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who are Africa's swing voters? This article argues that in settings where ethnicity is politically salient, core and swing are defined by whether ethnic groups have a co-ethnic leader in the election. For members of ethnic groups with a co-ethnic in the race, there is typically less uncertainty about which party or candidate will best represent the group's interests. For members of groups without a co-ethnic in the race, uncertainty is often greater, making these voters potentially more receptive to campaign persuasion and more likely to change voting intentions during the campaign. Consistent with these expectations, panel data from Kenya's 2013 presidential election shows that voters from groups without a co-ethnic in the race were more than two and a half times more likely to change their voting intentions during the campaign period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Accounting for undecided and uncertain voters is a challenging issue for predicting election results from public opinion polls. Undecided voters typify the uncertainty of swing voters in polls but are often ignored or allocated to each candidate in a simple deterministic manner. Historically this may have been adequate because the undecided voters were sufficiently small to assume that they do not affect the relative proportions of the decided voters. However, in the presence of high numbers of undecided voters, these static rules may in fact bias election predictions from election poll researchers and metapoll analysts. We examine the effect of undecided voters in the 2016 US presidential election compared with the previous three presidential elections. We show that there were a relatively high number of undecided voters over the campaign and on election day, and that the allocation of undecided voters in this election was not consistent with two‐party proportional (or even) allocations. We find evidence that static allocation regimes are inadequate for election prediction models and that probabilistic allocations may be superior. We also estimate the bias attributable to polling agencies, which is often referred to as 'house effects'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governing parties often face the challenge of coordinating the behavior of legislators to pass bills and achieve their policy goals. Solutions to this collective action problem vary, but generally involve a combination of inducements and punishments to encourage legislators to toe the party line. “Ghost voting,” a form of proxy voting in which legislators record roll-call votes in place of their absent co-partisans has been noted over time in many representative institutions. This article addresses the process of proxy voting in Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada, empirically demonstrating that proxy voting has been widespread and essential to the success of crucial legislation. At the same time, proxy voting creates impediments to measures of legislative unity and undermines accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political observers, campaign experts, and academics alike argue bitterly over whether it is more important for a party to capture ideologically moderate swing voters or to encourage turnout among hardcore partisans. The behavioral literature in American politics suggests that voters are not informed enough, and are too partisan, to be swing voters, while the institutional literature suggests that moderate candidates tend to perform better. We speak to this debate by examining the link between the ideology of congressional candidates and the turnout of their parties’ bases in US House races, 2006–2014. Combining a regression discontinuity design in close primary races with survey and administrative data on individual voter turnout, we find that extremist nominees—as measured by the mix of campaign contributions they receive—suffer electorally, largely because they decrease their party’s share of turnout in the general election, skewing the electorate towards their opponent’s party. The results help show how the behavioral and institutional literatures can be connected. For our sample of elections, turnout appears to be the dominant force in determining election outcomes, but it advantages ideologically moderate candidates because extremists appear to activate the opposing party’s base more than their own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Volatility is a central theme of the scholarship on party competition. At the extreme, entire systems collapse. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela each went through a protracted period of change with the crash of old parties and the rise of new ones, including one representing the "new left." Average electoral volatility grew by more than 50 percent and remained high for a decade or more. Can this churning surface of party death, birth, and change obscure undercurrents of stabilization in individual voting behavior? This project decomposes electoral volatility into two subtypes: system-level volatility--long-term spatial and temporal trends of change in support (e.g., realignment)--and individual volatility--fluid and cycle-specific fluctuations in support (e. g., electoral swing). It shows that the high volatility through the transformation has been at the system level, not the individual level. The cause is the stronger partisan and ethnic bonds mobilized by the new left. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a theory of primary elections and the provision of public and private goods. In our model, candidates from two parties compete for the support of "core" party voters in their respective primary elections and "swing" voters in a general election. Candidates within a party share a fixed ideology and offer platforms that distribute a unit of public spending across group-specific private goods and public goods. Without primaries, candidates offer only public goods when they are very valuable, and only private goods to the swing group otherwise. Because public goods appeal to both types of voters, primary elections increase their provision under a broad set of conditions. The level of public good provision is nonmonotonic in ideological polarization. The prediction of increased public goods spending following the adoption of primaries matches patterns in capital expenditures across US states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date, agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main insights emerge from our analysis and are consistent with an array of stylized facts regarding committee decision making. First, majority rule is more vulnerable than super-majority rules to the disproportionate influence of impatient committee members. Second, more diverse preferences, more patient members, or more unanimous decision voting rules lead to lengthier deliberation and more accurate decisions. Finally, balanced committees unanimously prefer to delegate deliberation power to a moderate chairman rather than be governed by a rule such as unanimity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To win elections, candidates attempt to mobilize supporters and persuade swing voters. With what magnitude each operates across American elections is not clear. I argue that the influence of swing voters should depend upon change in the candidates across elections and that the consequences of changes in composition should depend upon the relative balance of campaign expenditures. I estimate a Bayesian hierarchical model on Florida electoral data for house, governor, and senate contests. Swing voters contribute on average 4.1 percentage points to change in party vote shares, while change in turnout influences outcomes by 8.6 points. The effect of swing voters is increasing in the divergence between the Democrat and Republican candidates. Candidates increasingly benefit from the votes of occasional voters as the relative balance of campaign spending increases in their favor. More broadly, the effects of swing voters and turnout are not constant features of American elections, instead varying across time and space in ways related to candidates and context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyse the results of British general elections from 1950 to 2015. In our model, voting is both instrumental and expressive, and is driven both by ideology and the perceived valence of different parties. On most assumptions the model predicts that the safer the seat the lower the swing. The exception is where ideological factors are relatively dominant in instrumental voting, and valence factors are relatively dominant in expressive voting. In this case the highest swings might be in the safest seats. Alternatively swing might peak at intermediate majorities, and this is what we find when we look at swings between Conservative and Labour in seats held by one or other of these parties. We also find that marginals behave more distinctively when the national result is expected to be close or when there has been another general election recently; and that at least some voters have a sense of what is a 'bellwether' seat i.e. one that would be marginal in a close election. However in those seats where the main contest has been between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, the swing is positively related to the closeness of the contest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the patterns of political selection in majoritarian versus proportional systems. Political parties face a trade off in choosing the mix of high- and low-quality candidates: high-quality candidates are valuable to voters, and thus help to win elections, but they crowd out loyal candidates, who are most preferred by the parties. Under proportional representation, politicians' selection depends on the share of swing voters in the entire electorate. In majoritarian elections, it depends also on the distribution of competitive versus safe (single-member) districts. We show that a majoritarian system with only a few competitive districts is less capable of selecting good politicians than a proportional system. As the share of competitive districts increases, the majoritarian system becomes more efficient than the proportional system. However, for a large enough share of competitive districts, a non-monotonic relation arises: the marginal (positive) effect of adding high-quality politicians on the probability of winning the election is reduced, and highly competitive majoritarian systems become less efficient than proportional ones in selecting good politicians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The observed rate of Americans voting for a different party across successive presidential elections has never been lower. This trend is largely explained by the clarity of party differences reducing indecision and ambivalence and increasing reliability in presidential voting. American National Election Studies (ANES) Times Series study data show that recent independent, less engaged voters perceive candidate differences as clearly as partisan, engaged voters of past elections and with declining rates of ambivalence, being undecided, and floating. Analysis of ANES inter-election panel studies shows the decline in switching is present among nonvoters too, as pure independents are as reliable in their party support as strong partisans of prior eras. These findings show parties benefit from the behavioral response of all Americans to polarization. By providing an ideological anchor to candidate evaluations, polarization produces a reliable base of party support that is less responsive to short-term forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of the Electoral College on U.S. presidential elections is often criticized by academics and political commentators. One facet of its impact, the winner-take-all allocation of states' Electoral College votes, serves in practice to overweight some votes in some states relative to other votes in other states. These disparities in the relative impact of votes in a presidential election can be large. Here, a metric is introduced to quantify the magnitude of these disparities in each presidential election. Using that metric, we show that states whose votes were overweighted in a presidential election subsequently received higher levels of federal grant spending under the newly-elected (re-elected) administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Humanitarian transfers in Malawi are targeted based on political considerations. • Instead of targeting its strongholds to mobilize supporters, the government targets marginal constituencies to win over swing voters. • This strategy does not seem to be succesfuk in increasing the vote share of ruling party candidates in subsequent elections. Do electoral considerations play a role in the targeting of humanitarian transfers? We analyze the targeting of direct cash and food transfers distributed in Malawi in response to an exceptionally poor harvest following a late and erratic rainy season of 2015/16. Combining household survey data on transfers with a remotely sensed measure of drought and with the results of the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections, we show that transfers were disproportionately targeted at marginal constituencies. Rather than distributing the transfers based solely on need or mobilizing its tribal base, the government attempted to persuade swing voters to support its candidates in the next elections. We find no evidence that this strategy was successful at increasing the vote of ruling party candidates in subsequent elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the history of swing voters in American elections and the U.S. Supreme Court (USSC), focusing on various former and current USSC Justices such as Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, Byron White, and Stanley Forman Reed. According to the article, a swing voting USSC Justice is an individual who does not employ a standard voting pattern and has the power to change law, policy, and history. The attitudes of USSC Justices are examined, along with the term swingman.

The article explores how the ideology of the British Labour Party contributed to the decline in the political party's popularity. Topics discussed include the factors behind Labour's failure to gain the support of British swing voters and working class supporters, the consequences for the political party of its failure to directly address the issue of immigration and the reasons why Labour should continue to campaign for a devolution of administrative power.

This article applies a theoretical approach that focuses on the interaction between media, politicians, activists, and citizens to investigate the influence of social media during two recent general elections in Singapore. Taking into account the combination of authoritarian governance and popular elections in this city-state, this article utilizes a mixed methods approach (i.e., a combination of statistics and virtual ethnography) to analyze four aspects of this influence. First, social media are used by the opposition parties because they are the only alternative to use in disseminating information and fostering dialogue. However, the ruling authorities use the same social media to counter the opposition. Second, social media empower the opposition by serving as efficient tools to mobilize, organize, and engage active citizens. However, compared to the traditional grassroots approach, online mobilization is not as effective as expected. Third, social media are able to change the perceptions of ordinary citizens regarding the opinion climate, which could be to either the advantage or the disadvantage of the opposition. Finally, the youngest age group (i.e., 21–30 years) was surveyed in both 2011 and 2015 to investigate their responses to these changes. Because of the complex influence of social media in Singapore, the citizens in this age group are particularly prone to being swing voters. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The logic of electoral competition suggests that candidates should have to adopt moderate issue positions to win majority support. But U.S. presidential candidates consistently take relatively extreme positions on a variety of important issues. Some observers have attributed these “polarized” positions to the extreme views of the parties’ core supporters. I characterize the issue preferences of core Republicans, core Democrats, and swing voters over the past three decades and assess how well the positions of presidential candidates reflect those preferences. I find that Republican candidates have generally been responsive to the positions of their base. However, Democratic candidates have often been even more extreme than the Democratic base, suggesting that electoral polarization is due in significant part to candidates’ own convictions rather than the need to mollify core partisans. Neither party’s presidential candidates have been more than minimally responsive to the views of swing voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]