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textabstractWe draw on a discontinuity at a large university, wherein second-year students with a low first-year grade point average are allocated to a full year of forced, frequent, and regular attendance, to estimate the causal effect of additional structure on academic performance. We show that the policy increases student attendance but has no average effect on grades. The effects differ, however, depending on how course instructors handled unforced students, such that we observe significant grade decreases in courses where unforced students were given full discretion over their attendance. Our evidence suggests that grades decrease in these courses because the policy prevented forced students from picking their desired mix of study inputs.

textabstractQueues are puzzling because they are consistent with wasted profit in equilibrium. Standard rationales trace the puzzle to the pricing of goods. This article uses field experimental evidence from large-scale restaurants to trace the puzzle to the pricing of labor. The customary wage contract in these settings fosters congestion and longer queues because it can encourage workers to emphasize the quality rather than quantity of output. To study this problem, the field experiment pays waiters bonuses for customer volume on days with excess demand, in addition to the tips and hourly wages they customarily receive. The experimental contract shortens queues substantially, generating surplus gains for consumers with no discernible cost in terms of perceived service quality. Workers earn more via the bonuses and because they earn more in tips. Short-run profits increase by at least 49%. There is no discernible reduction in long-run profit. The firm reverted to the baseline contract on excess demand days after many months of evidence, even after acknowledging the gains from the experimental contract. The evidence suggests the puzzle may partly be explained by inefficient wage contracting.

Most studies analyzing worker adjustments to discrimination focus on sorting decisions, such as occupations workers pursue. We instead analyze on the job adjustments, focusing on the effects of discrimination by customers and managers. Specifically, we use observational and experimental data from large-scale restaurants to investigate the effects of the symmetry of waiter facial attributes on the trade offs they make, the extent to which the trade offs are shaped by consumer preference for symmetry, and whether the trade offs affect how they are treated by managers. We find customers have a preference for symmetry and that preferred workers consequently give them less personal attention. This allows preferred workers to serve more customers, generate more revenue for the firm, and more earnings for themselves. The large ensuing productivity and earnings differentials are facilitated largely by small differences in managerial treatment of preferred workers.

We estimate the causal effect of independent candidates on voter turnout and election outcomes in India. To do this, we exploit exogenous changes in the entry deposit candidates pay for their participation in the political process, changes that disproportionately excluded candidates with no affiliation to established political parties. A one standard deviation increase in the number of independent candidates increases voter turnout by more than 6 percentage points, as some voters choose to vote rather than stay home. The vote share of independent candidates increases by more than 10 percentage points, as some existing voters switch who they vote for. Thus, independents allow winning candidates to win with less vote share, decrease the probability of electing a candidate from the governing coalition by about 31 percentage points, and ultimately increase the probability of electing an ethnic-party candidate. Altogether, the results imply that the price of participation by independents is constituency representation in government.

What explains apparent price rigidity over the business cycle? This paper shows that price fluctuations may be hidden in prices of add ons. Using 10 years of extended warranty data from a nationwide Canadian retailer, we show that extended warranty prices respond strongly to changes in local economic activity whereas prices of underlying durable goods do not. The pro-cyclicality is driven by a shift in price setting behavior, where local stores use extended warranty discounts to make base durable demand less price elastic and, as a result, increase sales of durable goods. Discounts on extended warranties were especially sharp during the Great Recession.

Observers have long been ambivalent about democratic representation by parties with a regionalist orientation. We estimate the causal effect of regionalist party representation on political violence in India and find that regionalist parties that win power cause local violence, but not through increased conflict with the Center. Rather, successful regionalists tend to favor local ethnic majorities, causing heightened uncertainty for local minority groups. In particular, we show that the effect is explained entirely by electoral constituencies with significant tribal populations who have no mandated political representation, and that regionalist parties decrease local tribal persons' reported consumption of television and radio, cultural goods, and wages. Our results suggest that culturally and economically insecure tribal minorities respond to representation by local majorities with organized political violence.

We exploit the introduction of pedestrian countdown signals—timers that indicate when traffic lights will change—to evaluate a policy that improves the information of all market participants. We find that although countdown signals reduce the number of pedestrians struck by automobiles, they increase the number of collisions between automobiles. They also cause more collisions overall, implying that welfare gains can be attained by hiding the information from drivers. Whereas most empirical studies on the role of information in markets suggest that asymmetric information reduces welfare, we conclude that asymmetric information can, in fact, improve it. (JEL D82, D83, R41)

Most studies analyzing the adjustments of workers to discrimination focus on sorting decisions, such as occupations workers pursue. We instead analyze on-the-job adjustments, focusing on the effects of discrimination by consumers. Specifically, using data from a couple of large-scale restaurants, we investigate the effects of an outward yet immutable physical trait - symmetry of the facial attributes of workers - on trade offs workers make, and the extent to which the trade offs are shaped by consumer preference for the trait. Large-scale restaurants are well-suited for studying these issues because, as with many jobs in the services sector, workers must trade off quality of service for the quantity of consumers they serve. Using a combination of observational data and data generated by a field experiment, we find consumers have a preference for the trait and that preferred workers deliver lower service quality. Instead they specialize in serving more consumers. The findings imply that when outward physical traits substitute for service quality in consumer preferences, preferred workers specialize in tasks having no services component because consumers punish them less for poor performance. Our evidence further implies preferred workers are better off, as they earn the same as their coworkers despite working fewer hours. We conclude that consumer discrimination shapes comparative advantage and, by doing so, generates inequality in the workplace.