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Ordinary people disagree about normative questions (e.g., morality, politics) constantly. But so do philosophers—the people specially trained to investigate these questions. Isn’t it bad news for our normative views if even the best-trained people, who devote their lives to investigating these questions, can’t agree about the correct answers? Many have thought so. But I think they’re wrong. This dissertation explains why. It consists of three papers with an introduction and conclusion. In the first two papers, I consider three types of disagreement-based challenges to our realistically-construed normative views: metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic challenges. I argue that all of these challenges fail because they share the following structural flaw: they all treat normative disagreement as especially problematic. But it’s not. Every part of philosophy is shot through with deep, intractable disagreement. That includes metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language, the disciplines from which these challenges emerge. I argue that this fact causes big problems for these disagreement-based challenges. So the first two papers are about how not to think about normative disagreement. The third paper is about how we ought to think about it. Many have thought that intellectual humility requires us to give up our normative views in the face of intractable controversy. I think they’re wrong. I argue that another virtue of the mind is just as important as intellectual humility but has been almost completely ignored: intellectual courage. I develop a novel account of this virtue and argue that intellectually courageous agents are sometimes justified in retaining their normative views in the face of disagreement from smart, well-informed, well-motivated people. The story in brief: just as taking calculated practical risks is part of the well-lived practical life, so taking calculated intellectual risks is part of the well-lived intellectual life. So sometimes suspension of judgment in the face of controversy can be a form of intellectual cowardice, not humility, and taking a stand can be just what intellectual virtue requires.

The most important outcome of a guidance and counselling programme is desirable change in students, such as improved school attendance, better study habits, and better scholastic achievement, fewer scholastic failures, lower dropout rate, better educational planning, and better home-school relations. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the implementation of guidance services in senior high schools in Ho the Municipality. Descriptive survey research design was adopted for the study. A sample size of 376 students and 21 counsellors from 7 senior high schools in the Ho Municipality was selected using the multistage sampling procedure comprising proportional stratified sampling, purposive sampling and systematic sampling procedures were used. Data was collected using researcher-made questionnaire with reliability coefficient of was 0.83 and 0.80 for students and counsellors questionnaires respectively. Frequency counts and percentages were used to analyze the five research questions stated for the study. The findings revealed that guidance and counselling units were available even though the facilities were inadequate and the rooms were not well furbished. Again, orientation and counselling services were the most common guidance and counselling services while referral and evaluation services were the least common guidance and counselling services provided in the senior high schools in the Ho Municipality. The headmaster/mistress, housemaster/mistress, class teachers and chaplain were all involved in the provision of guidance and counselling services. Furthermore, it was found that the professional counsellors were comparatively better than the non-professionals in terms of adherence to the right practices. It was recommended that a clear national policy for Guidance and Counselling services in Senior High Schools with adequate funding, allocation of time and role definition of counsellors.

Many students of tertiary institutions including Colleges of Education are young adults who feel more concerned about getting a job, making a home and continuing higher education. These concerns require proper guidance The general purpose of this study therefore was to find out the perception of students on guidance and counselling services provided to students of colleges of education in Volta region, Ghana. The research design used for the study was the descriptive survey. A sample of 346 students was selected from seven Colleges of Education in the Volta Region, Ghana; using a multi-stage sampling procedure comprising purposive, quota and simple random sampling techniques. Data was collected with a 55-item researcher-made questionnaire which has a reliability coefficient of 0.89. One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Independent sample t-test were used to analyse the four research hypotheses at 0.05 significant level. The study found a statistically significant difference in students’ perception of guidance and counselling services on the basis of class levels. There was no statistically significant difference in respondents’ perception of guidance and counselling needs on the basis of gender. However, there was statistically significant difference in students’ reasons for not patronizing guidance and counselling services on the basis of gender. It was recommended that Colleges of Education should organize detailed orientation programmes for new in-takes to assist them adjust and handle academic and social challenges that new students usually encounter. Also, counsellors should explore and employ attractive strategies to motivate both male and female students to patronize guidance and counselling services.Keywords: Perceptions, guidance and counselling services, level of study

In Ghana, control and management of HIV/AIDS have been challenging due to the nature of the virus. Thus, this research was therefore conducted at the Cape Coast Teaching Hospital in the Central Region. The respondents were conveniently selected and interviewed on the HIV clinic day. Primary data were collected for the research. Firstly, the patients numbering 40 were asked questions on their background including gender, number of children and the status of the spouses with regard to HIV/AIDS. After identifying the HIV/AIDS patients an agreement was reached with them to contact their spouses. Their spouses were questioned on whether they knew the status of their spouses with regard to HIV/AIDS. Thirteen of them indicated that they knew and that their spouses were positive. The thirteen respondents were then used for the study; they were interviewed on their knowledge level of measures to prevent transmission and the challenges they face as sero-discordant spouses. Depression (51.4%) was the major challenge outlined by respondents followed by social isolation (37.1%). Despite these challenges the respondents exhibited relatively good knowledge on prevention measures as 69.2% resorted to the use of condoms and 92.3% did not share sharp objects. It was also revealed that there was no statistical significant difference in the knowledge levels of male and female sero-discordant spouses with regard to of HIV/ AIDS prevention measures. It was recommended that workshops should be developed for further training of counsellors and healthcare providers on issues that are related to sero-discordancy. Counsellors should also employ effective counselling techniques to aid sero-positive clients disclose their status to spouse to curb any HIV related violence at homes and in the communities.Keywords: Knowledge, Challenges, Sero-discordant, HIV/AIDS, Metropolis

Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too.