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The discontinuation of life-sustaining therapy has been the subject of dispute for many years. Despite the guidelines, which were created to facilitate the resolution of disputes between the doctor (hospital) and the patient (family, surrogate), new cases of seriously ill patients continue to emerge and stir up controversy. One such case was the RS case. A Polish citizen living in the UK suffered severe brain damage as a result of cardiac arrest. The hospital applied to the court to withdraw ventilation, hydration, and nutrition for RS. The judge ultimately ruled that it was in RS’s best interest to withdraw ventilation and nutrition, but he left the decision on hydration to RS’s wife and the hospital. The court’s ruling has stirred up controversy among the Polish public. Some Polish doctors assessed the UK court’s decision as “legal murder” and “euthanasia”. I believe that it is worth examining the RS case for at least two reasons. Firstly, it provides a better understanding of the difference in approaches to therapy cessation in the UK and Poland. Secondly, many Poles live in the UK, and therefore similar disputes may arise in the future. In this paper, I point out several differences between the British and Polish approaches to discontinuing life-sustaining therapy. These differences are focused on the definitions of medical futility and persistent therapy, best interest and dignity, and quality of life and sanctity of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nigerians from the onset, have a peculiar culture which is known in their ways of life. Their values and norms as elements of this their ways of life are embedded in moral education. However, in Nigerian society today, there is a high rate of negligence of societal moral values while many vices such as: dishonesty, disrespect of elders, insecurity, kidnapping, banditry, raping, corruption, bribery, and many others prevail. In light of the above, this paper examines the role of moral values and the sanctity of life in nation-building. Moral education is a means through which individuals are formed and reformed through qualitative training and retraining of human beings who are agents of development in society. The paper also considers moral education as a means of regenerating these norms and moral values. Again, the paper discovers among other things that moral values which are seen as behavioural conduct and attitude, should be displayed and encouraged by members of the society to build and revitalized the nation. Several recommendations were made and emphasis was laid on the need for moral values taught in moral education, with the collaboration of parents and government by imparting good moral values on the Nigerian Citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the problem of the value of life in the context of its understanding in bioethical discourse. Two different approaches are used to discuss the topic. The first approach demonstrates a set of imperatives of human behaviour associated with the dominance of the religious component defining the value of life. It is called the concept of the “sanctity of life” and considers human life as a sacred act of divine influence on the existence of the living. The second approach systematises bioethical views that promote the supreme value of freedom and autonomy in making decisions by each individual, including those related to their life and health. It is called the concept of “quality of life” and represents a set of ideas that suggest to consciously influence the state of life of the individual if it is possible to improve it or if its further existence loses its rational meaning. Being in opposition to each other, these two main conceptual approaches create a problematic situation that stimulates scientific interdisciplinary research within the framework of bioethical discourse, forming its conceptual and categorical apparatus and expanding the worldview of the researcher and the reflective individual.

P. Singer is called one of the most influential living philosophers in the world, and one of the most controversial. The author of "Animal Liberation", "Practical Ethics", "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" created his own project of preference utilitarianism, in which he placed animals as moral subjects equal to man. In this, he questions Christian anthropocentrism: a human in his system of ethics is intrinsically no better than a chimpanzee or a dog. He recognizes the uniqueness of all species, speaking out against speciesism (discrimination on grounds of species). Singer's ethics is completely independent of religion. Raising issues related to abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, etc., the philosopher inevitably arrived to confrontation with Christian ethics and religious worldview in general. Religion, especially Christianity, plays a significant role in his works, since he considers many of the provisions of Christianity: the special position of humans in the natural world, the attitude to the sanctity of life - to be morally problematic. The article analyzes Peter Singer's critical theses on the Christian religion, including Christian ethics. The second section considers the responses of a number of modern religious thinkers to Singer's criticism of Christianity. In conclusion, the arguments of both sides are analyzed, their strengths and weaknesses are outlined, involving a broader tradition of secular-religious dispute. Conclusions are made about the validity of P. Singer's criticism of religion. Although said criticism is broadly integrated into the works of the philosopher, it is hardly a focus point - rather a tool to solidify Singer's position on practical questions like abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, etc. The negative attitude to religion has roots in Singer's early acquaintance with the Bible and the unhappy past of his family (two of the philosopher's grandparents died in concentration camps). The question of the meaninglessness of suffering largely determines the philosophy and practical ethics of P. Singer. Arguing with theologians, he most often resorts to the classical argument from evil. Singer's criticism of Christian religion is limited, reduced to the problem of the meaninglessness of suffering, the Euthyphron dilemma, criticism of the sanctity of human life, the "dominion" of man over nature. With the exception of a detailed analysis of the bias of Christianity against animals, the criticism is not original.

Ethical dilemmas in nursing are most pronounced in palliative and end-of-life care, where we meet the most demanding and complex needs of nursing care. The research discusses the importance of ethics, religion and spirituality in palliative care, from the perspective of three monotheistic religions and the emphasis on end-of-life ethical dilemmas and how religious beliefs can affect end-of-life medical care and nursing. The importance of ethics, religion and spirituality is presented in the research within three basic ethical principles, such as withholding and withdrawal of treatment, unjustified treatment and treatment with palliative sedation, and tried to justify its assessment in light of Jewish, Catholic and Islamic perspectives.

The article offers a study of the bioethical discourse regarding the value of life through the prism of conceptualizing the main approaches to the study of this phenomenon. It is noted that with all the diversity of approaches that demonstrate a wide range of views on the value of life, the modern bioethical discourse combines the ideas of scientific research, the dogmatics of religious doctrines and the basic principles of moral imperatives, which are interpreted in a civilized society in the context of medico-biological problems of life preservation and reproduction, as well as determining its value. This combination is far from being eclectic. It synthesizes the main achievements of scientific, religious and ethical thought and extrapolates them to the problem of human life, which is a unique phenomenon that should be separated into a specific system of moral norms and imperatives of human activity. The article notes that in modern conditions the bioethical discourse is concentrated around the axiological paradigm in the study of living beings. All the diversity of viewpoints is proposed to be grouped into two main approaches: the ethics of the sacredness (sanctity) of life and the the quality of life ethics. The conceptualization of these two main approaches permits to consider all the diversity of views on the value of life in the context of bioethical discourse as a systematized set of views, which contributes to the creation of an appropriate scientific research situation and will contribute to the deepening of scientific studies on the specified subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The doctrine of the sanctity of life has traditionally been characterised as a Judeo‐Christian doctrine that has it that bodily human life is an intrinsic good and that it is always impermissible to kill an innocent human. Abortion and euthanasia are often assumed to violate the doctrine. The doctrine is usually understood as being derived from religious dogma and, as such, not amenable to debate. I show that this characterisation of the doctrine is problematic in a number of ways, and I go on to rethink the doctrine. In doing so I follow in the footsteps of Ronald Dworkin, who offered a characterisation of the doctrine in his 1993 Life's Dominion, drawing on a conceptualisation of sacredness that is radically different from standard ones and not dependent on religious dogma. I'll argue that although Dworkin's efforts have much to recommend, his conceptualisation of sacredness is inadequate. Dworkin attempted to reconceptualise sacredness 'from the armchair'. Here I explain how sacred values are thought of in anthropology and psychology and argue that the sanctity of human life should be understood in the same way. I'll explain how doing so allows us to resolve a number of conceptual problems that bedevil standard characterisations of the doctrine of the sanctity of life. I'll also consider the possibility of a compromise over the sanctity of human life, and as a consequence, compromise over the permissibility of abortion and euthanasia. I'll argue that such compromise is possible, albeit difficult to achieve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Warmińskie is the property of University of Warmia & Mazury in Olsztyn and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Studia Oecumenica is the property of Editorial Office of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Opole and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Kant formulated a secular argument against suicide's permissibility based on what he regarded as the intrinsic value of humanity. In this paper, I first show that Kant's moral framework entails that some types of suicide are morally permissible. Just as some homicides are morally permissible, according to Kant, so are suicides that are performed according to equivalent maxims. Intention, foreseeability, voluntariness, diminished responsibility, and mental capacity determine the moral characterization of the killing. I argue that a suicide taxonomy that differentiates types of suicide according to morally relevant criteria is compatible with Kantian ethics; it establishes that even where we hold a robust deontological sanctity of life position, we are not obligated to preserve the lives of people whose future life only offers profound suffering, and helping them to die may be justifiable if doing so honors their dignity and autonomy. Nevertheless, homicide and suicide are only weakly morally symmetrical in that even if a given suicide is morally impermissible, we do not normally have the right to prevent it forcibly, though this may be altered by juridical laws under some circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sanctioning abortion is a challenging task because of the competing maternal and foetal interests. While the former asserts her right to autonomy and bodily integrity the latter relies on its right to personhood and sanctity of life. In order to reconcile the competing interests the Courts across the world have declared the foetal viability as the line of demarcation, clearly acknowledging that the woman’s autonomy does not include the right to sacrifice a viable foetus unless its continuance imperils the life of the woman. The U. S. Supreme Court's pronouncement on 1 September, 2021 refusing to injunct the Heartbeat Act enacted by Texas legislature, declaring the conceptus as "Unborn child", "from fertilization until birth", treating "fetal cardiac activity" as the relevant point to determine the fetal viability and equating an illegal abortion with "wrongful death" has created a storm in the ethico-legal circles and medical community. This article examines the salient features of the Texas anti-abortion law and the U.S Supreme Court's refusal to grant the interim relief, in the light of judicial decisions on abortion across the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Studia Warmińskie is the property of University of Warmia & Mazury in Olsztyn and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of the study is to identify a common theoretical basis for the study of human life as capital and unconditional higher value. Theoretical basis is based on the value-laden and revised structural constructivism, provided by the French philosopher and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, critical analysis of the concepts of capital as the embodiment of social expectations, the biological concept of the value of human life, as well as the concepts of its sanctity. Originality. It is proved that one should not consider the value of human life as capital only but instead takes into account its different value interpretations, especially when forming the social identity of a person. Moreover, in each of the value systems, the value of human life can be recognized as unconditional, which does not prevent the coexistence of such different value interpretations within the framework of one social identity, which then inevitably becomes a multiple social identity. Conclusions. Human life cannot be considered as a result of integrating economic expectations into the concept of "advertising" capital: first, expectations may well be inadequate; second, expectations by themselves are not directly related to capital; third, expectations do not necessarily lead to development; fourth, one should clearly distinguish between the spontaneous "expectations" and the values that express people’s strong motivation as members of social communities. The multiplicity of possible cultural conditions that affirm the unconditional value of life indicates that this unconditionality is always relevant rather than absolute. The multiple social identities could be used to add value to the protection of human life, the affirmation of multiple social identities is a means of affirming the unconditional value of human life – it is unconditional in several alternative ways.

Social downshifting is emerging as one of the key strategies of optimizing and maintaining the quality of human life in view of the prospect meet one's death with dignity. The aim of the issue is to conceptualize the term “social downshifting”, by analyzing the relationship between social and biological aspects of death and the connection of a person's understanding of his/her death with his/her social self-identification. In this study the functional approach was used in its value interpretation, that is, as a method of value functionalism. If social downshift emerges as a social value, it can have different functional consequences - institutional, organizational, communicative. On the other hand, the functional choice of a person in favor of social downshift as accepting a new value of the state of limited functional capacity can have very different value reasons - biological (anthropologic, environmental, etc.) or social (ethical, religious, political, economic, etc.). Social downshifting is not an outgrowth of social identity frameworks, but rather their artificial (possibly temporary) narrowing. While there may be objective reasons for this, social downshifting is still the result of the subjective, conscious position being taken by an individual, with which he or she is replacing his/her previous, socially aggressive and expansive position. Changing of the social identification is the best alternative to the uncompensated loss of grounds for the individual’s ordinary method of social identification. The uncompensated loss of identity is essentially social death of a person - full or partial, and it is not surprising, therefore, that it often entails overt or covert suicide, that is, premature, artificially caused physical death. Therefore, social downshifting as a realistic variant of changing the social identity of an individual in unfavorable circumstances, acts as a safeguard against suicide. With successful social downshifting, the person acquires a new meaning of life and new, acceptable living conditions. Thus, a person is motivated to use the technological life-extension capabilities that global civilization offers.

My recent article, “The challenge of brain death for the sanctity of life ethic” (Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2018, 8 (3–4), pp. 153–165) elicited five commentaries. In this brief response, I clarify my own position in the light of some misunderstandings, and discuss whether the definition of death is best thought of as an ethical question, or as a matter of fact. I also comment on the suggestion that we should allow people to choose the criteria by which they wish their own death to be determined, or their organs removed to be donated to others.

For more than thirty years, in most of the world, the irreversible cessation of all brain function, more commonly known as brain death, has been accepted as a criterion of death. Yet the philosophical basis on which this understanding of death was originally grounded has been undermined by the long-term maintenance of bodily functions in brain dead patients. More recently, the American case of Jahi McMath has cast doubt on whether the standard tests for diagnosing brain death exclude a condition in which the patient is not dead, but in a minimally conscious state. I argue that the evidence now clearly shows that brain death is not equivalent to the death of the human organism. We therefore face a choice: either we stop removing vital organs from brain dead patients, or we accept that it is not wrong to kill an innocent human who has irreversibly lost consciousness.

Social downshifting is emerging as one of the key strategies of optimizing and maintaining the quality of human life in view of the prospect meet one's death with dignity. The aim of the issue is to conceptualize the term "social downshifting", by analyzing the relationship between social and biological aspects of death and the connection of a person's understanding of his/her death with his/her social self-identification. In this study the functional approach was used in its value interpretation, that is, as a method of value functionalism. If social downshift emerges as a social value, it can have different functional consequences - institutional, organizational, communicative. On the other hand, the functional choice of a person in favor of social downshift as accepting a new value of the state of limited functional capacity can have very different value reasons - biological (anthropologic, environmental, etc.) or social (ethical, religious, political, economic, etc.). Social downshifting is not an outgrowth of social identity frameworks, but rather their artificial (possibly temporary) narrowing. While there may be objective reasons for this, social downshifting is still the result of the subjective, conscious position being taken by an individual, with which he or she is replacing his/her previous, socially aggressive and expansive position. Changing of the social identification is the best alternative to the uncompensated loss of grounds for the individual's ordinary method of social identification. The uncompensated loss of identity is essentially social death of a person - full or partial, and it is not surprising, therefore, that it often entails overt or covert suicide, that is, premature, artificially caused physical death. Therefore, social downshifting as a realistic variant of changing the social identity of an individual in unfavorable circumstances, acts as a safeguard against suicide. With successful social downshifting, the person acquires a new meaning of life and new, acceptable living conditions. Thus, a person is motivated to use the technological life-extension capabilities that global civilization offers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The third chapter of Jonathan Glover's Causing Death and Saving Lives is devoted to the doctrine of the sanctity of life. In this article, I propose to analyse the Gloverian critique of the sanctity of life in its initial presentation. When Glover wrote this work in 1977, the affirmation of the sanctity of life was a recurring theme in public and scientific debates in both England and the United States. While there seems to be some consensus about it, it should be noted that the term "sanctity of life" is very rarely discussed. Jonathan Glover was one of the first philosophers to engage in such an investigation and to show the limits of affirming the sanctity of life. In his analysis, he proposed replacing the defective parts of the doctrine, i.e., those that do not stand up to rational analysis. His contribution is of primary importance not only for the criticism of the doctrine of the sanctity of life, but also for the development of bioethics and its theoretical arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

THIS case commentary analyses the application of the best interests standard in section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 by the Court in the decision in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v RY (by his litigation friend the official solicitor) and CP [2017] EWCOP 2. It evaluates the way in which the law impacted on how clinical decisions in respect of RY were made and identifies systemic concerns arising from the case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine international public opinion towards stem-cell research during the period when the issue was at its most contentious. We draw upon representative sample surveys in Europe and North America, fielded in 2005 and find that the majority of people in Europe, Canada and the United States supported stem-cell research, providing it was tightly regulated, but that there were key differences between the geographical regions in the relative importance of different types of ethical position. In the U.S., moral acceptability was more influential as a driver of support for stem-cell research; in Europe the perceived benefit to society carried more weight; and in Canada the two were almost equally important. We also find that public opinion on stem-cell research was more strongly associated with religious convictions in the U.S. than in Canada and Europe, although many strongly religious citizens in all regions approved of stem-cell research. We conclude that if anything public opinion or ‘public ethics’ are likely to play an increasingly important role in framing policy and regulatory regimes for sensitive technologies in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Muslim woman in her sixteenth week of pregnancy was informed that her ultrasound scan showed spina bifida, and laboratory results confirmed the diagnosis. The child would have various complications and, most probably, would need medical care for life. With the consent of her husband she decided to terminate the pregnancy. Her decision sparked controversy among Muslim clerics in her community, sparking debate between those who would allow abortion for medical reasons and those who oppose abortion for any reason. This paper will review the philosophical and theological arguments of the pro-life and pro-choice groups as well as the Islamic perspective concerning a woman’s autonomy over her reproductive system, the sanctity of the fetus and the embryo, therapeutic abortion, and ensoulment.

The aim of this article is to present an account of an important element of medical ethics and law which is widely cited but is often confused. This element is most frequently referred to as ‘the principle of the sanctity of life’, and it is often assumed that this language has a religious provenance. However, the phrase is neither rooted in the traditions it purports to represent nor is it used consistently in contemporary discourse. Understood as the name of an established ‘principle’ the ‘sanctity of life’ is virtually an invention of the late twentieth century. The language came to prominence as the label of a position that was being rejected: it is the name of a caricature. Hence there is no locus classicus for a definition of the terms and different authors freely apply the phrase to divergent and contradictory positions. Appeal to this ‘principle’ thus serves only to perpetuate confusion. This language is best jettisoned in favour of clearer and more traditional ethical concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Managing individuals with chronic disorders of consciousness raises ethical questions about the appropriateness of maintaining life-sustaining treatments and end-of-life decisions for those who are unable to make decisions for themselves. For many years, the positions fostering the "sanctity" of human life (i.e., life is inviolable in any case) have led to maintaining life-sustaining treatments (including artificial nutrition and hydration) in patients with disorders of consciousness, allowing them to live for as long as possible. Seldom have positions that foster "dignity" of human life (i.e., everyone has the right to a worthy death) allowed for the interruption of life-sustaining treatments in some patients with disorders of consciousness. Indeed, most ethical analyses conclude that the decision to interrupt life-sustaining therapies, including artificial nutrition and hydration, should be guided by reliable information about how the patient wants or wanted to be treated and/or whether the patient wants or wanted to live in such a condition. This would be in keeping with the principles of patient-centered medicine, and would conciliate the duty of respecting both the dignity and sanctity of life and the right to a worthy death. This "right to die" has been recognized in some countries, which have legalized euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide, but some groups fear that legalizing end-of-life decisions for some patients may result in the inappropriate use of euthanasia, both voluntary and nonvoluntary forms (slippery slope argument) in other patients. This review describes the current opinions and ethical issues concerning end-of-life decisions in patients with disorders of consciousness, with a focus on the impact misdiagnoses of disorders of consciousness may have on end-of-life decisions, the concept of "dignity" and "sanctity" of human life in view of end-of-life decisions, and the risk of the slippery slope argument when dealing with euthanasia and end-of-life decisions. We argue that the patient's diagnosis, prognosis, and wishes should be central to determining the most appropriate therapeutic approach and end-of-life decisions for that individual. Each patient's diagnosis, prognosis, and wishes should also be central to legislation that guarantees the right to die and prevents the slippery slope argument through the establishment of evidence-based criteria and protocol for managing these patients with disorders of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Embryonic Stem Cell Research (ESCR) raises ethical issues. In the process of research, embryos may be destroyed and, to some, such an act entails the 'killing of human life'. Past studies have sought the views of scientists and the general public on the ethics of ESCR. This study, however, explores multi-faith ethical viewpoints, in particular, those of Buddhists, Hindus and Catholics in Malaysia, on ESCR. Responses were gathered via semi-structured, face-to-face interviews. Three main ethical quandaries emerged from the data: (1) sanctity of life, (2) do no harm, and (3) 'intention' of the research. Concerns regarding the sanctity of life are directed at particular research protocols which interfere with religious notions of human ensoulment and early consciousness. The principle of 'do no harm' which is closely related to ahimsa prohibits all acts of violence. Responses obtained indicate that respondents either discourage research that inflicts harm on living entities or allow ESCR with reservations. 'Intention' of the research seems to be an interesting and viable rationale that would permit ESCR for the Buddhists and Hindus. Research that is intended for the purpose of alleviating human suffering is seen as being ethical. This study also notes that Catholics oppose ESCR on the basis of the inviolability of human life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muslims believe that only Allah swt has the ultimate will and power over life and death. Life is merely a gift and a loan entrusted to mankind until death takes place. It is therefore forbidden for any person to intentionally end a life; to do so would be to commit a grievous transgression against Allah. Islam holds life in the highest esteem to the extent that the duty to preserve life forms one of the core principles in maqasid al-shari'ah. Protection of one's life includes taking care of one's body, health and mind from that which would lead to harm and death. All lives are equally inviolable; Islam does not discriminate one's life on the basis of nationality, race or religion. In order to ensure a just order that protects both individual and public interests at large, Islam prescribes certain legitimate situations where the dimensions of sanctity of life are qualified, for example, by permitting to end life in self-defence or in due course of law. There is thus a need to understand the wisdom behind the sanctity of life principle in Islam, not only by studying its importance, but also the overall scope in which it operates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]