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mit einer deutsch- und französisch-sprachigen Zusammenfassung, Studie 1 analysiert, wie Stellensuchende (STES)3 auf eine Reduktion in der Dauer des Taggeld-Anspruches reagieren. Im Rahmen der 4. Teilrevision des Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetzes (AVIG)4 per 1.April 2011 wurde der maximale Taggeld-Anspruch der STES unter 25 Jahren ohne Kinder halbiert von 400 auf 200 Tage. Wir zeigen, dass diese Reform die durchschnittliche Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit im ersten Jahr nach dem Arbeitsplatzverlust um etwa 10 Tage oder 6% der Gesamtdauer gesenkt hat. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass sich ein/e STES ohne explizit ausgewiesene neue Beschäftigung aus dem Versicherungssystem abmeldet, steigt um 35%. Dieser Effekt bewirkt einen insgesamt negativen Effekt auf die kurzfristigen Erwerbseinkommen (-3%; in den ersten 6 Monaten nach Arbeitslosigkeit). Langfristig verschwindet dieser negative Effekt. Weitere Analysen zeigen auf, dass die Wirkungen der Reform massgeblich dadurch beeinflusst sind, wie die STES informiert sind und welche Erwartungen sie haben: STES reagieren stärker auf unvorhergesehene Reduktionen in der Versicherung als auf unvorhergesehene Ausweitungen. Weiterhin unterscheiden sich die Wirkungen der untersuchten Reform deutlich nach verschiedenen sozio-demographischen Eigenschaften: Weniger qualifizierte STES, Männer, Nicht-Schweizer und Personen mit tieferem versichertem Verdienst (und damit Taggeldhöhe) sowie mehr Arbeitslosigkeits-Erfahrung reagieren stärker auf die Taggeldkürzung. Sie reduzieren ihre Arbeitslosigkeits-Dauer überdurchschnittlich stark. Langfristig generiert die Taggeldkürzung negative Lohneffekte für wenig qualifizierte STES sowie für Personen mit hohem versichertem Verdienst, also für jene STES mit relativ hohem Erwerbseinkommen vor Arbeitslosigkeit (oberster Viertel der Verteilung). Eine positive längerfristige Wirkung auf die Löhne ist für Frauen, für Personen mit mittlerer bis tiefer Taggeldhöhe sowie für STES mit gewisser Arbeitslosigkeits-Erfahrung sichtbar. Studie 2 stellt die Frage, wie sich eine erhöhte

For as long as the EU has been using sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, countering violations has been a challenge. With the EU rapidly expanding the breadth and depth of its sanctions, its ­institutions and member states must find ways to ensure stricter and more uniform enforcement to deter violations, enhance efficiency, and ensure a more level playing field for economic actors. The stakes are high: the success of the EU's response to Russia’s military aggression hinges largely on effective sanctions, and the long-term legitimacy of the tool itself depends on its enforcement.

As diplomatic initiatives have thus far failed to achieve the objective of a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Demo­cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and given that a military solution is generally considered to be unfeasible, sanctions have become the central instrument of the international community in dealing with the threat from North Korea. While inherently linked to and built upon the respective resolutions of the UN Security Council, the EU's sanctions regime against North Korea succeeds the former in terms of quantity and quality, constituting the most comprehensive sanctions regime of the EU currently in operation. Since its inception in 2006, the EU's sanctions regime against the DPRK developed in several episodes, which are built upon different logics and objectives: coercion, constraining, signaling. The political explanation for the EU's decision to adopt autonomous sanc­tions results from a set of interrelated factors, most notably the general sup­port for sanctions as an adequate tool for EU member states to use against North Korea, the influence of powerful member states, namely Germany, France, and (before Brexit) the UK, pushing for the imposition of autonomous EU measures, the lack of diplomatic engagement and eco­nomic interest, as well as third party pressure. While sanctions will remain an important aspect of the EU’s North Korea strategy in the foreseeable future, it is in Brussels' interest to supplement its sanctions-based strategy with more proactive initiatives vis-à-vis North Korea, as the current approach has distinct negative strategic implications for the EU. (author's abstract)

Diplomarbeit Universität Innsbruck 2023

eine theoretische Analyse mit Praxisbezug Paula Malin Fetköter, Diplomarbeit Universität Innsbruck 2023

As a region, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the world's largest grain importer. Approximately 30 per cent of global exports of wheat and barley, 20 per cent of corn, and a whopping three-quarters of sunflower oil come from Ukraine and Russia. The aggression against Ukraine is thus disrupting global food trade and affecting food security in the MENA. The war is also raising questions about future food systems and their water footprint. In the Arab world, dependence on Ukraine and Russia for imports of wheat, the world's largest source of calories, is at 50 per cent - among the highest globally. The greatest vulnerability exists in Egypt, Lebanon, and Sudan. Imports will actually need to rise from pre-war levels if population growth and dietary changes towards meat and dairy products are taken into consideration. For lack of water, food self-sufficiency is not an option in the MENA. Food imports constitute "virtual water" - that is, the water used to produce a commodity and thus embedded in it. Virtual water can be imported by MENA countries via the food trade and has mitigated water scarcity by adding a "second Nile River" to the region's water balance. The global food crisis of 2007/2008 spurred MENA countries to attempt to alleviate their import vulnerabilities bilaterally, via investments in land and in value chains, but reliance on the multilateral international trading system remains. The reaction to the current crisis can build on lessons learnt since then, with coping capacities unevenly distributed between the region's richer oil exporters and poorer countries. Avoiding new export restrictions such as those that occurred during the global food crisis of 2007/2008 is crucial. Western attempts to stabilise the multilateral food trade could help the MENA to source alternative supplies. This might also offer an opportunity to mend fences between the West and MENA at a time when closer energy cooperation is essential and an ambivalent stance in the MEN

Das BMAS hat das QuBe-Kooperationsprojekt mit einem Fachkräftemonitoring beauftragt, das aus einer jährlichen Mittelfristprognose und einer regelmäßigen Langfristprognose besteht. Mit der Mittelfristprognose wird die Lücke geschlossen zwischen der Engpassanalyse der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA), welche vor allem die aktuelle Fachkräftesituation auf dem Arbeitsmarkt nach Berufsgattungen (Fünfsteller) der Klassifikation der Berufe 2010 (KldB 2010) bewertet, und den bisherigen Langfristprognosen des Fachkräftemonitorings. Die vorliegende Mittelfristprognose für 2022 bis 2026 beinhaltet neben der zunehmenden Digitalisierung auch die ökonomischen Folgen der COVID 19-Pandemie und die damit verbundenen Veränderungen der Wirtschaft und des Arbeitsmarktes. Auch die Auswirkungen des Angriffskrieges der russischen Föderation auf die Ukraine, die damit verbundenen Sanktionen und die Reaktion darauf im Rahmen der Verteidigungsausgaben werden mit Informationsstand Juni 2022 berücksichtigt. Die Energiewende ("Osterpaket") und die steigenden Zinsen sind somit ebenso Teil der Prognose.

Der russische Angriffskrieg in der Ukraine hat die europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur zum Einsturz gebracht. Das Friedensgutachten 2022 analysiert die Eskalation, zeigt Folgen für die Ukraine und die Region auf und richtet den Blick auf die Neuausrichtung der deutschen und europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Neben den globalen Implikationen des Krieges werden auch die Erfolgsbedingungen und Grenzen von Sanktionen dargelegt sowie die Krise der globalen nuklearen Ordnung analysiert. Darüber hinaus zeigen die Untersuchungen zum globalen Konfliktgeschehen, dass internationalisierte Konflikte, dschihadistische Gewaltakteure sowie Gewalt und Diskriminierung gegen Frauen und LGBTQI*-Minderheiten neue friedenspolitische Akzente erfordern. Und die wegen Terrorgefahr, Pandemie und Extremismus stetig ausgeweiteten Kompetenzen der Sicherheitsinstitutionen im Innern der Demokratien bedürfen ebenfalls stärkerer demokratischer Kontrolle. Das Friedensgutachten 2022 analysiert das Kriegs- und Konfliktgeschehen, zeigt Trends der Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik auf und gibt friedenspolitische Empfehlungen für Bundestag und Bundesregierung. Mit seinen konkreten Handlungsempfehlungen ist das Gutachten ein zentrales Medium für den Dialog zwischen Wissenschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik. Die deutschen Friedensforschungsinstitute (BICC/HSFK/IFSH/INEF) geben das Gutachten seit 1987 heraus.

Media governance has changed substantially after Russia's attack on Ukraine. A digital Iron Curtain was put up, as social media companies withdrew or were banned in Russia and Russian state sponsored news outlets were the targets of EU sanctions and deplatforming. This study analyses how 29 states, including 18 EU members, have dealt with the media governance questions related to the informational dimension of Russia’s war on Ukraine. It appears that in only one country - Finland - did large private media outlets act quickly on their own initiative after the start of the military aggression against Ukraine to suspend the distribution of Russian news channels. There are examples that some companies in Austria and Latvia took similar actions, but the scale is smaller. In five countries - Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland - the national authorities issued instructions to suspend Russian media outlets shortly after the invasion, prior to the 1 March 2022 Council Regulation 2022/350 and even before the President of the European Commission announced on 27 February 2022 the intention to implement such a measure across the EU. Given the shortness of this "time window" it would be overly formal to give too much meaning to the question "Who acted first?" - private media companies or national governments. What matters is that access to certain Russian and Belarussian media outlets was suspended within a very short period as a result of coordinated activity between national authorities and private actors. There are no reports of non-compliance with the respective state instructions. Most EU Member State responses were confined to the transposition of the sanctions imposed against Russia at the supranational level, including the ban on Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, without taking further, more wide-ranging action. The transposition of Council Regulation 2022/350 was typically accompanied by communications by the respective regulatory agencies in EU Member States t

Fiscal policy surveillance, including the possibility to impose financial sanctions, has been an important feature of Economic and Monetary Union since its inception. With the reform of fiscal rules in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis, coercive provisions have been made stricter and the Commission has formally gained power vis-à-vis the Council. Nevertheless, sanctions under the Stability and Growth Pact for budgetary non-compliance have so far not been imposed. This article asks why the Commission has until now refrained from proposing such sanctions. Using minimalist process-tracing methods, three post-crisis cases in which the imposition of fines was possible, are analysed. Applying an adaptation of normative institutionalism, it is argued that the mechanism entitled "normative-strategic minimum enforcement" provides an explanation of why no sanctions are imposed in the cases studied: Given that the Commission does not perceive punitive action as appropriate, it strategically refrains from applying the enforcement provisions to their full extent.

Die Attribution von Cyberangriffen ist ein souveräner Akt der EU-Mit­gliedstaaten. Diese haben jedoch unterschiedliche technische und geheim­dienstliche Fähigkeiten. Das führt zu Inkohärenzen in der europäischen Cyberdiplomatie, etwa bei der Verhängung von Cybersanktionen. Die Analyse der politischen Reaktionen auf die Cybervorfälle WannaCry, Not‑Petya, Cloud Hopper, OVCW und Bundestag-Hack offenbart folgende Probleme: Die Attribution dauert lange und ist auf Erkenntnisse von Nato-Partnern angewiesen; die technischen Realitäten und die rechtlichen Tatbestandsmerkmale zur Klassifikation und Verfolgung von Cyber­angriffen passen nicht immer zusammen; die Gewichtung der Tatbestands­merkmale ist unklar. Cybersanktionen sollen gezielte Maßnahmen und vor allem in ihrer Intensität verhältnismäßig sein: Destruktive Angriffe wie WannaCry oder NotPetya sollten härtere Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen als alltägliche Fälle von Cyberspionage wie Cloud Hopper oder Bundestag-Hack. Hier muss die EU ihre Werkzeuge genauer konfigurieren. Die EU sollte die rechtlichen Tatbestandsmerkmale schärfen und Beweis­standards zur Attribution vereinheitlichen. Die Gemeinsame Cyber-Stelle der EU und EU INTCEN im Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst sollten ge­stärkt werden, um den Austausch forensischer Informationen zu verbessern und die Politik der Attribution effektiver koordinieren zu können. Die EU-Mitgliedstaaten und ihre alliierten Partner müssen Angreifer häu­figer gemeinsam verurteilen, damit die davon ausgehende politische Bot­schaft wirklich deutlich wird. Dazu wäre es sinnvoll, für den Erlass von Cybersanktionen qualifizierte Mehrheitsentscheidungen zuzulassen. (Autorenreferat)

The attribution of cyberattacks is a sovereign act by the EU Member States. However, these all have different technical and intelligence capabilities. This leads to a lack of coherence in European cyber diplomacy, for exam­ple when imposing cyber sanctions. Analysis of policy responses to the WannaCry, NotPetya, Cloud Hopper, OPCW, and Bundestag hack cyber incidents reveals the following problems: Attribution takes a long time and relies on intelligence from NATO partners; the technical realities and the legal facts for classifying and pros­ecuting cyberattacks do not always match; the weighting of the criteria for establishing what constitutes a crime is unclear. Cyber sanctions should be proportionate, targeted measures and destructive attacks, such as WannaCry or NotPetya, should result in harsher punishment than everyday cases of cyber espionage, such as Cloud Hopper or the Bundestag hack. The EU must adapt its tools accordingly. The EU should tighten the legal criteria and harmonise the standards of evidence for attribution. The EU Joint Cyber Unit and EU INTCEN, part of the European External Action Service, should be strengthened to improve the exchange of forensic information and to coordinate attribution policy more effectively. EU Member States and their allied partners should better coordinate political signalling to condemn cyberattacks. To this end, it would make sense to allow qualified majority voting for the adoption of cyber sanctions. (author's abstract)

Die Europäische Union (EU) greift im Rahmen ihrer Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) verstärkt zu autonomen Finanz­sanktionen, um auf weltweite Krisen und Konflikte im Sinne eigener Zielsetzungen umgehend zu reagieren. Der vermehrte Einsatz dieses wichtigen Instruments im Werkzeugkasten der GASP geschieht dabei im Kontext eines blockadeanfälligen Entschei­dungsverfahrens im Rat, hoher Hürden des Unionsrechts und der Schwie­rigkeit, eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit Verbündeten zu koordinieren. Die Wirkung autonomer EU-Finanzsanktionen könnte ohne tiefgreifende Strukturreformen kurz- bis mittelfristig auf fünf verschiedenen Wegen gesteigert werden. So ließe sich (1) die Entscheidungsfindung im Rat in Bezug auf Listungen vergemeinschaften, (2) die Orientierungshilfen ver­bessern, die von der Europäischen Kommission und den zuständigen Behörden in den jeweiligen EU-Mitgliedstaaten bereitgestellt werden, (3) der Anwendungsbereich von Verfügungs- und Bereitstellungsverboten vergrößern, (4) die Verzahnung mit Instrumenten aus inhaltlich verwand­ten Politikfeldern weiter vorantreiben und (5) die bestehende Zusammen­arbeit mit dem Vereinigten Königreich und den Vereinigten Staaten als den beiden engsten Verbündeten weiter verstetigen. Mit der Chance auf einen wirkungsvollen Einsatz geht das Risiko überzoge­ner Erwartungen einher. Denn eine größere Wirkung ist für sich allein genommen noch keine hinreichende Bedingung für einen wirk­samen Einsatz autonomer EU-Finanzsanktionen, der ein Erreichen der jeweils verfolgten politischen Ziele auch tatsächlich fördert. (Autorenreferat)

This article aims to enrich the literature on EU sanctions in two ways. First, it argues that the absence of material sanctions does not imply a non-response. When faced with human rights violations, policymakers enjoy a third option besides exerting material pressure or refraining from intervening. They may instead employ what constructivist scholars call social sanctions. This option consists of verbally calling out the violators, either publicly, through a naming-and-shaming strategy, or diplomatically via political dialogue and demarches. Social sanctions can be a credible alternative or complement to material sanctions. Second, we argue for the importance of disaggregating the EU as a sender of sanctions. A non-response by executive institutions does not mean that the EU as a whole is standing idly by. Looking at social sanctions alongside material ones more accurately describes the choices policymakers face when designing their response to human rights violations. We demonstrate the value of our arguments by examining the EU’s various responses to LGBTI rights violations in Lithuania and Uganda.

Although sanctions targeting political regimes receive the most media attention, the EU can also sanction states for labour rights violations through its trade policy. Although in practice such sanctions are applied only in extreme cases, the possibility of suspending trade preferences increases the EU’s leverage. In modern trade agreements, the EU incorporates Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters for labour and environmental matters. However, trade sanctions for non-compliance with this chapter are absent. Instead, a dedicated dispute settlement arrangement exists, leading to recommendations by a panel of experts. In 2019 the EU launched proceedings against South Korea for failing to uphold commitments to ratify and implement International Labour Organisation core conventions regarding trade unions under the 2011 EU-Korea Trade Agreement. In 2021, the panel of experts sided with the EU's interpretation of commitments under the TSD chapter. This initial case represents the EU's intention to focus on the implementation of TSD chapters. Using data from official documents, this article process-traces the dispute with Korea. It argues that the outcome of the case, and Korea's ratification of fundamental International Labour Organisation conventions in 2021, demonstrate the potential of the TSD chapter, when forcefully enforced, to partially redress the weak sanctioning capacity in TSD chapters. It also uncovers important caveats regarding state capacity and alignment with government objectives as conditioning the effectiveness of TSD chapters' non-legally binding sanctioning mechanisms.

In the wake of unsettling conflicts and democratic backsliding, states and organisations increasingly respond with sanctions. The European Union (EU) is one of them: Brussels makes use of the entire toolbox in its foreign policy, and its sanctions appear in different forms - diplomatic measures, travel bans, financial bans, or various forms of economic restrictions. Yet, there is little debate between different strands in the literature on EU sanctions, in particular concerning measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and those pertaining to the development and trade policy fields. Our thematic issue addresses this research gap by assembling a collection of articles investigating the design, impact, and implementation of EU sanctions used in different realms of its external affairs. Expanding the definition of EU sanctions to measures produced under different guises in the development, trade, and foreign policy fields, the collection overcomes the compartmentalised approach characterising EU scholarship.

Since the 1990s, sanctions senders like the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations have been imposing visa bans and asset freezes on individuals as a key element of their sanctions packages. Notwithstanding the growing centrality that individual sanctions have acquired in international sanctions practice, little is known about the impact of sanctions listings on designees. Some researchers have scrutinised targeting choices, while others have explored the effects of sanctions on designees. However, no study has yet examined the fit between targeting choices and impacts on designees. First, we interrogate the theory of targeted sanctions to identify the expectations that it generates. Second, we examine the effects on designees and contrast them with the targeting logic of the sender, in a bid to ascertain their fit. Our analysis of the cases of Côte d'Ivoire (2010-2011) and Zimbabwe (2002-2017) benefits from original interview material.

The European Union (EU) states in its 2016 Global Strategy that it intends to be a "responsible global stakeholder" and to "act worldwide to address the core causes of war and poverty, as well as to promote the indivisibility and universality of human rights" (European Union Global Strategy, 2016, pp. 5–8, 18). However, the Global Strategy is silent on the credentials or prerequisites that give the EU the authority to act globally and address conflicts and violations of human rights, including through the use of sanctions against non-EU states. How far the EU has the authority to use sanctions, which are essentially coercive measures, is especially relevant when the EU resorts to unilateral sanctions based on obligations owed erga omnes, namely measures without explicit United Nations Security Council authorisation and based on obligations owed to the international community as a whole. Drawing on Habermas's theory of communicative action, this article introduces an analytical framework - the "moral dimension" of EU authority - which maps the substantive and procedural standards to guide the assessment of whether the EU has the appropriate credentials to qualify as an authority with the right to intervene forcibly into the internal affairs of non-EU states. The analytical value of the framework is examined empirically in the case study of the EU's restrictive measures (sanctions) imposed in response to state violence against anti-government protests in Uzbekistan in 2005.

The implementation of European Union (EU) policies has been investigated for several policy areas, but Decisions made under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have rarely been considered. While many CFSP measures are applicable throughout the EU without the need for further action on the domestic level, some Decisions must be implemented by Council Regulations. These Council Regulations adopted with the intent to implement CFSP Decisions have qualities of Directives, which delegate implementing tasks to member states and require transposition. The aim of this article is to investigate whether restrictive measures imposed by the EU are uniformly implemented across the member states, and, if not, to what extent implementation performance varies. We observe significant differences in implementation performance across member states. The findings of this article are twofold. First, we claim that implementation and compliance studies should involve CFSP decisions more systematically. Second, empirical confirmation is provided of how uneven transposition and application occurs also in CFSP matters. This study is based on empirical work that consisted of desk research and semi-structured interviews with national competent authorities of 21 EU member states taking place between March 2020 and January 2021.

Die breite Solidarisierung mit Polen, die innerhalb der EU aufgrund der Krise an der Grenze zu Belarus aktuell zu beobachten ist, ändert nichts am Grundsatzkonflikt in der Frage der Rechtsstaatlichkeit. In den vergangenen Monaten hat Polen Rechts­prinzipien der Union offen in Zweifel gezogen. Es ist nicht zu erwarten, dass die amtierende polnische Regierung effektive Maßnahmen zur Wiederherstellung der Unabhängigkeit der Justiz ergreifen wird. Wenn es dabei bleibt, wird die EU ihre Finanztransfers an Polen wie an Ungarn substantiell einschränken müssen. Auch die horizontale Anwendung von EU-Recht wird gegenüber Polen auf wachsende Vor­behalte stoßen. Zum Schutz des europäischen Gemeinwesens müssen politisch an­gespannte Beziehungen zu Polen indes in Kauf genommen werden. Die neue Bundesregierung hat das Ziel, die Verteidigung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit zu priorisieren, in ihrem Koalitionsvertrag niedergelegt. Sie sollte daran festhalten. (Auorenreferat)