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Studies suggest that internally oriented cognitive processes are central to creativity. Here, we distinguish between intentional and unintentional forms of mind wandering and explore their behavioral and neural correlates. We used a sample of 155 healthy adults from the mind-brain-body dataset, all of whom completed resting-state fMRI scans and trait-level measures of mind wandering. We analyzed intentional and unintentional mind wandering tendencies using self-report measures. Next, we explored the relationship between mind wandering tendencies and creativity, as measured by a divergent thinking task. Finally, we describe patterns of resting-state network connectivity associated with mind wandering, using graph theory analysis. At the behavioral level, results showed a significant positive association between creativity and both intentional and unintentional mind wandering. Neuroimaging analysis revealed higher weighted degree connectivity associated with both forms of mind wandering, implicating core regions of the default network and the left temporal pole. We observed topological connectivity differences within the default network: intentional mind wandering was associated with degree connectivity in posterior regions, whereas unintentional mind wandering showed greater involvement of prefrontal areas. Overall, the findings highlight patterns of resting-state network connectivity associated with intentional and unintentional mind wandering, and provide novel evidence of a link between mind wandering and creativity.

Previous research indicates that episodic retrieval contributes to divergent creative thinking. However, this research has relied on standard laboratory tests of divergent creative thinking, such as generating creative uses for objects; it is unknown whether episodic retrieval also contributes to domain-specific forms of creativity. Here we start to explore whether episodic retrieval contributes to content generation on one such domain-specific task: creative writing. In two experiments, we use an episodic specificity induction (ESI) that selectively impacts tasks that draw on episodic retrieval. If episodic retrieval contributes to content generation during creative writing, then ESI should selectively increase the number of episodic details that people subsequently generate on a creative writing task. In our first experiment, we found evidence that ESI increased the number of episodic details participants generated. We observed a similar, though non-significant, trend in the second experiment. These findings constitute a starting point for examining the contribution of episodic retrieval to creative writing, but additional studies will be needed to more definitively characterize the nature and extent of these contributions.

Mental time travel is often presented as a singular mechanism, but theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that it is composed of component processes. What are these components? Three hypotheses about the major components of mental time travel are commonly considered: (i) remembering and imagining might, respectively, rely on different processes, (ii) past- and future-directed forms of mental time travel might, respectively, rely on different processes, and (iii) the creation of episodic representations and the determination of their temporal orientation might, respectively, rely on different processes. Here, we flesh out the last of these proposals. First, we argue for 'representational continuism': the view that different forms of mental travel are continuous with regard to their core representational contents. Next, we propose an updated account of episodic recombination (the mechanism generating these episodic contents) and review evidence in its support. On this view, episodic recombination is a natural kind best viewed as a form of compositional computation. Finally, we argue that episodic recombination should be distinguished from mechanisms determining the temporal orientation of episodic representations. Thus, we suggest that mental travel is a singular capacity, while mental time travel has at least two major components: episodic representations and their temporal orientation. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Suicidal individuals experience ambivalent states where they simultaneously consider death and the continuation of their lives. But we have little understanding of how suicidal individuals, particularly youth, mentally construct their future lives. To address this knowledge gap, we aimed to examine episodic future thinking and the related cognitive process of episodic memory among suicidal and nonsuicidal adolescents. Method: We administered a performance-based measure of episodic future thinking to community-based adolescents (N = 176, 15–19 years; 69.3% female at birth, 57.1% identifying with a racial minoritized group) and examined the concurrent and predictive validity of details generated within an imagined future event in relation to suicidal ideation (SI; ranging from passive desire of wanting to be dead to active desire to kill oneself). Results: Greater difficulty imagining discrete actions within an imagined positive future event was associated with past and subsequent SI, although these associations were largely accounted for by depressive symptoms. In contrast, greater difficulty imagining action-related details tied to either positive or negative future events predicted SI 6 months later controlling for symptoms of both anxiety and depression, SI history, and narrative style. Conclusions: Findings from this study offer an initial glimpse into how suicidal adolescents imagine their future and may inform the design of interventions intended to promote a stronger desire for life than death. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives How does creative expression change across the life span? Although creativity is generally preserved well into adulthood, certain cognitive functions, such as episodic detail and ideational fluency, have been shown to decline with age. The present study employs computational linguistic analyses to investigate the salient features of creative writing in older adults. Methods We collected short stories from a sample of 50 older adults (age 65≤) which were subsequently rated for creativity by an independent set of participants. Mixed-effects linear regression models were used to describe semantic diversity and perceptual details as predictors of creativity. Semantic diversity reflects the extent to which a narrative connects divergent ideas and is closely associated with creativity. Perceptual details, characterized by sensorial descriptions, have been previously associated with creative writing and may serve to transport readers to alternative times and places. Additionally, we compare these measures to a previously collected sample of stories from younger adults. Results Results indicate that the presence of perceptual details and semantic diversity were significant positive predictors of creativity (p  < .05). Moreover, we find that stories written by older adults contain fewer perceptual details compared with stories written by younger adults. Discussion These results advance our understanding of age-related changes in creativity and highlight the potential role of episodic simulation in writing creative short stories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Despite increased attention on treatment and prevention for suicidal adolescents, we know little about potential intervention targets. Episodic future thinking—the ability to imagine detailed, personal, and future‐oriented events—is a modifiable cognitive process that has been linked with suicidal ideation (SI) in adolescents. However, until now its modifiability has only been tested in adults. Method: Adolescents (N = 176, ages 15–19; 71% SI) completed performance‐based measures of episodic future thinking (i.e., Experimental Recombination Paradigm) and memory immediately before and after an Episodic Specificity Induction (ESI). Results: Adolescents produced a greater number of future episodic details after (vs. before) the ESI but showed no change in non‐episodic details (e.g., semantic information). Patterns of change in episodic future thinking were not moderated by SI history. Adolescents overall did not demonstrate change in past episodic detail counts after the ESI. However, there were select moderating effects of SI history on this effect. Conclusion: Results show that episodic future thinking can change immediately following an episodic specificity induction among adolescents, regardless of whether they have previously experienced SI. This demonstration of within‐person change constitutes a foundational first step in examining malleability of episodic future thinking in adolescents and offers preliminary evidence of a cognitive mechanism that may be leveraged in service of reducing adolescents' SI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Episodic memory relies on constructive processes that support simulating novel future events by flexibly recombining elements of past experiences, and that can also give rise to memory errors. In recent studies, we have developed methods to characterize the cognitive and neural processes that support conscious experiences linked to this process of episodic recombination, both when people simulate novel future events and commit recombination-related memory errors. In this Perspective, we summarize recent studies that illustrate these phenomena, and discuss broader implications for characterizing the basis of conscious experiences associated with constructive memory from a cognitive neuroscience perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that prior knowledge structures or schemas affect recognition memory. However, since the acquisition of schemas occurs over prolonged periods of time, few paradigms allow the direct manipulation of schema acquisition to study their effect on memory performance. Recently, a number of parallelisms in recognition memory between studies involving schemas and studies involving category learning have been identified. The current paper capitalizes on these findings and offers a novel experimental paradigm that allows manipulation of category learning between individuals to study the effects of schema acquisition on recognition. First, participants learn to categorize computer-generated items whose category-inclusion criteria differ between participants. Next, participants study items that belong to either the learned category, the non-learned category, both, or neither. Finally, participants receive a recognition test that includes old and new items, either from the learned, the non-learned, or neither category. Using variations on this paradigm, four experiments were conducted. The results from the first three studies suggest that learning a category increases hit rates for old category-consistent items and false alarm rates for new category-consistent lures. Absent the category learning, no such effects are evident, even when participants are exposed to the same learning trials as those who learned the categories. The results from the fourth experiment suggest that, at least for false alarm rates, the effects of category learning are not solely attributable to frequency of occurrence of category-consistent items during learning. Implications for recognition memory as well as advantages of the proposed paradigm are discussed.

Martin Conway's influential theorising about the self-memory system (Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261–288) illuminated how the "working self" influences the construction of autobiographical memories. Moreover, his constructive view of self and memory is compatible with the occurrence of various kinds of errors and distortions in remembering. Here we consider one of the "seven sins" of memory (Schacter, D. L. (2021). The seven sins of memory updated edition: How the mind forgets and remembers. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt) that we believe is most closely related to the operation of Conway's self-memory system: bias, which refers to the role of current knowledge, beliefs, and feelings in shaping and sometimes distorting memories for past experiences and attitudes. More specifically, we discuss recent research on three forms of bias – consistency, self-enhancing, and positivity biases – that illuminate their role in influencing how people remember the past and also imagine the future. We consider both theoretical and applied aspects of these biases and, consistent with Conway's perspective, argue that despite sometimes contributing to inaccuracies, bias also serves adaptive functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]