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The past decade has seen an immense proliferation of non-state stan-dards, especially in the fields of environmental and social regulation. Industry self-regulation and corporate social responsibility initiatives - the predominant forms of standards set by non-state actors - typi-cally result from the regulatory shadow of state, public pressure, or a combination of the two. Despite this enthusiasm about governance beyond and beside the state, this chapter cautions to consider whether the carriers of non-state standards are well suited to bring about the changes on the ground desired by instigators of non-state standards. Comparing the effects of environmental standards adopted by the World Bank, bilateral Export Credit Agencies, and Equator Principle financial institutions on the development of infrastructure, industry, and resource extraction projects, it seems clear that these institutions are poorly equipped to bring about meaningful change in the environ-mental performance of such projects. They were tasked with their environmental missions because their vulnerability to state authority and public pressure made them easy targets, not because they were well suited for the job. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German government needed to gain support from a majority in the Bundesrat to pass parts of the tax and retirement reform packages that were dependent on Bundesrat approval. However, the opposition parties opposed the reforms and sought to kill the bill in Bundesrat. Since the ruling coalition and opposition parties could not agree on compromises, the government made financial offers to a few state governments ruled by coalitions to change their voting behavior and thus secure a majority in Bundesrat. Not surprisingly, this strategy was quickly compared to U.S. style pork barreling. This article takes up this comparison and comes to the conclusion that the government used the prevalent Parteienlogik to secure passage in Bundestag. In Bundesrat, however, the federal government’s strategy of distributive politics providing pork projects to state coalition governments ran counter to the Parteienlogik. This dual strategy has serious potential of undermining two fundamental institutions in German politics - consensus-orientation of the system as a whole and objectivity (Sachorientierung) in Bundesrat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bi-lateral export credit agencies have been a prime target of environmental activists seeking to green international financial institutions. Their pressure has resulted in environmental policies for export credits throughout the OECD and even the China Ex ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades we have witnessed the proliferation of environmental policies among providers of international finance. Under the pressure of an international NGO campaign with the support of the U.S. government first the World Bank Group and then other multilateral development banks have adopted environmental rules for their operations. A second wave of NGO activity then resulted in export credit agencies (ECAs) adopting similar rules. Most recently, the broadening of this NGO campaign has forced private banks to adopt a comparable as the Equator Principles to which they subject their large-scale project finance business. The overall result has been a proliferation of related policies (rooted in the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act?s environmental review logic) among most of international project finance.What sets this rules apart, are their very different compliance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms ? ranging from the World Bank?s independent Inspection Panel over peer monitoring among ECAs to opaque and almost non-existent formal monitoring for compliance with the Equator Principles. However, in all three cases NGOs play an important role in monitoring the performance of these rules. In the case of World Bank policies, their role has been institutionalized and they have been given access to World Bank policy development. Though the OECD?s export credit group conducts annual consultation sessions with NGOs, access to ECAs has been much more limited. Still, the international agreement on environmental standards for ECAs, the Common Approaches, has established reporting mechanisms which effectively provide the basis for outside monitoring by NGOs. However, at no point in the agreement is this intentional mechanism made explicit. The Equator Principles finally do not provide for any NGO access. Still, NGOs do monitor private bank?s environmental performance and employ name-and-shame tactics to entice banks to live up to their commitment.This paper will take stock of the varying roles NGOs play in monitoring and enforcing these three sets policies. Theoretically, the different accountability mechanisms and power structures in public governance (World Bank), mixed private-public governance (ECAs), and corporate governance (Equator banks) and the resulting logic of action for NGOs will be analyzed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe and the United States appear to be headed on a collision course with regard to nanotech that promises to run almost perfectly parallel to the ongoing dispute about the adequate regulation of biotech in foods. Most countries regulate GMOs under a regime specifically created for these varieties. However, the United States is an outlier (along with Australia) in this regard as it regulates GMOs within the framework created for traditionally bred varieties. Furthermore, most countries start from the assumption that GMOs may carry a potential risk that needs to be disproved before a variety is approved; the United States, to the contrary, starts from the regulatory presumption that GMOs are harmless unless proven otherwise. Similarly, the emerging nanotechnology is regulated under the pre-existing U.S. Toxic Substances Act with authority shared by EPA and FDA. GMOs, too, are overseen jointly by EPA, FDA, and USDA. Europe, on the contrary has embarked on the development of a regulatory framework specifically designed for nanotech mirroring its regulatory approach to biotech.If transatlantic conflict over nanotechnology is to be avoided it is imperative to design regulatory structures that are compatible with each other and with international trade rules. Such regulation would not only avoid transatlantic political strife but it would also benefit industries as market access and limitations would be similar and predictable. The current uncertainties for U.S. exporters of GM foods demonstrate why it is important to have a level playing field for nanotechnology in place if U.S. industry is to profit from nanotechnology to the fullest extent possible. This paper will contrast the emerging regulatory regimes for nanotechnology on both sides of the Atlantic and explore the potential for designing mutually compatible regulations. In a second part, transatlantic regulatory cooperation and dialogue with regard to nanotechnology will be assessed. This assessment will conclude with recommendations how regulatory cooperation can move towards mutually compatible regulations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conflict over the Kyoto protocol, European GMO regulation, and environmental standard-setting for export credit agencies provide for very different negotiation dynamics in transatlantic environmental politics. In climate politics, a coalition between European nations and an extensive number of other countries, among them most importantly Russia, Canada, Japan and the major developing countries, appears to have won an intermediate victory over U.S. opposition to Kyoto protocol provisions. In GMO politics, the U.S. ended negotiations by taking the case to the WTO when it became clear that European regulation was to become a de-facto global standard. With regard to ECA politics, the United States managed to bring about an international agreement by building alliances with individual European states which is modeled after its domestic regulation and required substantial concessions by all other parties. It appears that transatlantic environmental agreements are most likely to come about when the United States can shape the provision of the agreement after its domestic regulations. When Europeans define their interest(s) as contrary to the U.S. proposal and therefore resist internationalization of domestic U.S. regulation, contention arises and agreement is less likely. However, we can witness in the case of GMO politics that a unison and determined Europe can drive home (at least intermediate) victories, too. This paper examines what role Europe can play in transatlantic environmental politics if it manages to speak with one voice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional classifications of domestic and foreign policy are somewhat limited in dealing with a number of modern regulative phenomena that do not stop at national borders. Analysts have applied the labels of "domestic foreign" and "foreign domestic" policy. Yet, labels as such are oftentimes only applied in an ad-hoc fashion without considering the implications of policies beyond the domestic-foreign divide. In this paper I lay out a way to characterize such policies and explore the theoretical and practical implications of these policies where the targets of regulation and policy-making processes are (deliberately) disjointed. This paper is not about domestic sources of foreign policies but rather about policies that are targeted into the borders of another sovereign and at the same time are formulated as domestic policies. In its simplest form, these policy types can be arranged in a 2x2 table: obvious question when stumbling across such a void in the literature is: "does it matter?" I contend that it does. Most prominent is the issue of sovereignty, i.e., to what extent do these different kinds of policies affect the sovereignty of the state in which they originate and which they have their effect. In a second step, these sovereignty concerns become policy-relevant: states are more likely to engage in international agreements that pose little threat to their national sovereignty than in those that require sovereignty sacrifices. Also of concern is the question of voice in the policymaking process. States' "voice" can be subsumed under the sovereignty heading. However, those affected by regulation may or may not have an opportunity to bring their concerns to the table. Transdomestic policy, on the other hand, defies these traditional categories: policies appear to be domestic in nature, yet their deliberate effects occur within the borders of another sovereign state. This quality leads to unusual implications for state sovereignty. Little or no concerns exist for the state in which these policies are devised, and the state in which the policies will have their effect have little or no influence on the policy-making process. Infringement of state B's sovereignty comes at no cost to state A; state B meanwhile suffers from an infringement on its sovereignty with little or no means of remedying it. Whether it is foreign domestic or domestic foreign policy is a question of perspective: for A it is domestic foreign, i.e. domestic policy with effects elsewhere; for B it is foreign domestic. Furthermore, foreign people in state B have no voice in this domestic policy process unless they can forge transnational coalitions with domestic partners in state A. Boomerang policy is targeted at regulating behavior at home. However, it is formulated and implemented as foreign policy. Policy-makers may pursue this option if traditional domestic regulation would come at high political cost, or if domestic veto players make it impossible to regulate in a purely domestic fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with an example of transatlantic harmonization of policies in a practical perspective. Studying environmental standard-setting for export credit agencies provides an interesting perspective on how conflicting environmental policy positions emerge and are mediated across the Atlantic. In this issue area, the European Union plays a somewhat limited role; therefore, this paper will focus on the most relevant national players in Europe, especially Germany. Differing regulatory cultures that have produced differing means to provide export credits, nevertheless, provide a direct link to the panel?s theme of different institutional structures and policy cultures. It is exactly these differing regulatory cultures that have turned export credit agency policy harmonization into a contentious issue. In setting environmental standards for export credit agencies, Germany and the United States assume counter-intuitive roles. The United States unilaterally implemented high standards in the mid-1990s and sought harmonization of these standards within the OECD to its own level. In 2001, OECD negotiations resulted in non-binding ?Common Approaches? to environmental screening that fell short of U.S. demands ? due largely to Germany?s opposition to these standards. The consequences were high environmental standards for U.S. exporters seeking export credits, and lower standards for their foreign competitors; thus putting U.S. exporters at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors in accessing developing- and transition-country markets. I argue that roles were distributed this way because of diverging domestic institutions and domestic power distributions. Rules proposed by the United States provided for a poor institutional fit in countries which also had lesser incentives than the United States to arrive at a substantial international agreement on the issue. This case underscores that domestic politics and national interest drive international environmental politics. Norms and values matter and certainly help particular negotiating parties that can invoke them on their behalf, but they first need to overcome hard material interests that may leave little room for ?good? policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]