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Altruism, defined as costly other-regarding behavior, varies considerably across people and contexts. One prominent context in which people frequently must decide on how to socially act is under stress. How does stress affect altruistic decision-making and through which neurocognitive mechanisms? To address these questions, we assessed neural activity associated with charitable giving under stress. Human participants (males and females) completed a charitable donation task before and after they underwent either a psychosocial stressor or a control manipulation, while their brain activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging. As the ability to infer other people's mental states (i.e., mentalizing) predicts prosocial giving and may be susceptible to stress, we examined whether stress effects on altruism depend on participants' general capacity to mentalize, as assessed in an independent task. Although our stress manipulation per se had no influence on charitable giving, increases in the stress hormone cortisol were associated with reductions in donations in participants with high mentalizing capacity, but not in low mentalizers. Multivariate neural response patterns in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were less predictive of postmanipulation donations in high mentalizers with increased cortisol, indicating decreased value coding, and this effect mediated the (moderated) association between cortisol increases and reduced donations. Our findings provide novel insights into the modulation of altruistic decision-making by suggesting an impact of the stress hormone cortisol on mentalizing-related neurocognitive processes, which in turn results in decreased altruism. The DLPFC appears to play a key role in mediating this cortisol-related shift in altruism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human decisions are often influenced by emotions. An economically relevant example is the role of fear in generating loss aversion. Previous research implicates the amygdala as a key brain structure in the experience of fear and loss aversion. The neural mechanism behind emotional influences on loss aversion is, however, unclear. To address this, we measured brain activation with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while participants made decisions about monetary gambles after viewing fearful or neutral faces. We observed that loss aversion following the presentation of neutral faces was mainly predicted by greater deactivations for prospective losses (relative to activations for prospective gains) in several brain regions, including the amygdala. By contrast, increases in loss aversion following the presentation of fearful faces were mainly predicted by greater activations for prospective losses. These findings suggest a fear-induced shift from positive to negative value coding that reflects a context-dependent involvement of distinct valuation processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We targeted the sociocognitive and neural mechanisms linking status and altruism. • Subjective socioeconomic status (SES) positively predicted charitable giving. • This link was mediated by increased mentalizing capacity in higher-status individuals. • Subjective SES was linked to mentalizing-related neural value coding in the rTPJ. • Higher SES was associated with increased negative rTPJ-putamen connectivity. Socioeconomic status (SES), a concept related to an individual's economic and social position relative to others, can shape social interactions like altruistic behaviors. However, little is known about the exact neurocognitive mechanisms that link SES with altruism. Our study aimed to provide a comprehensive account of the sociocognitive and neural mechanisms through which SES affects charitable giving – an important variant of human altruism. To this end, participants completed a charitable donation task while their brain activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We also assessed participants' socio-cognitive ability to infer other people's mental states (i.e., mentalizing) – a driver of prosocial behavior – in an independent social task. Behaviorally, we found that both charitable giving and social cognition were status-dependent, as subjective SES positively predicted donations and mentalizing capacity. Moreover, the link between SES and charitable giving was mediated by individuals' mentalizing capacity. At the neural level, a multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data revealed that higher subjective SES was associated with stronger value coding in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). The strength of this value representation predicted charitable giving and was linked to mentalizing. Furthermore, we observed an increased negative functional coupling between rTPJ and left putamen with higher SES. Together, increased charitable giving in higher-status individuals could be explained by status-dependent recruitment of mentalizing-related value coding and altered functional connectivity in the brain. Our findings provide insights into the socio- and neurocognitive mechanisms explaining why and when higher SES leads to prosociality, which might ultimately inform targeted interventions to promote prosocial behavior in human societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social distance (i.e., the degree of closeness to another person) affects the way humans perceive and respond to fairness during financial negotiations. Feeling close to someone enhances the acceptance of monetary offers. Here, we explored whether this effect also extends to the spatial domain. Specifically, using an iterated version of the Ultimatum Game in a within-subject design, we investigated whether different visual spatial distance-cues result in different rates of acceptance of otherwise identical monetary offers. Study 1 found that participants accepted significantly more offers when they were cued with spatial closeness than when they were cued with spatial distance. Study 2 replicated this effect using identical procedures but different spatial-distance cues in an independent sample. Importantly, our results could not be explained by feelings of social closeness. Our results demonstrate that mere perceptions of spatial closeness produce analogous–but independent–effects to those of social closeness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rational choice should be guided solely by the prospects of available options. However, our decisions are often influenced by irrecoverable past costs, even when the current course of action turns out to be unfavorable, reflecting a cognitive bias known as the "sunk-cost effect". In everyday life, many decisions are made under stress or elicit stress themselves. Whether and how stress impacts the sunk-cost effect, however, is not known. Based on evidence suggesting that the sunk-cost effect critically depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which in turn is highly sensitive to stress, we hypothesized that stress may reduce the influence of past expenses on current decisions. Participants underwent a psychosocial stress manipulation or control procedure, before we assessed their sunk-cost tendency in a monetary investment task. Overall, participants showed a pronounced sunk-cost effect, particularly for options with low expected value. Acute stress reduced this tendency to invest in risky options with low probability of success following high prior investments. Moreover, the strength of this reduction of the sunk-cost effect was predicted by individual cortisol reactivity. These findings show that acute stress may reduce the impact of past expenses on current choice and that this effect may be mediated by glucocorticoid action. • We investigated whether stress modulates the sunk-cost effect. • Stress reduced the sunk-cost effect. • Reduction specific for low-success-probability options and high prior investments. • Strength of the reduction was predicted by individual cortisol reactivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Dual-process models of psychopathy postulate two underlying dimensions. [•] Fearless Dominance was associated with altered feedback processing. [•] Feedback-related negativity amplitudes were reduced. [•] Self-Centered Impulsivity was unrelated to feedback processing. [•] These findings provide further evidence for dual-process models of psychopathy. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

• Young adults are sensitive to the reducibility of uncertainty during belief updating. • Updating processes are quasi-optimal and valence-dependent. • Neural responses in frontoparietal regions show valence-dependent recruitments. • Valence asymmetry at behavioral and neural levels is correlated. Selective use of new information is crucial for adaptive decision-making. Combining a gamble bidding task with assessing cortical responses using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), we investigated potential effects of information valence on behavioral and neural processes of belief and value updating during uncertainty reduction in young adults. By modeling changes in the participants' expressed subjective values using a Bayesian model, we dissociated processes of (i) updating beliefs about statistical properties of the gamble, (ii) updating values of a gamble based on new information about its winning probabilities, as well as (iii) expectancy violation. The results showed that participants used new information to update their beliefs and values about the gambles in a quasi-optimal manner, as reflected in the selective updating only in situations with reducible uncertainty. Furthermore, their updating was valence-dependent: information indicating an increase in winning probability was underweighted, whereas information about a decrease in winning probability was updated in good agreement with predictions of the Bayesian decision theory. Results of model-based and moderation analyses showed that this valence-dependent asymmetry was associated with a distinct contribution of expectancy violation, besides belief updating, to value updating after experiencing new positive information regarding winning probabilities. In line with the behavioral results, we replicated previous findings showing involvements of frontoparietal brain regions in the different components of updating. Furthermore, this study provided novel results suggesting a valence-dependent recruitment of brain regions. Individuals with stronger oxyhemoglobin responses during value updating was more in line with predictions of the Bayesian model while integrating new information that indicates an increase in winning probability. Taken together, this study provides first results showing expectancy violation as a contributing factor to sub-optimal valence-dependent updating during uncertainty reduction and suggests limitations of normative Bayesian decision theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We investigated the effect of stress hormones on decision-making under risk. • Yohimbine and hydrocortisone were administered before a decision-making task. • Hydrocortisone reduces risk taking in gain-only trials. • Yohimbine has no effect. • Hydrocortisone might decrease reward processing. Many studies have investigated the influence of stress on decision-making. However, results are equivocal and the exact role of increased noradrenaline and cortisol after stress remains unclear. Using pharmacological manipulation, we investigated the influence of noradrenergic and glucocorticoid activity on risky decision-making in a gambling task that included mixed-gamble trials (gains and losses are possible) and gain-only trials. One hundred-and-four healthy young men participated in our randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, between-group study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups: (A) yohimbine, (B) hydrocortisone, (C) yohimbine and hydrocortisone, or (D) placebo. Frequency of risky choices, i.e., monetary risk taking, was the dependent variable. We also investigated the influence of hydrocortisone and yohimbine on loss aversion, which is the tendency to overweigh losses compared with gains. Participants chose the risky option less often after receiving hydrocortisone compared with no hydrocortisone. This effect was strongest in the gain-only trials. Yohimbine had no effect. Loss aversion was not affected by hydrocortisone or yohimbine. Decreased reward processing may explain the reduction of risk taking by hydrocortisone in gain-only trials. The effects of stress hormones on different decision-related constructs and processes hence require further investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]