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Over the past century, the scientific conception of the protein has evolved significantly. This paper focuses on the most recent stage of this evolution, namely, the origin of the dynamic view of proteins and the challenge it posed to the static view of classical molecular biology. Philosophers and scientists have offered two hypotheses to explain the origin of the dynamic view and its slow reception by structural biologists. Some have argued that the shift from the static to the dynamic view was a Kuhnian revolution, driven by the accumulation of dynamic anomalies, while others have argued that the shift was caused by new empirical findings made possible by technological advances. I analyze this scientific episode and ultimately reject both of these empiricist accounts. I argue that focusing primarily on technological advances and empirical discoveries overlooks the important role of theory in driving this scientific change. I show how the application of general thermodynamic principles to proteins gave rise to the dynamic view, and a commitment to these principles then led early adopters to seek out the empirical examples of protein dynamics, which would eventually convince their peers. My analysis of this historical case shows that empiricist accounts of modern scientific progress—at least those that aim to explain developments in the molecular life sciences—need to be tempered in order to capture the interplay between theory and experiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sharing research data has great potential to benefit science and society. However, data sharing is still not common practice. Since public research funding agencies have a particular impact on research and researchers, the question arises: Are public funding agencies morally obligated to promote data sharing? We argue from a research ethics perspective that public funding agencies have several pro tanto obligations requiring them to promote data sharing. However, there are also pro tanto obligations that speak against promoting data sharing in general as well as with regard to particular instruments of such promotion. We examine and weigh these obligations and conclude that all things considered funders ought to promote the sharing of data. Even the instrument of mandatory data sharing policies can be justified under certain conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes international legal acts (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind, the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, the Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications, reports of the Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO recommendations, General Comment No. 25 on Science of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, etc.), adopted within international intergovernmental organizations at the universal level regarding the right to benefit from scientific progress and its application. The article focuses on the normative content of the studied right, in particular, it reveals the content of the concepts "results of scientific progress", which means material results of the application of scientific research, and "practical application", which should be understood as the use of scientific achievements to solve specific problems and meet specific needs of the population. The article also emphasizes the role of soft law instruments and international treaties as tools for reflecting the consensus among states on the need to promote the development of science as a public good available to all, and to integrate human rights norms and principles into the development and advancement of science, technology and related policies. The article serves as a theoretical basis for further research of a unified approach to understanding the right to benefit from scientific progress and its application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kuhnian philosophy of science implies that progress in the study of open-ended evolution (OEE) would be accelerated if the OEE science community were to agree on some examples of striking success in OEE science. This article recounts the important role of scientific paradigms and scientific exemplars in creating the productivity of what Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, calls "normal" science, and it describes how the study of OEE today would benefit from exhibiting more of the hallmarks of normal science. The article concludes by describing five proposed projects that would help create a consensus in the OEE community on some good examples of the scientific study of OEE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chiffi and Pietarinen (2020) argue that the knowability paradox disappears if we adopt the concept of conjecturability instead of knowability within the framework of Peirce's theory of science. They make two main claims: first, conjecturability plays an all-important role in scientific inquiry and it explains better scientific progress than knowability; second, conjecturability does not produce aparadox akin to the knowability paradox. However, based on our reading of Peirce, we contend that knowability plays an important role in scientific inquiry and progress. Moreover, we show that there is a conjecturability paradox with an analogous conclusion as the knowability paradox, which is rooted in their modal analysis of conjecturability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the discussion regarding the relationship between idealisation, de-idealisation and cognitive scientific progress. In this, I raise the question of the significance of the gradual de-idealisation procedure for constructing political science theories. I show that conceptions that assume the reversibility of the idealisation process can be an extremely useful theoretical perspective in reconstructions of political science modelling and analyses of scientific progress in political science. I base my position on the results of the methodological reconstruction of Richard Jankowski’s theory of voting. My reconstruction and results of empirical studies show that by gradually removing simplifying assumptions, models can emerge that more accurately identify the determinants of the voting decision and the corresponding relationships. In the case I analysed, the transition from coarse-grained to fine-grained models likely demarcates the line of scientific progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the standard no miracles argument, science’s predictive success is best explained by the approximate truth of its theories. In contemporary science, however, machine learning systems, such as AlphaFold2, are also remarkably predictively successful. Thus, we might ask what best explains such successes. Might these AIs accurately represent critical aspects of their targets in the world? And if so, does a variant of the no miracles argument apply to these AIs? We argue for an affirmative answer to these questions. We conclude that if the standard no miracles argument is sound, an AI-specific no miracles argument is also sound. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Replication endeavors contribute to the accumulation of scientific evidence about previously reported findings and are crucial for scientific progress. Replication studies are, however, often discouraged and rarely published in the operations and supply chain management (OSCM) discipline. In this article, we offer a framework for replications consisting of two complementary tables. This framework recognizes two types of replications already defined in the literature (i.e., The Exact (EXT) Replication and the Methods‐Only (MTD) Replication) and adds to these two new types (i.e., the Bounded‐Conceptual‐Extension (BCE) Replication and the Transformative (TRF) Replication). The framework clarifies what constitutes replications, forms of replication endeavors, and their purposes. Importantly, we also differentiate replication endeavors from reproducibility tests, robustness checks, and post hoc analyses. Moreover, we describe a seven‐step procedure to guide the design, execution, and presentation of replication endeavors, illustrating these steps by conducting a TRF Replication that incorporates, at the same time, a BCE Replication and an MTD Replication of Polyviou et al. (2018). The proposed framework and seven‐step procedure hopefully motivate OSCM scholars to embrace replications as valuable scientific endeavors that can yield corroborating evidence to bolster confidence in previously reported findings and, better yet, provide new nuanced findings to advance precise scientific understanding of past and new OSCM phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychological-epistemic accounts take scientific progress to consist in the development of some psychological-epistemic attitude. Disagreements over what the relevant attitude is – true belief, knowledge, or understanding – divide proponents of the semantic , epistemic, and noetic accounts of scientific progress, respectively. Proponents of all such accounts face a common challenge. On the face of it, only individuals have psychological attitudes. However, as I argue in what follows, increases in individual true belief, knowledge, and understanding are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress. Rather than being fatal to the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts, this objection shows that these accounts are most plausible when they take the psychological states relevant to scientific progress to be states of communities, rather than individuals. I draw on recent work in social epistemology to develop two ways in which communities can be the bearers of irreducible psychological-epistemic states. Each way yields a strategy by which proponents of one of the psychological-epistemic accounts might attempt to account for the social dimensions of scientific progress. While I present serious reasons for concern about the first strategy, I argue that the second strategy, at least, offers a promising path forward for a psychological-epistemic account of scientific progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that the currently confused talk about "values in science" should be understood in terms of schemes of values. The new demarcation problem is then formulated as asking "Which scheme(s) of values should scientists adopt?" I defend the view that my title provides the answer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1956, John G. Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim proposed an approach to intertheoretical reduction as an alternative to that of Ernest Nagel. However, they neglected to provide a clear definition of its basic concept of systematization. After decades of languishing in the shadows, new interest in the KO approach is emerging. Nevertheless, there are still misunderstandings regarding this basic concept. The present paper elucidates this concept by returning to Oppenheim's hitherto little-noticed publications from the 1920s and 1930s, which Kemeny and Oppenheim obviously used as guidance in 1956. Reappraising Oppenheim's early writings delivers two significant payoffs: new clarity in understanding the concept of systematization as well as a more solid grasp of the structure of this approach as a distinctive combination of explanation and systematization. • The concept of systematization in the 1956 KO approach to intertheoretical reduction can be explicated with Oppenheim's philosophy of science from the 1920s and 1930s. • The degree of systematization of a theory is measured by the number of its terms. • There is a direct connection between systematization and explanation. • To explain means to describe something with fewer terms, i.e. to merge a summative juxtaposition of statements into one systematic law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most significant topics in the philosophy of science literature is the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. In recent years, a considerable amount of literature has emerged on scientific progress accounts. The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between scientific realism/anti-realism and scientific progress accounts. Scientific realism, in this article, refers to epistemic realism, which posits that mature and successful scientific theories offer an (approximately) true description of the world. In contrast, advocates of epistemic anti-realism reject the possibility of acquiring knowledge about unobservable entities. Scientific progress accounts fall into four categories based on their intended purpose: epistemic, semantic, problem-solving (functional), and noetic. This article argues that the epistemic and semantic accounts, which rely on the concept of truth, are based on scientific realism. The problem-solving account is considered an anti-realistic approach since it replaces the criterion of truth with the ability to solve problems. The primary argument of this article is that although the noetic account appears to use the concept of truth in its explanation, it prioritizes understanding over truth in determining the preferred theory. This means that the criterion for selecting the preferred theory is not approximation to the truth, but rather understanding. As a result, the noetic account is based on an anti-realistic approach. Introduction The thesis of epistemic realism posits that successful and mature scientific theories are (approximately) true. Also, various accounts of scientific progress focus on specific objectives within science. This article argues that the epistemic and semantic approaches align with a realist perspective, while the problem-solving (functional) and noetic accounts have anti-realist foundations. Scientific realism Generally, three theses of scientific realism can be identified: the metaphysical (ontological) thesis, the semantic thesis, and the epistemic thesis. The metaphysical thesis asserts that the world exists independently of the mind. The semantic thesis claims that propositions concerning unobservable entities can be evaluated as true or false implying that all scientific propositions have meaning whether they relate to observable or unobservable entities. The epistemic realism thesis argues that we can acquire knowledge about reality including knowledge about unobservable entities. To be more precise, the claims about theoretical entities in scientific theories are not only meaningful but also provide an almost true depiction of reality. In this article, realism refers specifically to epistemic realism, which encompasses three main aspects: 1) the existence of a mind-independent world, 2) the attribution of truth or falsity to scientific propositions concerning unobservable entities, and 3) the claim that the propositions in mature scientific theories regarding theoretical entities are nearly true. On the other hand, one advocate of epistemic anti-realism is Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. According to this perspective, van Fraassen denies the capacity to acquire knowledge about unobservable levels. In this view, the goal of science is not truth but rather empirical adequacy. This means that the objective of scientific endeavor is not to uncover the truth, but rather to construct models that are empirically sufficient. Scientific progress accounts Regarding the concept of scientific progress, four accounts have been presented. In the epistemic account, the goal of science is to increase knowledge or justified true belief. Therefore, scientific progress occurs as we accumulate knowledge. In the semantic account, the objective of science is to approach closer to the truth (verisimilitude). This implies that science progresses when our theories are more truth-like. In the problem-solving (functional) approach, the concept of truth is set aside, and the focus shifts to problem-solving or fulfilling specific functions within science. In this account, scientific progress is marked by the development of new theories that effectively solve more problems compared to previous ones. In the new functional approach, scientific progress is defined in terms of the usefulness of the problem-defining and problem-solving. Advocates of the noetic account consider increased understanding to be the goal of science. In other words, science advances when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world. Scientific progress accounts and scientific realism In both the epistemic and semantic accounts, truth plays a pivotal role. Justified true belief serves as a necessary condition for acquiring knowledge. In the epistemic account, it is possible to acquire knowledge about theoretical entities. Thus, we can infer that the epistemic account is rooted in scientific realism. In the semantic account, the ultimate aim of science is to achieve complete truth. While achieving complete truth in theories may not be certain within this approach, it is possible to demonstrate their approximate truth. Therefore, according to this account, mature scientific theories are considered to be almost true. Consequently, this account aligns with scientific realism. In presenting the problem-solving approach, Laudan explicitly argues against truth being the objective of science, as there is no criterion available to gauge the attainment of truth. In other words, if we define the success of scientific theories based on their ability to solve scientific problems, this success does not necessarily indicate the truth of the theory. While mature scientific theories may demonstrate success and possess the capability to solve numerous problems in comparison to earlier theories, this accomplishment does not directly correlate to the truthfulness of the theory. Consequently, this approach adopts an anti-realist perspective towards science. In the noetic account, priority is given to understanding over approximation to the truth, despite the presence of both criteria. To clarify further, if there are two competing theories, with one being more aligned with reality but the other providing a greater level of understanding, the second theory is considered preferable. Moreover, the concept of the model in the noetic approach resembles the concept of the model in the doctrine of constructive empiricism. This implies that scientific theories do not necessarily provide a true depiction of the world, but rather act as models designed to enhance our understanding. This perspective on scientific theories is anti-realist since it contradicts the thesis of epistemic realism, which asserts that mature scientific theories offer an (almost) true description of the world. Conclusion In summary, this article puts forth the following assertions: l The epistemic and semantic accounts offer explanations for scientific progress within the framework of scientific realism. l The problem-solving (functional) account takes an anti-realist standpoint by explicitly discarding the notion of truth. Although some argue that the new functional approach can be classified as a realistic perspective, the article contends that it still remains anti-realist. l The noetic account inherently embraces an anti-realist position. It considers scientific theories as models that prioritize enhancing understanding rather than providing a relatively accurate description of the world.

This paper explores the integration of machine learning into economics and social sciences, assessing its potential impact and limitations. It introduces fundamental machine learning concepts and principles, highlighting the differences between the two disciplines, particularly the focus on causal inference in economics and prediction in machine learning. The paper discusses diverse applications of machine learning, from extracting insights from unstructured data to creating novel indicators and improving predictive accuracy, while also addressing challenges related to data quality, computational efficiency, and data ownership. It emphasizes the importance of standardization, transparency, and ethical considerations in prediction tasks, recognizing that machine learning is a powerful tool but cannot replace economic theory. Ultimately, researchers remain optimistic about the transformative potential of machine learning in re-shaping research methodologies and generating new insights in economics and social sciences.

This paper revisits debates on a tension in Cassirer's philosophy of culture. On the one hand, Cassirer describes a plurality of symbolic forms and claims that each needs to be assessed by its own internal standards of validity. On the other hand, he ranks the symbolic forms in terms of a developmental hierarchy and states that one form, mathematical natural science, constitutes the highest achievement of culture. In my paper, I do not seek to resolve this tension. Rather, I aim to arrive at a better understanding of how it arises, and of the different options that it presents for understanding the development of culture. I discuss three recent attempts at resolving the tension, put forward by Sebastian Luft, Samatha Matherne, and Simon Truwant, respectively. Based on a reconstruction of Cassirer's system of symbolic forms that centralizes the concept of function, I show that the most promising of these attempts, formulated by Truwant, is not successful. I then turn to Cassirer's philosophy of the cultural sciences, the implications of which for the present problem have not yet been sufficiently explored. I argue that in this context, Cassirer develops the contours of an alternative to the function-based view of cultural development. I conclude that this alternative does not resolve the tension either, but that it allows for a reconceptualization of the teleology of culture as open. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is a list of references from the Mediterranean Journal of Clinical Psychology. The references cover a wide range of topics related to clinical psychology, including the impact of clinical and psychological characteristics on alexithymia in type 1 diabetes, the link between alexithymia and severe asthma, online psychodynamic psychotherapies, burnout in training health professionals, and the relationship between self-reported chronic stress and medically-unexplained symptoms. The document also includes references on epistemology in science and clinical psychology, the use of evidence in clinical reasoning, and the history of clinical psychology. These references provide valuable resources for library patrons conducting research in these areas. [Extracted from the article]

This paper supports the idea that the epistemology of Psychology had a relatively progressive line of development, and it was not only a constant swing between the primacy of two opposing perspectives: from out-side in and from in-side out. Although the recessive dynamics of these two metaphysical principles of Person Constructs Reality and Reality Constructs Person (Buss, 1978) was the critical marker of any significant paradigm change from the history of psychology, the development of psychological thinking has presupposed, in addition, a general evolutive path. I will demonstrate that these combined movements of alternation and progression form a unique complex sense of epistemological development of psychology accompanying the corresponding development of human personality level of self-reflection. Contrary to pessimistic views that interpret the reflexivity embedded in this dual paradigm shift to entrapping psychology to an eternal return, it actually propels the advancement of human self-reflective consciousness to a collective level of self-understanding. The final considerations are made about the current mainstream of psychological research and unreflexively practices detrimental to the substantiation of a Humanistic Psychological Science, which has become vital in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most significant topics in the philosophy of science literature is the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. In recent years, a considerable amount of literature has emerged on scientific progress accounts. The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between scientific realism/anti-realism and scientific progress accounts. Scientific realism, in this article, refers to epistemic realism, which posits that mature and successful scientific theories offer an (approximately) true description of the world. In contrast, advocates of epistemic anti-realism reject the possibility of acquiring knowledge about unobservable entities. Scientific progress accounts fall into four categories based on their intended purpose: epistemic, semantic, problem-solving (functional), and noetic. This article argues that the epistemic and semantic accounts, which rely on the concept of truth, are based on scientific realism. The problem-solving account is considered an anti-realistic approach since it replaces the criterion of truth with the ability to solve problems. The primary argument of this article is that although the noetic account appears to use the concept of truth in its explanation, it prioritizes understanding over truth in determining the preferred theory. This means that the criterion for selecting the preferred theory is not approximation to the truth, but rather understanding. As a result, the noetic account is based on an anti-realistic approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that the currently confused talk about “values in science” should be understood in terms of schemes of values. The new demarcation problem is then formulated as asking “Which scheme(s) of values should scientists adopt?” I defend the view that my title provides the answer.

The aim of this paper is to show that the logical approach to philosophy of science could be further improved with tools like the ones put forward by Schurz in his proposal to model scientific theory development. Section 2 is a presentation of the basics in AGM epistemology of logical abduction and of their connection. In Sect. 3 several operations for theory change proposed by Schurz (2011; 2018) are presented, followed by my own proposal of a further case of hypothesis refinement, consisting of the instantiation of an existential abduction. Section 4 offers a discussion and conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The concept of progress has long been a central focus of scholarly discourse, with science and technology serving as key drivers for societal advancement and the continual improvement of quality of life. In this context, the integration of AI into scientific discoveries has resulted in notable ontological and epistemological developments within the realm of science, lending itself to an understanding informed by post normal science approaches. This article aims to elucidate how artificial intelligence can augment the power of scientific discoveries and human knowledge in the ongoing progression of science. The research methodology employed for this study entails documentary studies and trend analysis is conducted to explore the influence of artificial intelligence on the advancement of science and technology.The principal findings of this investigation reveal that artificial intelligence has fundamentally transformed the structure, function, methodology, and human agency associated with scientific progress. Consequently, a new paradigm of dominance and subjugation within the scientific domain has emerged, perpetuating an increasing divide between AI beneficiaries and those deprived of such technological resources. This growing disparity underscores the significance of unequal access to emerging technologies and its implications for scientific research.

This article delves into the evolving relationship between theoretical discoveries and empirical verification in physics. It addresses the challenges posed by the empirical incoherence of Quantum Gravity and explores the role of paradoxes as a guide in scientific progress. While experiments remain crucial for validating theories, the paper argues that paradoxes can provide valuable insights and motivate the development of new theories. By examining the concept of paradoxes, analysing their role in fundamental physics, and focusing on black hole paradoxes in Quantum Gravity, this paper proposes a heuristic approach to incorporating paradoxes into scientific inquiry. It emphasises the convergence of paradox analysis and experimental validation for a comprehensive understanding of the natural world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William Whewell's philosophy of science is often overlooked as a relic of 19th century Whiggism. I argue however that his view – suitably modified – can contribute to contemporary philosophy of science, particularly to debates around scientific progress. The reason Whewell's view needs modification is that he makes the following problematic claim: as science progresses, it reveals necessarily truths and thereby grants a glimpse of the mind of God. Modifying Whewell's view will involve reinventing his notion of necessary truth as the pragmatist notion of superassertibility. And, if scientific progress does not uncover necessary truths, then it does not reveal the mind of God. The result is an outline of an account of scientific progress that is piecemeal and fallibilist in nature, yet at the same time maintains key Whewellian themes of consilience and the unity of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some researchers who examine the similarities between philosophy and psychology conclude that engaging in philosophy can improve one's mental health, instead of, or in addition to, traditional forms of therapy. This article reinforces this by establishing the relationship between self-knowledge as self-improvement in Plato's dialogues and in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). Despite multiple important points of congruence, some authors have rejected the idea that self-knowledge in Plato can be assimilated to self-knowledge in psychotherapy. Here, I argue against this criticism by focusing on three key areas of interest: (a) self-knowledge as improving one's beliefs via objective (nonsubjective) means, (b) self-knowledge as resulting in objective (nonsubjective) outcomes, and (c) self-knowledge as progress towards the Good. I reinforce the link by demonstrating that CBT uses methods which are equally objective as those of the Platonic dialogues. I then continue by claiming that the outcome of self-knowledge in both is also equally objective. Finally, I explore the nature of their relationship. Instead of arguing that self-knowledge in CBT is a modern version of Platonic self-knowledge, I propose that although not intended to, it functions as a preparatory process for one to be able to participate in Platonic self-knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the 'no miracle' thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we offer a brief overview of the debate between realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science. On the background of that debate, we consider two recently developed approaches aimed at vindicating realist intuitions while acknowledging the limitations of scientific knowledge. Perspectivalists explain disagreement in science without giving up the idea that currently accepted scientific theories describe reality largely accurately: they posit the existence of different perspectives within which scientific claims can be produced and tested. The integrative approach instead encourages researchers to embrace pluralism: conflicting frameworks and methodologies can be integrated when new knowledge is gained. In the natural and human sciences, researchers sometimes behave as if perspectivism is true; at other times, they hope for a reconciliation between conflicting frameworks and believe that this can be achieved by progressively filling knowledge gaps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern economy development is inseparably concerned with the use of the most modern and advanced information technologies. Therefore, scientists’ attention in terms of the issues of digitalisation and innovative development is constantly growing. In this paper studies different scientific views on the specifics of digitalisation of economic systems and building a modern smart economy of the future were used. The purpose of the study is to prove the relationship between the processes of digitalization and the formation of an innovative model of the smart economy in Ukraine. To achieve this goal, in the article statistical data on the state of innovative development of the Ukrainian economy and Ukrainian enterprises were analysed; the directions of the strategy of innovative development at the national level implementation was specified. The study substantiates that currently the national economy is on the way to a smart society formation, and most innovative initiatives are carried out at the expense of business, while the state uses regulatory levers without active financial participation. The mutual influence of digitalisation processes and implementation of the innovation development strategy is determined. It was established that digitalisation processes are essential and extremely important for the formation of a national model of the smart economy, as they are complex and applied, but not concentrated in a particular area or industry. At present, the national model of the smart economy cannot be formed without state support that is provided through the development and implementation of the innovation development strategy. The state has the capabilities and sufficient levers to stimulate the introduction of modern digital technologies and the development of an innovative component of scientific research that can be implemented in the practical activities of Ukrainian enterprises and organizations in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An examination of late Rorty shows that he does not abandon belief in an external world about which we can, and indeed must, acquire knowledge. His disapproval of the correspondence theory of truth does not involve the idea that anything other than local weather, for example, could falsify remarks about local weather. It is just that once we get done looking out the window or, if we are outside, feeling the right kind of drops make contact with our skin, there is nothing else we can do, nothing better, to make ourselves more certain, more cognitively secure. One can see this in the detailed work that enables scientific progress. Science improves itself by doing more of the same. G. E. Moore's famous open question stays open only as a reminder that our fallibility never disappears and that our cognitive security is never better than pro tem. Rorty, as a faithful pragmatist and undogmatic meliorist, thinks this is perfectly O.K. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions on the status of definitions of life have long been dominated by a position known as definitional pessimism. Per the definitional pessimist, there is no point in trying to define life. This claim is defended in different ways, but one of the shared assumptions of all definitional pessimists is that our attempts to define life are attempts to provide a list of all necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as alive. In other words, a definition of life is a strict, descriptive definition. Against this, several pragmatic alternatives have been put forward. On these pragmatic accounts, definitions of life are not strictly, but rather loosely descriptive. Their purpose is not to be true, but to be useful to scientists by guiding scientific practice. More recently, this position has come under attack for not being able to explain how our attempts to define life are connected to scientific progress within the biological sciences. Here, I argue to the contrary by showing how pragmatic definitions of life can be, and in fact are, conducive to scientific progress. Additionally, I show how the pragmatic account of definitions of life can be brought to bear upon our normative discussions involving definitions of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the academic study of International Relations (IR) in the Arab world has been ongoing for almost seventy years, there remains a dearth of information regarding its origins that can be attributed, in part, to a lack of research on the state of the field. The present study seeks to address this gap by conducting an examination of the state of IR in the Arab World over the course of a century. Additionally, this study proposes a novel method for evaluating the current state of the field and assessing its scientific output. To achieve these objectives, the study applies sociological generational analysis to three generations of Arab IR scholars, then examines their contributions to four key aspects of the field: the scientific production cycle, the formation of the scientific community, the development of its institutional structure, and relative autonomy from political science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements to the cognitive attitudes of those for whom progress is made, i.e. the receivers rather than the producers of scientific information. This includes not only scientists themselves, but also various other individuals who utilize scientific information in different ways for the benefit of society as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to provide an overview of the environmental factors within the pharmaceutical industry that have contributed to the emergence of flow chemistry over the past two decades. It highlights some of the challenges facing the industry and describes how they are being overcome by the exponential trajectory of scientific progress in the area. We identify current trends and offer a speculative glimpse into the future of drug development and manufacturing with some examples of progress being made at CARBOGEN AMCIS.

During the 19th century, accurate censorship laws were enforced in Modena and were designed to limit not only the printing of books considered dangerous, but also trading and import of such material from neighbouring countries. In particular, both Dukes Francesco IV and Francesco V adopted well-defined laws to place the content of books as much as possible under their own control. These laws were applied by professors from the University of Modena and members of the Academy of Sciences, Literature and Arts of Modena acting as censors. The present analysis of the role of the censors in Modena allows us to understand how universities and academies managed the complex relationship between the censorship requested by the dukes and the fast scientific progress that characterised science during the 19th century. This analysis shows us that censors, although aware of their role, opted for a more rational method of censorship, thus favouring scientific progress which has been at the basis of the cultural growth not only of the University of Modena, but also of the city of Modena altogether. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the usefulness of the concept of philosophical progress and the common assumption that philosophy and science aim to make the same, or a comparable, kind of progress. It does so by responding to Yafeng Shan's (2022) arguments that the wealth of research on scientific progress is not applicable or useful to philosophy, and that philosophy doesn't need a concept of progress at all. It is ultimately argued that while Shan's arguments are not successful, they reveal the way forward in developing accounts of philosophical progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

he ' Scientific Understanding of Climate Change' part of China' s Fourth National Assessment Report on Climate Change reflects a series of new evidence and new understanding of climate change in China since 2015, based on scientific analyses such as climate system observations, paleoclimate archives, theoretical research, and climate modeling. This report summarizes the basic climatic variables of the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, and biosphere, as well as the characteristics of climate change seen in extreme events and typical regions in China. It also analyzes the changes in natural and human driving factors affecting climate change and estimates the future trends of climate change in China. Compared with the Third National Assessment Report on Climate Change, this paper identifies the new features of this assessment report in terms of the structure and conclusions. At the same time, it is pointed out that the system of China' s climate change assessment report is continuously enriched and the understanding of scientific basis is constantly deep -ened. The paper also makes a preliminary comparison between this report and the report of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and proposes solutions to issues concerning climate change monitoring and diagnosis, detection and attribution, simulation estimation, instruments, and methods that China may face in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper contributes to the debate on the question of whether a systematic connection obtains between one’s commitment to realism or antirealism and one’s attitude towards the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, namely, theory change affecting our best, most successful theories (see, e.g., Stanford in Synthese 196:3915–3932, 2019; Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos Sci 76:30–38, 2019). We argue that it is not allegiance to realism or antirealism as such that primarily dictates one’s response to the possibility of radical theoretical novelty: what matters the most is, rather, the proposed alternative’s promise to realize one’s favored cognitive aim(s). Our argument tells not only against Stanford’s account of how adherence to realism or antirealism orients how one responds to possible radical theoretical novelty, but also against what we call the “natural pairing thesis.” According to such a thesis, which has kept resurfacing in the history of the philosophy of science, one-to-one pairings obtain between realism/antirealism, on the one hand, and theoretical conservatism/openness to radical theoretical novelty, on the other hand. As our argument suggests, however, when faced with the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, realists can respond either in a conservative way or by being open to theory change, not unlike antirealists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We aimed to numerically assess the progress of modern psychological science. Average explained variance in 1565 included articles was 42.8 percent, and this was constant during 1956 to 2022. We explored whether this could be explained by a combination of methodological conventions with the semantic properties of the involved variables. Using latent semantic analysis (LSA) on a random sample of 50 studies from the 1,565, we were able to replicate the possible semantic factor structures of 205 constructs reported in the corresponding articles. We argue that the methodological conventions pertaining to factor structures will lock the possible explained variance within mathematical constraints that will make most statistics cluster around 40 percent explained variance. Hypotheses with close to 100 percent semantic truth value will never be part of any assumed empirical study. Nor will hypotheses approaching zero truth value. Hypotheses with around 40 percent truth value will probably be experienced as empirical and plausible and, consequently, as good candidates for psychological research. Therefore, to the extent that the findings were indeed produced by semantic structures, they could have been known without collecting data. Finally, we try to explain why psychology had to abandon an individual, causal method and switch to studying whether associations among variables at the group level differ from chance. Psychological processes take place in indefinitely complex and irreversibly changing contexts. The prevalent research paradigm seems bound to producing theoretical statements that explain each other to around 40%. Any theoretical progress would need to address and transcend this barrier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the results of an empirical study following up on Mizrahi (2021). Using the same methods of text mining and corpus analysis used by Mizrahi (2021), we test empirically a philosophical account of scientific progress that Mizrahi (2021) left out of his empirical study, namely, the so-called functional-internalist account of scientific progress according to which the aim or goal or scientific research is to solve problems. In general, our results do not lend much empirical evidence in support of the problem-solving model of scientific progress over the other philosophical accounts of scientific progress (namely, the epistemic, noetic, and semantic accounts of scientific progress) tested in Mizrahi (2021) and in this follow-up study. Of all the subjects in the JSTOR database we have tested in this study, however, Mathematics is an interesting exception as far as the problem-solving model of scientific progress is concerned. For, in Mathematics alone, we have found that there is significantly more talk of the aims and/or goals of research in terms of solutions than in terms of truth, knowledge, or understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]