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Cognitive conflict is typically experienced as negative and this has been argued to drive adaptive behavior following a conflict. We tried to change the negative value of conflict using evaluative conditioning, and measured changes in conflict adaptation in a subsequent Stroop task (N = 416 Prolific participants, English native speakers from different countries). We found that only people with low goal motivation (as measured through BAS Drive) showed decreased conflict adaptation following positive evaluative conditioning of conflict. A memory test and a follow-up experiment (N = 70) suggest that, although the affective value of conflict was difficult to change, people with low goal motivation experienced less difficulty remembering the association between conflict stimuli and positive pictures, further corroborating better evaluative conditioning in this group. Our findings suggest that the affective value of conflict is important for conflict adaptation, but changing this value is difficult, especially in people with high goal motivation.

Humans can up- or downregulate the degree to which they rely on task information for goal directed behaviour, a process often referred to as cognitive control. Adjustments in cognitive control are traditionally studied in response to experienced or expected task-rule conflict. However, recent theories suggest that people can also learn to adapt control settings through reinforcement. Across three preregistered task switching experiments (n=415), we selectively rewarded correct performance on trials with either more (incongruent) or less (congruent) task-rule conflict. Results confirmed the hypothesis that people rewarded more on incongruent trials showed smaller task-rule congruency effects, thus optimally adapting their control settings to the reward scheme. Using drift diffusion modelling, we further show that this reinforcement of cognitive control may occur through conflict-dependent within-trial adjustments of response thresholds after conflict detection. Together, our findings suggest that, while people remain more efficient at learning stimulus-response associations through rewards, they can similarly learn cognitive control strategies through reinforcement.

In everyday life, people often have to switch back and forth between different environments that come with different problems and volatilities. While volatile environments require fast learning (i.e., high learning rate), stable environments call for lower learning rates. Previous studies have shown that people can adapt their learning rate while remaining in an environment, but it remains unclear whether they can also learn to associate different learning rates to different environments, and instantaneously retrieve their environment-specific learning rate settings when revisiting these environments. Here, we hypothesised that people can switch back and forth between two different environments and learn to use different, optimal learning rates for each. Second, we tested whether people would also show an echo of this learning rate difference in a test phase where both environments had the same volatility. We used optimality simulations and Bayesian hierarchical modelling to demonstrate, across three experiments (total N = 273), that people can alternate between two different learning rates, on a trial-by-trial basis, when switching back and forth between two two-armed bandit tasks in two different environments (i.e., casinos) that differ in volatility. Results from the test phase further suggest that participants learned to attribute these different learning rates to their respective environments, as there remained a small difference in learning rate and choice reversal around the first reward contingency switch. We conclude that people can flexibly adapt and learn to associate different learning rates to different environments, on a trial-by-trial basis, offering important insights for developing theories of meta-learning and context-specific control.

Cognitive effort is underlain by a cost-benefit calculation: as effort is inherently costly, and is preferentially avoided, incentives have to motivate effortful behaviour. This neurocognitive approach can account for findings in effortful decision-making, and effort expenditure based on effort-related information. The latter has been tested with paradigms where the reward and/or demand information of the upcoming task is indicated with a visual cue, allowing for investigation of the effect of reward/demand expectation on effort expenditure. Previous research utilising such a paradigm has shown that the brain encodes the motivational signals of reward and demand information in somewhat overlapping regions, as additive activation has been found for cues cuing (highly) rewarded trials that are also high in demand (Krebs et al., 2012). However, when anticipating effort but not yet preparing for it (Zhang & Zheng, 2022), and when evaluating reward related feedback (Botvinick, et al., 2009), the behavioural and neural data indicates that effort has a discounting effect on the value of external rewards, in accordance with the resource-rational models of effort expenditure. Literature thus suggests that the negative signals of effort in the evaluation stage (decision-making) must be translated into positive ones for optimal goal-directed effort exertion before the task execution. To investigate the neural dynamics involved in the evaluation stage and the allocation stage separately, we employ a paradigm that distinguishes these stages by the means of two cues preceding an effortful task: the first one indicating the reward and demand level of the upcoming task (evaluation cue, e-cue), the second one cuing for the need to prepare for the upcoming task based on the evaluative signals encoded in the first stage (allocation cue, a-cue). We hypothesise that in the evaluation phase we see effort-related discounting of reward value, specifically within the nucleus accumbens, orbitofrontal cortex, and other value-encoding regions. In other words, activity associated with high reward is dampened when coupled with high demand, and activity for the cue of high reward and low demand will elicit highest activation. This pattern of activation should be flipped in the allocation phase, where task execution is imminent and must be prepared for: we expect to see additive activation for high reward, high demand cues in attentional control regions, like the ACC and other fronto-parietal regions. This study will thus clarify how the brain supports effortful behaviour optimally, regardless of the negative connotation of effort.

Cognitive flexibility refers to a mental state that allows efficient switching between tasks. While deciding to be flexible is often ascribed to a strategic resource-intensive executive process, people may also simply use their environment to trigger different states of mental flexibility. We developed a paradigm where participants were exposed to two environments with different task switching probabilities, followed by a probe phase to test the impact of environmental cues. Our results show that people were more efficient at switching in a high-switch environment. Critically, we observe environment-specific triggering of cognitive flexibility after a four-day training period (Experiment 2, N = 51), but not after a one-day training period (Experiment 1, N = 52). Together, these findings suggest that people can associate the need for cognitive flexibility to their environment, providing an environmental triggering mechanism for cognitive control.

We can sometimes efficiently pick up statistical regularities in our environment in the absence of clear intentions or awareness, a process typically referred to as implicit sequence learning. In the current study, we tried to address the question whether suggesting participants that there is nothing to learn can impact this form of learning. If a priori predictions or intentions to learn are important in guiding implicit learning, we reasoned that suggesting participants that there is nothing to learn in a given context should hamper implicit learning. We introduced participants to random contexts that indicated that there was nothing to learn, either implicitly (i.e., by presenting blocks of random trials in "Experiment 1"), or explicitly (i.e., by explicitly instructing them in "Experiment 2"). Next, in a subsequent learning phase, participants performed an implicit sequence learning task. We found that these implicit or explicit suggestions that 'there was nothing to learn' did not influence the emergence of implicit knowledge in the subsequent learning phase. Although these findings seem consistent with simple associative or Hebbian learning accounts of implicit sequence learning (i.e., not steered by predictions), we discuss potential limitations that should inform future studies on the role of a priori predictions in implicit learning.

Fear learning allows us to identify and anticipate aversive events, and adapt our behavior accordingly. This is often thought to rely on associative learning mechanisms where an initially neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) is repeatedly paired with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US), eventually leading to the CS also being perceived as aversive and threatening. Importantly, however, humans also show verbal fear learning. Namely, they have the ability to change their responses to stimuli rapidly through verbal instructions about CS-US pairings. Past research on the link between experience-based and verbal fear learning indicated that verbal instructions about a reversal of CS-US pairings can fully override the effects of previously experienced CS-US pairings, as measured through fear ratings, skin conductance, and fear-potentiated startle. However, it remains an open question whether such instructions can also annul memory traces in the brain. Here, we used a fear reversal paradigm in conjunction with representational similarity analysis of fMRI data to test whether verbal instructions fully override the effects of experienced CS-US pairings in fear-related brain regions or not. Previous research suggests that only the right amygdala should show lingering representations of previously experienced threat (a so-called “Pavlovian trace”). Unexpectedly, we found evidence for the residual effect of prior CS-US experience to be much more widespread than anticipated, in the amygdala but also cortical regions like the dorsal anterior cingulate or dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex. This finding shines a new light on the interaction of different fear learning mechanisms, at times with unexpected consequences.

In keeping with the view that individuals invest cognitive effort in accordance with its relative costs and benefits, reward incentives typically improve performance in tasks that require cognitive effort. At the same time, increasing effort investment may confer larger or smaller performance benefits-that is, the marginal value of effort-depending on the situation or context. On this view, we hypothesized that the magnitude of reward-induced effort modulations should depend critically on the marginal value of effort for the given context, and furthermore, the marginal value of effort of a context should be learned over time as a function of direct experience in the context. Using two well-characterized cognitive control tasks and simple computational models, we demonstrated that individuals appear to learn the marginal value of effort for different contexts. In a task-switching paradigm (Experiment 1), we found that participants initially exhibited reward-induced switch cost reductions across contexts-here, task switch rates-but over time learned to only increase effort in contexts with a comparatively larger marginal utility of effort. Similarly, in a flanker task (Experiment 2), we observed a similar learning effect across contexts defined by the proportion of incongruent trials. Together, these results enrich theories of cost-benefit effort decision-making by highlighting the importance of the (learned) marginal utility of cognitive effort. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A common idea about individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is that they have an above-average preference for predictability and sameness. However, surprisingly little research has gone toward this core symptom, and some studies suggest the preference for predictability in ASD might be less general than commonly assumed. Here, we investigated this important symptom of ASD using three different paradigms, which allowed us to measure preference for predictability under well-controlled experimental conditions. Specifically, we used a dimensional approach by investigating correlations between autistic traits (as measured with the Autism-Spectrum Quotient and Social Responsiveness Scale in a neurotypical population) and the scores on three different tasks. The "music preference" task assessed preferences for tone sequences that varied in predictability. The "perceptual fluency" task required participants to evaluate stimuli that were preceded by a similar versus dissimilar subliminally presented prime. The "gambling" task presented four decks of cards that had equal outcome probabilities but varied in predictability. We observed positive correlations between autistic traits and a preference for predictability in both the music preference and perceptual fluency task. We did not find our hypothesized correlation with gambling behavior but did observe a post hoc correlation showing that participants with more autistic traits were faster to choose the predictable deck. Together, these findings show that a relation between autistic traits and preference for predictability can be observed in a standardized lab environment, and should be considered an important first step toward a better, more mechanistic understanding of insistence on sameness in ASD. Autism Res 2020, 13: 1144-1154. © 2019 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: A core symptom of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a strong preference for predictability, but little research has gone toward it. We show that neurotypical adults with more autistic traits have stronger preferences for predictable tunes, evaluate images that can be predicted as more beautiful, and are faster in choosing a gambling option resulting in predictable reward. These results offer the first important evidence that insistence on sameness in ASD can be studied in controlled lab settings.

Conflict adaptation refers to our ability to modulate our attention in line with changing situational demands, so we can engage in goal-directed behavior. While there is ample evidence demonstrating that such adaptation in conflict tasks can be captured using different response modalities, it remains unknown whether these effects rely on domain-general mechanisms applied to different response modalities, or are the result of more inherently response-specific processes. Here, we used an individual-differences approach to evaluate whether conflict adaptation in two highly similar tasks using different response modalities are related. Specifically, participants performed two versions of a Stroop task, one in which they responded via key presses and one in which they responded via mouse movements. In both tasks, we manipulated the item-specific proportion of (in)congruent trials (80% vs. 20% congruent). This allowed us to evaluate the item-specific proportion congruency (ISPC) effect, a hallmark indicator of conflict adaptation. ISPC effects were observed in both response modalities. However, we found no indications that individual differences in the ISPC effects of the two response modalities were related. This raises the question whether findings from studies on conflict adaptation measured by different modalities can reliably be compared. Furthermore, these results suggest that response modality plays a more integrative role in these adaptive processes, rather than being the mere output of a domain-general control mechanism. This is consistent with contingency learning accounts of the ISPC effect and associative learning models of cognitive control.

International audience; Motivation signals have been shown to influence the engagement of cognitive control processes. However, most studies focus on the invigorating effect of reward prospect, rather than the reinforcing effect of reward feedback. The present study aimed to test whether people strategically adapt conflict processing when confronted with condition-specific congruency-reward contingencies in a manual Stroop task. Results show that the size of the Stroop effect can be affected by selectively rewarding responses following incongruent versus congruent trials. However, our findings also suggest important boundary conditions. Our first two experiments only show a modulation of the Stroop effect in the first half of the experimental blocks, possibly due to our adaptive threshold procedure demotivating adaptive behavior over time. The third experiment showed an overall modulation of the Stroop effect, but did not find evidence for a similar modulation on test items, leaving open whether this effect generalizes to the congruency conditions, or is stimulus-specific. More generally, our results are consistent with computational models of cognitive control and support contemporary learning perspectives on cognitive control. The findings also offer new guidelines and directions for future investigations on the selective reinforcement of cognitive control processes.

Recent studies have demonstrated that cognitive conflict, as experienced during incongruent Stroop trials, is automatically evaluated as negative in line with theories emphasising the aversive nature of conflict. However, while this is well replicated when people only see the conflict stimuli, results are mixed when participants also respond to stimuli before evaluating them. Potentially, the positive surprise people feel when overcoming the conflict allows them to evaluate the experience as more positive. In this study, we investigated whether task experience can account for contradictory findings in the literature. Across three experiments, we observed that responding to incongruent stimuli was evaluated as negative on the first trials, but this effect disappeared after 32 trials. This contrasted with the results of a fourth experiment showing that the negative evaluation of incongruent trials did not disappear, when participants could not respond to the conflict. A re-analysis of three older experiments corroborated these results by showing that a positive evaluation of conflict only occurred after participants had some experience with the task. These results show that responding to conflict clearly changes its affective evaluation fitting with the idea that creating outcome expectancies (lower expectancies for being correct on incongruent trials) makes the experience of conflict less negative.

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-qjp-10.1177_1747021820986146 for Correct responses alleviate the negative evaluation of conflict by Ivan I Ivanchei, Senne Braem, Luc Vermeylen and Wim Notebaert in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-qjp-10.1177_1747021820986528 for Social group membership does not modulate automatic imitation in a contrastive multi-agent paradigm by Laura De Souter, Senne Braem, Oliver Genschow, Marcel Brass and Emiel Cracco in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

The goal of this study is to investigate whether we can selectively reinforce conflict processing in a task switching paradigm by selectively rewarding incongruent (congruent) more than congruent (incongruent) trials using a between-subjects design. In the task switching context, congruency effects refer to the slowing of responses when irrelevant task representations (i.e., stimulus-response mappings of task B) interfere with the task relevant ones (stimulus-response mappings of task A). Method: Participants will perform two different categorization tasks, in which they will classify words either by their animacy (living/non-living) or size (smaller/bigger than a basketball). They will be cued on which task to perform on a trial by trial basis, indicated by the font color (blue or green). Reward manipulation: One group of participants will receive higher rewards after correct responding to incongruent trials (in which the target word would require a distinct response in the currently irrelevant task), whereas the other group will receive higher rewards on congruent trials (in which the target word would require the same response in the currently irrelevant task).

The goal of this study is to investigate whether we can selectively reinforce conflict processing in a task switching paradigm by selectively rewarding incongruent (congruent) more than congruent (incongruent) trials using a between-subjects design. In the task switching context, congruency effects refer to the slowing of responses when irrelevant task representations (i.e., stimulus-response mappings of task B) interfere with the task relevant ones (stimulus-response mappings of task A).

A key prediction of ideomotor theories is that action perception relies on the same mechanisms as action planning. While this prediction has received support from studies investigating action perception in one-on-one interactions, situations with multiple actors pose a challenge because in order to corepresent multiple observed actions, observers have to represent more actions in their motor system than they can physically execute. If representing multiple observed actions, like representing individual observed actions, recycles action planning processes, this should lead to response conflict by observation. In five experiments, we tested this hypothesis by investigating whether simply seeing two conflicting actions is sufficient to elicit response conflict and therefore adaptive control in the same way as planning conflicting actions does. Experiments 1-3 provided meta-analytical evidence (N = 262) that seeing two conflicting gestures triggered a reverse congruency sequence effect on a subsequent, unrelated prime-probe task. Experiment 4 (N = 250) replicated this finding in a high-powered study. Finally, Experiment 5 (N = 253) revealed that the same effect was not present when using unfolding abstract shapes instead of moving hands. Together, these experiments show that not just planning but also seeing two conflicting actions elicits adaptive control, and they provide initial evidence that this is driven by action conflict. These findings have important implications both for theories of action representation and research on cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

BackgroundRecent theories of autism propose that a core deficit in autism would be a less context-sensitive weighting of prediction errors. There is also first support for this hypothesis on an early sensory level. However, an open question is whether this decreased context-sensitivity is caused by faster updating of one’s model of the world (i.e. higher weighting of new information), proposed by predictive coding theories, or slower model updating. Here, we differentiated between these two hypotheses by investigating how first impressions shape the mismatch negativity (MMN), reflecting early sensory prediction error processing.MethodsAn autism and matched control group (both n=27) were compared on the multi-timescale MMN paradigm, in which tones were presented that were either standard (frequently occurring) or deviant (rare), and these roles reversed every block. A well-replicated observation is that the initial model (i.e. the standard and deviant sound in the first block) influences MMN amplitudes in later blocks. If autism is characterized by faster model updating, we hypothesized that their MMN amplitudes would be less influenced by the initial context.ResultsWe found that MMN responses in the autism group did not differ between the initial deviant and initial standard sounds as they did in the control group.ConclusionsThese results show that individuals with autism are less influenced by initial contexts, confirming that autism is characterized by faster updating of sensory models, as proposed by predictive coding accounts of autism.

Botvinik-Nezer, Rotem et al., Data analysis workflows in many scientific domains have become increasingly complex and flexible. Here we assess the effect of this flexibility on the results of functional magnetic resonance imaging by asking 70 independent teams to analyse the same dataset, testing the same 9 ex-ante hypotheses. The flexibility of analytical approaches is exemplified by the fact that no two teams chose identical workflows to analyse the data. This flexibility resulted in sizeable variation in the results of hypothesis tests, even for teams whose statistical maps were highly correlated at intermediate stages of the analysis pipeline. Variation in reported results was related to several aspects of analysis methodology. Notably, a meta-analytical approach that aggregated information across teams yielded a significant consensus in activated regions. Furthermore, prediction markets of researchers in the field revealed an overestimation of the likelihood of significant findings, even by researchers with direct knowledge of the dataset. Our findings show that analytical flexibility can have substantial effects on scientific conclusions, and identify factors that may be related to variability in the analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging. The results emphasize the importance of validating and sharing complex analysis workflows, and demonstrate the need for performing and reporting multiple analyses of the same data. Potential approaches that could be used to mitigate issues related to analytical variability are discussed., European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en) under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement no. 665501. A. Eed was supported by a predoctoral fellowship La Caixa-Severo Ochoa from Obra Social La Caixa. S.B.E. was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement no. 785907 (HBP SGA2).

We can sometimes efficiently pick up statistical regularities in our environment in the absence of clear intentions or awareness, a process typically referred to as implicit sequence learning. In the current study, we tried to address the question whether suggesting participants that there is nothing to learn can impact this form of learning. If a priori predictions or intentions to learn are important in guiding implicit learning, we reasoned that suggesting participants that there is nothing to learn in a given context should hamper implicit learning. We introduced participants to random contexts that indicated that there was nothing to learn, either implicitly (i.e., by presenting blocks of random trials in "Experiment 1"), or explicitly (i.e., by explicitly instructing them in "Experiment 2"). Next, in a subsequent learning phase, participants performed an implicit sequence learning task. We found that these implicit or explicit suggestions that 'there was nothing to learn' did not influence the emergence of implicit knowledge in the subsequent learning phase. Although these findings seem consistent with simple associative or Hebbian learning accounts of implicit sequence learning (i.e., not steered by predictions), we discuss potential limitations that should inform future studies on the role of a priori predictions in implicit learning.

Humans are efficient at learning new behaviors through verbal instructions, bypassing the need for trial-and-error learning, but requiring a certain degree of cognitive flexibility. Recent theories suggest that abstract functions of cognition, like cognitive flexibility, can be (up)regulated by contextual features in our environment with which they are associated. Here, we tested whether people show a more flexible control mode in contexts where one frequently learns new task instructions. Specifically, participants had to encode and execute a series of new task instructions, and the likelihood of encountering a new (relative to old) task instruction varied in function of whether the instruction was presented above versus below the center of the screen (Experiment 1, n = 40), or in a blue versus green font (Experiment 2, n = 40). We measured the level of interference from retained new task instructions on secondary task performance to index cognitive flexibility, and show enhanced flexibility (i.e., enhanced receptibility for new task instructions) for contexts in which the likelihood of encountering new task instructions was relatively high. Similarly, participants were also faster to encode new instructions in these contexts. A third, online study (n = 77) replicated the main finding of Experiment 2, whose context manipulation (i.e., font color) was most effective. Together, these findings suggest that cognitive flexibility can bind to, and be signaled by, contextual features in our environment. Such ‘learning when to learn’ provides a (self-)regulating mechanism for the cognitive processes that support the encoding (and execution) of new task instructions.

Recent studies suggest that humans prefer information that is linked to the process of prediction. Yet it remains to be specified whether preference judgments are biased to information that can be predicted, or information that enables to predict. We here use a serial reaction time task to disentangle these two options. In a first learning phase, participants were exposed to a continuous stream of arbitrary shapes while performing a go/no-go task. Embedded in this stream were hidden pairs of go-stimuli (e.g., shape A was always followed by shape B). Data show faster reaction times to predictable shapes (i.e., shape B) as compared to random and predictive shapes (i.e., shape A), indicating that participants learned the regularities and anticipated upcoming information. Importantly, in a subsequent, unannounced forced-choice preference task, the shapes that were predictive of others were significantly more preferred over random shapes than shapes that could be predicted. Because both the reaction time benefit in the learning phase and the effect in the preference phase could be considered rather small, we studied the relation between both. Interestingly, the preference correlated with the reaction time benefit from the learning phase. A closer look at this correlation further suggested that the difference in preference was only observed when participants picked up the contingencies between predictive and predictable shapes. This study adds evidence to the idea that prediction processes are not only fundamental for cognition, but contribute to the way we evaluate our external world.

The ability to follow new instructions is crucial for acquiring behaviors and the cultural transmission of performance-related knowledge. In this article, we discuss the observation that successful instruction following seems to require both the capacity to understand verbal information, but also the ability to transform this information into a procedural format. Here we review the behavioral and neuroimaging literature on following new instructions and discuss how it contributes to our understanding of the functional mechanisms underlying instruction following. Based on this review, we distinguish three phases of instruction following. In the instruction phase, the declarative information of the task instruction is transformed into a task model consisting of a structured representation of the relevant condition-action rules. In the implementation phase, elements of this task model are transformed into a highly accessible state guiding behavior. In the application phase, the relevant condition-action rules are applied. We discuss the boundary conditions and capacity limits of these phases, determine their neural correlates, and relate them to recent models of working memory.

Unlike other animals, humans have the unique ability to share and use verbal instructions to prepare for upcoming tasks. Recent research showed that instructions are sufficient for the automatic, reflex-like activation of responses. However, systematic studies into the limits of these automatic effects of task instructions remain relatively scarce. In this study, the authors set out to investigate whether this instruction-based automatic activation of responses can be context-dependent. Specifically, participants performed a task of which the stimulus-response rules and context (location on the screen) could either coincide or not with those of an instructed to-be-performed task (whose instructions changed every run). In 2 experiments, the authors showed that the instructed task rules had an automatic impact on performance-performance was slowed down when the merely instructed task rules did not coincide, but, importantly, this effect was not context-dependent. Interestingly, a third and fourth experiment suggests that context dependency can actually be observed, but only when practicing the task in its appropriate context for over 60 trials or after a sufficient amount of practice on a fixed context (the context was the same for all instructed tasks). Together, these findings seem to suggest that instructions can establish stimulus-response representations that have a reflexive impact on behavior but are insensitive to the context in which the task is known to be valid. Instead, context-specific task representations seem to require practice. (PsycINFO Database Record

Supplemental material, Supplemental_Table_1 for Autistic traits are related to worse performance in a volatile reward learning task despite adaptive learning rates by Judith Goris, Massimo Silvetti, Tom Verguts, Jan R Wiersema, Marcel Brass and Senne Braem in Autism

Recent theories propose that autism is characterized by an impairment in determining when to learn and when not. We investigated this by estimating learning rate in environments varying in volatility and uncertainty. Specifically, we correlated autistic traits (in 163 neurotypical participants) with modelled learning behaviour during probabilistic reward learning under the following three conditions: a Stationary Low Noise condition with stable reward contingencies, a Volatile condition with changing reward contingencies and a Stationary High Noise condition where reward probabilities for all options were 60%, resulting in an uncertain, noisy environment. Consistent with earlier findings, we found less optimal decision-making in the Volatile condition for participants with more autistic traits. However, we observed no correlations between underlying adjustments in learning rates and autistic traits, suggesting no impairment in updating learning rates in response to volatile versus noisy environments. Exploratory analyses indicated that impaired performance in the Volatile condition in participants with more autistic traits, was specific to trials with reward contingencies opposite to those initially learned, suggesting a primacy bias. We conclude that performance in volatile environments is lower in participants with more autistic traits, but this cannot be unambiguously attributed to difficulties with adjusting learning rates. Lay abstract Recent theories propose that autism is characterized by an impairment in determining when to learn and when not. Here, we investigated this hypothesis by estimating learning rates (i.e. the speed with which one learns) in three different environments that differed in rule stability and uncertainty. We found that neurotypical participants with more autistic traits performed worse in a volatile environment (with unstable rules), as they chose less often for the most rewarding option. Exploratory analyses indicated that performance was specifically worse when reward rules were opposite to those initially learned for participants with more autistic traits. However, there were no differences in the adjustment of learning rates between participants with more versus less autistic traits. Together, these results suggest that performance in volatile environments is lower in participants with more autistic traits, but that this performance difference cannot be unambiguously explained by an impairment in adjusting learning rates.

In contrast to traditional conflict paradigms, which measure interference from (over)trained associations, recent paradigms have been introduced that investigate automatic interference from newly instructed, but never executed, associations. In these prospective-instruction paradigms, participants receive new task instructions (e.g., if cat press left, if dog press right), but before they have to apply the instructions, they are first presented with another task that measures the automatic interference from the instructed task information. The resulting instruction-based congruency (IBC) effect is assumed to reflect the strength with which instructions are encoded and maintained in view of their future application. If this assumption holds true, the IBC effect should be inversely related to the speed with which the task instructions are eventually executed. To test this hypothesis, we administered a prospective-instruction paradigm to a large sample of 184 participants and observed a negative correlation between the IBC effect and mean reaction time on the instructed task. Similarly, an analysis looking at within-subject variations in the IBC effect and instructed task reaction times showed the same negative relation. Finally, we also present additional analyses suggesting this effect is independent from standard (experience-based) interference effects, and report explorative analyses that tested possible correlations with personality trait questionaires. Together, these findings confirm a key assumption of the IBC effect in prospective-instruction paradigms, and further support the use of this paradigm in instruction research.

Influential theories of Medial Frontal Cortex (MFC) function suggest that the MFC registers cognitive conflict as an aversive signal, but no study directly tested this idea. Instead, recent studies suggested that nonoverlapping regions in the MFC process conflict and affect. In this preregistered human fMRI study (male and female), we used MVPAs to identify which regions respond similarly to conflict and aversive signals. The results reveal that, of all conflict- and value-related regions, only the ventral pre-supplementary motor area (or dorsal anterior cingulate cortex) showed a shared neural pattern response to different conflict and affect tasks. These findings challenge recent conclusions that conflict and affect are processed independently, and provide support for integrative views of MFC function.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTMultiple theories propose that the MFC, and the dorsal ACC in particular, integrates information related to suboptimal outcomes from different psychological domains (e.g., cognitive control and negative affect) with the aim of adaptively steering behavior. In contrast to recent studies in the field, we provide evidence for the idea that cognitive control and negative affect are integrated in the MFC by showing that a classification algorithm trained on discerning cognitive control (conflict vs no conflict) can predict affect (negative vs positive) in the voxel pattern response of the dorsal ACC/pre-SMA.

Whether you believe free will exists has profound effects on your behaviour, across different levels of processing, from simple motor action to social cognition. It is therefore important to understand which specific lay theories are held in the general public and why. Past research largely focused on investigating free will beliefs (FWB, ‘Do you think free will exists?’), but largely ignored a second key aspect: free will attitudes (FWA, ‘Do you like/value will?’). Attitudes are often independently predictive of behaviour, relative to beliefs, yet we currently know very little about FWAs in the general public. One key issue is whether such attitudes are subject to biased, socially desirable responding. The vast majority of the general public strongly believes in the existence of free will, which might create cultural pressure to value free will positively as well. In this registered report, we used a very large ( N = 1100), open available dataset measuring implicit and explicit attitudes towards free will and determinism to address this issue. Our results indicate that both explicit and implicit attitudes towards free will are more positive than attitudes towards determinism. We also show that people experience cultural pressure to value free will, and to devalue determinism. Yet, we found no strong evidence that this cultural pressure affected either implicit or explicit attitudes in this dataset.

Many psychologists and neuroscientists still see executive functions as independent, domain-general, supervisory functions that are often dissociated from more “low-level” associative learning. Here, we suggest that executive functions very much build on associative learning, and argue that executive functions might be better understood as culture-sensitive cognitive gadgets, rather than as ready-made cognitive instincts.

The past two decades have witnessed an explosion of interest in the cognitive and neural mechanisms of adaptive control processes that operate in selective attention tasks. This has spawned not only a large empirical literature and several theories but also the recurring identification of potential confounds and corresponding adjustments in task design to create confound-minimized metrics of adaptive control. The resulting complexity of this literature can be difficult to navigate for new researchers entering the field, leading to suboptimal study designs. To remediate this problem, we present here a consensus view among opposing theorists that specifies how researchers can measure four hallmark indices of adaptive control (the congruency sequence effect, and list-wide, context-specific, and item-specific proportion congruency effects) while minimizing easy-to-overlook confounds.

Task switching refers to the demanding cognitive control process that allows us to flexibly switch between different task contexts. It is a seminal observation that task switching comes with a performance cost (i.e., switch cost), but recent theories suggest that task switching could also carry an affective cost. In two experiments, we investigated the affective evaluation of task switching by having participants perform a task-switching paradigm followed by an affective priming procedure. Crucially, the transition cues of the task-switching paradigm, indicating task alternations or task repetitions, were used as primes in the affective priming procedure to assess their affective connotation. We found that task alternation primes were evaluated as more negative than task repetition primes. These findings show that task switching is affectively tagged, and suggest a potential role for emotion regulation processes in cognitive control.

Background Associations and regularities in our environment can foster expectations and thereby help create a perceptually predictable world (e.g., a knife next to a plate predicts with high certainty a fork on the other side). Based on several observations, it has been suggested that individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have an above average tendency to prefer well-organized information or structured environments. Surprisingly, however, this tendency has not yet been tested under controlled experimental conditions. Method A recent study suggested that neurotypical adults prefer associative information, regardless of their semantic content. Therefore, in this study, we examined the relation of this preference bias to the scores of 123 neurotypical adults on questionnaires that measure autistic traits, known to co-vary with typical autism spectrum characteristics. Participants were presented with different configurations of meaningless abstract shapes. Some shapes were always presented in the exact same fixed configuration, and other shapes were always presented in different random configurations. In an unannounced subsequent evaluation task, participants were required to indicate which shapes they preferred. Results We replicate the observation that people exhibit a general preference for shapes that were presented in fixed configurations. However, there were no correlations between autistic traits and this general preference. Conclusions Our findings suggest the preference for associative information in ASD might be less general than first thought, or restricted to more complex (social) situations or other levels of information processing. We outline specific guidelines for future systematic investigations into the hypothesized increased preference for associative information in ASD.

Humans are able to anticipate abstract task demands and prepare attentional sets accordingly. A popular method to study this ability is to include explicit cues that signal the required level of cognitive control in conflict tasks (e.g., whether or not word meaning will correspond to the task-relevant font color in a Stroop task). Here, we demonstrate that this ability is more limited than assumed by most theories. Starting from a recent finding that implicit cues on the previous trial do not aid task performance, we demonstrate that these cues remain inefficient even when participants are explicitly instructed about their meaning, when the cue-stimulus interval is prolonged, or when the cues are deterministic and blocked (Experiments 1-4). In fact, the cues sometimes even impaired performance. Extending cue-information into the intertrial interval did not help (Experiment 5), and even though we replicated previous cueing effects using explicit cues in between trials in the vocal Stroop task (Experiment 7), this effect disappeared when using manual responses or presenting the cue in the preceding trial (Experiments 6, 8, and 9), and only benefited congruent responses when the intertrial interval was reduced (Experiment 10). Together, these findings point to important boundary conditions in cued control: The ability to prepare for control demands on a trial-by-trial basis is restricted to situations in which cues are presented alone, and where the task involves a nonarbitrary stimulus-response mapping. We discuss these findings in light of recent theories that emphasize the role of event boundaries and the value of cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Previous research has shown that motivational signals bias action over inaction, which may be due to putative inherent valence-action mappings, similar to those observed in the emotional domain. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study we sought to investigate the neural underpinnings of such reward-related response tendencies, and in particular, how valence-action compatibility effects arising from predominant response tendencies are reflected at the neural level, and whether overlapping emotional valence amplifies these effects. To this end, we employed an equiprobable (50:50) Go/NoGo task in which reward (reward/no-reward) and response mode (Go/NoGo) were signaled by orthogonal features of number targets that were overlaid on emotional images (positive, neutral, negative). Reward-related targets led to response facilitation (faster Go responses) and impairment in withholding responses (more NoGo commission errors), consistent with a reward-induced action bias. This pattern was paralleled by modulations in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), with increased activity in no-reward as compared to reward-related Go trials, and the reversed pattern in NoGo trials. Albeit being processed in ventral visual areas, emotional background did not modulate performance in the present task, suggesting that irrelevant emotional information is globally outweighed by reward. In the current paradigm, which neither favors Go responses generally nor allows for differential preparation in Go versus NoGo trials, reward-related targets promote action over inaction. In turn, additional effort is needed to inhibit responses to these targets as well as to initiate responses to (less salient) no-reward targets, which may be considered as a downside of direct stimulus-reward associations.

Item does not contain fulltext Verbal instructions are central to humans' capacity to learn new behaviors with minimal training, but the neurocognitive mechanisms involved in verbally instructed behaviors remain puzzling. Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) evidence suggests that the right middle frontal gyrus and dorsal premotor cortex (rMFG-dPMC) supports the translation of symbolic stimulus–response mappings into sensorimotor representations. Here, we set out to (1) replicate this finding, (2) investigate whether this region's involvement is specific to novel (vs. trained) instructions, and (3) study whether the rMFG-dPMC also shows differences in its (voxel) pattern response indicative of general cognitive processes of instruction implementation. Participants were shown instructions, which they either had to perform later or merely memorize. Orthogonal to this manipulation, the instructions were either entirely novel or had been trained before the fMRI session. Results replicate higher rMFG-dPMC activation levels during instruction implementation versus memorization and show how this difference is restricted to novel, but not trained, instruction presentations. Pattern similarity analyses at the voxel level further reveal more consistent neural pattern responses in the rMFG-dPMC during the implementation of novel versus trained instructions. In fact, this more consistent neural pattern response seemed to be specific to the first instruction presentation and disappeared after the instruction had been applied once. These results further support a role of the rMFG-dPMC in the implementation of novel task instructions and highlight potentially important differences in studying this region's gross activation levels versus (the consistency of) its response patterns. 15 p.

Whereas psychology knows a long tradition of studies that focused on the role of practice and training in acquiring new skills or knowledge, systematic studies into learning via instructions remain relatively scarce. This is surprising given the tremendous influence instructions have on human behavior and cognition. In recent years, however, a (re)new(ed) interest into learning via instructions resulted in new paradigms and findings that can inspire future research in this understudied domain. We offer a brief overview of the articles in this special issue, which present some of the latest empirical developments dedicated to unraveling the implications and applications of learning via instructions. The special issue offers insights into the dynamics underlying the assimilation of new instructions and highlights the strengths and limitations of what can be achieved on the basis of instructions. Furthermore, the different studies showcase various examples of recent methodological advances in testing the effects of instructions. Finally, this special issue shows how different fields in psychology share similar questions on the role of instructions in human behavior, suggesting that this topic should no longer be considered as a subsidiary of these different fields, but as a research field on its own.

Background Recent predictive coding accounts of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) suggest that a key deficit in ASD concerns the inflexibility in modulating local prediction errors as a function of global top-down expectations. As a direct test of this central hypothesis, we used electroencephalography to investigate whether local prediction error processing was less modulated by global context (i.e., global stimulus frequency) in ASD. Methods A group of 18 adults with ASD was compared with a group of 24 typically developed adults on a well-validated hierarchical auditory oddball task in which participants listened to short sequences of either five identical sounds (local standard) or four identical sounds and a fifth deviant sound (local deviant). The latter condition is known to generate the mismatch negativity (MMN) component, believed to reflect early sensory prediction error processing. Crucially, previous studies have shown that in blocks with a higher frequency of local deviant sequences, top-down expectations seem to attenuate the MMN. We predicted that this modulation by global context would be less pronounced in the ASD group. Results Both groups showed an MMN that was modulated by global context. However, this effect was smaller in the ASD group as compared with the typically developed group. In contrast, the P3b, as an electroencephalographic marker of conscious expectation processes, did not differ across groups. Conclusions Our results demonstrate that people with ASD are less flexible in modulating their local predictions (reflected in MMN), thereby confirming the central hypothesis of contemporary predictive coding accounts of ASD.

We investigated whether stimuli merely instructed to be fear-relevant can bias visual attention, even when the fear relation was never experienced before. Participants performed a dot-probe task with pictures of naturally fear-relevant (snake or spider) or -irrelevant (bird or butterfly) stimuli. Instructions indicated that two pictures (one naturally fear-relevant and one fear-irrelevant) could be followed by an electrical stimulation (i.e., instructed fear). In reality, no stimulation was administered. During the task, two pictures were presented on each side of the screen, after which participants had to determine as fast as possible on which side a black dot appeared. After a first phase, fear was reinstated by instructing participants that the device was not connected but now was (reinstatement phase). Participants were faster when the dot appeared on a location where an instructed fear picture was presented. This effect seemed independent of whether picture content was naturally fear-relevant, but was only found in the first half of each phase, suggesting rapid extinction due to the absence of stimulation, and rapid re-evaluation after reinstatement. A second experiment similarly showed that instructed fear biases attention, even when participants were explicitly instructed that no stimulation would be given during the dot-probe task. Together, these findings demonstrate that attention can be biased towards instructed fear stimuli, even when these fear relations were never experienced. Future studies should test whether this is specific to fear, or can be observed for all instructions that change the relevance of a given stimulus.