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INTRODUCTION 1335 I. ABORTION RIGHTS 1336 II. GAY RIGHTS 1345 INTRODUCTION The poet laureate Robert Pinsky wrote that "[a] country is the things it wants to see." (1) But a [...], Walter Dellinger's scholarship, litigation, and popular writing were marked by a distinctive combination of doctrinal sophistication, strategic sagacity, and deep humanity. One theme that informed his work was the "normative power of the actual": the idea that "what is already in place, seems right." Dellinger saw that while that concept can produce unthinking acceptance of an existing, and unfair, legal order, it need not always be so. Sometimes, the normative power of the actual can bend the legal order to accommodate social change that has already occurred. Dellinger's work on abortion rights and on gay equality illustrates this point. Dellinger offered a powerful critique of abortion laws that rested on blinkered accounts of history and present-day conditions. And his embrace of the normative power of the actual anticipated the nation's reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. Similarly, Dellinger harnessed the normative power of the actual to help achieve marriage equality for same-sex couples.

I. INTRODUCTION 390 II. OVERVIEW OF TITLE IX 391 A. RECENT HISTORY OF TITLE IX 391 B. NON-ATHLETIC APPLICATIONS OF TITLE IX 393 1. Sexual Harassment 394 2. Employment Practices [...]

INTRODUCTION 96 I. WHAT IS A DRAG PERFORMANCE? 97 II. DRAG IS EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT 100 III. DRAG PERFORMANCES EXPRESS VIEWPOINTS 105 IV. DRAG IS NOT OBSCENE 108 A. CURRENT SUPREME [...], This article explains why virtually any law aimed specifically at restricting, suppressing, or banning drag performances violates the First Amendment. The key reasons for this are as follows. First, drag performances are expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Second, drag performances generally do not fall into any uncovered category of speech, such as obscenity. Third, drag performances express viewpoints. Fourth, the Supreme Court has set an extremely high standard for permitting viewpoint discrimination--even for speech not covered by the First Amendment. Laws aimed at restricting drag performances do not meet this high standard because, among other reasons, such laws are not precisely tailored. Thus, laws that pick out drag performances for restriction over and above other forms of covered (or even uncovered) speech violate the First Amendment. After offering these arguments, this article examines how these First Amendment facts impact anti-drag laws in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Montana. These three case studies provide further evidence for the conclusion that anti-drag laws are generally unconstitutional by examining issues of overbreadth and vagueness, with an emphasis on how vague and overbroad anti-drag laws like these impermissibly chill the speech and expression of drag performers and of trans people.

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 885 I. BACKGROUND ON BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY 887 A. Justice Gorsuch's Majority Opinion 887 B. "Dueling Textualisms" 888 II. JUSTICE ALITO'S APPENDIX C 889 A. [...]

FEATURE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1068 I. SEX EQUALITY, REAL DIFFERENCES, AND ANTI-STEREOTYPINC 1084 A. Real Differences 1084 1. Biology Is Neutral, or Biology Is Not Bigotry 1095 2. The Two Sexes [...], This Feature uses recent developments in LGBTQ-equality law to unsettle sex equality's enduring commitment to biology as a basis for sex discrimination. Sex equality rejects sex discrimination when it is based on sex stereotypes, defined as gross generalizations about women and men, but not when it is based on biological differences between the sexes, like pregnancy, anatomy, and strength. Biological justifications for race discrimination--once commonhave been relegated to the trash heap of history. But biological justifications for sex discrimination persist. This is so because sex equality insists that biology alone is neither a stereotype nor an expression of bigotry. Biological rationales for sex discrimination remain attractive to lower federal and state courts, and have received the Supreme Court's blessing, most recently in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. The result is a broad swath of laws across substantive areas--including family law, tort, immigration law, criminal law, property, and abortion law--that sustain sex inequality courtesy of biology and despite a fairly robust anti-stereotyping principle. This Feature argues that sex equality's continued embrace of real differences should not survive what LGBTQ equality shows: that biologically rationalized sex discrimination is an illegal sex stereotype. It uses recent developments in LGBTQ equality surrounding sex, the body, procreation, and parenthood to unsettle sex equality's beliefs in the reality of biological differences between the sexes and in the legality of laws based on those differences. It urges sex equality to grapple with what LGBTQ equality has to say about biology and its role in lawmaking and imagines what the American law of sex might look like when it does. Biologically rationalized sex distinctions have always been sex stereotypes. It is just that now, LGBTQ equality makes those stereotypes easier to see, harder to ignore, and impossible to justify.

I. Introduction. 733 II. Developments in Religious Exemptions. 734 III. The Ministerial Exception 736 A. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC 736 B. EEOC V. R.G. & G.R. [...]

INTRODUCTION Slowly but surely, some U.S. courts are increasing protections for LGBTQ+ individuals (1) and eliminating stereotypes in laws based on sex and gender. (2) A recent Fourth Circuit decision [...]

I. Introduction 671 II. Same-Sex Marriage 672 A. Background 672 B. The Obergefell Holding 673 C. Implementation and Enforcement Challenges Since Obergefell 675 III. State Regulation of Marriage 676 A. [...]

INTRODUCTION I. THE CONTENT MODERATION ASSEMBLAGE A. Deconstructing Moderation B. Putting Moderation Back Together II. A HISTORICAL MODEL FOR SEXUAL CONTENT MODERATION A. Legal Contexts, Discourses, and Values 1. Repressive [...], Content moderation plays an increasingly important role in the creation and dissemination of expression, thought, and knowledge. And yet, throughout the social media ecosystem, nonnormative and LGBTQ+ sexual expression is disproportionately taken down, restricted, and banned. The current sociolegal literature, which focuses on content moderation as a whole and sees echoes of formal law in the evolution of its values and mechanics, insufficiently captures the ways in which those principles and practices are not only discriminatory, but also resemble structures of power that have long been used to police queer sexual behavior in public spaces. This Article contributes to the sociolegal literature by approaching content moderation from an explicitly queer perspective, bridging siloed scholarship on law, technology, and LGBTQ+ history. It argues that content moderation for "sexual activity" is an assemblage of social forces that encodes queerness as sexual in a way that straightness is not. This is the case because far from simply reflecting free speech principles, as several scholars have argued, content moderation in fact resembles oppressive anti-vice campaigns from the middle of the last century in which "disorderly conduct," "vagrancy," "lewdness," and other vague morality statutes were disproportionately enforced against queer behavior in public. This analogy highlights underappreciated pieces of the content moderation puzzle. Like anti-vice campaigns, sexual content moderation emerged from similar sociolegal contexts, relies on similar justificatory discourses, leverages similarly vague rules, similarly operates mostly without rigorous, science-backed expertise in sexual content, also disproportionately silences queer content, and similarly does so without due process. Ultimately, I argue that like anti-vice enforcement, sexual content moderation results in the maintenance and reification of social media as "straight spaces" that are hostile to queer, nonnormative expression. This Article provides a full, critical account of sexual content moderation and its effects on queer expression. It details and challenges the current content moderation literature and explores potential new directions for scholarship, moderation, and law. The similarities and differences between anti-vice enforcement and sexual content moderation also suggest a way forward, offering novel justifications for modest legal reform, social activism, and platform responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 87 I. POLARIZATION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: KEY DRIVERS 89 A. End of White Christian America 89 B. Tribalization of American Politics and [...], Americans are deeply polarized on a plethora of issues. One of the most prominent areas of polarization is religious liberty, which in recent years has increasingly pitted conservative, white Christians against a range of marginalized minorities, particularly Muslims. The divide threatens Muslims' rights and the vitality of religious liberty more broadly. This Article assesses the extent to which self-interest--especially the self-interest of the conservative Justices of the Supreme Court--can help depolarize religious liberty. Professor Derrick Bell's theory of "interest convergence" helps connect different self-interests that, in turn, enable issue-specific coalitions strong enough to effect serious cultural and legal change. Bell used interest convergence theory to analyze judicial decisionmaking during the civil rights movement. Other scholars have built upon Bell's original thesis about Black people's rights by extending interest convergence to other racial minorities. This Article is the first to consider the implications of interest convergence not just for religious minorities but specifically the status of religious minorities in today's politicized religious liberty landscape. In so doing, it aims to formulate a theory of "religious liberty interest convergence." Specifically, this Article applies Bell's framework to two recent Supreme Court cases. It uses interest convergence theory to explain the rulings against Muslim claimants in Trump v. Hawaii (2018) and for Muslim claimants in Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020). The Article concludes by assessing the relevance of religious liberty interest convergence to political coalition-building. In both the judicial and coalition-building contexts, relying on self-interest helps create openings where openings may not otherwise be possible.

INTRODUCTION In January 2019, California Senator Scott Wiener introduced Senate Bill No. 145 ("SB 145"), which amended the Sex Offenders Registration Act. (1) California Governor Gavin Newsom signed the bill [...]

INTRODUCTION The late Ruth Bader Ginsburg began her notorious career rendering unprecedented opinions and scathing dissents in the name of effectuating the prohibition on sex-based discrimination. (1) In her early [...]

"You never completely have your rights, one person, until you all have your rights." - Marsha P. Johnson (1) Introduction 916 I. History 919 A. Employment-at-Will 919 B. The Development [...]

INTRODUCTION At the heart of Singapore's political identity lies a paradox: Singapore's reliance on liberal foreign policy (1) while maintaining an insular, conservative socio-political landscape. (2) This inconsistency forms a [...]

I. INTRODUCTION 268 II. OVERVIEW 269 A. "Similarly Situated" Requirement 270 B. Standards of Review 270 1. Strict Scrutiny 271 a. Suspect Classifications 271 b. Fundamental Rights 273 2. Intermediate [...]

INTRODUCTION 326 I. DEFINITION OF PROSTITUTION UNDER STATE LAWS 330 A. Sexual Activity or Conduct 330 B. Compensation 332 C. Intent 332 II. CRIMES RELATED TO PROSTITUTION 333 A. Patronizing [...]

I. INTRODUCTION 361 II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 362 A. Background 362 B. The ObeRgefell Holding 362 C. Implementation and Enforcement Challenges Since Obergefell 364 III. STATE REGULATION OF MARRIAGE 366 A. [...]

Texas's Senate Bill 8 113 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia 114 State v. Arlene's Flowers 116 Legal Sex Change in Utah 119 Each year, the Georgetown Journal of Gender and [...]

I. INTRODUCTION: AIMS OF THIS ARTICLE II. GOALS OF LGBTQ POLICY ADVOCACY III. GUIDING PRINCIPLES A. Dignity 1. Broadly Recognized 2. Relevance to LGBTQ a. Recognition of inherent worth b. [...]

I. INTRODUCTION 35 II. CASES CHALLENGING SCHOOL BATHROOM POLICIES THAT RESTRICT ACCESS BY TRANSGENDER STUDENTS 41 A. GAVIN GRIMM LITIGATION 41 B. A.H.v. MINERSVILLE (2019) 43 C. WHITAKER V. KENOSHA [...], This article suggests that the moment may be right to rethink the societal need for sex-separated bathrooms, and to consider the harmful ways in which they perpetuate a problematic gender binary. Architectural innovations for public restroom design, inspired by the need to increase social distancing during the pandemic, align well with designs that have already been proposed for gender-inclusive bathrooms. At the same time, recent federal cases have confronted the tortured logic of those insisting on policing the gender binaty that sex-separated bathrooms represent. The responses in these decisions, which uphold the rights of transgender students to have access to the bathrooms that align with their gender identity, are shown to undermine the logic of the gender binary in general and the rationale for sex-separated facilities in particular.

This special issue addresses the role of appellate judges in addressing hotly contested social-political issues. Despite our limited judicial role, we are often called on to make legal decisions that [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING IN A CHANGING SOCIETY A. Framing the 'Public' of Original Public Meaning 1. The Basic Concept of 'Ordinary [...], The meaning of sex matters. The interpretive methodology by which the meaning of sex is determined matters. Both of these were at issue in the Supreme Court's recent landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, where the Court held that Title VII protects lesbians, gay men, transgender persons, and other sexual and gender minorities against workplace discrimination. Despite unanimously agreeing that Title VII should be interpreted in accordance with its original public meaning in 1964, the opinions in Bostock failed to properly define sex or offer a coherent theory of how long-standing statutes like Title VII should be interpreted over time We argue that longstanding statutes are inherently dynamic because they inevitably evolve beyond the original legislative expectations, and we offer a new theory and framework for how courts can manage societal and linguistic evolution The framework depends in part on courts defining 'meaning' properly so that statutory coverage is allowed to evolve naturally over time due to changes in society, even if the meaning of the statutory language is held constant (via originalism). Originalism in statutory and constitutional interpretation typically focuses on the language of the text itself and whether it has evolved over time (what we term linguistic dynamism), but courts should also recognize that the features of the objects of interpretation may also evolve over time (what we term societal dynamism). As society changes, so do social norms; what we call normative dynamism is the influence of evolving values on the interpretive enterprise, however conceptualized. Linguistic and normative dynamism create difficulties for originalism, but societal dynamism should not, as originalists have assumed in other contexts (such as Second Amendment jurisprudence) We explore the relationship among societal, linguistic, and normative dynamism and their implications for original public meaning. Putting our framework into action, we demonstrate, through the application of corpus analysis and linguistic theory, that sex in 1964 was not limited to "biological distinctions between male and female," as all the opinions in Bostock assumed, and that gender and sexual orientation were essentially nonwords in 1964. Sex thus had a broader meaning than it does today, where terms like gender and sexual orientation (and other terms like sexuality) denote concepts that once could be referred to as sex (on its own and in compounds). In turn, today's gays and lesbians and transgender people are social groups that did not exist (or that existed in a very different form) in 1964. By limiting the meaning of sex to "biological distinctions" and failing to recognize that societal dynamism can change statutory coverage, the Court missed the opportunity to explicitly affirm that the societal evolution of gays and lesbians and transgender people has legal significance. Finally, the Court missed an opportunity to acknowledge the importance law can assume in societal and linguistic dynamism: one reason gays and lesbians are a novel social group is that they live in a world where same-sex intimacy is not a crime and the state does not treat homosexuality as psychopathic.

I. Introduction In February (2017), an "anti-gay purge" was unleashed by Chechnya. (1) At least 150 persons, targeted due to their homosexuality were arrested and subjected to sexual violence, torture [...]

I. INTRODUCTION 251 II. AN EXAMINATION OF SELECT STATE CONVERSION THERAPY BANS 255 A. THE NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA STATUTES 255 III. A REVIEW OF CHALLENGES TO [...], "I was told that my faith community rejected my sexuality; that I was the abomination we had heard about in Sunday school; that I was the only gay person in the world; that it was inevitable I would get H.I.V. and AIDS." "The therapist ordered me bound to a table to have ice, heat and electricity applied to my body. I was forced to watch clips on a television of gay men holding hands, hugging and having sex. I was supposed to associate those images with the pain I was feeling to once and for all turn into a straight boy. In the end it didn't work. I would say that it did, just to make the pain go away." (1)

INTRODUCTION On August 19, 2019, the City Council of Fayetteville, Arkansas, had a ten-hour meeting. (1) More than a hundred citizens lined up to share their thoughts on Ordinance 119, [...]

ARTICLE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 80 I. SEX SEGREGATION IN LAW AND CUSTOM 86 A. "The Last Great Piece of Americana": Preserving the Male Public 88 B. "The Myth of the Evil [...], This Article recounts the first history of sex in public accommodations law--a history essential to debates that rage today over gender and sexuality in public. Just fifty years ago, not only LGBTQ people but also cisgender women were the subject of discrimination in public. Restaurants and bars displayed "men-only" signs. Women held secondary status in civic organizations, such as Rotary and Jaycees, and were excluded altogether from many professional bodies, such as press clubs. Sports--from the Little League to the golf club--kept girls and women from achieving athletic excellence. Financial institutions subsumed married women's identities within those of their husbands. Over the course of the 1970s, the feminist movement protested and litigated against sex discrimination in public accommodations. They secured state laws opening up commerce and leisure for "full and equal enjoyment" by both sexes. When "sex" was added to state public accommodations laws, feminists, their opponents, and government actors understood sex equality in public to signify more than equal access to public spaces. It also implicated freedom from the regulation of sexuality and gender performance and held the potential to transform institutions central to dominant masculinity, like baseball fields and bathrooms. This history informs the interpretation of public accommodations laws in controversies from same-sex couples' wedding cakes to transgender people's restroom access.