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Why are some ethnopolitical movements divided while others are relatively unified? A growing literature examines the consequences of internal divisions in ethnopolitical movements – and shows that it matters for a range of conflict outcomes – yet the mechanisms causing such divisions remain poorly understood. Our argument emphasizes competitive dynamics between states and self-determination movements and between rival factions within these movements as key determinants of fragmentation. Drawing from literatures on social movements, contentious politics, and civil war, we situate our argument vis-à-vis three alternative and complementary sets of explanations based on theories emphasizing transnational dimensions, political institutions, and structural factors within ethnopolitical groups. Using an original dataset, we test hypotheses explaining movement fragmentation over time and use a case study of Punjab in India to identify specific causal mechanisms and missing variables. Our findings show some support for three of these theories, suggesting that ethnopolitical movements divide as a result of complex and interactive processes. But our findings also underscore that central to explaining fragmentation dynamics are factors capturing competitive dynamics, including repression, accommodation of movement demands, the turn to violence, and the dynamic and changing nature of ethnopolitical demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Side switching by armed groups is a prominent feature of many civil wars. Shifts in alignment have far-reaching consequences, influencing key outcomes such as civil war duration and termination, military effectiveness, levels of civilian victimization, and state-building prospects. In Sudan's wars, ideological and ethnic cleavages have not influenced factional alignments nearly as much as one might expect given the prominence of clashing political projects and ethnically organized violence in southern Sudan and Darfur. Recent explanations highlighting the role of territorial control, factional infighting, or relative power considerations also have limited value. In many wars fought in weak states characterized by low barriers to side switching, two mechanisms explain patterns of collaboration and defection: first, political rivalries that lead actors to collaborate in exchange for military support in localized struggles; and second, patronage-based incentives that induce collaboration for material gain. A nested analysis drawing on original data from wars in southern Sudan and Darfur supports this argument. The findings have implications for understanding alignments in civil wars, the role of weak states in counter-insurgency, and ethnic politics more generally, as well as policy relevance for factionalized civil wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on peace operations, finance and the political economy. Two conspicuous features of the contemporary global security problématique need to be explicitly connected: first, diplomatic, humanitarian, development and military responses to conflict are hampered by a basic lack of resources; second, these underfunded interventions are increasingly directed at conflicts that thrive on resource abundance. In other words, while the global peace regime is constrained by resource shortfalls, rapacious competition over commodity rents perpetuates local conflict and frustrates peacemaking efforts. Drawing on recent research into the political economy of conflict and underdevelopment, three main arguments are presented in the article. First, sociologists show how using local resources promises to expand the scale and scope of activities otherwise inhibited by the international system's inability to provide adequate financing for peace operations and related activities. The second section considers the political economy of resource wars. In the third section, sociologists take a long-term, developmental perspective.