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Several authors have distinguished automatic behaviour of routine or well-learnt action sequences from controlled behaviour of novel actions. In this paper we present an interactive activation model of routine action selection based on the Contention Scheduling theory of Norman & Shallice (1986). The model, developed in the specific domain of coffee preparation, provides a good account of normal behaviour in a complex yet routine task. In addition, we report lesioning studies which show breakdown of action selection qualitatively similar to that seen in a variety of neurological patients (action disorganisation syndrome, utilisation behaviour, and Parkinson's disease). These lesioning studies are based on the systematic variation of critical system parameters. Such parameters, which are implicit in all interactive activation models, raise complex methodological issues relating to the criticality of their values. We address these issues by reporting results of a detailed exploration of the parameter space.

Deep dyslexics are patients with neurological damage who exhibit a variety of symptoms in oral reading, including semantic, visual and morphological effects in their errors, a part-of-speech effect, and better performance on concrete than abstract words. Extending work by Hinton & Shallice (1991), we develop a recurrent connectionist network that pronounces both concrete and abstract words via their semantics, defined so that abstract words have fewer semantic features. The behavior of this network under a variety of "lesions" reproduces the main effects of abstractness on deep dyslexic reading: better correct performance for concrete words, a tendency for error responses to be more concrete than stimuli, and a higher proportion of visual errors in response to abstract words. Surprisingly, severe damage within the semantic system yields better performance on abstract words, reminiscent of CAV, the single, enigmatic patient with "concrete word dyslexia."

Damage to the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) can lead to Optic Ataxia (OA), in which patients misreach to peripheral targets. Recent research suggested that the PPC might be involved not only in simple reaching tasks toward peripheral targets, but also in changing the hand movement trajectory in real time if the target moves. The present study investigated whether patients with a lesion arising from operation for prefrontal, premotor or parietal tumours are selectively impaired in three experimental pointing conditions: (i) pointing to peripheral targets, (ii) pointing to fixatable targets, and (iii) pointing to moved targets (on-line movement corrections). The study confirmed the selective importance of the parietal cortex in all three tasks. Surprisingly, given clinical claims about OA, the degree of peripheral reaching errors correlated strongly in parietal patients with that to fixatable targets. However, there was no relation between peripheral reaching errors and the "shift cost" of making on-line correction to moved targets, and classical double dissociations between the two skills were observed. The findings suggest that deficits in pointing to peripheral and to moved targets reflect two at least partly independent processes. (Contains 1 table and 4 figures.)

While many behavioural studies on refractory phenomena in lexical/semantic access have focused on the mechanisms involved in the oral production of names, comprehension tasks have been almost exclusively used in neuropsychological studies on brain damaged patients. We report the results of two experiments on healthy participants conducted by means of speeded word to picture matching tasks. They assess the effects of the same variables examined in the study of refractory access dysphasic patients: semantic distance and word frequency (experiment 1) and presentation rate and serial position effects (experiment 2). Semantic access patients usually show little effect of word frequency but a large semantic distance effect. However, critical in characterising the syndrome as "refractory", effects of presentation rate and serial position should also be present. The experiments involved the use of a deadline response procedure. The critical manipulation was the absence of a Response Stimulus Interval (RSI) in the fast presentation rate conditions; slower presentation rates involved 1 s RSI. With these manipulations the typical behavioural pattern of performance provided by semantic access dysphasic patients was reproduced. Semantic distance effects were more powerful than word frequency effects (experiment 1). Presentation rate effects were found and, most important for a "refractory" account of the effects, a serial position effect was obtained (experiment 2). These results provide the first evidence of such a broad range of refractory effects at the same time in comprehension tasks in healthy subjects and support a purely semantic account for the locus of refractoriness. Moreover, error analysis showed a predominance of perseverative errors with subsequent representations of the same target, supporting a failure of cognitive control mechanisms as the cause of refractory behaviour. The findings are discussed in the light of current models of lexical and semantic processing. (Contains 5 figures.)

Elementary deduction is the ability of unreflectively drawing conclusions from explicit or implicit premises, on the basis of their logical forms. This ability is involved in many aspects of human cognition and interactions. To date, limited evidence exists on its cortical bases. We propose a model of elementary deduction in which logical inferences, memory, and meta-logical control are separable subcomponents. We explore deficits in patients with left, medial and right frontal lesions, by both studying patients' deductive abilities and providing measures of their meta-logical sensitivity for proof difficulty. We show that lesions to left lateral and medial frontal cortex impair abilities at solving elementary deductive problems, but not so lesions to right frontal cortex. Furthermore, we show that memory deficits differentially affect patients according to the locus of the lesion. Left lateral patients with working memory deficits had defective deductive abilities, but not so left lateral patients with spared working memory. In contrast, in medial patients both deductive and meta-deductive abilities were affected regardless of the presence of memory deficits. Overall, the results are compatible with a componential view of elementary deduction, and call for the elaboration of more fine-grained models of deductive abilities. (Contains 2 figures and 4 tables.)

The present study addresses the question of how such an abstract concept as time is represented by our cognitive system. Specifically, the aim was to assess whether temporal information is cognitively represented through left-to-right spatial coordinates, as already shown for other ordered sequences (e.g., numbers). In Experiment 1, the task-relevant information was the temporal duration of a cross. RTs were shorter when short and long durations had to be responded to with left and right hands, respectively, than with the opposite stimulus-response mapping. The possible explanation that the foreperiod effect (i.e., shorter RTs for longer durations) is greater with right than with left hand responses is discarded by results of Experiment 2, in which right and left hand responses alternated block-wise in a variable foreperiod paradigm. Other explanations concerning manual or hemispheric asymmetries may be excluded based on the results of control experiments, which show that the compatibility effect between response side and cross duration occurs for accuracy when responses are given with crossed hands (Experiment 3), and for RTs when responses are given within one hand (Experiment 4). This pattern suggests that elapsing time, similarly to other ordered information, is represented in some circumstances through an internal spatial reference frame, in a way that may influence motor performance. Finally, in Experiment 5, the temporal duration was parametrically varied using different values for each response category (i.e., 3 short and 3 long durations). The compatibility effect between hand and duration was replicated, but followed a rectangular function of the duration. The shape of this function is discussed in relation to the specific task demands.

In a variable foreperiod (FP) paradigm, reaction times (RTs) decrease as a function of FP on trial n (FP effect) but increase with FP on trial n = 1 (sequential effects). These phenomena have traditionally been ascribed to different strategic preparation processes. According to an alternative explanation, common conditioning laws underlie both effects. The present study aims to disentangle these opposite views using a developmental perspective. In Experiment 1A, 4- to 11-year-old children and a control group of adults performed a simple RT task with variable FPs (1, 3, and 5 s). Furthermore, 12 4- to 5-year-old children were retested after 14 months (Experiment 1B). In Experiment 2, a narrower pool of participants (4, 5, and 6 years old) performed a variable FP paradigm with different FPs (1, 2, and 3 s). The results consistently suggest different ontogenetic time courses for the two effects: The sequential effects are already present in the youngest group (4-5 years old), whereas the FP effect appears gradually some years later. These findings are not fully compatible with previous views. A dual-process account is proposed to explain the data.

The emergence of modern humans with their extraordinary cognitive capacities is ascribed to a novel type of cognitive computational process (sustained non-routine multi-level operations) required for abstract projectuality, held to be the common denominator of the cognitive capacities specific to modern humans. A brain operation (latching) that allows this novel computational process is proposed as well as a physics-inspired mechanism that could explain its rather recent emergence without invoking unlikely genetic or structural changes.

Traditional accounts of sequential behavior assume that schemas and goals play a causal role in the control of behavior. In contrast, M. Botvinick and D. C. Plaut (see record 2004-12248-005) argued that, at least in routine behavior, schemas and goals are epiphenomenal. The authors evaluate the Botvinick and Plaut account by contrasting the simple recurrent network model of Botvinick and Plaut with their own more traditional hierarchically structured interactive activation model (R. P. Cooper & T. Shallice, 2000). The authors present a range of arguments and additional simulations that demonstrate theoretical and empirical difficulties for both Botvinick and Plaut's model and their theoretical position. The authors conclude that explicit hierarchically organized and causally efficacious schema and goal representations are required to provide an adequate account of the flexibility of sequential behavior.

When subjects switch between a pair of stimulus-response tasks, reaction time is slower on trial N if a different task was performed on trial N--1. We present a parallel distributed processing (PDP) model that simulates this effect when subjects switch between word reading and color naming in response to Stroop stimuli. Reaction time on "switch trials" can be slowed by an extended response selection process which results from (a) persisting, inappropriate states of activation and inhibition of task-controlling representations; and (b) associative learning, which allows stimuli to evoke tasks sets with which they have recently been associated (as proposed by Allport & Wylie, 2000). The model provides a good fit to a large body of empirical data, including findings which have been seen as problematic for this explanation of switch costs, and shows similar behavior when the parameters are set to random values, supporting Allport and Wylie's proposal. [This research was supported by the UK Medical Research Council.]

Argues that accounting for introspection within a theory of consciousness can be achieved through constructing information- processing models that account for "Type-C" processes in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. Suggests that the Shallice (1988) framework provides an initial account of Type-C processes and may be refined through investigating the functions of the prefrontal cortex. (Author/KB)

Fluid intelligence is arguably the defining feature of human cognition. Yet the nature of its relationship with the brain remains a contentious topic. Influential proposals drawing primarily on functional imaging data have implicated 'multiple demand' frontoparietal and more widely distributed cortical networks, but extant lesion-deficit studies with greater causal power are almost all small, methodologically constrained, and inconclusive. The task demands large samples of patients, comprehensive investigation of performance, fine-grained anatomical mapping, and robust lesion-deficit inference, yet to be brought to bear on it. We assessed 165 healthy controls and 227 frontal or non-frontal patients with unilateral brain lesions on the best-established test of fluid intelligence, Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices, employing an array of lesion-deficit inferential models responsive to the potentially distributed nature of fluid intelligence. Non-parametric Bayesian stochastic block models were used to reveal the community structure of lesion deficit networks, disentangling functional from confounding pathological distributed effects. Impaired performance was confined to patients with frontal lesions [ F (2,387) = 18.491; P < 0.001; frontal worse than non-frontal and healthy participants P < 0.01, P <0.001], more marked on the right than left [ F (4,385) = 12.237; P < 0.001; right worse than left and healthy participants P < 0.01, P < 0.001]. Patients with non-frontal lesions were indistinguishable from controls and showed no modulation by laterality. Neither the presence nor the extent of multiple demand network involvement affected performance. Both conventional network-based statistics and non-parametric Bayesian stochastic block modelling heavily implicated the right frontal lobe. Crucially, this localization was confirmed on explicitly disentangling functional from pathology-driven effects within a layered stochastic block model, prominently highlighting a right frontal network involving middle and inferior frontal gyrus, pre- and post-central gyri, with a weak contribution from right superior parietal lobule. Similar results were obtained with standard lesion-deficit analyses. Our study represents the first large-scale investigation of the distributed neural substrates of fluid intelligence in the focally injured brain. Combining novel graph-based lesion-deficit mapping with detailed investigation of cognitive performance in a large sample of patients provides crucial information about the neural basis of intelligence. Our findings indicate that a set of predominantly right frontal regions, rather than a more widely distributed network, is critical to the high-level functions involved in fluid intelligence. Further they suggest that Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices is a useful clinical index of fluid intelligence and a sensitive marker of right frontal lobe dysfunction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]