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Psychology ought to treat mind as a scientific object and ought to come to terms with the irreducible cultural dimensions of mind. However, it is argued that an uncritical shift in favor of a cultural approach runs the risk of imposing uniquely human characteristics on the general study of mind.

Despite some questionable decisions regarding its organization, this anthology is an interesting read and a valuable general education resource concerning the intellectual history, and subsequent evolution, of systems theory. The book details early conceptual landmarks while emphasizing latter-day developments and applications, in particular in the context of cultural studies and the socio-economical sciences. While commenting on the book's form and content I also raise questions concerning systems theory's standing in relation to such themes as consciousness, constructivism, and the machine metaphor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to John Searle's connection principle (CP) all intentional states are, necessarily, potentially conscious (Searle 1992). Thus formulated, CP implies that intentionality is ontologically dependent on consciousness. Searle's argument in favour of CP is based on the assumption that, while every intentional state is endowed with an aspectual shape, only conscious intentional states are intrinsically so endowed. In turn, the contention that only conscious intentional states are intrinsically aspectual and perspectival is based on what I call the Cartesian view of subjectivity (CS), according to which subjectivity implies consciousness. I argue that, though intuitive, CS is ultimately untenable. A plea is made for an alternative, 'Aristotelian' view of subjectivity (AS), on which the roots of subjectivity lie not in consciousness per se, but in the more basic capacity for autonomous conduct. Searle's failure to appreciate this point, I argue, accounts for the unresolved dualistic tension overshadowing his conception of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]